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
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THE CARDINAL OF LORRAINE
AND THE
COUNCIL OF TRENT

1525

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THE CARDINAL OF LORRAINE
AND THE
COUNCIL OF TRENT

A STUDY IN THE
COUNTER-REFORMATION

b. 1525

BY

H. OUTRAM EVENNETT

Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge



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TO
DOM LUCIUS GRAHAM

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PREFACE

“**E**INE dem gegenwärtigen Stand der Forschung entsprechende Biographie des Kardinals [von Lothringen], der eine sehr komplizierte Natur war, bleibt dringend zu wünschen.” So wrote Ludwig von Pastor in the seventh volume of his *Geschichte der Päpste*, which first appeared in 1919.¹ Five years previously M. Lucien Romier, in the second volume of his *Origines Politiques des guerres de religion*, had spoken of the valuable purpose that would be served by “une étude, qui reste à faire, sur les dernières sessions du concile [de Trente] en 1563 et sur le rôle qu’y joua le cardinal de Lorraine”.² Neither of these passages was known to me when I first began work on a fellowship dissertation intended to illuminate the part played by the Cardinal of Lorraine in the third and last assembly of the Council of Trent. The discovery that I was engaged upon a task recognized to be of the highest importance by continental scholars of the first rank naturally gave me much encouragement and was a powerful incentive to perseverance. The subject had a double aspect. In the first place, as Pastor had emphasized, the character of the Cardinal of Lorraine, hitherto painted for the most part in colours far too simple, called for re-interpretation in the light of fuller and more recent knowledge. In the second place a detailed investigation of the Cardinal’s part in the Council of Trent promised to be of the greatest value in adding to our knowledge and understanding of that assembly. This was the necessity stressed by M. Romier, who had himself already gone far towards unearthing the true character of the Cardinal of Lorraine from beneath the unmeasured abuse of his enemies and the equally uncritical eulogies of his admirers.

But since the present book is neither the full biography desired by Pastor nor the exclusive study of the sessions of Trent looked forward to by M. Romier, a more detailed explanation

¹ *Geschichte der Päpste*, vii, 396, note.

² *Origines Politiques des guerres de religion*, ii, 343-4.

of its scope, which at first sight may well give some appearance of caprice, would seem to be desirable. In the course of my work upon the sessions at Trent I was driven more and more to magnify the importance which it seemed necessary to attribute to the events of the two years previous to the Council's opening, if any attempt to understand the French attitude towards the Council while it was actually in session were to be successful. I have since formed the opinion, which I endeavour to uphold and to illustrate in the following pages, that the period between the election of Pius IV in December 1559 and the moment when the fathers at Trent turned their attention to serious considerations in April 1562, was one of the gravest crisis for Catholicism and for the future orientation of the movement known as the Counter-Reformation. The crisis found expression in the controversy whether the Council of Trent should be resumed or whether an attempt should be made to summon an entirely new General Council, one so constituted as to win the goodwill of Christians who had seceded from the obedience of Rome, and thus to hold out better hope of restoring the broken unity of Christendom. A demand for such a Council was made by the French continually from the spring of 1560, and unless we realize how strongly and persistently it was made, unless we can understand how violently the whole controversy over the nature of the General Council which Pius IV proposed to summon shook the Catholic world, almost to its very foundations, much of the meaning of the later history of the Tridentine Council will be in danger of escaping us. And intimately connected with this main problem arise others of scarcely less importance: the competency of National Councils and national settlements of religion, the legality of toleration for dissenting minorities, the possibilities of dogmatic *rapprochement* between Catholicism and various forms of Protestantism.

For on all these subjects opinion within the Catholic Church was still, at the opening of the pontificate of Pius IV, far less stabilized, far less uniform, than is generally supposed. This is very clearly apparent in contemporary movements of French opinion. The period between the death of Paul IV and the

resumption of the sessions at Trent forms in French history a bridge that connects the France of Henri II, externally so gay, so splendid and so adventurous, with the misery and abasement of the wars of religion. Shaken violently out of its earlier religious complacency by the rise of French Calvinism, the French Crown now fought hard against the resumption of the Tridentine Council which it had done so little to help, and so much to hinder, in its earlier sessions. Both in the movement towards toleration that culminated in the January Edict of 1562, and in the fruitless experiment of the Assembly and Colloquy of Poissy, the French government endeavoured to work out, on its own lines and clean contrary to those laid down by Rome—yet without disowning the Roman supremacy as the dominant Gallicanism of the day understood it—an independent and liberal settlement of France's own peculiar difficulties. There lay behind this attempt a great deal of purely political expediency, but also no little measure of the spirit of Erasmus and of the older *Réformisme* of François I.

The interaction between the course of these events in France and the fortunes of Pius IV's conciliar projects is one that seems to me not to have received all the attention that its importance demands. This must serve as a justification for the detailed nature of much of my narrative. In the earlier chapters, however, such detailed treatment has been neither possible nor desirable, though I am very keenly conscious of the kind of criticism to which a heavily compressed and generalized form of historical writing lays itself open. Yet it was necessary to supply the historical background to the later chapters in sharply drawn outline and simple colouring. Between the second and third meetings of the Council of Trent, the French and German attitudes towards a Council had been reversed. Before 1555 it had been Germany who had cried out for a General Council; France who had been uninterested and obstructive. But after the settlement of Augsburg, by means of which Germany had come to a *modus vivendi* between her Catholic and Lutheran states, the idea of a General Council ceased, for the most part, to be regarded by Germans through the old rose-coloured

spectacles as an ideal panacea. It came rather to be eyed with reserve and mistrust, as a possible menace to a settlement which, though unsatisfactory, it was for the moment essential to maintain. And while Germany was settling down exhaustedly into her uneasy repose, France was hit hard and suddenly by the full force of the second wave of the Reformation. Then there went up from Frenchmen in their turn the cry for a General Council, which in Germany—at least in so far as the problem of restoring religious unity was concerned—history had both discredited and outdated. Judged by the German time-scale, French conciliar aspirations were a generation behind. And so we shall find France endeavouring to go behind the last generation.

During much of the period covered by this book the Cardinal of Lorraine held supreme political power in France. During all of it he controlled ecclesiastical affairs without a serious rival. The part he played in the working out of the various problems which have been referred to above—the struggle for a new as opposed to a resumed Council, the endeavour to secure a national, almost autonomous, religious settlement in France, the search for formulae of reunion with the Calvinists, the problem of toleration for the Huguenot cultus—was as large and as important as that which he later took in the sessions at Trent. And in all of these endeavours—except in the movement towards toleration—it will be my aim to bring out his initiative. The period was one to which he must afterwards have looked back as marked by a curious restlessness and excitement. Great changes were felt to be in the air. Visions of a reunited, reconditioned Christendom, confused and fantastic perhaps, but conjured up in all piety and seriousness, floated before men's eyes. The Cardinal's strange inconsistencies of character, his ingenuousness and his complexity, his ability and his ineffectiveness, are all best seen in these few eventful years which form the most interesting period of his life, and to which his part in the actual sessions at Trent comes as a conclusion full of surprises. A second volume, of which parts are already in an advanced state, will, I hope, carry his story through to the close of the Council

of Trent and the struggle over its reception in France. Thus, though the present volume deals with a period and with issues whose interest and importance are not merely independent but of the very highest possible order, it is also partly in the nature of an introduction.

Among those to whom I should like to record my indebtedness, the first place must be given to M. l'Abbé G. Constant of the Institut Catholique in Paris. M. Constant has lavished his kindness upon me to an extent which renders the conventional expressions of gratitude more than usually inadequate. His example as a scholar and his sympathy as a friend, both of which I value most highly, have been a continual inspiration to me. In Cambridge the Reverend Professor Whitney, Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History, and Mr R. Vere Laurence of Trinity College have both assisted me, with very great friendliness, in a variety of ways. The Abbot of Downside, Dom John Chapman, has been good enough to read through and criticize one or two of the more technically theological passages, and another eminent Catholic scholar, Father Benedict Zimmerman, of the English Discalced Carmelites, in addition to other kindnesses obtained for me a transcript of one of the more illegible portions of Appendix 10. Mr C. W. Crawley of Trinity Hall made for me the transcript for Appendix 5, and Mr Gabriel White has dedicated much of his meagre leisure to helping me with the proofs. To these, as well as to the many other friends whom I have bothered with minor points, and to the various librarians and archivists who have assisted me—especially Dr Hefele and Dr Müller in Stuttgart, and Dr Cartagnani in Modena—I desire to offer my warmest thanks.

H. O. EVENNETT

TRINITY COLLEGE
CAMBRIDGE

Corpus Christi, 1930

CHAPTER I

The Cardinal of Lorraine

*Ecce sacerdos magnus,
qui in diebus suis placuit Deo.*

—From the Lesson and Gradual of the Mass *Statuit*.

OLDER, it is said, than Rome herself, the city of Bologna, twin-spired with her leaning towers, nestles under the first foothills of the Apennines and looks northward across that fertile vine-covered plain of Lombardy which in the past was the perennial allurements of the ultramontane nations and is still, whether sunbaked or frostbound, the perpetual despair of the traveller along its never-ending roads. On October 16th in the year 1547, a group of bishops vested in rochet and mantelletta was assembled at the northern gate of the city, where the road from Ferrara enters. At their head were the Cardinals Giovanni del Monte and Marcello Cervini, legates of the Holy Father Pope Paul III and presidents of the Œcumenical Council of Trent, lately transferred to Bologna; and their purpose was to extend an honourable welcome, as Rome had commanded, to the young, brilliant and handsome Charles de Guise, Archbishop of Reims and First Peer of France, newly admitted into the ranks of the Sacred College and on his way to Rome to receive the hat from the hands of the Sovereign Pontiff.

As he rode into the city between the two legates, both future Popes, the great stature and remarkable personal beauty of the new Cardinal were fittingly framed. He had the tallness of his house, overtopping most men by a full head; he was well-proportioned and carried his height with dignity and assurance. Contemporaries, if they agree in little else about the enigmatic Charles de Guise, are at least united in acclaiming the young Adonis whose charm and personality captivated all who came within range of his spell. His face was long, his expression benign, and his penetrating blue eyes, set beneath a lofty forehead, indicated a quick apprehension and an acute perception. In colour he was on the dark side; his cheeks were prominent,

and his smile revealed a row of smallish and well-set teeth. Slightly domineering, a little proud, and with more than the ordinary self-confidence of successful and flattered youth, he yet had sensitiveness stamped all over his features, which responded quickly to the play of emotion and except when he was in private were lit up with vitality and alertness. Twenty-two years old, with every circumstance of birth, intelligence and ability in his favour, this irresistible young man—*séduisant* is an epithet applied more than once to him—was on the threshold of his singularly varied career, and still, in the realms of high diplomacy, both lay and ecclesiastical, something of an unknown quantity. But that a brilliant future lay before him was not doubted.

Thus did Charles de Guise, at once the ablest and most complex of his talented family, make a first transient contact with the Council of Trent. He was destined to play an important part in its closing stages, to fight fiercely against its resumption, deeply to influence the course of its last sessions, and in the end, leading the closing chorus of cheers and anathemas, to emerge from it in a blaze of glory and renown—bought however at the hard price of a spectacular change of policy, the motives of which did not appear altogether beyond question. The future was hid from the fathers at Bologna, or the fervour of their welcome might have been slightly modified. Charles lodged one night with the French ambassadors, and the next day took the road for Rome.¹

I

The foundations of the Guise fortunes in France were firmly laid in the early decades of the sixteenth century by two able brothers, Claude, first Duke of Guise, and Jean, first Cardinal of Lorraine, the younger sons of Duke René II of Lorraine, by whose united labours and talent for friendship the way was

¹ The description of Charles' personal appearance given by his official panegyrist Nicolas Boucher, *Caroli Lotharingii... Litterae et arma* (1577), French version 1579, is borne out by contemporary portraits and engravings. See especially a fine drawing in the Musée Condé at Chantilly, reproduced in M. Garnier's *Agrippa d'Aubigné* (1928), I, facing p. 168. For his passage through Bologna see Merkle, *Concilium Tridentinum*, I, 710.

opened up for the triumphs of the six brothers of the second generation. Charles was the second son of Claude de Guise and his wife Antoinette de Bourbon, and was born in the Château of Joinville on February 17th, 1525. The early formative years of his life were passed under the strict control of his pious mother, who in an age of relaxed manners gave to the Christian world a shining example of feminine modesty and wifely devotion, instilling into her children a simple piety and a sense of religious and moral seriousness that remained with them throughout their lives. Charles seems from the first to have been dedicated both by personal inclination and parental desire to the service of the Church. At the Collège de Navarre his intelligence soon became apparent, and his precocity was supplemented by the virtue of industry. His mind, with qualities of brilliance rather than of depth, was quick, acute, penetrating, and retentive; his memory was out of the ordinary.¹ He was a naturally fluent speaker, and his marked oratorical gifts were trained and developed by the celebrated François de Beaucaire de Peguillon, whom he afterwards rewarded with the title of the bishopric of Metz. While still quite young he had mastered Spanish and Italian and possessed a considerable knowledge of Greek and Latin. For the study of theology he came under the influence of two very differently minded men, both of whom left a permanent mark upon him. The first, François Le Picard, seems to have been that not uncommon type, the lovable and genuinely learned intransigent; fiercely conservative and the violent enemy of dissent, he was execrated by the Huguenots but beloved of the people of Paris: Charles studied under him at the Collège de Navarre and remained much attached to him until his death in 1557.² As a counter-weight to Le Picard was Claude d'Espence, a theologian of noble birth, solid learning and independent mentality, who detested persecution and desired to overthrow heresy by argument and persuasion rather than by force; and who because of this attitude, rather than any seriously grounded

¹ See an amusing anecdote related by Brantôme, *Œuvres*, ed. Lalanne, ix, 297.

² See Hilarion de Coste, *Le Parfait Ecclésiastique ou l'histoire de la vie et de la mort de François Le Picard* (1658), especially pp. 193-4 and 216.

imputation of heterodoxy, was looked askance upon in many quarters. But despite a public humiliation in 1534 at the hands of the Sorbonne, Claude d'Espence found favour both with François I and with the Cardinal Jean de Lorraine, to whose household he was attached as tutor to the young Charles, and he must have done much to develop the naturally liberal propensities of Charles de Guise's mind¹; indeed a historian of the University of Paris tells us that the future Cardinal in his early sermons was fond of differentiating between school opinions and articles of faith.² D'Espence passed into Charles' service on the death of the Cardinal Jean, and remained his faithful friend and adviser until his own death in 1572.

King François I was fond of all the Guises, but he was especially captivated by the beauty and ability of Charles. Struck one day, it is said, by an eloquent public defence of certain moral and theological propositions made by the young student, the King marked him out for the archbishopric of Reims, though he was only fifteen, and summoned him to Court.³ Here Charles' personality rapidly expanded. He revealed himself as a young man who combined the highest social gifts with his intellectual precocity, dazzling everyone with whom he came into contact by his winning manners. An Italian diplomatist compared him to a *tentatore*,⁴ but there is no need to interpret the word too darkly. Among the many temptations of an easy Renaissance Court, Charles' austere moral upbringing prevailed.⁵ He even denied himself many innocent pastimes normal to persons of his social status, whether lay or ecclesiastic. He neither hunted nor gambled; kept neither horses, dogs nor birds; was sober and abstemious at table, and fasted twice a week, on Fridays and Saturdays. In the eyes of that tireless dancer and lover,

¹ On d'Espence see my "Claude d'Espence et son Discours du Colloque de Poissy", in the *Revue Historique* for Mai-Juin 1930.

² Crevier, *Histoire de l'Université de Paris* (1761), v, 406-7; vi, 105.

³ Bouillé, *Ducs de Guise*, I, 151; Boucher, p. 8. But contrast below, p. 14.

⁴ Cited by Lucien Romier, *Origines Politiques des Guerres de Religion*, I, 46 (notes).

⁵ That he was later known to be the father of one or two natural children hardly militates against the general regularity of his life.

Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, he appeared as *un santorello*, without sin or vice.¹ But he was no puritan, and was amiable to all who sought the entertainment of his company. He managed to devote much time to study and intellectual pursuits. He liked to surround himself with men of culture and learning, to listen to and take part in their conversation, to discuss questions of law or philosophy, art or theology. Knowledge of all kinds he cultivated for its own sake; but his ingenious mind was curiously restless, and from the first he lacked something in solidity and perseverance. Placed in charge of the household of the King's only surviving son, the Dauphin Henri, he soon won the lasting affection of that prince, who from that time, says Charles' panegyrist, Nicolas Boucher, loved him as Jonathan loved David, loading him with honours and marks of favour, and more than once soliciting the Red Hat for him from Paul III.² On Henri's accession to the throne in the spring of 1547, Paul could no longer refuse the King what he had long withheld from the Prince. The young Archbishop was raised to the Cardinalate on July 28th, 1547,³ with the title of Santa Cecilia, and received his Hat from the Pope's hand in solemn consistory on October 24th.⁴ But his desire to be known as the Cardinal of Anjou was objected to by the French ambassador in Rome,⁵ and he was at first known as the Cardinal of Guise.

The change of reign not only lifted Charles de Guise to the top of the ecclesiastical tree; it elevated him also to a supremacy in the King's secular councils. Henri's partiality for the two elder sons of the Duke of Guise—Charles and his elder brother François—had caused it to be generally understood that the death of the old King would be the signal for a Guise ascendancy. These prophecies were speedily fulfilled. Cardinal Tournon,

¹ Cited by Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 47. Cf. Boucher's panegyric, pp. 7-9, where some allowances for exaggeration may well be made.

² Boucher, p. 10; Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 50 (note 1).

³ Friedensburg, *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland*, x, 547. Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 54, relying on Ferrarese correspondence, says the 27th; Bouillé, I, 171, following Marlot, *Histoire de Reims*, IV, 307, says August 1st.

⁴ Friedensburg, x, 168.

⁵ Marlot, *Hist. Reims*, IV, 307 and *Metropolis Remensis Historia*, II, 786.

who had guided the policy of François' last years, was disgraced, and replaced even in his Chancellorship of the Order of St Michel by the Cardinal of Guise, who on July 26th performed the ceremony of the King's Sacre in Reims Cathedral and delivered an eloquent harangue on the defence of the true faith against heresy.¹ But from the very first the Guises found that the conservation of their influence over the easily swayed Henri II would involve them in perpetual conflict with a rival family. Much as he loved François and Charles de Guise, the King preserved an almost awe-struck respect for the Constable, Anne de Montmorency, with whom were associated, like satellites, his three Châtillon nephews. Henri could never bring himself permanently to exclude either the Guises or the Constable from his counsels, though they usually stood for diametrically opposed policies; for each was able to preserve a hold over him by means denied to the other. The King was for ever torn between his reverence for Montmorency and the extraordinary persuasiveness of the Cardinal of Guise. It was on foreign policy that the conflict was most severe. The Italian ambitions of the Guises² allied with the numerous Florentine and Neapolitan exiles who had collected round the Italian Queen, Catherine de Médicis, pressed Henri, and usually with success, towards active interference in Italian politics. Such a policy was, in a way, the line of least resistance for a naturally undecided monarch; it was a natural inheritance from the previous reign and a perhaps unavoidable consequence of active rivalry with Charles V. But that Henri persisted in it was certainly due to the persuasions of the Guises, for Montmorency, supported at home by his Châtillon nephews, by Morvilliers, Bishop of

¹ Latin text in the *Petri Paschalii Historiarum Fragmenta* (Bibliothèque Nationale, Coll. Dupuy 624, ff. 69-74). The speech does not deserve the opprobrium heaped upon it by the late M. Weiss in *La Chambre Ardente*, pp. lx-lxii. M. Weiss gave the impression—doubtless quite false—of supposing that the ceremonies of the Sacre symbolizing the King's duty to suppress heresy had been inserted on this occasion as a special theatrical menace against the followers of Calvin.

² It is not my intention to offer any defence of the Guises' Italian ambitions, the authenticity of which, questioned by Dom René Ancel and more recently by M. Courteault, has been again upheld by M. Lucien Romier in his *Origines Politiques*.

Orleans, and M. de Lansac, and in Italy by the Cardinal Jean du Bellay, worked unceasingly against it. Despite momentary periods of ascendancy, however, they were unable to exert any permanent check upon their more brilliantly favoured rivals. Montmorency could never cope adequately with the extraordinary skill and activity of Charles de Guise, whose talent for diplomacy now rapidly expanded. Thanks to his perfectly organized system of agents Charles was able to meet, forestall or trap the heavy-handed Constable at almost every point. But though Montmorency could be rendered impotent, it was impossible to drive him from power. Throughout the twelve years of Henri II's reign there was the curious spectacle of a ministry perpetually divided against itself. However frequent the crises, there could be no real solution, for Henri had not the strength of mind permanently to dismiss either of the parties, both of whom, in their different ways, were essential to his happiness. It was against this ever-changing but fundamentally fixed political background that the first part of Charles de Guise's public life was spent. And in the struggle it was usually the Guises who were on top. They took every conceivable precaution to preserve the King's affections, and for a long time even the *San-torello* himself did not scruple to lunch regularly with Diane de Poitiers, the King's famous mistress.¹

Charles' visit to Rome in the autumn of 1547 was his first glimpse of Italy. He went accompanied by his younger brother the Duke of Mayenne and a train of eighty retainers, with 30,000 écus in his pocket for "honourable expenditure". Travelling first by river from Turin to Piacenza, he took the road to Modena and Ferrara, after which he turned south, and passing through Bologna, where the Council of Trent was sitting, reached Rome by way of Florence. He had two purposes to fulfil in the Holy City, and having received the Red Hat he remained in Rome two-and-a-half months, lodged in the Vatican in the apartments of Alessandro Farnese. His second duty was to negotiate an alliance between the Pope and the French King as a reply to the seizure of Parma by the agents of Charles V after

¹ Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 82.

the assassination of Pier Luigi Farnese. The aged Paul III was delighted with the engaging young Frenchman. He treated him with almost exaggerated honour and fell in readily with his proposals. With his objects quickly achieved, Charles left Rome early in the New Year, and after paying his devotions to the Holy House at Loretto, returned to Ferrara by the ordinary east coast route of Ancona, Pesaro and Ravenna. At Ferrara he stayed several days with the Duke, whose daughter Anna d'Este was soon to be betrothed to François de Guise, and thus, through her mother Renée of Ferrara, to bring the Lorrainers into affinity with the Royal House of France. The Cardinal next made a détour to Venice, where he also proposed, but with less success, an alliance against the Emperor. He returned home through the Grisons, having seen a large part of Italy, and having thoroughly involved Henri II in the complicated web of Italian politics. The King greeted his return with demonstrations of affection and confidence, but Montmorency, whose peace plans he had ruined, lost his temper and spoke of him rudely as a "great calf".¹

Two years later the Cardinal was again in Italy. Paul III died in the autumn of 1549 and the intrigues preparatory to the conclave began to be spun in all the Catholic capitals. The Guises schemed to place one of their own family, Cardinal Jean de Lorraine, immensely rich and almost equally flexible, upon the papal throne. Great sums of money were spent in his interest, and his nephew Charles aided him energetically in the conclave, arousing the resentment of the other French cardinals, all much older men, by the overbearing manner which he adopted towards them. A convenient hole in the wall of Cardinal du Bellay's room made possible regular communication with Paris. But it soon became evident that Jean de Lorraine was throwing his money away. His nephew then directed his energies towards securing the election of another relative, Hippolyte d'Este, Cardinal of Ferrara and brother of the Duke of Ferrara. But Montmorency, represented in the conclave by his nephew Cardinal Châtillon, endeavoured to out-manœuvre the Guise-d'Este combination by imposing haste upon the election.

¹ "*Grant veau*": see Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 43-5; Bouillé, I, 177-81.

Finally Cardinal del Monte, a former president of the Council of Trent, was chosen Pope as Julius III. He had been sixth on the French list, so that the Guises did not regard his election as a French defeat, especially as their adhesion had in the end made it possible. Before leaving Rome the Cardinal Charles addressed a protest to Julius against the indecencies prevalent in the Roman baths; and on his return to France triumphantly vindicated his conduct during the conclave in face of the complaints of the Montmorency-Châtillon party.¹

II

During the Cardinal's absence at the conclave of Julius III, his father, Claude de Guise, died at Joinville at the age of fifty-three. With his own eyes he had seen his sons' fortunes secured, and he was laid peacefully to rest beneath a magnificent tomb sculptured by Domenico del Barbieri and Jean Le Roux. He was shortly followed to the grave by his brother, the wealthy Cardinal Jean, who succumbed on May 10th, 1551, after an Easter spent with the Olivetan monks of Milan. The passing of the older generation brought the younger Guises to the summit of their prosperity. François, the eldest, became Duke of Guise and head of his house with estates worth 53,000 francs a year. Charles, already rich, succeeded—despite the efforts of Montmorency—to his uncle's benefices *en bloc* together with the title of Cardinal of Lorraine. Even as a lay potentate he overtopped his brother. Duke of Reims and of Chevreuse, he was the First Peer of the Realm²; Bishop of Metz in succession to his uncle,³ he ruled over a small independent princi-

¹ Bouillé, I, 210-12; Marlet, *Correspondance d'Odet de Châtillon*, pp. 5-6; Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 79-80.

² Bouillé, I, 170. The dukedom of Chevreuse he bought, together with the Château of Meudon, from the Duchesse d'Étampes in December 1552.

³ In 1547 he had asked Paul III for the co-adjutorship (Friedensburg, x, 607) which he consequently obtained quite soon. On his uncle's death he came into full possession and tried to levy a tax on the Chapter, which they refused. In 1551 he resigned the title to Cardinal Lenoncourt, reserving for himself all the revenues and temporalities with the right of regression. This right he exercised in 1555, when he resumed the title himself but soon gave it out again to his old tutor François de Beaucaire (see Calmet, *Histoire de la Lorraine*, VII, 41-2).

pality, was a Prince of the Empire and sent representatives to its diets.¹ Again by inheritance from his uncle, he was administrator of the temporalities of the bishopric of Verdun.² Possessed of the revenues of Metz and Verdun, as well as those of his own see of Reims, he was in addition Abbot-in-commendam of St Remi-de-Reims, Gorze, Cluny, St Paul-de-Verdun, St Martin-de-Laon, St Urbain, Montier-en-Der, Cormery, Fécamp and Marmoutier, of which the last two alone were between them worth 55,000 francs per annum. Later on he added to the list the famous abbey of St Denis, usually reserved for a member of the royal family. His income has been estimated at about 300,000 livres per annum.³ But it was not only wealth that his benefices brought him. In October 1550 Julius III by a special indult, confirmed by royal letters patent, bestowed upon him free from all kind of papal or legatine interference the rights of collation, provision and general disposition of all the benefices, offices and dignities dependent upon his archbishopric of Reims and upon his abbeys.⁴ This placed at his disposal a large amount of clerical patronage, which was further augmented in 1554 when similar privileges were bestowed upon his younger brother Louis—who was in turn Bishop of Troyes and Metz and Archbishop of Albi, Sens and Bordeaux, and was created Cardinal of Guise in 1553—in respect of his abbeys of St Germain-d'Auxerre and Notre-Dame-de-Trois-Fontaines.⁵

The Cardinal's hold over the French Church was thus firm and extensive. With great independent patronage of his own he was also able to direct the distribution of that immense amount which the Concordat had placed in the hands of the King.⁶ Soon Guise creatures were everywhere in the hierarchy and in

¹ See Zeller, *La réunion de Metz à la France* (1926), II, 207 *et seq.* The principality, whose capital was Vic, did not include the town of Metz.

² These revenues had been made over to him by his uncle in 1548, the title remaining with Nicholas Psaume (Calmet, VII, 110). Charles de Guise's correspondence with Psaume over the affairs of Verdun was published by Frizon in the *Petite Bibliothèque Verdunoise* (5 vols, 1885-9), II-v, where it is incorporated into the *Histoire* of Matthieu Husson.

³ Bouillé, I, 223, 246.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 253.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 253.

⁶ Romier *Origines Politiques*, p. 55, note 5.

the diplomatic and administrative services. Bishoprics rewarded the service of faithful protonotaries such as the clever Jean de Montluc and the literary Lancelot de Carles, later Bishops of Valence and Riez; of successful diplomatists such as Marillac, afterwards Archbishop of Vienne, and Sebastian de l'Aubespine, Bishop of Limoges; of personal friends such as Robert, Cardinal Lenoncourt, in turn Bishop of Auxerre and Metz, Archbishop of Embrun and Arles; and Nicolas de Pellevé, Bishop of Amiens, Louis of Guise's successor at Sens, Charles' at Reims itself. Finally, like Wolsey, Charles aspired to set the seal on his position by becoming perpetual legate in France. From Julius III he received the promise¹ and from Paul IV the title. But the title was only that of *Legatus Natus* which, as every Archbishop of Canterbury up to Cranmer knew, carried more honour than power.

Yet power comparable almost to Wolsey's own was concentrated in the hands of the Guises during the 'fifties. And they were united by the strongest bonds of fraternal affection. Seldom has so eminent a family been so completely free from internal dissension. The six brothers knew each others' minds intimately and could trust each with absolute confidence—François the duke, Charles and Louis the cardinals, Claude, Marquis of Mayenne and later Duc d'Aumale, René, Marquis of Elbœuf, and a second François, Grand Prior of France and General of the galleys. Of the sisters two were religious, Renée, for sixty years Abbess of St Pierre-des-Dames at Reims, and Antoinette, Abbess of Farmoustier, while the third, Mary, married as her second husband James V of Scotland and was mother to Mary Queen of Scots.² The Guise tentacles penetrated to all corners of Europe. In addition to the ordinary state diplomatic servants the Cardinal of Lorraine had his own system of private agents, which he developed to a very high pitch of efficiency,³ the skilled politician and administrator

¹ *Ibid.* p. 55, note 6.

² Mary was the eldest of the family, having been born in 1515. René, born in 1536, was the youngest. A fourth daughter, Louisa, died in 1542 at the age of twenty-two, having already been twice married. Two sons, Pierre and Philippe, died in infancy.

³ Brantôme, IV, 275-6.

existing, in his person, side by side with the grave scholar, the seductive courtier and the austere man of God. It is not easy to conceive the combination in one man of talents so diverse that they merged the man of thought and prayer with the man of action. The suspicion is only natural that their accumulation in Charles de Guise can be no more than a reflection of the exaggerated flattery of contemporaries. But versatility and ingenuity were the keynotes of Charles' character, and a faculty of rapid adaptation to circumstances and surroundings allowed full play to his varied powers. At twenty-five, or even later, many of a young man's potential abilities may still be lying dormant, awaiting the call of circumstance or some sudden, inexplicable mental revolution. Certainly with the responsibility for affairs of state came a remarkable aptitude for their conduct; and since the attention of François de Guise was mainly confined to military matters, practically the whole combined bulk of home and foreign affairs fell more or less continuously upon the shoulders of the Cardinal. Only his great energy and versatility enabled him to bear the burden and yet find time to be a conscientious churchman and an active patron of art and letters. He collected art treasures with an unrestrained eagerness that instilled dismay into the hearts of his rivals. On his return to France from the conclave of Julius III he came laden with twenty-five cases of marble and bronze statues and, after a somewhat highhanded transaction, with three valuable Greek books which had been loaned—and only loaned—from Florence to the library of the deceased Cardinal Ridolphi, which library he had failed to buy for 4,500 écus.¹ Treasures of all kind filled his palaces—the famous Château of Meudon acquired from the Duchesse d'Étampes in 1552, the *petite merveille* of Dampierre which he himself had constructed, the superb house of Marchais bought from the Sieur Bossu de Longueval in 1557,² the Hôtel de Cluny in Paris. The best artists of the time were pressed into his service. Primaticcio designed, and Domenico del Barbieri, Dominique Florentin, Niccolò del Abbate, Ponzio

¹ Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 47-8.

² Bouillé, I, 170.

Trebati and the sculptor Jean Le Roux executed the famous grotto of Meudon, which long remained a marvel to sight-seers, on whom hidden fountains would playfully turn unsuspected sprays of cold water. Extensive gardens were laid out at Meudon under the Cardinal's direction, and in his later life the scenes of his "triumphs" at the Council of Trent were painted on the walls and ceiling of the château, unhappily disappearing, however, in the course of the following century.¹

As a patron of art and letters the Cardinal of Lorraine assumed and embellished the mantle of his uncle the Cardinal Jean, from whom he seems to have inherited, together with wealth, benefices and debts—which last, on questionable grounds, he refused to pay—most of his literary, artistic and musical propensities as well. In these departments nephew and uncle had much in common. It was due to his uncle that Charles developed a college attachment with the famous Ramus, which grew into a lifelong connection; while Jean Dorat the hellenist, Louis des Mazures the poet, who later became a Calvinist, and the first members of the Pléiade were among those who, upon the decease of the elder, transferred their allegiance to the younger and more brilliant prelate who was stimulating Henri II to the patronage of literature that had come naturally to François I. The full blooming of French literature after the reaction of the Pléiade school against the earlier poets produced a galaxy of famous men who were proud to solicit the Cardinal's patronage and to celebrate him in verse, or as in the case of Jacques Arcadelt, a Flemish musician whom he brought back from Italy in 1555 and whose attention he first turned to church composition,² in the dedication of Masses. The extent of his patronage soon eclipsed that of his uncle. Ronsard and Joachim du Bellay, who constantly speak of him as Mercury to Henri II's Jupiter, Ramus, Rabelais, Turnèbe the classicist, Danès, Michel de l'Hôpital, J.-A. de Baïf, Mellin de St-Gelais the adversary of the Pléiade, Jodelle, Pasquier—these do not exhaust

¹ On Meudon and its famous grotto under the Cardinal of Lorraine see Biver, *Histoire du Château de Meudon*, cap. iii. But the résumé of Lorraine's career in cap. ii is besprinkled with inaccuracies.

² Art. "Arcadelt" in Grove's *Dictionary*.

the stars of the literary firmament whom in his leisure moments the Cardinal of Lorraine delighted to entertain in his palaces and gardens, and who in return heaped upon him odes, dedications and poetic eulogies of all kinds.¹ It was Lorraine's influence which in 1551 restored Ramus to favour and literary liberty when his attacks on the Aristotelian logic had caused his lectures to be suppressed.²

But for all the splendour of his public patronage and entertainment, the zest with which he entered into the quaint passion of the time for mythological representations, masques and amateur histrionic performances of every curious and fantastic kind, the Cardinal of Lorraine seems never to have entirely lost his first youthful satisfaction with the simple and the austere. Chaste, sober, self-restrained, he was able to preserve both his health, which was never too strong, and his looks, by the simplicity of his personal habits. He took frequent exercise in his gardens and arcades, not merely on medical advice, but because he liked it. And he walked with such great strides, for he was very tall, that those who walked with him usually took their leave—in Nicolas Boucher's simple and telling words—"non sine sudore".³

III

Three is undoubtedly a young age at which to be a bishop. But the Cardinal Jean de Lorraine had been appointed co-adjutor of Metz before his fourth birthday, so that it may indicate some little recovery in the standards of ecclesiastical propriety that on the death of the Cardinal-Archbishop of Reims, Charles de Lenoncourt, in 1532, François I and Clement VII between them should have considered it undesirable for Charles de Guise to succeed immediately to the archiepiscopal throne at the more advanced age of eight. But the bestowal of the prize that Claude de Guise coveted for his second son was only delayed. For six years the seat was kept warm for Charles

¹ Collignon, "Le mécénat du cardinal Jean de Lorraine" (1910), *Annales de l'Est*, année 24, fasc. 2—especially pp. 32-3, 72 and 152-3.

² Pasquier, *Recherches de la France*, ix, 18.

³ Boucher, p. 7.

by his uncle Jean, being resigned to him, according to plan, when he entered upon his fourteenth year. Charles took possession of his see by proctor on April 26th, 1538, and the *lettres de réception* of his oath of fidelity in regard to its temporalities are dated September 15th of that same year.¹

At what age Charles received the priesthood seems unrecorded. But he was not consecrated bishop until he was twenty, the ceremony being performed by Cardinal de Givry in the private chapel at Joinville in February 1545. He received his pallium in the following May and on December 5th, 1546, made his solemn entry into Reims as Archbishop and Duke—the titles went together—with extreme pomp and a profuse distribution of indulgences. It would seem that up to this time the actual administration of the archdiocese had remained in the hands of Cardinal Jean, who, according to the historians of the see, had not over-exerted himself in its interests—after all it was only one of many and he was merely a stop-gap. The strictly episcopal functions had been performed by a bishop *in partibus* of the name of Jean de Pleurs, while two relatives of the late Cardinal Lenoncourt—another Robert de Lenoncourt, Abbot-in-commendam of St Remi-de-Reims, and Philip de Lenoncourt, canon and treasurer of the cathedral—acted as vicars-general, occasionally receiving exhortations from the absent Cardinal Jean to take precautions against the spread of heresy. In 1542 Robert de Lenoncourt became Bishop of Chalon-sur-Saône and second Cardinal Lenoncourt, and his place as vicar-general was taken by Thomas Cauchon. About the same time we hear of a new assistant prelate, Jacques Belleau, Abbot of Chéminon and titular Bishop of Tiberias *in partibus*.

From the time of his consecration and solemn entry Charles took over personally the supervision of the diocese of which he was now in the fullest sense Archbishop. No excuse will be

¹ *Actes de François I*, vi, No. 21,452 (p. 494). No. 21,434 of the same collection (p. 491), is: "Lettres de souffrance et délai accordées à Charles de Lorraine... de prêter serment de fidélité... jusqu'à ce qu'il ait atteint sa majorité," dated July 12th, 1538. In the intervening August he would have turned thirteen and a half. See also *Gallia Christiana*, ix, colls. 148-9.

offered here for reviewing his episcopal activities in some detail since it is as a churchman that he is considered in this book.¹ In his reforms we shall find much evidence of zeal and sincerity, but the lines followed are conservative and conventional, and there is as yet no trace of the radicalism and love of novelty that he was later to display in wider ecclesiastical fields. He loved his church—so Nicolas Boucher tells us—with the love and fidelity of husband to wife. He gathered around him grave and capable advisers, laying particular store, it is said, on the counsel of the severe Le Picard.² The post of vicar-general, together with that of grand archdeacon, continued to be filled by Thomas Cauchon till his death in 1568. Assistant bishops were also a permanent necessity, and during the 'fifties we hear of yet another—Pierre Meusnier, Bishop of Philadelphia³—while in 1559, when the Cardinal became supreme under François II, he entrusted the general care of his diocese to Louis Guillard, Bishop of Chalon-sur-Saône, an old man whose sight was failing him.

On his first visit to Rome, in the winter of 1547–8, the Archbishop arranged with Paul III for the creation at Reims of a special prebend for a canon-penitentiary to be charged with the duty of absolving sinners in cases reserved to the bishop. Hitherto this had been done haphazardly by different persons delegated *ad hoc*, usually the abbot of the canons-regular of the church of St Denis. But the Cardinal, as he now became, wished to systematize, and the new prebend was confirmed by the Chapter on April 2nd, 1548. On his return from Rome he held a diocesan synod at which various regulations were made concerning preaching; canons and vicars were laid under obligation

¹ Most of the following and preceding details are taken from Dom Marlot's seventeenth-century *Histoire de la Ville de Reims* (edition of 1846), iv, 300–441. With a few exceptions all the chapters therein on the Cardinal Charles of Lorraine are repeated in the same author's *Latin Met. Rem. Hist.* (1679), II, 782–822. Cf. also Boucher, pp. 15–16.

² Hilarion de Coste, pp. 193, 216.

³ Marlot mentions Pierre Meusnier as functioning in 1558: *Ste Marthe* (*Gallia Christiana*, ix, coll. 149) calls him Philippe Meunier and states that he functioned in 1552–3. Both give him the titular see of Philadelphia which according to Migne had been held since 1540 by the German Leonard Haller.

to reside; and rules were promulgated concerning the examination of candidates for minor orders, the recipients of which Charles was anxious should be animated by the right motives. Though he wished all the liberties and privileges of the clergy to be preserved, he also wished to ensure that those who entered the clerical state did so for spiritual reasons and not merely to put themselves under the protection of ecclesiastical law and then neglect their ecclesiastical duties. At the same time it was decreed that for ordination to the priesthood and collation to benefices an examination of personal morals should follow that of doctrine. This was with the specific intention of rooting out the inebriate and the unchaste.¹

Having completed his synod the Cardinal made a tour of visitation round his diocese as a result of which he issued further regulations. These enable us to form some idea of the state of ecclesiastical life in what was admittedly one of the more exemplary of French dioceses. Mendicant friars were forbidden to hear confessions or give Holy Communion without the consent of the parish priest and without furnishing him with statistics. *Custodes* of churches were to render annual accounts; fonts were to be kept covered for fear of profanation; the *oleum infirmorum* was to be everywhere reserved in a separate vessel. Pluralists who resided in one benefice were to pay regular visits to the other. No priest from another diocese was to serve a church if natives were available. Duplication was regulated.² On Sundays and festivals the laity were to be exhorted not to frequent taverns at the hour of Divine Service, not to engage in any kind of business, nor to allow carts to be taken through the streets: even the Jews were to be asked to conform to these last regulations. On days of weddings there was to be no dancing during the hour of vespers. But it was against the evil of non-residence that the fight was severest.

¹ Other regulations of a more domestic nature declared that the clergy were to refuse baptism to children born abortively unless there were definite signs of life, and that women with children at the breast should be warned against taking them to bed for fear of the infants being unintentionally suffocated.

² "Fiat statutum de sacerdotibus bis eadem die celebrantibus."

After his visitation in 1548, the Cardinal drew up a scheme for pronouncing upon the legitimacy of excuses offered and for examining the suitability of curates. This seems to have failed, for at a second synod in 1549 all dispensations for absenteeism were withdrawn, except those *de jure*, and regulations of an even more stringent nature were produced. On leaving his diocese the Cardinal ordered his vicar-general to call a kind of supervisory council, whose members he himself had nominated, every week during his absence.¹

During the periods of his residence at Reims the Cardinal's life was in every way exemplary. He said Mass frequently and with great devotion. On Christmas Day he would not only celebrate three times, the last pontifically, but attend all the offices and preach for an hour and a half as well. He performed ordinations in person and insisted on meticulous accuracy in ceremonial. People flocked to receive Holy Communion from his hands, and, if we are to believe Boucher, on one day he communicated the almost legendary and quite incredible number of 12,000 persons. He introduced many new devotions. He instituted a eucharistic procession at 4 a.m. on Easter Sunday in imitation of a Roman custom,² and obtained special indulgences for participants. He frequently walked himself in processions, bare-footed and bare-headed, "*squaloris et pulveris plenus*", says Boucher; and, though people feared for his health, they were nevertheless moved to follow his example. But it was after such a procession that he eventually caught the chill that led to his death.³

His diocesan reforms were of but local import: his fame as a preacher was European. Endowed with an extraordinary natural facility of speech, he had received the best oratorical training. In a period when few bishops and still fewer cardinals preached, when pulpit eloquence was everywhere left mainly to the hired services of friars and monks, the Cardinal of Lorraine preached continually—to select fashionable Paris assemblies,

¹ Canons of 1549 in Gousset, *Actes ecclésiastiques de la province de Reims*, III, 346 *et seq.*, taken from Marlot, *Met. Hist. Rem.* pp. 786–90.

² This is still a custom of the Discalced Carmelites.

³ Marlot, *Hist. Reims*, IV, 331–2; Boucher, pp. 16–17.

to his canons, to the good people of Reims, to the most remote rustic congregation of his archdiocese. In 1557 he transferred the Lenten course in Reims from a smaller church to the cathedral, and more than once helped to give it himself. The universal testimony of both friend and foe leaves little doubt that he must have been an exceedingly fine speaker of really first-class merit. Boucher has left a vivid pen picture of the effect produced by his words¹:

Deum immortalem, quanta linguae volubilitate, verborum delectu, copia et varietate, quasi rapidus torrens, ferebatur eius oratio! quanti verborum et sententiarum lepores! quanta gestus et motus corporis gratia! quanta vultus moderatio et actionis dignitas! Tanta mehercle, ut eius audiendi diuturnitate aures defessae nunquam exirent: tanta, ut eius audiendi satietate expleti animi nunquam redirent.

And then a vignette of the vested preacher himself, charmingly sketched:

Vidisses illum toto pectore supra suggestum celsum et erectum, lineo supra purpuram amictu vestitum, promissa ex humeris pendente stola, vultu vero adeo serenum, fronte adeo tranquillum, voce adeo plenum et suavem, ipsa denique forma totoque corporis habitu adeo spectabilem: ut auditores non modo longioris concionis expectatione suspensos, rei novitate et miraculo attonitos teneret, sed in amore sui languentes dimitteret, quasi qui ex corporibus per aures aninos eorum extraxisset. Quodque mireris amplius, dum concionantis animus totus ad ea quae dicit, intenditur acerrime, notabat ex ipso suggestu, in tanta qua cinctus erat auditorum corona, oculis unumquemque: ut reversus, gestum, statum, motum, habitumque referret. Tanta valebat oculorum acie, tam erat solida mente, iudicioque constanti: ut pluribus intentus sensus, observatioque propria prope singulorum, cogitationem eius nihilo remitteret, obrueretve memoriam phantasmatum multitudo.

Despite this engaging picture with its feats of pulpit memory, concentration and observation, despite also the accounts which Boucher earlier provides of the immense press of auditors, of the fainting carried out over the heads of the crowd, of the hoarseness of the preacher in contest with the thick and heavy atmosphere engendered by the multitude—it is not easy to place the Cardinal as a purely spiritual force. Such orations of

¹ Boucher, pp. 12–13.

his as survive are mostly semi-political, or conventionalized for some special occasion, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate what can have been the practical value of his ordinary sermons. Preaching undoubtedly gratified his self-satisfaction. He made a necessity of his virtuosity. But he was fully alive on more serious grounds to the need for well-regulated encouragement to be given to an over-neglected pastoral function. His reforms of 1548-9 are full of wise regulations on this point. No *quaestor* of alms might henceforth preach in parish churches, but merely—if he had the necessary permissions—announce his arrival. In all cases preaching was subject to episcopal licence, and in the case of regulars testimonials would be required from their superiors. And preachers were guided as well as controlled. Encouraged to declaim against heresy, they were to seek out the localities where this was especially needed. No deviation would be tolerated from the faith of the Roman Church or the articles of the Sorbonne. For the better instruction of preachers, copies of these articles were published and circulated, and inquisitorial proceedings were threatened against any one failing to defer to them.¹

In the opposition to heresy the pulpit was supplemented by the press. For many years a stream of controversial pamphlets from the pens of Hubert Morus, Nicolas Chesneau, canon of Reims, and other local writers, issued from the press of Nicolas Bacquenois, which was installed in Reims under the Cardinal's auspices in 1550.² But controversial tracts, however skilfully composed, can only serve a limited purpose. The Cardinal of Lorraine had other and more deeply-laid plans for the safeguard of his people's faith. A prelate of wide intellectual interests, he recognized in the spread of knowledge an instrument for the Church's use from which she had nothing to fear, and he made education one of his first concerns. His attention was first directed to the primary schools. By decrees of 1527 and 1534 the Cathedral Chapter of Reims had amalgamated several educational institutions—the Cathedral Schools, the

¹ Gousset and Marlot as cited above, p. 18, note 1.

² Henry, *La Réforme et la Ligue en Champagne et à Reims* (1867), pp. 48-57.

Collège des Écrevés and the Collège des Bons-Enfants—under the ancient title of the last-named, and had transferred the whole to more spacious buildings. This was carried through by Paul Grand-Roux, the master of the Cathedral Schools, but the Cardinal assumed his administration in time to add a final touch by putting the buildings in better repair and enlarging the chapel dedicated to St Patricius.¹

The happy condition of primary education was not, however, paralleled in the case of higher studies. Reims had played no part in the French revival of learning though this had flourished as much in the provinces as in Paris. Her clerics were obliged to resort to Paris for their university degrees. It was the Cardinal's ambition to end this unsatisfactory state of affairs and to raise his archiepiscopal city to a status in the world of letters and learning befitting her traditional religious eminence. During his first visit to Rome he obtained from Paul III a Bull, dated January 6th, 1548, erecting a University at Reims. Closely modelled on the University of Paris and endowed with all the privileges of that august body, the new academy was composed of four faculties—arts, medicine, law, both civil and ecclesiastical, and theology. It was divided into two nations, French and Lorrainers, and was empowered to teach Latin and Greek, Hebrew and Chaldean, arts, philosophy, theology, canon law, civil law, physics and medicine. Extensive powers over the professors and statutes was given to the Archbishop of Reims, including a certain amount of civil jurisdiction. Poor scholars were to be assisted out of the University endowments and all the religious houses of the diocese, even the mendicant friars, were to send at their own expense at least one in ten of their subjects to study there. The University was endowed partly by the appropriation of sixteen benefices, yielding between them about 500 livres annually, and partly from the private purse of the Cardinal who set aside double that amount from the revenues produced by his estates at Chevreuse and Dampierre.² The University began its career in 1550. Its first rector was

¹ Marlot, *Hist. Reims*, IV, 320-2.

² "Dotation du Collège de Reims", in Marlot, *Hist. Reims*, IV, 686-92.

Jean Blavier, a D.D. of Paris, who was in addition dean of the theological faculty; while Nicolas Boucher, whom we have met as the Cardinal's panegyrist, was given a general superintendence over the professors and students.¹ There seems little doubt that the University efficiently fulfilled its immediate purpose.² In its time it produced a respectable list of quite eminent men. By means of its foundation, as also by the patronage which he extended to artists and men of letters, the Cardinal of Lorraine undoubtedly raised Reims to a higher level of culture. And by his generosity, his many personal charities and his schemes for improving and beautifying the city, he won for himself the affection and esteem of his people.³

It was into the hands of this many-sided and temperamental man, at once courtier, scholar, statesman, and priest, that the destinies of the French nation and the French church were to find themselves entrusted at a later critical period of the Counter-Reformation. Unless we can appreciate the Cardinal of Lorraine's manysidedness, the diversity of his talents, the catholicity of his interests, we shall miss an essential element of his character. His alert and elastic mind ranged widely, rather than profoundly, over many fields, occupying itself with all that is most interesting and most important in life—literature, art, philosophy, religion. Nothing could be less just, or less accurate, than to dismiss him briefly as a worldly, dissipated youth "everywhere at once, except in his diocese".⁴ Certainly his busy life knew lighter moments in plenty. He took his part unhesitatingly in all the amusements of the Court, and was at times the victim of Henri II's coarse but affectionate practical

¹ Marlot, *Hist. Reims*, iv, 801.

² All the documents relevant to the foundation of the University—the Bull, the letters patent, the registrations of the letters patent in various courts, the reservations made by the *Parlement de Paris*, the roll of officers, documents of the *bailliage de Vermandois* and in connection with the special privileges of the University—are in Varin, *Archives législatives de la ville de Reims, Statuts* (1847), II, 70–87: Latin text of the Bull in both works of Marlot. Cf. Marlot, *Hist. Reims*, iv, 313–20.

³ Boucher, pp. 19–20.

⁴ The judgment of Bourciez, *Les mœurs polies et la littérature de cour sous Henri II* (1888).

joking.¹ He was optimistic, forceful, mercurial; but if he is to be reproached with dissipation, it will be a dissipation of his talents. Unlike Dryden's Shaftesbury he was all his life everything at once—but nothing pre-eminently, except in so far as a man's religion by definition embraces and transcends all his moods and actions. The Cardinal of Lorraine was undoubtedly a religious man; and so, while admitting that his ecclesiastical rôle was but one among many, we must not in justice deny its claim to serious and sympathetic attention.²

¹ On one occasion the King amused himself by putting Lorraine and Cardinal Châtillon—who hated each other—into the same bed, similarly treating the Duke of Aumale (Claude de Guise) and Marshal de St André, himself then retiring with Montmorency. See Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 23, note 6.

² There is only one full-length biography of the Cardinal, that of Guillemin, *Le Cardinal de Lorraine et son influence politique* (1847). It is still useful, if only on account of its unique character, though it is naturally in many respects very out-of-date. Its main defect is its failure to appreciate the manysidedness of the Cardinal, but it forms a valuable corrective to the systematic *ex parte* blackening of the Cardinal's character by the Calvinist pamphleteers, a process the influence of which is still too largely evident in many modern histories.

CHAPTER II

France and the earlier Tridentine Assemblies

*Quadraginta nunc anni sunt quod nobis concilium
promissum et a nobis expectatum est.*

—The Cardinal of Lorraine: Memoir written in 1561.

I

DURING the course of the fourteenth century there was born and elaborated in France the novel doctrine, hitherto unknown to Christendom in any generalized or developed form, of the supremacy of a General Council over the Pope, with its corollary of the legitimacy of appeals from the Pope to a future Council.¹ Partly the reflection of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century constitutionalism, the doctrine was much aided by the circumstances of the Great Schism, and rose to the zenith of its popularity during the Conciliar Movement. It found many adherents, chiefly in France and Germany; and despite both failure in practice and repeated theoretical condemnation by the triumphantly resurrected Papacy, it lasted on, in the abstract, up to and even long beyond the Reformation period. In France the doctrine became enshrined in the rigid traditions of the University of Paris, and was stoutly protected by all the fierce Toryism of that body. Conciliar supremacy was taught in the first half of the sixteenth century by able and reputable theologians such as Jacques Almain and Jean Major, of whom the latter crossed swords on its behalf with Cajetan de Vio.

When the cry for a General Council arose in connection with the Lutheran revolt, it was not without plausible reason that the Popes feared to stir up into renewed activity a doctrine that was apparently no more than dormant. Such fears, however, were not in fact well grounded. Many different considerations conspired to prevent France from re-enacting at this new crisis the conciliar rôle which she had played a hundred years before.

¹ Salembier, *Le grand schisme d'Occident* (1921), p. 119 and notes.

The conciliar doctrines, through long relegation to the sphere of pure theory, had become sterile and academic, and bore an increasingly smaller relationship to the live movements of ecclesiastical politics. The Schismatic Council of Pisa-Milan-Lyons, engineered by the French in 1511-12, was but the feeblest echo of the grand thunders of the old Conciliar Movement; and it led, moreover, to French acceptance of the fifth Lateran Council, the decrees of which did much to develop the *plenitudo potestatis* of the Papacy and to further the centralizing tendency which was to mark the Counter-Reform. At the same time the Lateran Council solemnly ratified, in December 1516, what the late Professor Kraus went so far as to call "the most immoral covenant that Church History had hitherto recorded".¹ The morality of the Concordat of Bologna concluded between Leo X and François I is not relevant here. But a bargain in itself of questionable morality may well produce beneficial results entirely absent from the minds of the original partners; and the plea is frequently urged that by placing the control of Church property and personnel in the hands of the King, the Concordat went far to save Catholicism in France by removing what in other countries proved the greatest temptation to its overthrow.² The fact however remains that the cure smacked of the disease. It was only by a half-capitulation to the new cæsaropapism of the sixteenth century that the danger of a complete surrender was averted. The Concordat inevitably gave a great impulse to those natural tendencies of the age which in England produced the Tudor "Royal Supremacy" and in France the new "Gallicanisme du Roi", which, sponsored by the Parlements and the legal profession generally, superimposed itself upon the older ecclesiastical Gallicanism, and ultimately pushed the prerogatives of King and secular law in regard to things ecclesiastical as far and perhaps at times farther than was logically compatible with the acknowledgment

¹ *Cambridge Modern History*, II, 32. On the Concordat the in many ways unsatisfactory work of Thomas, *Le Concordat de 1516* (3 vols. 1910), is not, however, without its utility.

² See e.g. Monseigneur Baudrillart, *La Vocation Catholique de la France* (1925).

of the papal headship of the Church Universal. The Concordat allowed the free development of neo-Gallican tendencies which had their roots as far back as Philippe le Bel, and the completed Gallican theory may be seen in the works of such sixteenth-century constitutional lawyers as de Ferrault and de Graissaille.

For the present purpose what is most important about the new Gallicanism is the extent to which it tended to shut the French Church up within herself. Gallicanism helped to neutralize Conciliarism. These conditions were not entirely new; they had been a feature of the old Pragmatic Sanction which the Concordat had replaced. But the isolation of the Gallican Church was accentuated by the Concordat at the very moment when the flowering strength of a new and almost irresistible nationalism was crushing œcumenical ideals, erecting subtle psychological barriers between the spiritual as well as the temporal lives of nations, and seriously compromising the very existence of an international Church. In no other age was international action more necessary for Catholicism than in the sixteenth century: in no other age was it more difficult of achievement. The French Church had become self-sufficient and felt a dwindling community of interest with foreign Catholics. The interest taken by French churchmen and French scholars in General Councils tended to flow in harmless literary channels rather than to express itself in constructive, practical proposals. It was not so much an ardour for the doctrines of Gerson and d'Ailly as anger at the easy-going attitude of François I towards the Lutheran proclivities of his courtiers that moved a canon of Paris, Jacques Merlin, to produce the first attempt at a collected edition of the Councils, and thus to take his stand at the head of that distinguished list which ends in the name of Mansi.¹ But the heresy that showed

¹ See Dom Henri Quentin, *Jean-Dominique Mansi et les grandes collections conciliaires*, pp. 7-11. Other works on conciliar history produced in France in the first half of the sixteenth century were J. Le Maire des Belges, *Le Promptuaire des Conciles de l'Église Catholique* (1st edition, Paris, about 1530, others between 1533 and 1547); J. Tillius, *Codex Canonum seu Canones SS. Apostolorum et priscarum synodorum decreta* (Paris 1540); G. Contarenus,

itself in France during the 'twenties and 'thirties was not serious enough to generate any real desire for a Council. King and Church felt no call to link their efforts very closely, or indeed even to identify their religious position and interests, with those of foreign Catholics.

The conditions prevailing in international politics when the Lutheran heresy arose in Germany also conspired to render France disinclined to pay more than the necessary lip-service to the cry for a General Council. The whole question of the Council became fatally involved with the dominant political problem of the day—the Habsburg-Valois rivalry. The internal dissensions which Lutheranism had produced in Germany were from the French point of view a providential crippling of the might of Charles V; and the solution of the Lutheran problem by a General Council would have left France face to face with a united Germany. The French Crown had more to gain from the encouragement than from the extinction of these German dissensions, while, more and more bound up in herself, the French Church did not see why she should put herself out to support a General Council for the sake of the Faith in Germany, being, in her own estimation, in no need of one herself. "Sire," wrote the French ambassador in Germany to Henri II in 1551, "...vous n'avez aucun interest aux doctrines d'Allemagne pour veu que vos églises demeurent saintes et catholiques."¹ The writer of these words was no cynic but a serious-minded churchman who was later revered as Archbishop of Vienne.

II

From every point of view it was not then surprising that the first serious mootings of a General Council between Charles V and Clement VII should find French opinion cold, if not directly antagonistic. It would, of course, be captious and untrue to lay on the French doorstep the whole responsibility for the failure

Conciliorum magis illustrium summa (Paris 1543; Venice 1562); Claude Blassius, *Explicatio SS. conciliorum ad fidem vetustissimam* (Paris 1553). See Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles*, I, 119-24.

¹ Marillac to Henri II, Feb. 24th, 1551, in Druffel, *Beiträge zur Reichsgeschichte*, I, 583.

of Clement VII's half-hearted conciliar proposals and of Paul III's more earnest first attempts. But it is beyond denial that in each case French obstruction on one pretext or another played no small part in sterilizing successively the negotiations that followed the Conference of Bologna in 1530, those of 1534 and 1535, Paul III's schemes for a Council first at Mantua then at Vercelli in 1536 and 1538, and his later plans in 1541-2 when legates were actually sent to Trent and the Council formally opened. It is not just that Paul III should be left to bear by himself the responsibility for a series of failures which was not entirely his.¹ But in the autumn of 1544 the Peace of Crépy at last brought the meeting of a Council, or more accurately the bringing to life of the embryonic Council of Trent, within the bounds of practicability. Agreement over a Council formed one clause of the peace. François I therefore addressed a letter to the Pope asking for its summons,² and gathered together twelve theologians at Melun, among them Claude d'Espence, in preparation.³ On November 30th, Paul III issued the Bull *Lætare Jerusalem*, directing the Council to resume on Lætare Sunday 1545. Cardinals del Monte, Cervini and Pole were appointed legates. It seemed as if the impossible had happened—that Pope, Emperor and King of France were piously and sincerely united for the godly work.

Unfortunately the edifying appearance was not completely true to fact. François' chief minister, Cardinal Tournon, may have sincerely wanted the Council for its own sake, but with the King himself it had not ceased to be a purely political issue. He now supported it in the hope of driving an additional wedge between the Emperor and the English allies whom Charles had tricked over the Peace. François' attitude towards the Council therefore depended on the course of the English war. But when the German Protestants, early in 1545, announced their

¹ See Ehses, *Concilium Tridentinum*, IV (Acta I, 1904), pp. xv-cxxxvii. Also Ehses, "Franz von Frankreich und die Konzilsfrage in den Jahre 1536-1539", in the *Römische Quartalschrift* (1898), pp. 306-23.

² Druffel, *Kaiser Karl V und die Römische Kurie*, p. 97.

³ Dupuy, *Mémoires pour le Concile de Trente*, pp. 9-10; Desjardins, *Négociations avec la Toscane*, III, 140-1.

refusal to recognize the Papal Council, he chose to believe that this would ultimately ruin its chances, and throughout the earlier months of 1545 he found means to make difficulties with Paul III. Nevertheless four prelates from France, the Archbishop of Aix and the Bishops of Agde, Clermont and Rennes, arrived in Trent in August 1545. It was a happy augury of a long stay that they immediately laid in so large a supply of wine as to send the price up by about 25 per cent. But as the sessions had not yet started they soon began to hint at retirement, and in November caused consternation by announcing that they had definite orders to go home, orders which they dared not disobey. Indeed it seems that already the Bishop of Clermont had gone off to Bologna. After a great deal of fuss and persistent efforts on the part of the legates to retain them, Rennes left for France on November 17th, while Agde, breaking a pledge given to Cardinal del Monte, slipped secretly away nine days later. The legates were deeply chagrined and even offended. But suddenly the King of France made up his mind definitely to support the Council. Agde returned to Trent just in time for the opening session on December 13th, while Clermont came back early in the new year.

At their royal master's bidding the three French bishops now started to sing a very different tune. They petitioned for the work of the Council to be held up until the arrival of the King's ambassadors with further prelates and theologians. This rather presumptuous proposal was severely criticized by the Italian and Spanish bishops who formed the bulk of the Council, and it was well for the legates that they found polite words to turn it aside, for it was not until July that the ambassadors arrived while the continually expected reinforcement of bishops under Charles de Guise as Archbishop of Reims¹ never turned up at all. François had appointed three orators, Claude d'Urfé, Pierre Danès and Jacques de Lignière.² In his first oration the eloquent Danès urged the Council to restore unity of doctrine as the only basis for reform, and though Massarelli classes the

¹ Buschbell, *Concilium Tridentinum*, x (*Epistulae*, I, 1916), 407, 434.

² Letters patent of April 1545—Bib. Nat., fonds français, 20099, f. 5.

three French bishops together among those who desired priority of treatment to be given to reform, it is evident from the reports of the Archbishop of Aix's speeches that he at least agreed with Danès. It is obvious that Gallican liberties stood less danger of attack from a discussion on doctrine than from one on reform, and the instructions which François had given his ambassadors dealt almost exclusively with the preservation of these liberties.¹ The attitude of the French Crown towards the Council may thus be described as mainly defensive. Should the fathers show any disposition to question the *appel comme d'abus*,² the payment of décimes to the Crown, or the cognizance taken by lay judges of matters concerning benefices, the ambassadors were instructed as to the lines on which they were to defend these things and also empowered to riposte by attacking the papal levy of annates and the system of papal preventions.

The ambassadors had, however, no occasion to display the cloven hoof. But the growing success that attended Charles V's attack on the Smalkaldic League, after the fruitless Conference and Diet of Worms, had the unhappiest effects on the Council. Fearful of Habsburg domination the legates took the opportunity of a convenient outbreak of disease at Trent to transfer the fathers quite suddenly to Bologna in the spring of 1547. The transference was made by decree of the Council itself, but a disgruntled and obstinate Spanish rump stayed behind, which the Emperor persisted in regarding as the true Council. In these circumstances support of the Council at Bologna would clearly be a strong anti-Imperialist gesture. It was a gesture that François would undoubtedly have made had he lived, but he died a few weeks before the translation and it was left to his successor to carry out this policy. The accession of Henri II led to the fall of Cardinal Tournon and the beginning of the hybrid Guise-Montmorency dyarchy. Under Guise influence Henri decided to form a military alliance with the Pope against

¹ Bib. Nat., fonds français, 20099, ff. 71-84.

² This was an appeal allowed from the clerical courts to the Royal Council, theoretically on the question of competency, but often permitting in fact the exercise of true appellate jurisdiction over the church courts.

Charles V who was now waxing over-mighty after his victory at Mühlberg. Heavy support of the Council at Bologna was one of the bribes held out to Paul III by Charles de Guise on that first diplomatic mission of his that has been spoken of earlier.¹

At Trent the French bishops and ambassadors had refused to express any opinion regarding the validity of the translation. Unwilling to identify themselves either with the Italian majority or with the Spanish rump, they had scattered, to await instructions from home. The ambassadors were at Venice, the Archbishop of Aix at Padua, the Bishop of Agde—now translated to Mirepoix—at Verona, while the Bishop of Clermont had earlier gone home with the legates' permission.² On the completion of the alliance with Paul III, Aix and Mirepoix were ordered to proceed to Bologna. During the time that the Council remained there they were joined for varying periods by the Bishops of Avranches, Noyon, Angoulême, Montpellier, St Malo, Séz, Nevers, St Briec, St Paul-Trois-Châteaux, the Italian bishops of Fréjus, Cavaillon and Vannes, and the French General of the Friars-Minim. The ambassadors were also ordered to follow the Council to Bologna, Michel de l'Hôpital replacing Jacques de Lignière, and Claude d'Espence being attached to them as theological adviser. New instructions repeated those of François I,³ and the fact that the Concordat had automatically ceased to apply to Brittany and Provence on the death of François I inspired the insertion of a strongly worded protest against the abuses which the revived system of preventions had created in those provinces. Large sums of money, it was alleged, were being regularly drained out of the country and great confusion caused in ecclesiastical administration.

At Bologna the Council of Trent dragged on a harmless and increasingly inactive existence, and when formally suspended

¹ See above, pp. 7-8.

² Friedensburg, ix, 625.

³ Dupuy, pp. 13-18. In publishing the main sentences from a sixteenth-century copy in the Vatican, M. Romier (*Origines Politiques*, I, 199-200, notes) gives the impression of being unaware of this earlier edition, which, however, unlike most of the pieces in Dupuy, was for some reason not incorporated in Le Plat's great collection.

in 1549 had in fact long been dead. As when at Trent itself, it had given no occasion for protest by the French ambassadors; but the differences of ecclesiastical opinion that underlay the political alliance of the Pope and the King of France found other ways of making themselves felt. Charles V had taken matters into his own hands by promulgating the Interim in Germany and solemnly protesting against the sessions at Bologna, whereupon Henri II made it perfectly clear that his own friendship with the Pope and the presence of his bishops at Bologna depended entirely upon the firmness of the attitude which Paul III adopted towards this imperial recalcitrance. The Spanish bishops were still at Trent, and when Paul proposed to summon to Rome delegates from both Trent and Bologna to hold an impartial enquiry into the circumstances of the translation, the formal prohibition of the French King, based on excuses more or less plausible, made it impossible to include French representatives. Later, when Paul saw that the Council at Bologna was doomed, he reverted to the idea of an international assembly of bishops in Rome, this time, however, to undertake measures of general reform. To represent France he chose the Bishops of Noyon, Mirepoix and Nevers, but again the French King intervened. The three prelates pleaded that they could not obey the Pope unless he gave a guarantee that Gallican rights would not be touched; and, as they time and again pointed out when conflicting demands were made upon them by Rome and Paris, they were not in a position to disobey a monarch who had so complete a control over their temporalities. Quite apart, however, from this consideration, several of the French bishops protested volubly against the removal of the question of reform out of the Council's hands into those of the Pope. Indeed, Avranches and Noyon were told that they had incurred grave spiritual penalties by their outspoken declaration, and fell under suspicion of having implied the superiority of the Council over the Pope. To justify themselves they addressed a long epistle to Paul III. They respectfully asked for the Council to be properly re-established either at Trent or Bologna or elsewhere, and protested against the idea of superseding it by commissions

sitting at Rome; they disclaimed any intention of bringing up the question of the relationship of Pope and Council, but added a long and quite gratuitous attack against the abuses of patronage alleged to be committed by the Pope in Brittany and Provence. Noyon, however, was certainly in Rome a few months later, and in 1550 he negotiated with Julius III a renewal of the extension of the Concordat to these provinces.¹

This dispute with the French bishops was not the only way in which Paul III in his last years saw himself hindered by the French Crown and hierarchy in the performance of his spiritual duties. Execution was refused in France to a papal decree forbidding prelates to administer more than one metropolitan or cathedral church, the open support of pluralism being grounded on the plea that the Pope had no authority to interfere with the interior administration of the French Church or the distribution of the French sees. The royal opposition was supported on grounds of Gallican principle by the Universities, by the Parlements and by Montmorency: it was supported for private reasons of their own by rich French prelates like Cardinal du Bellay.² Paul III was amazed at the contrast between the French King's political amiability and his ecclesiastical importunity. The French alliance to which Charles de Guise had committed him in the winter of 1547-8 had borne as little fruit in the easing of ecclesiastical relations as in the achievement of its political objectives.

¹ On France and the first period of the Council of Trent-Bologna see Druffel, *Kaiser Karl V und die Römische Kurie* (1877-81), I, 95-101; III, 21 *et seq.*; *Beiträge zur Reichsgeschichte*, I, II, III, *passim*; Druffel und Brandi, *Monumenta Tridentina* (1899), *passim*; Merkle, *Concilium Tridentinum*, I (*Diaria*, I, 1901), *passim*; Ehses, *Concilium Tridentinum*, IV, and V (*Acta* I and II, 1904, 1911), *passim*; Dupuy, pp. 9-21, documents reprinted with others in the fourth volume of Le Plat, *Monumentorum... amplissima collectio* (7 vols. 1781-7); Carcereri, *Il Concilio di Trento dalla Traslazione a Bologna alla sospensione* (Biblioteca Storica Bolognese, No. 15, 1910), especially pp. 40-1, 88-90, 148-52, 229-34 and 378-96; Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'Estat* (1666), II, *passim*, and Maynier, *Étude sur le Concile de Trente* (1879).

² Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 202-5.

III

From the purely spiritual aspect France had played little part in the first period of the Council of Trent. It was true that several French theologians had taken part in the important and lengthy discussions on Scripture and Justification, while the Archbishop of Aix, himself a competent theologian, had figured on several important committees. But on the whole the French attendance had been very poor, even at Bologna. No constructive proposals had come from the Gallican Church; it had identified itself with no positive point of view. The general attitude of Crown and clergy alike may be described as negative and suspicious.

These features were even more marked in the second period of the Council. Less than a year after the final suspension of the sessions at Bologna, when Cardinal del Monte had become Julius III and was planning to re-establish at Trent the Council over which he had formerly presided, the conciliar ardour of the Most Christian King and his advisers had signally cooled. The conditions of international politics had been modified. Julius' election had in the end been made possible by the withdrawal of the main French candidates, but the new Pope had not maintained the gallophile sentiments of gratitude that he had expressed in the first days of his pontificate, when he seems to have given the Cardinal of Lorraine some sort of pledge not to raise the question of a Council without a previous agreement with France. He regarded its resumption, however, as a sacred duty from which no political difficulties ought to deter him, and in spite of protests from the Cardinal of Ferrara in Rome nuncios were soon sent into Germany and France to announce his intention. Charles V was favourably inclined, despite difficulties regarding the validity of the sessions at Bologna. But Henri II complained bitterly to the nuncio Trivulzio of the Pope's falseness in thus playing into the Emperor's hands, though Julius was anxious to avoid creating this impression. It was useless for Trivulzio to reply that without the Council the Emperor might well make his own religious terms with the Lutherans: Henri II

was unmoved; the more so that a strangely misguided letter from the German nuncio had thrown strong doubt upon the Pope's sincerity. Moreover Henri II was preparing to invade imperial territory on the Lorraine frontier and was negotiating an alliance with the Lutheran princes. Without formally rejecting the Pope's proposals, the King told Trivulzio that the Gallican Church stood happily in no need of a General Council, that such reforms as might be necessary could best be carried out by her own prelates at home, and that the Pope himself, as a former president, could hardly fail to be aware of the very meagre liberty that had been enjoyed at Trent. It was the old self-sufficiency, now expressed quite frankly and openly. But Julius was not going to let the French King baulk him; for all his mutability of temper and increasing love of ease, neither of them unnatural in an old man of sixty-three, he had a fundamental strength of character; the Council was his duty, and he would go through with it. Having first attempted in various ways to assuage Henri II, he issued a Bull on November 13th, 1550, directing the Council to meet at Trent in the following May. The opening session was subsequently deferred until September.¹

The Bull provoked a sudden and violent access of anti-papal fury at the French Court. It was not, however, the French King's only grievance against Rome. Its issue was regarded as a final proof of that desertion to the Imperial camp which the new Pope had already foreshadowed by his policy in regard to his predecessor's grandsons. Julius had at first confirmed Ottavio Farnese in possession of Parma, but under pressure from Charles V had very soon agreed to surrender the duchy to the Empire and to compensate its owner in other ways less substantial and less agreeable. The brothers Ottavio and Oracio thereupon put themselves under French protection; political relations between Rome and Paris became strained, and the Bull of Convocation caused the final rupture. Yet the wild extravagance of Henri II's wrath creates a suspicion that he actively

¹ See Carl Erdmann, "Die Wiedereröffnung des Trienter Konzils durch Julius III", in the *Quellen und Forschungen des Preussischen Historischen Instituts in Rom* (1928-9), xx, 238-317, with new documents.

desired, or was being driven on by others, to force the pace and provoke a complete break with Rome. In March 1551 he made a virtual declaration of ecclesiastical warfare by instructing the French bishops to retire to their dioceses in order to collect information as to what reforms it would be necessary to propose at a National Council which he intended shortly to summon.

Nine years later, and under very different circumstances, the Cardinal of Lorraine was to make out a very fair case for a National Council on plausible grounds of urgent necessity: in 1551 the empty threat of Henri II was merely a display of temper, a piece of wilful, captious and hypocritical spite which nothing could justify. Julius III was touched on the raw. If it came to temper he was Henri II's match. He fulminated vigorously against the National Council, but preserved sufficient judgment to perceive the hand of the Gallican lawyers behind the King. Negotiations over the Parmesan followed, but quickly collapsed, and their collapse brought matters to a head. With threats of excommunication and deposition Julius spoke of offering the French throne to the Prince Philip of Spain—the beginning of a fifty-years' temptation for that potentate—and in his fury welded together the secular and spiritual issues in a common condemnation. "If the King takes Parma from Us, We will take France from him. If he takes from Us the obedience of France, We will take from him the obedience of Christendom." It was impossible for such wild anger to last. With a characteristic collapse Julius realized that it was impossible for him to face a war with France in which he could hardly hope to meet with military success and which, whatever the issue, would certainly wreck the Council. He sent his nephew Ascanio della Cogna to remonstrate with the King, but refused to reverse his attitude towards the Farnese and their claims to Parma.¹

His wrath had not however been entirely ineffectual. Alarmed by the unexpected threat of deposition Henri II had drawn in his horns, and even before receiving news of della Cogna's mission wrote a moderate letter to the Pope attempting to clear himself of the charge of schism. Meanwhile the Cardinal of

¹ See Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 229–35, mainly from unedited sources.

Lorraine sought to explain away the National Council to Trivulzio. But no such spirit of conciliation was apparent in Rome where the ambassador, de Termes, a soldier and not a churchman, said openly that his master desired to cast off the papal supremacy. Indeed the French agents in Rome received instructions to quit the city unless the Pope changed his attitude over the question of Parma, and it was just on this political issue that matters now took a turn for the worse. In May 1551 Ottavio Farnese signed a treaty with France. He was at once declared rebellious by the Pope and his duchy was overrun by Gonzaga, the Imperial viceroy in Milan. The French therefore mobilized in Piedmont to fulfil what were now treaty obligations, and the anger of the high dissenting parties flared up anew. Della Cogna's mission failed, and a return mission to Rome undertaken by the able and persuasive Jean de Montluc failed to do more than restore Julius to sufficient good-humour to provide Montluc himself with the see of Bordeaux—of which however he was never able to take possession.¹ One after another, Montluc, de Termes and his wife, the Cardinal of Ferrara and Cardinal Tournon all left Rome, and by the end of July only a secretary, the furiously Gallican Étienne Boucher, remained to link the Vatican with Paris.²

The climax of the ecclesiastical crisis was now fast approaching. Early in August Henri II received from the Pope a letter denuded of the customary superscriptions and salutations, in which the pontiff summoned him before the tribunal of God to answer for the ravages that were being committed in Italy by the French troops sent to the aid of Ottavio Farnese. At the same time the King heard through Trivulzio that Julius was renewing his menaces of deposition and excommunication, threatening to stir up rebellion against him and to annihilate him with the assistance of the Emperor should he persist in the unholy alliance which he had concluded with the Turks. In rage Henri II dismissed the nuncio, who retired to his church of

¹ Cardinal du Bellay held Bordeaux with Paris despite Paul III's decrees against pluralism. He refused to surrender it to Montluc even at the instance of the Cardinal of Lorraine. Montluc was finally provided with the see of Valence.

² Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 243-52.

Toulon. At once all the extreme Gallican tendencies in high places broke loose. The transmission to Rome of all fees for the expedition of benefices was stopped,¹ and in a meeting of the *Conseil Royal* on August 4th the very recognition of the papal headship by the French Church was placed in jeopardy. The King was urged to make the breach with the Holy See permanent, to remove the Gallican Church from the papal obedience and to create under himself an independent National Patriarchate with complete and final spiritual authority. For a brief moment it seemed as if the worthless Ottavio Farnese might play the part of a French Anne Boleyn.

Whoever it may have been who actually put these proposals before the King, it was the Gallican lawyers who were really speaking. The Cardinal of Ferrara's later statement to Cardinal Dandino that the instigators were Montmorency and d'Urfé, the royal ambassador at Trent and later in Rome, though undoubtedly partisan, probably contained a good deal of truth, for Montmorency held quite extreme Gallican opinions, and Rome made an error in classing him with the Guises as a restraining influence upon the King. Again, Jean de Montluc has been suggested as the actual spokesman; for though not technically a member of the *Conseil* he was frequently admitted to its meetings on account of his Roman mission, and some time later he told the story that when in Rome he had spoken to Julius of the legitimacy of a possible withdrawal of obedience, representing the proposition as one recently endorsed by the Sorbonne, whereat Julius had threatened, a little uselessly, to throw himself out of the window were it true. But Montluc had nothing to gain from schism—and his chances of the archbishopric of Bordeaux to lose. Moreover he was an adherent not of Montmorency but of the Guises. It was to Charles de Guise that Henri II now turned for advice. On few occasions did the Cardinal fail to find suitable words or gestures. "Sire," he replied with tears in his eyes, "j'en appelle à la conscience de votre Majesté: c'est d'elle seule qu'elle doit prendre conseil et non des autres." It was a masterpiece of tact. Such an appeal

¹ Isnard, *Actes Royaux*, I, No. 1023.

could have only one meaning. The King declared that he could not arm himself with so extreme a weapon as schism.¹

It would be idle to speculate whether a French schism at this juncture would have become permanent, or whether it would have led within the next twenty years to some religious settlement comparable to that of Elizabeth in England—whether, in short, Gallicanism cut loose from Rome would ever have evolved into Anglicanism. Yet if we consider what course events might have taken ten years later, in 1561 and 1562, if Catherine de Médicis had not had Rome, and the loyalty of the French hierarchy to Rome, to deal with, it will not appear an altogether extravagant conclusion to assert that the Cardinal of Lorraine in saving the Roman supremacy in August 1551 had probably, in the long run, saved the future of the Catholic Faith in France. And not only had he saved the Roman supremacy; he had virtually refused a patriarchal crown. For though Lyons was the Primatial See of France, there can be little doubt that it would have been upon Lorraine's brow rather than upon Tournon's that the crown of the Gallican patriarchate would have rested. In face of the ungenerous accusations, that dogged the Cardinal all his life, of being in perpetual intrigue for a patriarchate, it is well to remember that he had once spontaneously refused the prize when it came within his grasp. Nor is there need to look for any subtler motive other than a simple conviction in regard to the Roman supremacy. The older ecclesiastical Gallicanism which Lorraine represented might hedge about the Papacy's actions with canonical restrictions and limitations, but it would never deny its supremacy—such as it conceived it—to be of divine ordinance. Jesuit influence has been seen guiding the Cardinal at this crisis;² but it seems both unnecessary to postulate this and difficult to imagine it. Only eighteen months had elapsed since the Cardinal had constituted himself protector of the Jesuits in France. It is true that he was receiving letters of gratitude both from St Ignatius and St Francis Borgia, but his

¹ On the crisis of August 1551 see Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 252–260.

² Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 260–1.

correspondence with these two great saints was purely formal.¹ Moreover in the autumn of 1551 the numbers of the Jesuit community in Paris had sunk from fourteen to four, of whom only one was a priest, most of the subjects having had to retire either to Rome or into the Low Countries on account of the war.² Lorraine regarded the Society simply as an edifying and useful association of priests—not as a powerful body from which to receive opinions on Church government or politico-religious problems. Even twelve years later, when he had become far more closely associated with the Society than he was in 1551, he had no hesitation in opposing Laynez at the Council of Trent on the question of the derivation of episcopal jurisdiction. The Cardinal's opposition to the political Gallicanism which had certainly inspired the schismatic proposals of 1551 had been known since the very outset of his public life,³ and did not need to be created by a few formal letters of thanks from two foreign priests in Rome and a small community of mostly foreign clerics. The suggestion of Jesuit influence lacks both direct evidence and inherent probability.

So there was to be no schism. But the campaign against the Papacy was to proceed, nevertheless, in other and less extreme ways. The flow of money to Rome for the expedition of benefices remained dried up; the Council reassembled at Trent ungraced by French recognition. At the opening session on September 1st the Abbé Jacques Amyot appeared and, a little embarrassed by his unpleasant task, read out a declaration that whereas the Pope by his bellicose activities in Italy had rendered an Œcumenical Council impracticable, the King of France could not see his way to allowing the prelates of his realm to participate in the Tridentine Assembly; that the King had, however, no intention of breaking altogether with the Holy See, but that if the Gallican Church refused to be bound by such decrees as might be made at Trent the fault would lie at the Pope's door. In contradistinction to the harsh expressions used towards Julius, a studied

¹ *M.H.S.J., Monumenta Ignatiana*, II, 37-8, 139-41, 252-4, 295, 399-400; *Sanctus Franciscus Borgia*, III, 67-8.

² Fouquieray, *Histoire de la Compagnie de Jésus en France*, I, 167-9.

³ Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 495.

politeness was shown to the Tridentine fathers themselves. But although the legate Crescentius and the Italian and German bishops—everyone in fact except the Spaniards—treated Amyot himself with sympathy and kindness, the Council was unable to take official cognizance of the letters he bore, since it was addressed in these not as a General Council legitimately assembled but simply as the *conventus* at Trent.¹

Henri II now set himself to consolidate his position within the limits which he had marked out. The ordinance forbidding money to go to Rome was eagerly registered by the Parlement de Paris, and legal measures were taken to safeguard the King against possible papal censures.² This was the climax of Julius' discomfiture. He saw with dismay that Henri II was neither feeble nor penitent; his own finances had been heavily hit by the stoppage of French supplies, and the Parmesan war was going badly; he was disgusted at the French King's alliance with the German Protestants, concluded at Chambord in February 1552, and horrified at his league with the Turks, one result of which had been the Turkish capture of Tripoli from the Christian Knights of Jerusalem—who had close Imperial connections. Wildly Julius called out for an anti-French crusade. Then suddenly he saw that he was beaten and must accept defeat with as good a grace as he could muster. Small and petty, perhaps, in his feeble wrath, Julius knew how to be dignified in surrender. The gracious letter, written with more sorrow than anger, in which he confessed himself beaten to Henri II, revealed amid the smoke of battle the underlying kindness and generosity of his nature. It was the moment for all those forces which were making for peace to prevail. There were quarrels among the war-party in France; the Farnese and the other Italian refugees were falling out with the Guises, who wished to concentrate on the war against the Emperor which had now developed out of the Parmesan campaign; while Montmorency was prepared to sacrifice a Gallican position of remarkable

¹ The royal letters to the Council, the Protestation and Amyot's own account of his mission in Dupuy, pp. 21-37. Cf. Ribier, II, 354-5.

² Ribier, II, 543-6.

strength in order to put an end to military adventure in Italy. The King turned down the advice of the ultra-Gallicans, among them the secretary Boucher in Rome, who urged him to press home his advantage to the full. Henri II was satisfied with having driven Julius to his knees, and it was always awkward for a Catholic monarch to defeat the Pope too heavily. He received the papal envoy Verallo with kindness and allowed his Bulls to be registered: he even had the boldness to deny that he had ever contemplated either a National Council or a withdrawal of obedience.

Verallo's mission was the Pope's confession of defeat. In reply Henri II accredited Cardinal Tournon to negotiate peace in Rome. The old minister of François I had been in political eclipse since his master's death. He was too much a man of principle to be one of party, in the sense in which it was necessary to be a partisan, either of the Guises or of Montmorency, for a political career under Henri II. Instead he had a direct and well-balanced loyalty both to Church and to State. From his retreat in Venice he had long been endeavouring to pull the peace-strings, and now he was the only possible intermediary with Julius. Patiently and without offence he supported the many violent changes in the Pope's temper—for Julius bitterly resented defeat and kicked with occasional violence against the goad. But the vanquished may not choose their terms. The Farnese were restored to their possessions, Oracio to the duchy of Castro, the egregious Ottavio to Parma. Julius III had to swallow his words and receive the whole family back into favour, including the two cardinals, Alessandro and Ranuccio. In return the French financial ban was removed. The papal treasury breathed again, but the French power to cripple the papal finances had been demonstrated, and the enforced suspension of the Council of Trent in the spring of 1552 only postponed the conciliar conflict to a later day. The peace was not, however, universally popular in France, despite its triumphal nature. The Parlement de Paris was implacable and indulged its whim by deposing the Pope. But the Tiara did not fall from Julius' head. When the first bitter pangs had subsided, he found it easy to

forgive and to forget. In place of curses he was soon exchanging compliments with the Most Christian King, heaping more insults upon him, and placing the Red Hat upon the head of Louis de Guise.¹

History has dealt hardly with Julius III.² He was something more than an irascible hedonist, though his quickness of temper often gave him a false appearance of triviality. He has been solemnly depreciated both for the episode of the Parmesan war and the political inaction of his last years. The very historians who loftily blame the political rôle played by the Papacy in the Habsburg-Valois contest are the first to point the finger of scorn at Julius' attempted extrication. This is because they regard the latter simply as an act of personal cowardice, prompted by the attractions of an easy life in a pleasant villa outside Rome and facilitated by the convenient appearance of so admirable and hard-working a secretary of state as Cardinal Dandino. But Julius' personal retirement was one thing; his political renunciation was another. He had not sought the Parmesan war, which was really alien to the spirit of his pontificate. He had come to the papal throne with a keen desire to preserve his political neutrality, and it seems fairly certain that the influence of Cardinal Pole and Cardinal Morone strengthened him in the deliberate conclusion that the Papacy must avoid further political entanglement. His attempted resumption of the traditional papal rôle of peacemaker, his endeavour to lift the Papacy out of the ruck of sordid secular controversies into which it had sunk, was one of the first victories of the counter-reform spirit, though it was a victory doomed to transiency and robbed of permanent fruit by Paul IV's disastrous return to the old passionate partisanship. Its achievement, however, temporary though it was, needed something more than mere inactivity on Julius' part. It is sometimes easier to act than not to act; and it must have required no small strength of purpose for Julius to resist, as for the last three years of his life

¹ On the peace negotiations see Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 264-301.

² E.g. in the *Cambridge Modern History*, vol. II: where he is described as "utterly selfish" (p. 670), and his career as "insignificant" (p. 90).

he did resist, the continual flattery by which the French sought to draw him into military alliance. His nuncios replied always by counsels of peace. In France and in Germany they implored the warring monarchs to accept either the *status quo* or papal mediation; but on the French side, at least, the war was going too well, and Guise prestige had soared too high after the defence of Metz for peace talk to be popular or acceptable. Yet towards the end of Julius' pontificate the chances of peace began to brighten. The Emperor, broken by ill-health and the disasters of 1552, was facing the prospect of resignation: France had begun to feel the effects of severe financial exhaustion, and her successes in the north-east were set off by the failure of the revolt of Siena against Florentine over-lordship. A peace conference at Marcq in 1555 only just missed success. But early in 1556 a truce for five years was concluded between the Emperor and the French at Vaucelles. Julius III was dead—but the short-lived truce was his pathetic and posthumous victory.

It seemed all in the French interest to convert the truce into a permanent peace. The Three Bishoprics, Piedmont and Savoy had been left in their victorious hands, while the religious settlement of Germany at Augsburg and the gradual, piecemeal retirement of Charles V seemed to herald a new era of pacification. All later history would have been changed had a Peace of Vaucelles forestalled the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. But the Guises' blood was up, and their Neapolitan ambitions, their insatiable appetite for yet greater military glory, fitted in only too well with Paul IV's unfortunate hispano-phobia. The truce of Vaucelles had been not a national settlement but a party *coup*, skilfully brought off by the Constable behind the Guises' backs while the Cardinal of Lorraine was in Rome actually negotiating an alliance with Paul. It infuriated both the Pope and the Cardinal, who had just concluded their pact; and it was clear that the first opportunity would be taken to break the truce as soon as the Guises regained their directive influence over Henri II which Montmorency had temporarily usurped.

IV

Viewed in relation to the later sessions under Pius IV, the first two periods of the Council of Trent stand very much together. They are the profit that the Papacy and the Counter-Reformation were able to garner from the seven years' suspension of the Habsburg-Valois contest which lasted from the Peace of Crépy in 1544 until the generalization of the war of Parma late in 1551. The Counter-Reformation had seized the opportunity offered by the lull in the storm, but it was still unable to calm the storm itself. Only in the later years of Julius III did it attempt to do so. But until the storm could be permanently brought to rest by a general and lasting peace, there was little chance that the secular powers would ever be induced to consider the question of a General Council independently as a spiritual necessity. A mere truce was not enough, for it was not simply the fighting but the whole all-pervading atmosphere of jealousy, suspicion and perpetual diplomatic intrigue—which a temporary truce served rather to intensify than to dissipate—that ruined the General Council's prospects and enmeshed it hopelessly in a subtle and complicated web, degrading it from an instrument of religious peace to serve as one more political battlefield. It is little less than marvellous, under these circumstances, that the first two assemblies of the Council of Trent should have accomplished the great work that they did. None the less it is perhaps arguable that it would have been better in the long run for the Council's own interests had it not met at all until the pontificate of Pius IV. After 1559 the international peace was permanent and general, and though actually there were even then, and would have been in any case, political and diplomatic considerations which deeply affected the course of the Council, they were not comparable in importance or intensity to the fundamental impediment of the Habsburg-Valois rivalry. Under Pius IV the bulk of the Council's difficulties, from the political standpoint, arose from the fact that it was a continuation, that it could not escape from its own past and from the influence of the conditions under which

that past had been enacted. The past broods ceaselessly and enigmatically over the present. Events happen, and then cease to be; but the shadows they cast do not fade so easily.

The attitude of France towards the first two periods of the Council, particularly the second, engendered endless trouble and complication for the third. After 1552 for the French Crown to have accepted the continuation of the Council of Trent would have been for it to capitulate retrospectively to the claims of Julius III and to condemn Henri II. The protest of Jacques Amyot committed the French Crown to a position impossible to maintain in the long run, but which was destined to be desperately defended, especially when it proved of great assistance to those who under Pius IV wished to go behind the Pauline and Julian Council and start again *de novo*. In this movement the protest of 1551 added an historical argument of fact to general considerations of convenience. That it was an argument that could hardly apply to the earlier Pauline sessions was a criticism never adequately met.

But even more pregnant with future difficulties than Amyot's protestation was the French alliance with the Lutherans in 1552. Concluded during the very sessions at Trent, this alliance represents an important step in the consolidation and development of a relationship which deeply affected French conciliar policy under Pius IV, and indeed all later French foreign policy. Appearances, it is true, were saved, or at least their salvation was attempted, by assurances being demanded from the Protestants that they would undertake no offensive warfare for the spread of the Confession of Augsburg or the forcible conversion of Catholics, that they desired to remain in the "true Christian and Catholic religion", and that they were willing to submit peacefully if convinced of error from the "prophetischen oder apostolischen Schriften".¹ But despite such enigmatic guarantees the Franco-Lutheran pact, by being directly aimed against the Emperor, could by implication be said to be directed also against the Council of Trent which the Emperor recognized but which had been disowned by both parties in the alliance against him. It was impossible for connections other than those of a

¹ Druffel, *Beiträge zur Reichsgeschichte*, III, 321, 325, 326.

purely military character not to arise between the allies. Even prior to the conclusion of the alliance certain Lutheran authorities had consulted the French envoys as to the desirability of attending the Council which Julius III had just re-summoned, desiring, further, to know whether the French intended to support it themselves.¹ A little later the French envoy Marillac urged Henri II not to support Julius' Council on the grounds that since it was evident that the Lutherans would neither attend nor submit, the success of the Council would inevitably entail the establishment of Charles V's complete mastery over all Germany.² The diplomatic and military relations between the French Crown and the German Protestants thus possessed, in the nature of things, and by reason of the interconnection of issues, implications distinctly ecclesiastical. It is significant that the idealist Maurice of Saxony should have regarded the moment as a favourable one at which to commend the Augsburg Confession to the Cardinal of Lorraine, known to be an ardent supporter of the alliance.³ Early in 1552 he implored the Cardinal, by letter, to give the Confession the honour of his impartial consideration, that he might—at the least—convince himself of the sincerity and godliness of its adherents. With apparent faith in the Cardinal's evangelical and reforming tendencies, he advanced the suggestion of a religious colloquy to be held between French and Lutheran divines under the Cardinal's patronage, and which should attempt to remove abuses, extirpate heresies and by attracting the favourable notice of other Protestants pave the way for the reunion of Christendom.⁴ How the Cardinal replied to this communication is not known. But ten years later, almost to the day, and the Council of Trent again sitting, he was himself to make almost identical proposals to the Duke of Württemberg.⁵ Throughout the century it was the intermittently pursued aim of the French to attempt reunion by private conferences with the Germans rather than by means of the Council of Trent, and this tendency suffused with an ideal eirenic glow the political connections between French

¹ Druffel, *Beiträge zur Reichsgeschichte*, I, 566–9.

² *Ibid.* I, 583.

⁴ *Ibid.* II, 111–13.

³ *Ibid.* I, 337.

⁵ Cf. below, chap. xii.

Catholics and German Lutherans which were primarily a business arrangement. The negotiations between the du Bellay and Melanchthon in the early 'thirties, the life and ideas of the theologian Claude d'Espence, the later activities of the Cardinal of Lorraine, all help to bear this out; and while it would be naïve not to recognize the large political stimulus, it would be unfair not to concede also the influence of a specifically religious idealism. The mixture of spiritual and temporal motives that inspired Franco-Lutheran intercourse in the sixteenth century may well be compared to the similar combination which lies behind modern Anglican advances to the various schismatic oriental churches.

And finally, when in the summer of 1552 the Lutheran delegates to Trent returned home disgruntled and the flight of the Emperor before Maurice of Saxony scattered the conciliar fathers, it was clearly seen that any future continuation of the Council of Trent would not only involve a dishonourable retreat on the part of the French Crown from the position of Henri II but would in addition have but small chance of ever re-establishing German religious unity. For the moment, indeed, the prolongation of German disunion was welcome to France; Germany's religious tragedy had been France's political opportunity. A time however was shortly to come when France would develop an internal religious tragedy of her own, and would be forced at last to take a very serious interest in the question of a General Council. Then, peace having been restored with Germany, she would be loud in proclaiming the dire necessity of restoring Germany's internal religious unity—and would remember her conviction that the Council of Trent had proved itself utterly disqualified for this task. At that time the Cardinal of Lorraine, who had probably taken little direct interest in the earlier periods of the Council, was to find himself at the political helm in France, heir to all the problems set by them, faced by all the conditions generated by them. But before that time could come, the internal complacency of the Gallican Church, which had enabled France to draw with impunity political profit from foreign heresy, would have to be very seriously disturbed.

CHAPTER III

The Menace of Calvinism

Inimicus homo hoc fecit.

—St Matthew, XIII, 28.

I

IF the French Church gave no lead to sixteenth-century Catholicism in regard to a General Council, neither can she be credited with the foremost place in the spiritual revival which that century saw within the Catholic Church. The French Counter-Reformation, when it came at last to flower, produced a mass of blossoms, unrivalled either in splendour or numbers, to grace the never-wintered garden of Catholic spirituality; but the bursting of the glory was strangely retarded. It is only with the close of the religious wars at the end of the century that M. Brémond can begin his monumental history of French religious sentiment, and M. Pourrat in his history of Christian spirituality finds hardly a French name to mention between Gerson and St Francis of Sales. An early reform movement under the Cardinal of Amboise had spent its limited and ephemeral force before 1520, and had seemed only to demonstrate the Church's incapacity to reform herself from inside.¹ The many diseases which afflicted the Church Universal were no less grievous in France than elsewhere, and the cold grip which the Concordat had enabled the Crown to lay upon hierarchy and Church organization did not help to kindle the sparks of revival which undoubtedly existed. Though there were notable exceptions, many monasteries and convents were in a state of almost unbelievable laxity, which the disgraceful system of lay commendations appeared likely to perpetuate. A large number of the lower secular clergy lived in the most abject poverty, and were ground down by taxation in the form of *décimes* and forced loans exacted by the Crown. Many parishes were without any kind of pastor at all, and preaching was left

¹ See Imbart de la Tour, *Les origines de la Réforme*, II, livre 4, cap. ii.

mostly to the mendicant friars. The higher clergy were on the whole extremely unclerical, and the conditions for nomination laid down by the Concordat were often unobserved. Bishoprics and abbeys were regarded quite frankly, both by giver and taker, as pensions for political, literary or personal services, as natural perquisites of the great families, or as gratuities for foreigners who had been useful or whom it was necessary to placate. It must never be thought that it was only the Pope who provided Italians with sees the wrong side of the Alps. After the Concordat the names of the best Italian families are never absent from the roll of the French hierarchy, and under Henri II their shufflings and reshufflings reveal the workings of a spoils system reflecting the constant changes of that monarch's relations with the different parties in the peninsula. Only when Italian beneficiaries—naturally non-resident—appointed Italian vicars was any incongruity felt.¹ Non-residence itself was quite common, though there were praiseworthy exceptions even among the literary, humanist prelates. Perhaps it was too much to ask of refined foreigners, of elderly retired diplomats, of the younger scions of the nobility bred up to their sports and their trivialities, all alike devoid of pastoral vocation, that they should have settled down to face the routine drudgery of ecclesiastical administration with all the attendant inconveniences and vulgarities of clerical life in a provincial town. It was not the enforcement of residence upon the unwilling, but the selection in the first instance of the willing, that was needed to save the French hierarchy. Failing this it were better to have the underpaid and overworked vicar-general.

But even worse results followed from the Concordat than the improper use of the royal nomination of bishops. Councils of no kind might be summoned without royal permission, and Diocesan and Provincial Synods had become rarities. The Church courts were being continually encroached upon, and all kinds of ecclesiastical activity, even down to the administration

¹ Isnard, *Actes Royaux*, I, No. 1185: Royal *Déclaration* of September 1554 against foreign vicars being appointed by foreign beneficiaries, on penalty of seizure of temporalities. Text in Isambert, *Anciennes Lois Françaises*, XIII, 400-2.

of the Sacraments and the ordering of clerical life, had by various legal expedients been brought in the last resort within the purview of the Parlements. To a large extent the power as well as the inclination to reform itself had been drained from the Gallican Church: the defence of Gallican liberties had become a menace to the prospects of reform. The vested interests of the new Gallicanism not only impeded for ten years the spiritual work of the Jesuits but throughout the whole century hindered the Gallican Church as a body, and its members individually, from co-operating with the best efforts of the Counter-Reform Papacy. We have seen, in the last chapter, papal decrees against pluralism ignored; the defence of Gallican liberties constituting the entire attitude of the French Crown to the Council of Trent; French bishops forbidden to assist the Pope in the reform of the Church without first obtaining guarantees in favour of these liberties; and it is undeniable that the general unwillingness of the French Cardinals to reside in Rome, coupled with the suspicions of the French Crown, together ensured the almost complete absence of French names from the rolls of the many special papal commissions for reform that fill the pages of the *Acta Consistorialia* from Paul III onwards.

But though critical accounts of the French Church as an institution in the first half of the sixteenth century make dismal enough reading,¹ it does not follow that there was a complete dearth of all spirituality. The Carthusian houses and several of the reformed communities such as the canons of St-Victor at Paris, the Benedictines of Lérins, Marmoutier and St-Martin of Tours, and the nuns of Fontevrault and Ste-Marthe at Tarascon, were centres where the spiritual life was earnestly cultivated. The production of new spiritual works and the re-editing of older ones testified to a revived interest in mysticism and in the problems connected with grace,² and we have only to dip into the *Litterae Quadrimestres* of the first Parisian

¹ E.g. M. Romier's excellent chapter "L'Église Gallicane" in his *Le Royaume de Catherine de Médicis*, II, cap. vi.

² Imbart de la Tour, III, 343-57.

Jesuits to become aware of the amount of spiritual material that lay to hand in Paris alone. That a handful of Jesuits could send youths by their tens into the Charterhouse, could restore disillusioned theological professors to their first fervour, and convert numberless hardened sinners on their death-bed, was proof enough that the elements of a spiritual revival existed. But there was no common force or inspiration to weld the diverse elements together into a movement and give them the strength of union—not simply to institutionalize them, but to draw them out to the fullness of their potentialities. The men who might have done this were not in the position; those in the position lacked both ability and desire. Yet here again, just as there was never a time when the Sacred College was without pious and non-political cardinals, so the Gallican hierarchy at no time lacked its small quota of pastoral bishops: du Prat of Clermont, who gave the Jesuits their first foothold in France; Jean Hangest, the active Bishop of Noyon; the Cardinal of Lorraine himself, and others. But the whole system, as it was worked, tended to put the wrong men in the wrong place for the wrong motives. A kind of official topsy-turveydom barred the path of the Counter-Reform. The complacency which characterized both the exterior and interior policies of the Gallican Church stood in need of some violent shock. It got it, violently and suddenly—and it was in the dread shape of heresy.

II

One of Luther's earliest condemnations had been that of the Sorbonne; during the 'twenties active measures had been taken in France against the spread of Lutheranism, and Provincial Councils at Sens and Bourges had helped to construct the Catholic doctrinal defence. Whether or no there existed at this period in men such as Lefèvre, Farel, Roussel and others, the beginnings of a native French Protestantism, or whether the heterodox and quasi-heterodox elements that freely manifested themselves were merely the pale reflection of foreign luminaries, is a question which does not call for an answer here,

and one indeed that may plausibly be regarded as meaningless.¹ Though vigorously pursued by the Church and by the University of Paris, the Lutheranistic opinions that made their appearance in France during the first great decade of the Lutheran advance in Germany were spasmodic, unco-ordinated and void of political content. To the Church authorities they were more a nuisance than a serious danger, and François I was inclined to fluctuate in his attitude towards them. Eager not to stifle free intellectual play, this cultured if at times crude monarch veered during the middle portion of his reign towards a policy of religious toleration. A spirit of breadth and leniency animated many highly placed and influential Churchmen; and the frequent difficulty of drawing a precise line between orthodoxy and heterodoxy, the political harmlessness of the French dissidents, and the diplomatic convenience of cultivating the friendship of the German Protestant states, all helped to produce a state of mind tending towards the ideal of a broader Catholic synthesis to include all that was best and most valuable in Renaissance criticism and ideas, and with an eye also towards the Lutherans. But the only practical product of this spirit, termed *Le Réformisme* by Imbart de la Tour,² was a series of inconclusive negotiations, undertaken with the knowledge of Clement VII, between Bucer and Melancthon on the one hand and the brother-bishops du Bellay on the other. These took place in the early 'thirties and were accompanied by a relaxation in the measures against the French heretics.³ To regard *Réformisme* as a definite movement would be a misconception: it was more a mental atmosphere. Its spirit was quite distinct from that of the historical Counter-Reformation, from that, even, of such individualists as Erasmus or More; nor is a true parallel provided by the many German attempts at reunion

¹ See Lucien Febvre, "Une Question mal posée: Les origines de la Réforme française" in *Revue Historique*, Mai-Juin 1929.

² *Origines de la Réforme*, III.

³ Schmidt, "Unionsversuche Franz der I zwischen Katholischer und Protestantischer Kirche", *Zeitschrift für historisches Theologie*, 1850; Bourilly, *François I et les Protestants: Les Essais de Concorde en 1535* (B.S.H.P.F. 1900); Bourilly, *Jean du Bellay, les Protestants et la Sorbonne* (B.S.H.P.F. 1903); Imbart de la Tour, III, 534 *et seq.*

which punctuated the 'thirties¹ and struggled on past the failure of the famous Colloquy of Ratisbon up to the equally fruitless Colloquy of Worms in 1557, for these were dictated by political circumstances, and were not the pursuit of an ideal. *Réformisme* was *sui generis*, and characteristically French. It did much for the retention within Catholicism of the idea of development, and for the preservation of Renaissance ideals within the Church. But as a direct and immediate force it quickly evaporated. It was too frail, too formless, and too uncertain of its purpose to last. Yet its spirit never died out completely among French Churchmen, and we may see its survival in later phases of the Cardinal of Lorraine's life as well as in men such as Claude d'Espence, who sought to approach heretics with argument and persuasion rather than with intimidation and force. The Sorbonne, however, showed itself fiercely antagonistic from the start. For a time open warfare raged between it and the King; Le Picard and some other leading intransigents suffering temporary exile. But the affair of the Placards in 1534 helped to embitter the King, and slowly the Sorbonne and its spirit recovered ground. By the end of the decade such cultured prelates as the elder Cardinal Jean de Lorraine, who had at times displayed some lenience towards the Protestants, had recoiled to the right.² The death of Guillaume du Bellay was a heavy blow, and the King's last years were dominated by Cardinal de Tournon in whom the reaction from *Réformisme* had been most violent. In 1543 the Sorbonne triumphed completely, issued its famous articles and came down heavily on certain professors—among them d'Espence—whom it suspected of harbouring sentiments if not of direct doctrinal sympathy at least of unedifying kindness towards Protestant errors.

In 1540 the important Edict of Fontainebleau showed the extent to which François I had veered round.³ The Crown was now desirous of stimulating the pursuit of heresy by taking it out of the Church's hands into its own. In the previous year the

¹ Pastor, *Reunionsbestrebungen während die Regierung Karls V* (1879).

² See Collignon, *Mécénat du cardinal Jean de Lorraine*, pp. 22-5.

³ Isnard, 1, No. 750. Text in Isambert, XII, 676-81.

Ordonnance of Villers-Cotterets had practically swept away what ordinary jurisdiction over laymen still remained to the Church courts:¹ now, by the new edict, the cognizance even of heresy, except in the case of ordained clerks, was transferred to the lay courts. Three years later the protests of the despoiled clerical tribunals and the issuing of the Sorbonne's articles led to a compromise, and a concurrent ecclesiastical jurisdiction was restored;² but the fact remained that the civil power, as the culmination of a long process of usurpation, had obtained cognizance of matters pertaining to the *forum internum*. On the accession of Henri II this anomaly was further developed. A special committee of the Parlement de Paris was formed to deal with cases of heresy, and so energetically did it perform its task that it soon won for itself the unpleasant sobriquet of the *Chambre Ardente*. It does not seem likely, however—*pace* the late M. Weiss—that this accentuation of the proceedings against heresy that accompanied the accession of Henri II can have been in any way due to the Cardinal of Lorraine, who now came into political prominence. An absurdly exaggerated significance has been given to his oration at Henri II's Sacre, though his words were by no means violent and his thesis both normal and traditional.³ It is much more reasonable to detect his influence in the restoration to the Church courts, in 1549, of an exclusive jurisdiction over lay heretics. The Edict of Paris,⁴ by which this was done, abolished the anomalous situation created by the Edict of Fontainebleau, and as a necessary consequence the *Chambre Ardente* was suppressed. This rearrangement was in entire accord with the Cardinal of Lorraine's strongly clerical principles. All his life he fought consistently to protect ecclesiastical autonomy and privilege against the encroachments of secular authority, and a system under which laymen were tried for a spiritual offence before secular magistrates would naturally appear to him as dangerous as it was undesirable. The Edict of Paris, however, allowed lay judges to assist the clergy in cases of

¹ Isnard, I, Nos. 710-29. Text in Isambert, XII, 600-40.

² Isnard, I, No. 820. Text in Isambert, XIII, 818-20; cf. pp. 820-7.

³ See above, p. 6.

⁴ Isnard, I, No. 963. Text in Isambert, XIII, 134-8.

heresy involving civil disturbance, and exhorted them to lay information against suspects. The King was nevertheless not satisfied. The Church courts were too cumbersome, too slow—and apparently too lenient. The new conditions did not give satisfaction. In 1551 the Edict of Châteaubriant allowed the lay courts to resume full cognizance over cases of heresy where a breach of the peace had occurred,¹ a concession that angered Julius III and was one of the smaller issues that went to exacerbate the crisis of that year. Two years later the *Chambre Ardente* was restored, and an increasing number of cases came before the secular magistrates.²

But the vigour of the Government's proceedings against heresy did not satisfy Paul IV, whose nuncio in 1556 complained of the slackness of the King's officials. Carlo Caraffa, however, was at first rebuffed when he began to talk about introducing the Inquisition. Soon, however, there was a change. Late in 1556 the Guises managed to rupture the Truce of Vaucelles and war broke out with Spain. Paul IV was now an ally in the field, and to be propitiated. Henri II himself wrote to the Pontiff asking for the establishment of the Inquisition, and on April 25th, 1557, Paul issued a brief appointing as Grand Inquisitors the Cardinals of Lorraine, Bourbon and Châtillon, the three cardinals normally at Court.³ In May severely worded letters patent enjoined residence upon all prelates and pastors with a cure of souls,⁴ and in July two edicts issued at Compiègne regulated the functions of the Inquisitors and laid down that obstinate heretics were to be mercilessly punished. The Parlement de Paris, suspicious of the Roman Inquisition, resisted, but finally registered the edicts with some reservations.⁵

¹ Isnard, I, Nos. 1014-18. Text in Isambert, XIII, 189-208. Guillemin states that Lorraine obtained a modification of this Edict of Châteaubriant in the clerical interest, but I can find no evidence of this.

² On this paragraph see Weiss, *La Chambre Ardente* (the introduction), and Maurice Wilkinson, "Processes of heresy in France in the sixteenth century" in *Huguenot Society of London Proceedings*, XI.

³ Ribier, II, 677; Baronius, *Annales*, XIV, 623.

⁴ Isambert, XIII, 484-5; letter of the Cardinal of Sens, cited by Romier, *Origines Politiques*, II, 245, note 3.

⁵ Isnard, I, Nos. 1352-3; Isambert, XIII, 494-7; La Haag, *La France Protestante*, documents, p. 29.

It is known that in the late summer of 1557 the Cardinal of Lorraine was actively stirring on the rather somnolent officers of justice,¹ and there can be no doubt that this time he was very much involved in the new severity and the new methods; in the winter of 1555-6 he had visited Rome where, having arranged an anti-Spanish alliance with the Pope as a secular potentate, he had then in company with several French bishops and theologians discussed the reform of abuses with the Head of the Church.² But it is no longer possible to regard him as the senseless inquisitor of fiction. He was not a natural persecutor. By nature he was inclined to pliancy and lenience; he had more in common with the conciliatory Claude d'Espence than with the intransigent Le Picard, by whom nevertheless he often let himself be guided; and he had been brought up in the warm, humane atmosphere of the old *Réformisme*. But the Inquisition pleased Paul IV; the great Guise adventure was in progress in Italy, and the Crown of Naples was worth some concession to Caraffan methods at home. In practice, the French Inquisition seems never to have functioned, and two years later Paul turned his reproaches against the Cardinal of Lorraine for its failure.³

Persecution is a policy of sheer negation. Conditions that call for it must also of necessity call for concomitant remedies of a more positive nature. The Cardinal of Lorraine took more interest in active movements of reform than in the mere repression of dissent, and his patronage of the Society of Jesus is more characteristic of him than his share in the introduction of the Inquisition. The early history of the Society in the land which saw its birth, under the shadow of the very hill of martyrs that first nursed it, was one of continual difficulty and trial. From 1540 there had been Jesuit students in Paris at the Collège des Lombards, but the establishment of the first community did not take place until ten years later, and was due to Guillaume du Prat, Bishop of Clermont, the son of the great

¹ Letters of the Cardinal of Sens, cited by Romier, *Origines Politiques*, II, 245, note 5.

² But to say, as M. Romier does, that by so doing "il jeta les fondements de la Contre-Réforme française" seems out of all proportion.

³ Cf. the excellent remarks of Romier, *Origines Politiques*, II, 245-7.

chancellor, who had desired help in his diocese. The Jesuits had been recommended to him by a Friar-Minim; while he was at Trent in 1545-6 he came into personal contact with three of their great men, Laynez, Salmeron, and Le Jay,¹ and on his way home he saw the Society at work in Padua. Deeply impressed by these evidences of both pastoral and intellectual achievement, du Prat took the Jesuits in Paris under his wing. By giving them the use of his own Collège de Clermont he enabled them to set themselves up in community life, and their superior, Père Viola, an Italian, received permission from St Ignatius to accept property in the general's name and to take professions from the Bishop of Clermont. Du Prat then desired to give them his house in full ownership, but before this could be done it was necessary for the Jesuits to obtain legal recognition as a community, and to obtain *lettres de naturalisation* without which they could corporately neither hold nor inherit property. To advance the Society's interests du Prat advised it to secure the powerful assistance of the Cardinal of Lorraine who was at the moment in Rome for the conclave of Julius III. St Ignatius, therefore, visited the Cardinal, took him round the Jesuit house, and begged his patronage. Lorraine capitulated to the influence of the saint, to the edifying impressions of his visit, and to the reputation which the Jesuits had already acquired. He offered himself spontaneously as the Society's protector in France and spoke of giving it a house in Reims. On his return home he induced Henri II to grant the required letters of naturalization. In January 1551 letters patent were issued allowing the Jesuits to form houses and live in them according to their rule.

Trouble now reared its head. A long delay was experienced before the letters were submitted for registration to the *Conseil Privé*; then the Chancellor Olivier overcharged for the sealing and it was necessary to wait until his supersession by the less exacting Bertrand. Difficulties next cropped up with the Parle-

¹ I have been unable to trace the article referred to by Fouqueray as Tournier, "Monseigneur G. du Prat au Concile de Trente" in *Études*, XLVIII, 465.

ment. Père Viola had not unnaturally laid before it the Society's Bulls of constitution and Paul III's letters apostolic of October 18th, 1549, confirming the Society's special privileges. As a result of this action—specified as “useless and inopportune” by the Jesuit historian, Père Fouquieray—the Society's interests received heavy damage. A conservative suspicion of new orders or congregations animated many of the lawyers, and this was intensified by their dislike of the Jesuit privileges, of which the exemption from payment of the dime and from the ordinary jurisdiction of the bishop rankled the most. The Parlement became openly antagonistic. Then came the Gallican crisis of 1551, which not only held up business but helped to exasperate the animus against an order so heavily privileged by the Pope. In January 1553, however, Henri II, having had the Society's Bulls and privileges examined again carefully, confirmed his letters patent of 1551, and by new *lettres de jussion* ordered the Parlement to register them without further ado. But instead of obeying the King the Parlement handed over the whole question to the consideration of the Bishop of Paris, Eustache du Bellay, and of the theological faculty of the University.

A Frenchman, Père Paschase Broet, had now superseded Père Viola at the Collège de Clermont. He did his best with the bishop and with the theological professors, but all reason and expostulation were thrown away. Du Bellay viewed the Society with an unfavourable eye, partly because the recognition of its privileges involved an assent to papal prerogatives unpleasant to extreme Gallicans, and partly because it had been taken under the protection of his family rivals the Guises. After some delay he issued a fierce condemnatory document and forbade the members of the Society to officiate in his diocese. His lead was soon taken up by the Sorbonne, most of whose members were influenced by the same Gallican considerations and the same distrust of new congregations. The faculty produced an even more violently worded denunciation. Had the Jesuits been atheists or Turks, it would hardly have been possible for bishop and theologians to have condemned them more roundly or more rudely. Finally du Bellay, after refusing to

ordain Jesuit juniors, took proceedings against the Society for holding "conventicles" in St Germain-des-Prés, where the kindly and long-established Benedictines had willingly allowed the struggling congregation the use of a side-chapel. Père Broet thought of appealing to Rome, but stayed his hand on hearing that the officials of the bishop intended not to recognize the appeal. But St Germain-des-Prés was fortunately an exempt house, so that du Bellay was powerless to kill the spiritual life of the Jesuits who continued to preach there and by invitation in several other exempt churches as well.

The case of the Jesuit privileges had set all the extreme Gallicans by the ears. It is hardly possible to believe the extent of the abuse and opprobrium which were heaped upon the Society during these years of trial, surely the most perilous of the many "*ruses du démon*" which Père Fouqueray finds to tabulate. The Jesuits met it all with the most edifying and apostolic meekness, content to bow their heads until the passing of the storm, and secure at least in the bare necessities of a roof above their heads and a chapel for their ministrations. St Ignatius appealed to the Society's protector. But Lorraine, and even the King himself, who with a few Churchmen such as Le Picard and Pierre Danès alone remained favourable to the Society, could do nothing to quash directly the pronouncements of the bishop and the Sorbonne. Lorraine, however, advised the collection of testimonials to the Jesuits from all over the world, a suggestion most fruitful in results.¹ Furthermore, when he went to Rome in 1555 he took with him the Dominican, Jean Benoist, who had been largely responsible for the violent wording of the Sorbonne's condemnation. In company with Claude d'Espence, Jérôme de la Sauchière, Abbot of Cîteaux, and Crespín de Brinchanteau, a Benedictine, Benoist was present at an interview with leading Jesuits at which the Cardinal re-affirmed his support of the Society and again asked for a settlement in Reims in order that his university might benefit from the Society's presence. The four theologians were taken to the Jesuit house where they attended prayers and spiritual exercises,

¹ *M.H.S.J., Monumenta Ignatiana*, VIII, 563-7; IX, 451-2.

by which they all confessed themselves much edified. Finally they held a discussion with Laynez, Polanco, Olave and des Freux, after which Olave drew up an answer to the decree of the Sorbonne. There is no doubt that the attitude of all four Frenchmen towards the Society underwent very considerable modification, but the proportionate degrees of conversion are differently estimated by different Jesuit observers. It seems that the two monks promised to work actively for the rescinding of the Sorbonne's decree, but the Dominican was unwilling entirely to take back his own words.¹

No concrete results, however, followed. Sorbonne and Parlement remained inflexible: the Jesuits remained unnaturalized and continued to lie under episcopal censure. Lorraine from time to time uttered fair words and large promises, but he could do nothing, and occasionally even gave the appearance of having lost interest. It pleased him to think that he stood almost alone in the Society's behalf, and he seemed to resent any encroachment upon an isolated position which added to his own self-gratification though it did his protégés little good.² With the lapse of time he even became less approachable, and the Jesuits found it a matter of increasing difficulty to obtain even the comforting assurances with which they were periodically provided. The reason was not that Lorraine ceased to wish the Society well but that he could really make no impression upon the general opposition that it had evoked; while the emergence towards the end of the decade of more formidable problems added to the obstacles in the way of any settlement in the Society's favour. The Cardinal of Lorraine's early connections with the Jesuits show very well the enervating effect that failure always produced upon his enthusiasms. But when in 1558 Laynez sent Père Cogordan to France to aid Père Broet, he took a decisive step. As a negotiator Père Cogordan, even on Lorraine's admission, had few equals, and

¹ On this interview see *Lainii Monumenta*, II, 72-4; *Mon. Ign.* x, 196, 260, 333-4, 360, 454, 485, 497, 517, 560-1, 642, 646-7; XI, 33, 106, 214, etc., etc., as in Index, esp. 451-4.

² See e.g. *Mon. Ign.* x, 485, and *Litterae Quadrimestres*, VI, 497: "vultque unus esse totius in Gallia Societatis protector".

his labours were destined in time to meet with a deserved success.¹

III

Amid the confusion that followed the disastrous battle of St Quentin in August 1557, Henri II saw suddenly for the first time, with a terrible clarity produced by the military disaster, by the captivity of his favourite Montmorency and by the unconcealable exhaustion of his people, the grim spectre of heresy rise before his eyes: of heresy not, as hitherto, a sporadic manifestation of scattered, personal idiosyncracies, the punishment of which was part of the ordinary routine administration of justice; but of heresy as a thing compact and organized, extending throughout all the provinces of his kingdom and penetrating into all classes and ranks of his subjects; heresy as a challenge to the established order and as a menace to society. At that moment, under stress of a primitive terror and hatred, Henri II resolved to abjure foreign adventure, to purchase peace whatever the price, and to devote his remaining energies to the extirpation of the monster whose fearful vision had suddenly come upon him, and which throve upon the conditions of social and financial dislocation produced by the war. Henri II had been taught to identify heresy with revolution, and the experiences of other countries had not weakened his conviction of the justice of this identification. Now he saw organized heresy menacing him at the very moment when society was undergoing its heaviest strain, with disaster in the field and discontent in the home; and from the moment the vision dawned upon him, Henri II was never the same man again.

To the first tentative French heterodoxies of the 'twenties and early 'thirties there had now succeeded a thing of definite substance and body—the Calvinist *Réforme*. For nearly two decades the influence of the exiled Noyonnais and the example of his Genevan theocracy had been making rapid headway in France, despite the persecution which it encountered. Devoted

¹ On the Jesuits in France see Père Fouqueray, *Histoire de la Société de Jésus en France*, I. References to Lorraine *passim* in the *Monumenta Ignatiana*, the *Lainii Monumenta*, the *Polanci Chronicon*, etc.

ministers trained at Geneva—too many of them ex-friars—had steadily and laboriously been building up in France the Genevan discipline and the Genevan organization, while behind the scenes the master-mind of Calvin directed all. It was with the full, elaborate system of Congregation, Consistory and Synod, that the affrighted Henri II suddenly saw himself confronted in 1557. That year, in which the French military power was struck down for half a century, saw also a rapid advance of the Calvinist cause. For the first time, nobles and gentry began to rally to its standards.¹ The Constable's three nephews, Coligny, Admiral of France, d'Andelot, and even the Cardinal of Châtillon, showed signs of conversion, and during 1558 a series of untoward incidents deepened the King's apprehension. His own cousins the Bourbons, Anthony King of Navarre and Condé his younger brother, began to incline Genewards. Anthony was an irresolute man with little moral courage; and there was personal hostility between him and the Guises, who now tried to censor his private chaplain. But his main object in life was the recovery of the lost Spanish portion of his realm of Navarre. After the affair of the Rue St Jacques he committed the imprudence of associating himself with a Lutheran intercession on behalf of the culprits at a moment when Henri II was undergoing a violent anti-Lutheran revulsion. Later he attended the extraordinary manifestations in the Pré-aux-Clercs. But he continued to hear Mass, and probably religious sentiments of a more definite nature were imputed to him at the time, and by historians later, than he ever really experienced. The case of d'Andelot, however, caused a sensation and threatened to bring the issue of Protestantizing nobles to a head. He was reported to the King as being the instigator of the Pré-aux-Clercs demonstrations: simultaneously the Cardinal of Lorraine was told by Philip II's minister Granvelle that intercepted letters of d'Andelot revealed him as about to rise in arms at the head of the French Calvinists. Both charges were false; but d'Ande-

¹ For an impartial and up-to-date discussion of the causes and methods of the spread of Calvinism between 1540 and 1560, see Romier, *Le royaume de Catherine de Médicis*, II, cap. vii.

lot was arrested and remained in prison for some time, stoutly refusing to hear Mass. The natural animosity between the Guises and the Châtillons, who had the sympathy of the Bourbons, was heightened by this incident and by the patronage which the Guises' rivals gave to the *Réforme*. Indeed the seeds of the civil wars were now being sown broadcast, in personal and family jealousies as much as in religious estrangement. But the Guises were loath to abandon their Italian ambitions, even after St Quentin, when the Cardinal of Lorraine was largely responsible for restoring order and public confidence in a moment of terror and panic. They desired to carry on the war at least until France should be in a stronger position to make peace, hoping meanwhile to be able to deal with Bourbons, Châtillons and Calvinists all at once. The King, on the other hand, plunged into still deeper depths of terror by the spread of the *Réforme* among the nobility and by the firmness shown by d'Andelot, was convinced that he must have instant peace with Spain.

The Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, finally concluded in the spring of 1559, was the work of Henri II and of the Constable. The terms were overwhelmingly severe; but France had nothing to negotiate with and was forced from position after position. Alone the Cardinal of Lorraine—far from betraying his country to Spain as a calumnious tradition asserts—stood out vainly in the hope of better terms, and it is the judgment of a modern historian, who has largely re-made this period, that on the French side only the Cardinal himself, and Catherine de Médicis, emerged from the peace negotiations with untarnished honour.¹ Henri II did not mind the Carthaginian terms. His whole mind was focussed on the religious question; the long complacency of Crown and Church had been shattered by the sudden realization of the Calvinist danger, and France in her turn was about to pass through the cruel experiences from whose German counterpart she had drawn so much diplomatic profit. Frightened for the first time for her own safety, France at last endeavoured to link her reforming efforts with those

¹ Romier, *Origines Politiques*, II, cap. i.

of the rest of the Catholic world by calling out for a General Council.

Philip II did not view the peace in quite the same unadulterated crusading spirit. That France should turn her attention inwards and put her own clerical house in order was good and desirable, and harmless; but that the Catholic monarchs of Europe should unite for the celebration of a General Council, and for the universal suppression of heresy, though in theory doubtless very good and desirable also, nevertheless as a matter of practical politics would entail certain very serious risks. There would be grave disadvantages for Spain in French attention being directed towards the suppression of heresy in England and Scotland. In Scotland, where Mary of Guise was regent for her daughter, the Lords of the Congregation, an organization founded by John Knox in the interests of Presbyterianism, broke out into revolt early in 1559, overthrowing Catholicism wherever they passed and pressing back the regent upon Edinburgh. Henri II and the Cardinal of Lorraine wrote to Paul IV in pitiful terms of the state of the Church in Scotland, and endeavoured to rouse Savoy and Spain to an attack upon Geneva, the matrix of all the evil, promising French assistance.¹ They also directed their threats against Elizabeth and her newly established Church Settlement. All this was a source of great uneasiness to Philip II. The Queen of Scotland was Elizabeth's heir: she was also wife of the heir to the French throne. The extermination of heresy in England and Scotland by French arms, if coupled with the deposition of Elizabeth, would infallibly have led to a union of the three sceptres in one hand. Philip's Catholic internationalism broke down before so horrifying a prospect. He drew back in suspicion from any proposal that seemed, in however slight a way, to menace Elizabeth's hold upon her throne. Westminster and Geneva remained unscathed.

At home, however, Henri II was left free to follow his own will unchecked. He turned ferociously upon the Calvinists. By the Edict of Écouen, June 2nd, 1559, the whole judicial machinery

¹ Documents cited by Romier, *Origines Politiques*, II, 356-9.

of the country was set mercilessly upon them, leaving them the bare alternatives of flight or revolt.¹ Paul IV, setting the good example in Rome, urged on the King and reproached the Cardinal of Lorraine for his lenience.² When the Parlement hesitated to register the new acts of persecution the King visited the Court in person, and, more successful than Charles I, arrested six prominent members, among them the famous du Bourg, who had shown opposition.³ Nevertheless conditions rapidly deteriorated. The answer to the Edict of Écouen was a new wave of apostasies including a bishop. In many districts the Huguenot worship began to be publicly celebrated. The Cardinal of Lorraine in a moment of despair estimated the numbers of the sectaries at no less than two-thirds of the whole realm.

But Henri II did not live to do more than merely sketch the broad lines of the religious policy for the sake of which he had accepted a shameful peace. The lance that struck down the King in the tourney of June 30th, 1559, also carried the Cardinal of Lorraine to the summit of his political career, and left deposited in Guise hands the legacy bequeathed by its royal victim. The new King, François II, was an unattractive and callow youth, legally of age but a child in mind and totally uninterested in public affairs. He was dominated by his vivacious wife who persuaded him to hand over power to her Guise uncles. Thus Duke and Cardinal, whose influence over Henri II had waned at the end of his reign, found themselves raised to a position of stabilized political supremacy such as they had never enjoyed even under Henri II whilst Montmorency was there to dispute it with them. And it was the Cardinal who dominated in this partnership: "He is both Pope and King", wrote the Tuscan ambassador.⁴

There followed the general post normally consequent upon a

¹ Text and discussion in Romier, *Origines Politiques*, II, 361-4.

² *Ibid.* II, 367-8.

³ M. Romier perceives Jesuit revenge against the Parlement. Here again, despite Père Cogordan's great abilities, I think M. Romier overestimates Jesuit influence. It is true nevertheless that the Jesuits did suspect many of the Parliamentarians of heresy after the Court's refusal to register their letters of naturalization; but this is no proof that they engineered du Bourg's arrest.

⁴ Desjardins, *Négociations avec la Toscane*, III, 404.

change of monarch. The Guises gathered around them those who had been their followers against the Constable—Catherine de Médicis, the widowed Queen-Mother, the marshal de St André, subordinates such as Montluc and Marillac—and quietly dismissed their opponents. But there were no sensational disgraces, no petty revenges. Diane de Poitiers, the late King's mistress, who had always sought to incite her lover against the Protestants, was politely asked to retire from Court, and the Bourbons and Montmorency, though invited to attend the full *Conseil Privé*, were not summoned to the smaller *Conseil des affaires* which really wielded the power. It was not in the Guise interest wantonly to provoke their defeated rivals. They had problems enough to face without seeking to create new ones. The King of Navarre remained in the south at his miniature capital, Nérac, but was given every reason to expect a kind reception should he choose to come to Court; and when Condé was sent on an honourable mission to Philip II at Ghent he had only his own extravagance to thank if he found himself out of pocket at the end. Montmorency knew that he could hardly expect to be honoured with office by his rivals and accepted his relegation with a stoical loyalty.¹

The Guises acted with promptitude and ability in facing conditions of almost insuperable difficulty. There was the usual story of French financial exhaustion, due in this case to François I's extravagances and Henri II's wars. The Cardinal showed considerable skill as a finance minister.² Grants of royal domain were forcibly revoked, drastic economies were effected, and by a policy of open intimidation prominent financiers, both French and Italian, to whom the Crown was indebted, were induced to lower their rates of interest. The army was cut down and many troops were disbanded, but it was not always found possible to pay them off. Such vigorous retrenchment at home

¹ M. Romier in his *Conjuration d'Amboise* has entirely rewritten the history of the reign of François II and has smashed beyond repair the traditional account resting on the pamphlets of Regnier de la Planche.

² This is acknowledged now by most writers. See, for example, the résumé of French finance at this time in Laferrière, *Le Contrat de Poissy* (1905). Also M. Romier in his *Conjuration d'Amboise*.

did not allow of an active policy abroad, and there was no more talk of an attack on Geneva. But the interests of the Crown in Scotland had at all costs to be defended, for the Queen of Scotland had become also Queen of France. She now proceeded to quarter the arms of England as well. Relations with Elizabeth naturally became strained, and were not eased when in October the Knoxian rebels captured Edinburgh and received financial assistance from the English Treasury. Then came a reaction, and before the end of the year Mary of Guise was back in Holyrood, and Stirling and Fife had fallen to the French soldiery. But it was only temporary. The best part of two armadas raised by the Guises with extreme difficulty, and commanded by their younger brother, the Marquis d'Elbœuf, was destroyed by storms before reaching Scotland, and when by an astonishingly bold decision Elizabeth sent Admiral Winter into the Forth and created a *de facto* state of war with France, the resources which the Guises could bring to the succour of their hardly pressed sister had been practically exhausted. Even Guise ambition and Guise pride were forced to confess that schemes of foreign domination must reluctantly be laid aside.

Powerless to influence the course of events abroad, the Government redoubled the attack upon the Protestants at home. The unhappy du Bourg paid the extreme penalty for his outspokenness, and throughout the latter part of 1559 edicts and regulations supplementary to the Edict of Écouen were piled up one above the other.¹ Blind complacency had given way to exaggerated panic. Even the Cardinal of Lorraine was carried off his balance by the general terror. All classes were infected with heresy—nobles, magistrates, lawyers, bourgeoisie; to what exact extent nobody could accurately say. The complete collapse of Catholicism, as of some empty worn-out fabric, was freely prophesied; and though it was the grand era of the Calvinist martyrs it was also a time of signal Calvinist triumph, for in the spring of 1559 the celebration in Paris of the first National

¹ Isnard, I, Nos. 1440-2, 1445, 1452, 1461-3: edicts, letters patent and ordinances against conventicles; the death-penalty for all who encourage them or hide fugitives. See also Isambert, xiv, 7, 11.

Synod crowned the grand edifice of the reformers at the very moment of their greatest trial.

The ascendancy of the Guises and the intensification of the persecutions were doubly a matter of lamentation to the Huguenots. They had looked for an alleviation of their lot after the death of Henri II, fully expecting that the new king would put himself in the hands of his Bourbon relatives, or at least into those of his mother, rather than surrender himself to his wife's uncles. The Bourbons themselves had hoped for this too. The cloud of the great betrayal of 1523 had never completely lifted from them and they had seen a great opportunity of recouping their prestige. Their bitter disappointment led to the flotation of a theory that the Guise rule was unconstitutional; that the King, if not legally a minor, was at least legally incapable of selecting his advisers, and that by all rulings of law and precedent the Bourbons had a strict right to be his ministers. Pressure was put upon Anthony of Navarre to come to court and claim his "rights", and among those who thus urged him were Condé, Condé's Calvinist chaplain Chandieu, Morel, one of the Parisian pastors, the Vidame de Chartres, d'Andelot and the English ambassador Throckmorton. But Anthony shrank from the undertaking. He was by nature irresolute, but on this occasion he probably saw more clearly than his advisers the utter folly of their advice. On arrival at Court he dashed their expectations by deferring to the Guises, reaffirming his Catholic faith and submitting without protest to his exclusion from the *Conseil des affaires*. In November he was sent south again to escort the King's sister Marguerite into Spain where she was to marry Philip II. After this he did not return north but remained at Nérac.

The dramatic rôle which Anthony had refused to play was eagerly assumed by Condé, to whose rash self-confidence it was better suited. But even Condé saw that in spite of the Government's unpopularity—with the Huguenots, with many of the nobility, with the disbanded soldiery—it was useless to contemplate its overthrow by public action. Montmorency would never have countenanced open rebellion against the King's

ministers, and none of the discontented nobles dared come forward as leader. Condé was driven to underground plans, and in September he began to look about him for tools. He soon found his man in the person of a brave but silly officer called La Renaudie, who had private reasons for desiring to harm the Guises. A plan was devised to seize the two brothers and bring them to trial before the États-Généraux for usurpation of the legal rights of the King's next-of-kin. La Renaudie was recruiting all the winter, and meanwhile a series of pamphlets scattered throughout the country endeavoured to give publicity to the "constitutional thesis" of the Bourbons. But this legal and literary presentation of a case that in reality rested simply on frustrated personal ambition was not the work of Bourbon brains. The elaboration of the "constitutional thesis" with its practical denial of the King's majority was probably due to Chandieu, who was able and ingenious and had had a legal training; while the distribution of the pamphlets was certainly organized by François Hotman, the celebrated Protestant jurist, who from the safety of his retreat at Strasburg also sent out secret appeals for financial aid to England and to the German Protestant princes. But Chandieu, Hotman and Condé were unable to carry the legal profession with them. The "constitutional thesis" was manifestly unsound; the King might be unfit for responsibility but he was undoubtedly of age, and even had he not been it was doubtful whether anyone had any defined constitutional right to be regent. The Bourbons' case was patently manufactured *ad hoc*, as was pointed out repeatedly by the replies which their pamphlets evoked.¹

The plot had been devised, its chief actor chosen, a background of legality sketched. One thing more Condé sought to do—to implicate the Huguenot movement and turn to his own mundane purposes an organization built up, with infinite labour and suffering, for purely spiritual ends. But here he tasted failure. The Huguenots were still deeply impregnated with the spirit and doctrine of non-resistance. Whatever their opponents might

¹ See Naef, *Le Conjuraton d'Amboise et Genève* (1922), for the literary conflict over the "constitutional thesis".

sincerely believe to the contrary, the last thing the Calvinists consciously desired was to become involved in rebellion against what they held to be divinely appointed authority. Calvin condemned La Renaudie roundly. He issued repeated and forcible denials that the plot had the official sanction and blessing of Geneva. He had no opinion of La Renaudie and very little of Condé, and over and above his objection to violence on principle, he clearly saw the futility of the undertaking and prophesied its failure. Condé's hypocrisy never deceived the acuteness of Calvin, whose behests were faithfully adhered to by the French pastors. Excitable individuals like Chandieu and Morel might assist Condé, but they did so purely as individuals, committing nobody but themselves to their insane cause. Many Calvinists must undoubtedly have cherished a hope that the plot's success would alleviate their condition, but few raised a finger to help it on. As a body and as a movement Calvinism held aloof from Condé's adventures and spurned his bribes. All credit to it for its restraint. A time, however, was drawing near when the old integrity, unable to prevail against the influence of new undesirable elements, would break down, soon to become undermined beyond repair.

One further point in Henri II's religious programme remains to be considered. The Calvinist peril had revolutionized the attitude of the French Crown towards a General Council, and once again a French king was prepared to adore what he had formerly burned. Henri II told Père Cogordan shortly before his death that he sincerely desired a General Council, adding however "*secondo però la pragmatica del Re Ludovico Secondo*".¹ The implication, of course, was that a General Council must be warned off attempting to tamper with Gallican privileges, and Henri can scarcely have meant that he would be pleased to see the Council of Trent resumed. He wanted a General Council primarily in order to deal with the Huguenot danger, and though the Huguenots had expressed their willing-

¹ *Lainii Monumenta*, IV, 325. The Pragmatic Sanction of St Louis—if this be meant—is a fifteenth-century forgery.

ness to submit their case to a "free, general council" it was not likely that they would be prepared to accept the Council of Trent, already self-bound by past decisions, as fulfilling these conditions. Yet one clause of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis bound the Kings of France and Spain to work in harmony for the procuration of a "holy and general council", and two of du Bourg's companions in arrest—Paul de Foix and du Faur de Pibrac—had on the fateful day of the *mercuriale* made an appeal to a General Council and had demanded the cessation of the persecution.¹ For the view was daily gaining more adherents that legal proceedings against the Calvinists should be suspended until the doctrinal issues had been cleared by some pronouncement from œcumenical authority. That most of the issues were perfectly clear already, began to be deliberately ignored by many.

While Paul IV lived it was in vain that monarchs bound themselves by treaty to procure a General Council.² But his convenient death in August 1559 inspired with renewed hope those who looked ardently for a General Council as one of the benefits of the peace. It would have been a stroke of the profoundest irony if, when suitable political conditions had at last been attained and a European peace that promised stability at last achieved, the Papacy should have been allowed to remain longer in the hands of one who was unwilling to profit from these God-given conditions. The conclave of the autumn of 1559 was therefore critical. The successor of Paul IV had it in his power to make or mar, and it is surprising, this being so, that the French cardinals were on the whole unwilling to go to Rome to help elect him.³ Clearly Lorraine could not leave France; and Bourbon and Châtillon—his fellow titular-inquisitors—also made their excuses. But by degrees all the rest collected in Rome where under the leadership of the Cardinal of Guise they formed one of the three main parties in the conclave, the other two being the Spaniards and the followers of Carlo Caraffa. The Cardinal of Lorraine was of the opinion

¹ Maugis, *Histoire du Parlement de Paris*, II, 9.

² Ancel, "Paul IV et le Concile" in *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 1905.

³ Desjardins, *Négociations avec la Toscane*, III, 404.

that the world had suffered enough from base-born Popes.¹ The official French candidates were thus all of aristocratic birth; and though the chief of them—the Cardinal Hippolyte d'Este of Ferrara—could hardly be regarded as ideal from the spiritual point of view, no such objection could be taken to the others, Cardinal Gonzaga of Mantua and Cardinal de Tournon. It speaks oddly for the Guises' supposed hatred of Tournon that they should have been desirous of placing him on the papal throne. Yet the truth probably was that provided they could keep out the main Spanish candidate, Cardinal Carpi, the French Government would not really have taken anybody else's election ill. The conclave opened on September 5th. Among the capitulations which each cardinal bound himself to observe if elected was one binding him to call a General Council. It was time-honoured; but it was now charged with a new significance and import.

IV

It will be well at this point to take another look at the man into whose hands the various threads which have shortly been traced in the preceding pages are now to be gathered, and to whom were entrusted the fortunes of the French nation and Church at one of the most critical moments of a most critical century. It was inevitable, as the Cardinal of Lorraine grew older, that some part of the original fresh charm of his youthful attraction should become a little faded. The slightly ingenuous prodigy had become the mature and experienced statesman, and twelve years of power and immersion in public affairs had not only brought criticism and even hostility in their train, but had produced their dulling effect upon character. In 1559, at the age of thirty-four, Charles' ability is still unquestioned, but there is no longer the same universal testimony to the almost unnatural brightness of his character. Elements of hardness, of fickleness, even of duplicity, which enabled the later Calvinist pamphleteers to draw their grotesque, misshapen caricatures, may be perceived emerging under the strain of a life of quite

¹ Ven. Cal., No. 96.

uncommon fullness and variety. A curious inborn inconstancy, reflecting no doubt the swiftly changing moods of a restless and unharnessable mind, gave him a reputation for definite deceit, and the rapidity and unaccountable nature of his changes of temper drove ambassadors to distraction. "The Cardinal is a great liar", Throckmorton once wrote to Cecil. At the same time an unpleasant strain of harshness began to manifest itself, as is apparent from the incident of the Lyonese bankers, who, on complaining that they could not have been worse treated by the Grand Turk himself, were immediately clapped into jail. And yet power to charm never deserted Charles de Guise. The unreasonable bully—as he could at times appear—was able to melt suddenly into a suavity, a charm and an air of unassuming intimacy before which resentment and argument melted away too, leaving you completely at the mercy of his extraordinary attraction. But his amiability came to be regarded with some reserve, as an affectation, as an artificial rôle taken up and dropped at convenience, rather than as the natural effervescence of unaffected good-nature. Proud to arrogance in moments of success, at the first touch of misfortune or loss of favour he was all abject humility. The ease and suddenness of the frequent metamorphosis became the subject of feminine wit,¹ and Throckmorton thought it necessary to warn others against being deceived by the Cardinal's "pitiful plaints". In addition he suffered from an unfortunate lack of physical courage to which he was reluctant to own.²

Versatility was the key to his character, but it was also its canker. Not only did it make him appear hypocritical in the eyes of his enemies, often very unjustly, but it constituted a definite hindrance to the full use of his many gifts. He was overwhelmed by the profusion and exuberance of his talents, and he lacked that extra mental and spiritual power which talents in profusion call for if they are to be rightly and coherently used. He had aims and objects in plenty—but he was without the single directing motive which makes the great man,

¹ See the *mot* of Mdlle de la Guyonnière in Brantôme, iv, 278-9.

² Brantôme, iv, 276.

and the saint. Hence the appearance of ineffectiveness which somehow takes the lustre from all his achievements. Family interests, artistic gratification, national statesmanship, church reform—all may well be cultivated by one man, but unless each is given its due place in a fixed scheme of life, it will trip up the others and all will be frustrated as a result. It was the fundamental weakness of the Cardinal's character that he was unable to achieve for himself this supreme correlation. The *Santorello* never came near sainthood—not because his interests were too diverse but because they were too little unified. Yet the Cardinal of Lorraine had very large spiritual potentialities. Did he—unable to face the mental asceticism necessary if the greatest heights are to be attempted and scaled, whether it be in art or politics, in literature, in learning or in the Ascent of Mount Carmel—did he at some point consciously make the *gran rifiuto*? Or was he never aware that he had made it?

CHAPTER IV

Pius IV, the General Council and the National Council

Unusquisque in viam suam declinavit.
—Isaiah, LIII, 6.

Quoniam supervenit mansuetudo: et corripiemur.
—Psalm LXXXIX.

I

THE troubled pontificate of Paul IV left tossing in its wake a long, disordered and shamelessly venal conclave. For thirteen weeks the fierce, unedifying battle was fought out between the Spanish, French and Caraffan parties until as Christmas approached the finality of the triangular stalemate had at last to be recognized on all sides. It was not until then that the name of an Italian of the second rank, whose success only a few shrewd observers had dared originally to predict, was reintroduced as a compromise. In the small hours of December 26th, 1559, Gian Angelo de Medici, Cardinal-Priest of Santa Prisca, was acclaimed as Pope Pius IV, and one of the most transparently political conclaves in history had produced one of the least political of Popes.¹

The contrast between Pius IV and his predecessor was very marked. The new Pope was a kindly and affable lawyer whose long administrative career had been hampered by no political rôle. Neither an enthusiast nor a theologian, he was in many respects a throw-back to the Renaissance Papacy of Leo X and Clement VII. Yet his election is one of the most pregnant moments of the Counter-Reform. By withdrawing the Papacy from active partisanship in international politics, Pius IV clinched and safeguarded the settlement of Cateau-Cambrésis, and finally released the reform movement within the Church

¹ On the conclave of Pius IV see Dembinsky, "Wybór Piusa IV", in *Transactions of the Academy of Cracow* (1887), xx, 190-304; Müller, *Das Konklave Pius IV* (1889); Šusta, *Pius IV před pontifikátén a na počátku pontifikátu* (1900); and Pastor, *Geschichte der Päpste* (1920), vii, 1-57 with his note on the sources (Engl. transl. (1928), xv, 1-65). The work of Dembinsky being in Polish and that of Šusta in Czech, I cannot claim any first-hand acquaintance with them.

from the deadly political entanglements which had long lain round its neck like some diabolic old-man-of-the-sea, throttling all independent expression or development. Sensible rather than sagacious, and essentially simple for all his shrewdness, Pius was destined to repair much of the damage wrought by the unbalanced enthusiast in whose person the Counter-Reform had with such ironic results first consolidated its hold upon the papal throne. He gave a reasonable opportunity to what appeared to many to be a ruined and hopelessly compromised cause.

Pius IV was sixty years old at the time of his election. He came of a middle-class professional Milanese family, and was entirely unrelated to his great Florentine namesakes whose arms he afterwards assumed. His youth had been hard and variegated. His father had been ruined by the French conquest of 1515, and for six years, until the restoration of the Sforza in 1521, Gian Angelo had been dependent on the charity of the Morone family in order to pursue his studies at Pavia. Having taken his doctor's degree in Civil and Canon Law in 1525, he attached himself to the erratic fortunes of his elder brother, the adventurer Gian Giacomo, who from his fastness on Lake Como was plotting to overthrow the Spanish dominion in North Italy. Sent to Rome as his brother's agent, the future Pope became a protonotary and very nearly a bishop, and during the sack of 1527 was brought into close association with Clement VII. But in 1531 he left the Curia to become Chancellor to Gian Giacomo who was now reduced to a struggle for bare independence. In this employment it soon became his difficult and humiliating duty to negotiate his brother's final surrender, which done he returned to Rome where two years later his protector, Cardinal Farnese, became Pope as Paul III.

The adventures of youth were now over, and the routine of middle age set in. De Medici was to serve a long and at first thankless apprenticeship. As a minor official in the papal civil service he was in turn Governor of Ascoli Piceno, Città di Castello, Parma and Fano: he was twice Apostolic Commissary to the papal troops sent to assist Ferdinand, King of the Romans,

against the Turks, and after settling a boundary dispute between Bologna and Ferrara was made a papal referendarius. But it was long before any real promotion came his way, and he had the mortification of seeing younger fellow-countrymen, such as his friend Girolamo Morone, pass him on the ladder of advancement and even ascend into the Sacred College.

Paul III found him useful, but was not eager, on account of his brother's fluctuating political allegiance, to promote him. But when, after several years' steady service for the Emperor, Gian Giacomo married a near relation of the Farnese, it became impossible for Gian Angelo to remain longer in his modest station. In 1545 he became Archbishop of Ragusa; was ordained deacon and priest and consecrated bishop, but did not reside. He narrowly missed the Viennese Nunciature, but his appointment as Commissary-General to the Pope's auxiliaries in the Smalkaldic War enabled him to form a personal judgment as to conditions in Germany. He returned to Italy to become vice-legate in Bologna, and played a decisive part in the retention of the city of Parma for the Farnese in the crisis of 1547, after which he was transferred to the vice-legation of Umbria. At Paul III's last creation of cardinals, in April 1548, he entered the Sacred College and adopted the Medici coat-of-arms at the request of Cosimo of Florence.

Under the grateful shade of the Red Hat de Medici was at last able to indulge his natural temperament as a man of easy and pacific disposition, an appreciator of good living, a humanist who enjoyed and could hold his own in the company of artists and men of letters. These sunnier traits of his character had of necessity lain suppressed during his long and busy apprenticeship, but now, though he worked conscientiously and with success as Prefect of the *Signatura Gratiæ*, enjoying the confidence of Julius III, he was able to bask happily and enjoy himself in the warm sunshine of his cardinalate. As far from dissoluteness as from asceticism, he was at least ashamed of his previous moral lapses.¹ Politically his leanings were more

¹ He had had at least three natural children before taking major orders, two girls and a boy. See Pastor, pp. 64-5 (Engl. transl. pp. 74-5).

Imperial than French; but he played too small a part in politics to incur serious enmity, and though he enjoyed a pension from Charles V and was presented by him with the bishoprics of Cassano and Foligno, he already stood for the policy of sane political neutrality which in imitation of Julius III's later years was to be the keystone of his pontificate.

But the halcyon days of Julius III were followed by the whirlwind of Paul IV and his reforms. The new Rome, austere and rigid as the strictest friary of Capuchins, was uncongenial to de Medici's cheerful temper; and the violence of the Pontiff's anti-Spanish obsession was repugnant to his good sense. With an outspokenness that does not seem to have called down Paul's wrath, he told the Pope frankly that his war policy was heading direct for schism,¹ and an excuse for a temporary retirement to Milan was soon provided by his brother's death, which left him the head of his family. In 1558, however, de Medici again retired from Rome. He was granted leave of absence in the normal way, together with a gift from Paul of 1000 ducats, but there can be little doubt that life in the Holy City had become almost intolerable for opponents of the Pope's political views, even after the end of the war, and probably the demands made by the new régime were more than de Medici—and many others with him—could stand. He went to take a cure for his gout in the baths at Lucca, spending some time also in Florence, visiting his see of Foligno and his native city of Milan where he would have liked to have been archbishop, and enjoying himself among the chestnut groves on the Lago di Como near the site of his brother's ephemeral principality.

Death was perhaps the greatest service that his brother rendered to Gian Angelo. Freed from his connection with an undesirable adventurer, Cardinal de Medici became a respectable candidate for the Papacy, and as such was patronized by Cosimo of Florence who hoped to be rewarded with the title of King of Tuscany. During the three years before the death of Paul IV, de Medici placed his future in the Duke's hands, and it was Florentine influence that furthered his cause in the con-

¹ Ven. Cal., VI, 2, No. 781. Cf. Merkle, *Concilium Tridentinum*, II, 582, 589.

clave when the candidatures of greater names had broken down.

Pius IV was a healthy man except for spasmodic recurrences of gout and catarrh. His life was full, ordered and energetic; and he was a great walker. As the cardinalate had revealed the secret *joie de vivre* that had lain suppressed in the busy civil servant, so did the popedom bring out in its turn the real skill in affairs and great decision of character acquired by Pius in his long training. But to the end he was a solitary figure, with few intimate advisers, standing aloof from his cardinals and jealously preserving his freedom of action. A justifiable nepotism gave him an adviser of exceptional ability in St Charles Borromeo, his sister's son, whose zeal and other-worldliness formed an admirable complement to his uncle's prudence and diplomacy. Promoted rapidly to the archbishopric of Milan, the Scarlet and the Secretaryship of State, St Charles was raised by his remarkable austerity, industry and piety above the reach of all captious criticism. His influence over the Pope was very strong and increased with time. He was one of the few men who ever obtained Pius IV's real personal confidence. Perhaps not even Cardinal Morone, though an old family friend, ever penetrated so far into the recesses of Pius IV's mind.¹

Gian Angelo de Medici had not felt the overwhelming spiritual inspiration which had shaped his predecessor and created the Oratory of Divine Love, the Capuchin movement, St Ignatius, the Barnabites, the Jesuits. He had never been the victim of permanent strong emotion or of any intense religious enthusiasm. Yet his personal spirituality was of a solid nature and appeared to better advantage after his election, while he was alive to the magnitude of the tasks that lay before him. It was true that the intense pressure of the Caraffan régime in Rome was not maintained by Pius IV—indeed, it had been too severe for Cardinal de Medici—and it was noticed that the

¹ For Pius IV's early life, character and dealings with his relatives see Pastor, pp. 58 *et seq.* (Engl. transl. pp. 68–130), based mainly upon Šusta's monograph referred to above, p. 76 note 1. This corrects many inaccuracies in Onofrio Panvinio's contemporary life. See also Pastor's Appendix 90 (Engl. transl. Appendix 37).

prostitutes at once reappeared on the streets. But Pius IV was determined that backsliding should not assume too serious proportions. In a soil loosened at last from its unrelenting hardness by the tremendous hammer-blows of Caraffa, the seeds of a permanent reform might more hopefully be sown. A commission of fourteen cardinals was instituted to deal with reform in general; and the Inquisition under Cardinal Ghislieri continued its activities unchecked, though the new Pope took little direct interest in it. It was to diplomacy that Pius first turned his attention. He found the papal diplomatic service in some confusion. The nunciatures at Toledo, at Vienna, at Venice and at Florence were empty; the Emperor Ferdinand I was still unrecognized by the Holy See. Pius set to work to alter this unhappy state of affairs. He reorganized the nunciatures by filling up the vacant posts and changing the occupants of the rest, giving employment to none of his predecessor's diplomats. One of his first decisions was to acknowledge the Emperor Ferdinand, and in the termination of this latter-day struggle of Papacy and Empire, both parties displayed a most gratifying spirit of concession.¹

Pius IV made it quickly known that his programme for the preservation of the international peace and the stabilization of friendly relations between the Papacy and the secular powers included the summoning of a General Council to undertake the reform of the Church. It might indeed be plausibly argued, as Paul had argued, that the bishops would do better to apply themselves seriously to their duties than to leave their dioceses for the sake of lengthy discussions which might only reveal differences of theological opinion obstructive to the work of reform; and there was much truth in the plea that existing regulations needed to be enforced rather than new ones to be made. But such considerations could not outweigh the advantages likely to accrue to the Church from some spectacular demonstration outside her ordinary routine administration. If a new spirit were to be infused into the clergy, and especially into the more important younger generation of priests, some

¹ Pastor, VII, 100-1 (Engl. transl. pp. 124-5).

rallying point was necessary around which the spiritual revival might collect, and from which it might be enabled to radiate; there was urgent need of some impressive manifestation of the Church's supernational unity, the sense of which had been so seriously impaired by the secular policy of the Papacy and the peculiar developments of sixteenth-century nationalism; in short, the Counter-Reform needed the raising of a standard to create enthusiasm and to generate impetus. Pius soon showed that his intention of respecting the capitulations of the conclave in regard to the Council was serious. He had not been very closely connected with the reform movement inside the Curia but he had always been in general sympathy with it, and he had taken part in reform conferences under Julius III and Marcellus II. He now brought to the movement's assistance some measure of the worldly wisdom, the diplomatic skill and the talent for reconciling conflicting interests that had characterized the great Renaissance Popes. He combined very happily the ideals of the Counter-Reform with the moderation of the pre-Counter-Reform Papacy, that moderation which first by misapplication and then through lack of application had twice almost ruined the Church. Hardly was the conclave over when the foreign representatives in Rome—Imperial, Spanish, French, Portuguese, Florentine—were busy writing home of the remarkable impression created by the new Pope's obviously genuine desire to give satisfaction all round and to summon a General Council.¹ In an early consistory Pius spoke of the interdependence between Reform, the General Council, and the maintenance both

¹ Letters of Francis von Thurm, the Imperial representative, in Sickel, *Zur Geschichte des Concils von Trient* (Vienna 1870-2), pp. 24-5. Of Vargas, the Spanish representative, cited by Voss, *Die Verhandlungen Pius IV mit den Katolischen Mächten über die Neuberufung des Tridentiner Concils im Jahre 1560* (Leipzig 1887), p. 15. Of Lourenço Pires de Tavora, the Portuguese ambassador, in the *Corpo Diplomatico Portuguez* (*Academia Real das Sciencias de Lisboa*), VIII, 297, 348. Of Philibert Babou de la Bourdaisière, Bishop of Angoulême, the French ambassador—Bib. Nat. fonds français, 3102, sixteenth-century copies—letter of Jan. 2nd. (For copies of Babou's letters from Jan.-June 1560 I am indebted to the late M. Dufay of the Bibliothèque Nationale; other copies of them are in Fonds français, 16038 and Cinq Cents Colbert, 343 and the originals seem to be at Turin.) Of Ricasoli, the Florentine ambassador, cited from MS. by Pastor, *passim*.

of the international peace and of his own favourable political relations with the powers. He expressed his willingness to supply the decrees of the Council of Trent with official confirmation, and in regard to a fresh convocation promised not to act without the co-operation of the secular powers, or at least not without the assent of the Emperor and the Kings of France and Spain. That there might be no excuse for Protestant absenteeism, nor yet for any questioning of the Council's liberty, he would not celebrate it in Rome.¹ On January 12th he confirmed the capitulations of the conclave.²

Early in February Count Scipio von Arco presented the obedience of the Emperor. Privately he urged the Holy Father to summon a Council, but the matter was not referred to in his official instructions for fear of exciting Protestant suspicion. The Pope's official reply therefore maintained a corresponding silence.³ In informal conversation, however, Pius IV expressed his feelings clearly enough,⁴ and towards the end of March Stanislaus Hosius, Bishop of Ermland, who was sent to resume normal diplomatic relations with Vienna, received verbal instructions that the Council would be called as soon as the Kings of France and Spain had presented their obediences and expressed their assent.⁵ Relations with Spain were resumed through Ottaviano Raverta, Bishop of Terracina, in whose instructions the question of the Council figured prominently, the Pope declaring that he had been urged to celebrate it by the Emperor and by the Catholic cantons of Switzerland, while he understood that opinion was also favourable in France because

¹ Voss, pp. 15, 16, 29; the Cardinal of Augsburg to the Duke of Bavaria, letters published by Stichele in the *Archiv für die Geschichte des Bistums Augsburg*, II, 128; Döllinger, *Beiträge zur politischen, kirchlichen und Kulturgeschichte der sechs letzten Jahrhunderten*, I, 328; Pastor, VII, 103-4 (Engl. transl. p. 128).

² Ehses, *Concilium Tridentinum*, VIII, 2-6, 6-7.

³ *Ibid.* p. 8 and notes; Sickel, p. 38; other references in Pastor, p. 143 (Engl. transl. pp. 180-1). The Bishop of Angoulême must have been misinformed when he wrote on Feb. 27th that in his official reply to Scipio the Pope had promised to meet the needs of Christendom—"soit pour regard du Concile, soit, etc."

⁴ Sickel, p. 46; Ehses, pp. 10-11; Voss, pp. 15-16; Turba, *Venetianische Despeschen vom Kaiserhofe* (1892-5), III, 141.

⁵ Steinherz, *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland*, 2, I, 7-8.

of the disturbances there.¹ The Pope's intention was several times repeated within a short period; to the Swiss ambassador,² to the Polish ambassadors, and to the King of Poland in a personal letter.³ On March 25th a Bull of Indulgence for the Council was published, the wording of which made it clear that the intended assembly was to be a continuation of the Council of Trent.⁴

Pius IV has been criticized for failing to take immediate action. It has been maintained that with promptitude he could have had the Council under way within a few months of his accession; it has even been argued that his failure to do so proves his real insincerity in the matter.⁵ But the necessary corollary that the Council was forced upon Pius by the powers cannot be upheld. The initiative unquestionably came from the Pope himself, and previous to a request from any of the Catholic monarchs. From the first the Council was an integral part of Pius' general policy; but it had its proper place in that policy and was conditioned by it. It was not to be summoned until the Pope's political relations had been stabilized, the opinion of the powers properly ascertained and their assent duly given. Indeed the delay in the presentation of the French and Spanish obediences and the inability of the French and Spanish ambassadors to commit themselves to immediate acceptance of the Pope's conciliar proposals acted as checks upon him. They were, of course, checks of his own imposition, demanded by his own judicious caution. The delay which they necessitated is not therefore to be interpreted as evidence of sluggishness but rather of fidelity to principle. An observer who was convinced of the Pope's sincerity foretold Easter Sunday 1561—more than a

¹ Terracina's instructions are dated March 11th—Ehse, pp. 10-11. Cf. Voss, p. 32, note 60.

² Wirz, *Quellen zur Schweizer Geschichte*, XXI, 612-17 (March 15th).

³ Ehse, p. 8; Le Plat, IV, 617; Theiner, *Vetera Monumenta Poloniæ et Lithuanicæ*, II, 597.

⁴ Ehse, pp. 13-14.

⁵ Reimann in the *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte*, VI, 591, followed by Voss, p. 31. Their argument turns mainly on the views of the Cardinal of Augsburg and the insertion of the phrase "si opus videbitur" in Le Plat's edition of Pius' letter to the King of Poland, which does not appear in Theiner's version.

whole twelvemonth ahead—as the probable day that would be fixed for the Council's overture.¹ The wisdom of refraining from precipitate action without properly given guarantees of support can hardly be questioned. No one knew better than Pius himself that the olive branch, unless tended with the utmost care, might sprout only too easily with apples of discord.

Just how easily was soon to be demonstrated. Early in April the first puffs were felt of a storm which was to strew discords in plenty along the Pope's path and to tax to the utmost the strength of his principles and the ability of his statesmanship. It was to drive far out of her chartered course the stately ship of papal diplomacy, now setting out on her voyage so full of the promise of fair weather; to keep her tossing angrily and at times in dire peril of shipwreck outside the harbour for which she steered—though not ultimately to prevent her safe entry. The storm blew hard upon Rome from the north-west; and its Æolus was the Cardinal of Lorraine.

II

The result of the conclave was known to the French Court at Blois within a fortnight,² and was received without much criticism. It had long been realized that the French candidates could not hope to prevail, and the Cardinal of Ferrara's failure to grasp the tiara was no unprecedented disappointment. The dreaded Carpi had at least been kept out, and if the new Pope lacked blue blood and was neither an Este nor a Gonzaga nor a de Tournon, still a princely name again graced the papal throne. The pious fiction of the Holy Father's consanguinity with the Queen-Mother of France was studiously fostered, and Catherine was encouraged to share that part-responsibility for the outcome of the conclave which really belonged to her cousin the Duke of Florence.³ But an atmosphere of great uncertainty as to the future prevailed. English observers reported that there would

¹ Pires de Tavora in *C.D.P.* VIII, 297. It was a good guess.

² Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, Jan. 5th—Modena, Archivio di Stato, Cancelleria Ducale, Dispacci della Francia.

³ The Cardinal of Sens to Catherine de Médicis—Paris, *Lettres, négociations... du règne de François II* (1840), p. 208.

be many religious changes and that the King would demand a General Council of the new Pontiff.¹ Yet the first exchanges between the King of France and Pius IV contained no reference to any conciliar proposal. A special envoy, Julian de Medici, was sent to France with the Apostolic Blessing, and returned to Rome with the congratulations of the French Court;² while in a letter to the Cardinal of Guise the King expressed his satisfaction at the election, hoped that dealings with the new Pontiff would be easier than with his predecessor, and promised that he would never trouble him with "*choses extraordinaires*". At the same time several petitions were sent to Rome to be laid before the Pope by the Bishop of Angoulême. Confirmation was asked for the Royal Indults for France, Brittany, Dauphiné and Provence, and for the papal brief of 1557 appointing the Cardinals of Lorraine, Bourbon and Châtillon Grand Inquisitors; a joint protest was registered on the part of the King and the Cardinal of Lorraine against the erection of a new ecclesiastical province in Belgium by the late Pope whereby much territory had been removed from the jurisdiction of Reims; other petitions dealt with Scotch ecclesiastical affairs and smaller matters of less importance.³ That no ambassador was at once appointed to take the King's obedience to Rome seems to show, however, that on the larger issues of Church policy there had as yet been no decision, and neither the demand for the renewal of the ineffective inquisitorial brief nor the decision to recall Cardinal Tournon from Rome⁴ foreshadowed any relaxation of the persecutions. Renewed attempts were made to overcome the

¹ For. Cal., 1559-60, Nos. 552, 553.

² Angoulême to François II, Jan. 2nd; Pius IV to the Bishop of Fermo, nuncio in France, Feb. 18th—Cambridge University Library, Add. MSS. 4823, Transcripts from Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, Codice xi, G, 3.

³ Ribier, II, 840-2. Cf. Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, Jan. 5th—Modena, Archivio di Stato, Cancelleria Ducale, Dispacci della Francia. On the new province of Malines, see below, p. 226.

⁴ See Paillard in the *Revue Historique*, xiv, 72. Tournon's recall is usually ascribed to Catherine de Médicis, who is supposed to have hoped to use him as a makeweight against the Guises. Later on she told him that she had forced the Guises, against their will, to recall him—Šusta, *Die Römische Curie und das Concil von Trient unter Pius IV*, II, 373. I find this difficult to believe.

refusal of the Parlement de Paris to register Henri II's letters patent, now nine years old, naturalizing the Jesuits; but royal *lettres de jussion*, dated February 12th, again went unheeded, despite the favour shown to the Society by the Cardinal of Lorraine and other prominent ecclesiastics. In this strait the energetic and able Père Cogordan redoubled his efforts and paid continual visits to the King and the Cardinal to remind them of their promises of support.¹

The question of a Council, however, was by no means absent from the Cardinal's mind. But it was one which demanded serious reflection. A feeler was pushed out across the Pyrenees and Philip of Spain was asked whether he would be willing to support a request for a General Council.² The matter was laid before the Spanish Royal Council where the predominating influence of the Duke of Alva was unfavourably deployed. The Duke did not see of what use a General Council could possibly be; it could determine nothing new; it might desire to alter much that was already established; it would certainly encounter numberless obstacles in Germany. Philip gave an unsatisfactory and evasive reply, which showed that despite the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis international agreement on the desirability of a General Council would not easily be forthcoming.³

Meanwhile the unsettled conditions in France had not shown any signs of amelioration. The execution of du Bourg had been countered by the assassination of the President Minard, and as the winter advanced the Guises became convinced that the threats against their lives were crystallizing into a definite plot. Early in February the Court left Blois and went into the country west of Orleans. The Cardinal of Lorraine, now definitely apprehensive of a sudden *coup de main* by revolutionaries, was anxious to reach the shelter of Amboise, where Lent was to be passed; but the King, blind to all considerations of safety, insisted on satisfying to the full his inordinate passion for the hunt. About February 12th, however, information was received which sent the Court packing in full haste towards the

¹ Fouquieray, I, 231-3.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 278-9.

² Paris, pp. 206-7.

fortress, which it reached on the 21st in a state of considerable alarm.

The news was of Condé's plot. Realizing that his designs were somehow beginning to leak out, La Renaudie had determined to strike at once. At Nantes, on February 1st, he met a number of delegates representing those few of the lesser nobility whom after five months' recruiting he had persuaded to join him. It was a motley company, but though it contained some Huguenot gentlemen, the religious motive was almost entirely absent. Many of the conspirators had been simply bribed; others, such as the ill-fated Baron de Castelnau, were disbanded soldiers eager to resume professional activities or to indemnify themselves for the wages still owing them. A plan was elaborated to seize the Guises on March 6th at Blois—the Court, it was supposed, would still be there—which done, Condé would reveal himself as the author of the insurrection, assume the reins of government and the care of the King, and indict the Guises before the États-Généraux. Should a miscarriage occur, the Prince would of course disavow all connection with La Renaudie.

Only the barest outlines of this programme came to the ears of the Government,¹ but the very vagueness of their information deepened the suspicions of the Guises and gave scope to their alarmed imagination. At Amboise a new edict against conventicles was issued.² The Guises had visions of a vast international plot with religion as its motive power and with ramifications stretching from Westminster to Geneva. Elizabeth's bold and unforeseen intervention in Scotland had caused consternation; her mysterious and dreaded finger was henceforward supposed to be working secretly in every anti-French pie; and the Scotch rebellion and the French plot were regarded simply as different manifestations of the same movement. Some kind of English-engineered *coup d'état* seems to have been feared even in Amboise itself. For if Elizabeth, chancing what evil effects

¹ On the Nantes meeting and its betrayal see Romier, *Conjuration d'Amboise*, pp. 92-9; Thompson, *The Wars of Religion in France*, p. 32 and notes; and *Revue Historique*, xiv, 83-4.

² Isnard, I, Nos. 1477-8; Isambert, xiv, 21.

might follow the example of encouragement openly given to rebels for religion's sake, had by treaty promised definite military assistance to the Lords of the Congregation, was it not reasonable to assume that she must also have entered into similar relations with the French conspirators, seeing that these too were preparing to rise in the cause of religion against what was to all intents and purposes the same popish government?

But superficial resemblances are treacherous things. There was no organic connection, indeed no similarity of purpose even, between the two movements—though both were patronized, but to very different degrees, by Elizabeth. La Renaudie's aims were religious only by implication; he was encouraged by Elizabeth¹ solely in order to embarrass the French while the Scotch recovered lost ground. It was probably under the delusion that the plot was a Huguenot rebellion, and perhaps in the hope of placating Elizabeth, that the Cardinal of Lorraine broached the question of Church reform with the English ambassador. Dwelling with emphasis on the existence of intolerable abuses, he vigorously asserted the necessity for far-reaching changes, "as vigorously", reported Throckmorton in surprise, "as if he had been hired to defend the Protestant cause".² And yet plain-speaking of this kind was something more than a diplomatic device to meet a misinterpreted situation. The Scotch disaster and the menace of disaster at home—conceived of as far more serious than it actually was—had led to a certain loosening of ideas. Free expression was being given to sentiments which would never have been tolerated under Henri II, and it was being realized that the fiercest persecution was powerless to stay the progress of heresy. Already an Interim was being spoken of whereby the Calvinist worship should be tolerated until the decisions of a General Council. This was the advice of Coligny, a professed Calvinist but entirely ignorant of Condé's machinations and La Renaudie's plot; and it was advice in which

¹ There is no compelling documentary evidence of Elizabeth's relations with La Renaudie, but all inferences point very strongly towards them. M. Romier maintains—*Conjuration d'Amboise*, pp. 73–6—that her financial aid cannot be doubted, but that Throckmorton was ignorant of it.

² For. Cal., No. 777 (9).

both Catherine de Médicis and the Chancellor Olivier seem to have concurred.¹ Even Lorraine himself was veering towards this opinion—so great was the terror of the moment—and we find the Spanish ambassador, in unconscious confirmation of Throckmorton, writing indignantly to Philip II that the Cardinal was talking as though he were a Lutheran, and prophesying that some form of Interim would almost certainly be granted both in France and in Scotland.² An ambassador was now charged to take the Royal Obedience to Rome—Jean Babou de la Bourdaisière, brother of the Bishop of Angoulême—and he was instructed to petition for a General Council.³ The Pope's favourable attitude in this matter was by now general knowledge.

Further information now came to hand which seemed to lend colour to the most alarming conjectures of the Guises. The plot, it was said, had extensive connections abroad; a Prince of the Blood was implicated; there was treachery within the very walls of Amboise. A terror amounting almost to panic set in. Unseen enemies were felt to be present on all sides, watching and waiting in silence; every man suspected his neighbour's loyalty and was by him suspected in return. The panic culminated on the night of March 5th for which the dénouement of the plot was timed. Encircled by armed guards, and with coats of mail beneath their normal attire, the Court spent a sleepless night of terror, expecting at each moment the revelation of some appalling treachery to be followed by massacre and pillage. It was the most complete anti-climax. Nothing happened. The panic evaporated into nervous and premature relief: after three days the King could no longer be kept back from the hunting-field.

Nothing had happened: yet the fright of what might have happened had produced results of great importance. The Government sought to conciliate the hidden enemy whose strength and

¹ Naef, *Conjuration d'Amboise*, p. 54; Guettée, *Histoire de l'Église de France*, VIII, 367. Cf. the excellent biographies of Coligny and Catherine by Whitehead (1904) and Mariéjol (1920), respectively.

² Letters cited by Voss, note 76; cf. *Revue Historique*, XIV, 76, 95, 96.

³ For. Cal., No. 750.

motives it so radically misinterpreted. On March 8th the King signed, and three days later the Parlement de Paris registered, the first Edict of Amboise,¹ a remarkable document which bore unmistakable witness to the profound modification of sentiment which was being undergone in governmental circles. The failure of the persecutions was frankly confessed. The horrors of useless suffering and bloodshed were referred to with a compassion unprecedented in official utterances. Pardon was accorded to all prisoners for religion with the exception of preachers and conspirators; and provided they lived thenceforward as *bons catholiques* no questions would be asked about their past. This was, of course, very far from toleration, but so far as it went it was a complete break with the past.² Never before had heresy been pardoned so absolutely; never before had past lives been so completely blotted out from the inquisitorial purview. There was, to be sure, the proviso of subsequent orthodoxy; yet the Calvinists had their own interpretation of the words *bons catholiques*.

This first milestone on the road which led within two years to the Toleration Edict of January 1562 was the product of nervous panic. It was a desperate defensive measure against a mysterious foe whose strength defied computation and whose purposes had been misunderstood. It soon became apparent that the plot, far from having been out-manœuvred, was unaffected by the Pardon and could indeed hardly yet be said to have begun. Reconnoitring expeditions revealed a concentration of strange troops around Amboise, and confessions forcibly extorted from stray prisoners proved that the intended blow had only been postponed, owing to the difficulties of concentrating the conspirators and to the removal of the Court from Blois. Panic again seized the Court. Alarming evidence of treachery was provided by the mysterious and daily distribution of pamphlets attacking the Guises and the Queen-Mother, and

¹ Text in *Mémoires de Condé*, I, 336; and Isambert, xiv, 22-6. Not, of course, to be confused with its better-known namesake of 1563 by which the first civil war was terminated. Cf. Isnard, I, Nos. 1481-3: amplifications, Nos. 1485-7.

² Cf., however, François I's letters patent of 1536—*B.S.H.P.F.* xxxiv, 166.

repeating all the most obscene fabrications of François Hotman. Martial law was proclaimed; once more the castle was put in a state of defence. With the possible intention of averting violence at the last moment, letters patent were issued on the 16th in which the important concession of the right of petition was made to the *malsentants de la foy*.¹ Thus these were not only to be released from prison; they might now also legally present their case to the King.

But such concessions passed high over La Renaudie's head. A conscientious tool, under orders from a less conscientious employer, he would have remained unaffected by any proclamation of religious tolerance, however wide. It was for Condé to command, and of what use to Condé were the pardon and the right of petition? They could not help him to supplant the Guises. The plot went through to its dismal end. On March 17th several detachments of troops under La Renaudie's lieutenants attacked the castle of Amboise early in the morning. The Duke of Guise, though taken momentarily by surprise, was quite equal to the situation. Within a few hours Condé, who had arrived two days previously to await the climax of his intrigues, had the mortification of witnessing in person the futile débâcle by which the secret efforts of so many months were crowned.

The death of La Renaudie himself in a skirmish on the following day and the seizure of his secretary's papers added actual danger to the Prince's mortification, for the papers gave every reason to suspect his complicity, and now that the rebel bolt had been shot, and had turned out to be so feeble, the Government felt itself on surer ground. A reign of terror marked the restored confidence of the Guises. Executions and *noyades* on a large scale continued up to the end of the month; the Duke of Guise was made Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom with extended powers, the castle was kept in a state of siege against a possible renewal of the assault, and a hundred men-at-arms arrived to prove the loyalty of Montmorency. But the

¹ Published by de Ruble, *Antoine de Bourbon*, II, 176. Cf. Isnard, I, No. 1484.

extent of the reprisals created a widespread revulsion. In protest against the cruelty Coligny and his two brothers left Amboise denouncing the severity of the Guises as the real cause of all the troubles. Even Queen Mary blamed her uncle for having imperilled her Scotch realm by his severity.¹ The story of Olivier's dying reproach, "Ha! maudit Cardinal, tu te damnes et nous faictes aussi tous damner!" is apocryphal, but it seems certain that on his death-bed the Chancellor urged a policy of lenience.² The fundamental problem, however, appeared to the Guises to be not that of toleration as against persecution, but that of the restoration of unity of belief; for with this once re-established the question of toleration would fall to the ground. But the restoration of doctrinal unity could only be brought about by a General Council.

Circumstances had at last forced the Gallican Church to descend from her proud pedestal of splendid isolation and to crave the co-operation of the rest of the Catholic world in the solution of her own interior problems. It was a belated entry upon the stage but it was made with great vigour, and the impulse of very strong forces was behind it. From the outset the Cardinal of Lorraine set his face firmly against any resumption of the Council of Trent, though it was known in France, after the return of the Cardinal of Guise from Rome, that this was the Pope's desire.³ Lorraine however brought to his problem the old French conviction that the Council of Trent could never achieve the reunion of Christendom, and this reunion had now become the urgent objective. Men could not yet face with equanimity the appalling prospect of a permanently divided Christendom, and the solution of the religious problem that had been found in Germany in the settlement of Augsburg could not for obvious reasons be applied to France. Until 1555 religious unity had seemed a *sine qua non* of German peace; now, in the same way, when France was beginning to taste the bitter draughts which had killed Charles V, the preservation of her

¹ Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, March 18th and April 8th.

² Hubert Languet, *Arcana Sæculi Decimi Sexti*, II, 49.

³ For. Cal., No. 750.

religious unity, long accepted too complacently in contrast to the chaotic upheavals beyond the Rhine, seemed to the Cardinal of Lorraine, in accordance with the old traditional belief, to be essential to her very preservation as a united nation. France now was entering the phase of religious strife through which Germany had already passed. But *cujus regio ejus religio* could have no application in France if the monarchy were to be preserved; impossible, therefore, to profit from German experience. Impossible, too, to regard with any reasonable hope the remedy to which Charles V had originally pinned his faith—the Council of Trent. For the Council of Trent had notoriously failed to command either the adhesion or the respect of the German Protestants, and it was plain that to continue it would be to admit the permanence of the religious split—failing reunion by force or by sheer propaganda, eventualities now so remote as to be quite negligible. The French Government turned towards the idea of a new General Council free from the commitments of the Council of Trent, appealing in this freedom to the goodwill of all who had lapsed from the Church, and pointing forward not to petrified disunion but to a regained unity. The Cardinal of Lorraine had probably not the smallest personal desire to undermine or to repudiate the dogmatic decrees of the Council of Trent considered on their own merits; but he certainly desired to throw them open to rediscussion in order to appeal to those who had rejected them. The lack of real interest which the Gallican Church had shown in the first period of the Council, and the definite repudiation which the French King had made of the second, now facilitated the adoption of this policy of going back behind them both. To consent to a continuation as from the spring of 1552 would entail a posthumous abandonment of Henri II's protest. National pride—it could be argued—as well as national preservation stood or fell with a new General Council.

But though the Gallican Church had been brought to demand a General Council in order to face the problem of re-establishing doctrinal unity, now of such urgent importance for France, she was still loath to entrust her own internal reformation to an

International Assembly. As the German hankering after a National Council had formed a permanent background to the earlier periods of the Council of Trent, so did similar French aspirations emerge to complicate the later period. When Henri II had threatened a National Council in 1551 he had done so as a political move against Julius III, but when the Cardinal of Lorraine revived the proposal in the spring of 1560 he did so primarily because he did not believe that a General Council such as he desired would be forthcoming with sufficient speed, but also because he believed that a National Council at such a moment of internal crisis could do a great work of reform without prejudice to the true claims of an œcumenical assembly. It would also be better calculated to commend itself to the Huguenots, who believed that their cause stood to gain far more in a National Council than even in such a General Council as they were prepared to recognize.¹ By the term National Council seems to have been generally understood not a simple gathering of bishops but a mixed assembly of ecclesiastics and laymen. There were precedents for this sort of thing, but they dated almost exclusively from the earlier middle ages, and it was considered very strange by the Catholic ambassadors at the French Court that a remedy of this nature—not in itself schismatical, but in the existing circumstances opening out all kinds of incentives to schism—should be resorted to at a moment when a new, untried and favourably disposed Pope was proposing an Œcumenical Council. It gave the impression—only half-true—that the National Council was not a second-best but a deliberate preference; that obstacles would be placed in the way of the Pope's plans on purpose to create additional justification for the National Council. Such being—as it seemed—the state of mind of its advocates, what guarantee could there be that the National Assembly would be kept within due bounds? What, in short, would be the sop offered to the Huguenot Cerberus? Chantonay, in particular, shuddered to contemplate.²

¹ See the *Juste Complainte des fidèles de France* (Avignon 1560).

² Chantonay to Margaret of Parma, March 28th, and to Philip II, March 30th, cited in the *Revue Historique*, XIV, 336, 344; Alvarotti to the

The possibility of deliberate schism was certainly not present in the Cardinal of Lorraine's mind. If he ever—as his enemies continually asserted—desired for himself a patriarchate over the French Church, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that at any time he seriously contemplated throwing over the Roman supremacy. But he was undoubtedly prepared, if not deliberately anxious, to confine that supremacy within the bounds set by the older traditional Gallicanism, so as to preclude the direct interference of Rome in the interior affairs of the Gallican Church, except by the occasional action of approved legates. At the moment he was at pains to render the proposal of a National Council palatable to Pius IV by this very expedient. In a letter dated March 21st he explained the position to the Holy Father.¹ The crisis just weathered had made it plain, he wrote, that the hitherto unsuspected numbers and strength of the heretics constituted a menace of exceeding gravity to the Catholic faith in France. The desirability of securing the assent and co-operation of all Christian powers before proceeding to a General Council would unavoidably postpone for some little time this body's assembly, and, while the necessary negotiations were being undertaken, he requested that Cardinal Tournon might be sent to France as legate *a latere*, minus the usual faculties of patronage, and with powers simply to investigate and reform the corrupt life of the French Church, and to convene, should it be considered desirable, an assembly of bishops to decide questions of faith and morals. He suggested Tournon because a legate not of French nationality would be universally unpopular. He begged the Pope to believe that the situation was critical and to listen favourably to a request made by the King, the Queen-Mother and the whole Gallican Church. His Holiness might rely entirely upon his counsels, for though his

Duke of Ferrara, March 23rd—Modena MSS.; the Tuscan ambassador, letter of March 25th in Desjardins, *Négociations avec la Toscane*, III, 411–12; the Venetian ambassador in Ven. Cal., No. 142; all of whom dilate on the National Council scheme unfavourably.

¹ Published in Hubert Languet, II, 61–2. A less satisfactory text in Bib. Nat., Coll. Dupuy, 309, f. 36. See Appendix I. Cf. Ven. Cal., No. 146. Mgr. Eshes was unaware of this letter, but M. Romier has noticed it (*Conjuration d'Amboise*, p. 153).

zeal in the interests of the Faith had made him the open target of countless heretical daggers, he was prepared, with his brother the Duke, to face even death itself in defence of the Catholic Faith and in the interests of the Holy See.

In addressing the Pope the Cardinal preserved a discreet silence both on the amnesty offered to the Huguenots and on the precise nature of the proposed National Council, but to the resident nuncio, Lorenzo Lenzi, Bishop of Fermo, he discoursed with more fullness. The suppression of the revolt, he told the bishop, had by no means diminished the acuteness of the religious problem. He estimated the numbers of the Huguenots at about 200,000,¹ all possessed—to a man—of extreme obstinacy, utter deafness to reason and entire contempt of death. Similar conditions prevailed in many other parts of Christendom, and a General Council celebrated with the co-operation of all Christian princes was in the opinion of all experienced men the only effective remedy. But the preliminaries of a General Council would be lengthy, and meanwhile affairs in France would go from bad to worse. The Cardinal painted a dismal picture of the condition of the French Church. The people were neglected by their pastors, for monastic appropriation of tithes had so impoverished the parishes that it was practically impossible to find persons of quality or competence to accept the pauperized livings; and the few priests who could be prevailed upon to reside were often incompetent or disinclined to perform their pastoral duties. On the other hand, the parishes were too large to be manageable, and the same might be said of most of the ninety or so dioceses of which the French Church was composed.² The numerous indults heaped upon the Crown by successive Popes had had the most deplorable effects and a return to the election of bishops and monastic superiors was much to be desired. The rapid deterioration made it essential,

¹ The Cardinal was given to exaggeration; less than a year previously he had declared that heresy had gained two-thirds of the realm—Romier, *Origines Politiques*, II, 250. But in 1558 Calvin had made an estimate of 300,000.

² In 1560 the number of French dioceses was 118, excluding Nice, Metz, Verdun, Toul, Avignon and Orange, the two latter being in papal territory. The smaller all stretched in a band along the Pyrenees and the south coast; the larger were in the north and centre.

he declared, to take some remedial steps even before the General Council. Accordingly the King intended to summon at some date between August and November an assembly of bishops, prelates, princes of the blood, councillors and presidents of the Parlements. These would not usurp the functions of a General Council but would concert measures for the pacification of the realm and the retention of the people in the Catholic faith, and it was hoped that Cardinal Tournon would preside over their deliberations as legate *a latere*. The demand for a papal legate was not, however, simply a sop to the Pope. Lorraine spoke warmly to the nuncio upon the utility of papal legates and attributed the ruin of religion in Scotland to the deaf ear which Rome had consistently turned to all petitions for a legate to be sent there.¹ But he decried the practice of endowing them with extensive faculties of patronage which led them to neglect their proper functions and were prejudicial to the rights of lay patrons and ordinaries; after the failure of a series of attempts to check these abuses, the Parlement de Paris had decided, he said, to withhold legal recognition from any legate possessed of such faculties, for which reason the Pope had been requested not to confer them on Tournon. The nuncio, having listened quietly to all this, replied that the Pope intended to call a General Council and would doubtless be much encouraged in that intention by what the Cardinal had said.²

On March 31st the Government's decisions were made public. Letters patent were issued in which a National Council was promised within six months, while a circular letter to the local authorities explained and interpreted the Edict of Amboise.³ Condé and La Renaudie had achieved ends very different from those which they had had in view. The regency of the princes of the blood was as far off as ever; the Guise supremacy had not been seriously challenged. The fruits of the Tumult of

¹ For support of this view see Pollen, *Papal Negotiations with Mary Queen of Scots*, pp. xxiv-xxvi, xxxv-xxxvii, xliii.

² Lorenzo Lenzi to St Charles, March 25th and 26th—Modena, Archivio di Stato, Concilio di Trento, busta 110, Francia dello vescovo di Fermo, pp. 4-13. A short extract published in Ehse, p. 15, note 3.

³ *Mém. de Condé*, I, 347; Paris, p. 313; an Italian version in Ehse, p. 15. Cf. Isnard, I, No. 1493.

Amboise had been reaped by those who, in meek obedience to commands from Geneva, had as a body kept clear of the conspiracy. French Calvinism had not yet deserted the passive obedience of Calvin for the armed resistance to tyranny advocated by the more bellicose Knox. Condé and the King of Navarre were but poor imitators of the Lords of the Congregation, and the time was not yet come when the Huguenots, armed and prepared, would forswear the old principles and adopt the more convenient political theory of their Scotch brethren. Without having sown they now reaped. Unheard-of pardon was offered them; the right of petition was theirs; in the face of the Pope's announcement of a General Council the Government had announced a National Council. Political in aim and politically sterile, the Tumult of Amboise had ecclesiastical results ultimately affecting the whole Christian world.¹

It is impossible entirely to dissociate the Cardinal of Lorraine from the Edict of Amboise. Coligny, Olivier and Catherine de Médicis, to whom the credit of the amnesty is usually ascribed, could certainly not have forced upon him a line of action to which he was unalterably opposed.² These three doubtless suggested, counselled, persuaded; but the ultimate responsibility is the Cardinal's. When the Pope complained, Lorraine took upon himself the entire onus of the measure, confessing that he had been its chief advocate;³ while two years later the Bishop of Valence, one of the most prominent of the supporters of Toleration, declared that recognition of the failure of the persecutions and of the necessity of devising other methods first came in the spring of 1560 from the Guises.⁴ The extent

¹ The best narrative and study of the Tumult of Amboise is that of M. Romier, *Conjuration d'Amboise* (1923), pp. 89-125. His discussion of the edict of March 8th and the letters patent of March 16th (pp. 165-8) is of great importance. M. Naef's *Conjuration d'Amboise et Genève* (1922) deals almost exclusively with the polemical literature of the "constitutional thesis" and the attitude of Calvin and Hotman.

² The smallness of Catherine's political influence at this time is stressed by M. Mariéjol in his *Life*.

³ See below p. 125, and cf. Appendix III, p. 476.

⁴ *Apologie contre certaines calomnies mises sus à la desfaveur et désavantage de l'Estat des affaires de ce royaume* (1562), attributed to Montluc, Bishop of Valence.

to which the edict was an innovation must not be exaggerated. It was a concession more of sentiment than of strict principle. It pardoned but it did not tolerate. But in practice a certain measure of toleration does seem to have followed, for though on paper the released Huguenot should have been immediately re-clapped in the prison from which he had just been freed if he failed to conform to the practice of Catholicism, in point of fact this does not seem to have happened. Owing mainly to the slackness of the magistrates and to the growing administrative disorganization, arrests for simple heresy appear to have ceased from this time. Preachers, however, did not benefit by the amnesty, nor those who combined sedition with their heresy. Evidently the Government aimed at detaching the religious from the political opposition. The two, however, had not yet coalesced.

To the Cardinal of Lorraine, then, must in the long run be given both the credit and the responsibility for the Edict of Amboise. It is only a false *a priori* dogmatism regarding his character that could prevent this fact from obtaining general recognition. The Cardinal had not lost his early elasticity of mind, his faculty of adaptation to circumstances. And his, too, without any doubt, is the responsibility in regard to the National Council. Though the nuncio reported that the Queen-Mother echoed all that Lorraine said, Catherine's own admission that until the beginning of her regency, nine months later, she had disliked the idea of a National Council¹ must surely rule her out as its originator. The Gallican ideal of national autonomy which influenced the Cardinal and was inbred in most French ecclesiastics was alien to the Queen-Mother's Italian ways of thinking. Lorraine, indeed, in pressing a policy of local settlement at a moment when the Pope was preparing for general action along a united front, was showing boldness rather than originality.

On the last day of March the Court left Amboise, where the rotting corpses of Condé's hapless victims still dangled in the breeze from the castle walls. The King and his uncles burned for proof of the Prince's guilt, and in a sudden outburst of anger

¹ See below chap. vii, p. 202.

François II ordered the arrest of his cousin's private secretary. In the light of papers then seized the King accused Condé to his face of being the author of the conspiracy. He was met by a complete denial, and at Chenonceaux, on April 2nd, the princely conspirator fulfilled the compact made at Nantes by a ceremonial denial on oath of all complicity in the Tumult. His perjured word was accepted by the King and by the chivalrous Duke of Guise. But the Cardinal of Lorraine stood motionless behind the throne with his eyes fixed steadily upon the ground, giving no sign that he was deluded.

III

Pius IV had entered upon his pontificate full of benevolence towards the French. Disputes with the French Government had, nevertheless, already broken out on smaller points before the question of the National Council cropped up to overshadow all else. On January 19th the Pope confirmed the Royal Indults, but insisted on the Cardinal of Guise signing an undertaking that within six months the King would send letters patent promising the strict observance of all the provisions of the Concordat.¹ A week later the Cardinal left Rome, returning leisurely to France by way of Florence, Bologna, Ferrara and Milan.² But on February 16th the Cardinal Jean du Bellay died *in curia*, and a long dispute arose over the disposition of his benefices, a dispute later complicated by the non-arrival of the promised letters patent. Immediately on du Bellay's death the Pope sent Dr Antonio Vacca to France to announce his intention of disposing of the deceased Cardinal's benefices himself.³

¹ Raynaldus, *Annales Ecclesiastici*, 1560, No. 25; letters of the Bishop of Angoulême of Jan. 12th and Feb. 27th.

² Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, Jan. 13th and March 7th; the Bishop of Angoulême, Feb. 26th; Pius IV to François II and to Catherine de Médicis, Jan. 26th; and St Charles to Dr Vacca, March 24th—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823; letters of the Cardinal of Guise to the Duke of Ferrara—Modena, Archivio di Stato, Dispacci di Principi Esteri, Roma 99, Carlo di Lorena.

³ Instructions for Dr Vacca of Feb. 18th; Pius IV to Catherine de Médicis and to the Bishop of Fermo, Feb. 18th—all in C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823. I hope later to deal separately with this case of du Bellay's benefices, which has several points of interest.

Dr Vacca was at Amboise during the period of the Tumult. He left again for Rome on March 25th,¹ bringing the nuncio's letters describing his conversations with Lorraine. It was consequently with the greatest eagerness that Pius awaited the promised envoy who was to bring him official news of the French Government's new ecclesiastical programme. Jean Babou de la Bourdaisière, armed with Lorraine's formal request for a legate to preside over a National Council and also with a petition for a General Council, reached Rome on Good Friday, April 12th. Owing to the ceremonies of Eastertide his formal entry was postponed until the 20th, but before that date he had already had two audiences with the Pope who would have received him on Easter Sunday itself had that been possible. The news of the amnesty granted to the Huguenots and of the proposed National Assembly was received by the Pontiff with horror and amazement. Pius IV denounced the National Council as a "veritable schism" fraught with peril to souls and to the royal authority. Even on the question of Tournon's legation he appeared to waver, for du Bellay's death had left Tournon Dean of the Sacred College, and as such his presence in Rome seemed highly desirable. But finally he promised to consider the idea favourably and to take Tournon's own advice.² It seemed to him, however, that he could not better oppose the French designs than by developing his own. He spoke to Babou of his desire to reopen the Council of Trent and promised an allocution on the subject to the diplomatic corps on the arrival of the Emperor's permanent ambassador.³ The wars that had interrupted its sessions having happily been terminated, he felt it his duty to reassemble the Council. The original agreement of the Emperor and the Kings of France and Spain to the city of Trent, he said, ought to preclude any fresh controversy over a site; but if these three princes should now come

¹ *Revue Historique*, XIV, 344.

² A month later Pius declared that it had been his own original intention to send Tournon into France—Ehser, p. 21. It may very well be that the manner of the royal request caused him to draw back a little.

³ Francis von Thurm had represented Ferdinand only at the Conclave, while Scipio von Arco had been no more than a special envoy to present the Emperor's obedience.

unanimously to some other decision he would not stand in the way of a translation after the Council had once assembled at Trent. He would willingly guarantee the execution of the Council's decrees in Rome and the Papal States in return for a similar guarantee from the secular powers, nor would he shirk his proper contribution towards the expenses of providing military protection.¹

It was impossible, wrote the Bishop of Angoulême, to express the extent of the Pope's displeasure at the mere mention of the National Council. The announcement of March 31st pledging the French Government to summon a National Council within six months greatly increased His Holiness' perturbation; the first storm-cloud had gathered to darken the still serene horizon of his young reign. Pius IV was no alarmist. The shrewd and experienced civil servant, the dispassionate and comfortable Cardinal, had not been suddenly transformed into a fanatic detecting imaginary dangers where none really existed. There were very good grounds for his anxiety. His desire to conciliate the secular powers by soliciting their support and co-operation did not go to the extent of allowing them to take the entire control of the ecclesiastical situation into their own hands. The tendency for them to do this—whatever might be the abstract political theory held of the relations between spiritual and temporal—was almost as strong in Catholic as non-Catholic countries: it constituted a very grave menace to the unity of the Church, the preservation of which was naturally one of the essentials of the Catholic Reform and the first duty of the Papacy. Pius IV's visions of a complete disruption of the Church as a result of state action in individual Catholic countries² were not the nightmares of an unbalanced mind.

It is true that few sixteenth-century political theorists of any creed—not even Luther himself—would formally have allowed to the secular authority the power of doctrinal formulation. But behind most non-Catholic politico-ecclesiastical thought,

¹ The Bishop of Angoulême of May 6th; memoir given by Angoulême to Jean Babou on the latter's departure from Rome—see Appendix II.

² See Alberi, *Relazione degli Ambasciatori Veneziani*, 2, IV, 24-5; Ehses, pp. 21, 28.

there lay, whether openly or by implication, the assumption that religious truth was self-evidently revealed in the Bible, or perhaps in the Councils, so that the question of a deciding authority hardly arose in theory. But it arose naturally enough in practice, and it was inevitable that where the Catholic idea of a teaching Church with a magisterium entirely independent of secular authority had been overthrown, secular authority should take upon itself to proclaim, if not what was true and what untrue, at least what was to be held and what was not to be held. Thus it came about that the imposition of religious doctrine by the State, and by implication its sanction, came to be the accepted practice both in England and in Germany, while everywhere political theorists and men of real religious character still shrank from concession of the principle.¹ But when Pius IV lamented that princes had become their own popes he was thinking not so much of Elizabeth or Henry VIII—of whom this statement was literally true, as lawyers, if not theologians, admitted—as of Philip II, and of François II as represented by the Cardinal of Lorraine. For just as Wolsey, by uniting in himself all authority, temporal and spiritual, had prepared the minds of Englishmen for the Royal Supremacy of Henry VIII, so by a similar concentration of power might the Cardinal of Lorraine, described by an Italian ambassador in 1559 as “Pope and King”,² foreshadow—and as unwittingly as Wolsey—some future Gallic Leviathan. The system of National Legations had been followed by disaster in England. It might well prove equally as disastrous in France where the tradition of Gallican self-sufficiency was so strong.

Such considerations had a close bearing upon the question of the French National Council. National Councils had been all very well in the past; but the very growth of the spirit of nationality, expressed in the consolidation of strong National Governments, had rendered them dangerous. They were so convenient as vehicles for the advancing cæsaropapist ten-

¹ All this is well stressed by J. W. Allen in his *History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (1928).

² Desjardins, *Négociations avec la Toscane*, III, 404.

dencies of the period that it was not unreasonable to regard a National Council as one step—and that not the least important—towards a National Church. A close resemblance existed between the case made out in France for the National Council and the ideas contained in Bishop Jewel's *Apologia Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ*, in which the changes of 1559 were interpreted as a removal of abuses and a return to primitive doctrine by means of a National Synod of clergy and laymen—just such an assembly and nearly such an end as the Cardinal of Lorraine now proposed in France. That every local church has power to regulate ceremonies and customs is a doctrine that may cover much or little, as required. In England it covered much; in Gallican hands might it not also attain to the same comprehension? However laudable his motives, however devoid himself of schismatical intent, Lorraine was in grave danger of playing the game of the growing erastianism of the times, which he would have been the first to deplore, but whose advance through his own instrumentality he seemed incapable of discerning.

Pius IV did discern. To his well-balanced mind the ultimate principle at stake was clear, though he was unable to realize the enormous difficulties of the Cardinal's position or to form any adequate conception of the exigencies that had driven him to his policy of pure empiricism. The practical demands of the moment are often, to human appearances, irreconcilable with the first principles of action; but that is in the nature of existence, as the Trinity is irreconcilable with the first principles of arithmetic. It has ever been, and is still, the historic rôle of the Papacy to stand by the traditional principles, however troublesome their practical reconciliation with the expedencies of the moment.

IV

The ceremonial presentation of the French obedience was performed by Jean Babou on May 2nd with great pomp and display. His retinue of twenty gentlemen was attired in black velvet and wore caps embellished with fur trimmings, a Parisian

novelty which attracted much attention. Formally requested to summon a Council, the Pope replied that such indeed was his intention, and that he hoped thereby to bring about a complete reform of the Church together with the reconciliation of those who had broken away. He used the guarded phrase "concilium indicere ac celebrare", adding with emphasis that he looked confidently to the loyal support of all Christian princes. In the evening the Cardinal of Ferrara gave a banquet in his palace on the Aventine.¹

Jean Babou remained a further ten days in Rome and was lodged in comfortable apartments in the Vatican. The Pope desired to have him close at hand, doubtless that he might realize the extent to which the Council was occupying people's minds. Pius spoke of attending in person, and Cardinal Morone and Cardinal Madruzzo of Trent both urged the Emperor to make more earnest representations than he had yet done. Money began to be collected towards the necessary expenses; for the Papacy was in debt, mainly as a result of Paul IV's military expenditure and drastic curial reforms.²

The Pope's displeasure at the French proposals was expressed in a letter to the Cardinal of Lorraine of May 12th which was entrusted to the care of Jean Babou.³ His Holiness deplored the outbreak of disturbances in France and gracefully acceded to the request for Cardinal Tournon to be sent as legate. Pius had reached the conclusion that he could safely rely upon the devotion of Tournon to the Papacy as calculated rather to hinder than to help in any quasi-schismatical designs; while Tournon himself was anxious to undertake the mission, and was quite prepared to face the inconveniences of a journey

¹ The Bishop of Angoulême, May 6th and May 20th-21st; Merkle, II, 534; For. Cal., No. 148 (7); *Avvisi di Roma* of May 2nd—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4803; transcripts from the Codex Urbinate 1038. The papal reply in Ehses, pp. 16-17; earlier editions in Raynaldus, No. 24, and Le Plat, IV, 624.

² St Charles to the Bishop of Fermo, April 25th—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823; extracts in Ehses, p. 21 note 7, and p. 15 note 10; Sickel, p. 46; Voss, p. 33; C.D.P. VIII, 297; *Archiv für die Geschichte des Bistums Augsburg*, II, 162.

³ Ehses, pp. 19-20. Cf. also Pius IV to François II, to Queen Mary, to the Duke of Guise and to the Cardinal of Guise, all of May 12th—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823.

which he might well have asked to be spared in view of his age and infirmities. The Pope informed Lorraine that the legate would start when an adequate convoy had been assembled, the depredations of pirates rendering the crossing to Marseilles a matter of some danger; but he did not specify with what powers he would come armed. He criticized severely the new religious policy of the Government. The King had no authority to pardon convicted heretics, nor did such action befit His Majesty's title of Most Christian. The promise by letters patent of a National Council to reform religion, news of which he asserted had only reached him after his decision to send Tournon as legate, had caused him the greatest displeasure. He spoke of the proposed assembly as "hoc conciliabuli genus"; he denounced it as "discidium et schisma manifestum". But in his desire to avoid unpleasantness the Pope was careful to leave open a door through which the French might execute a retreat without loss of dignity. He would assume that the amnesty and the letters patent were tactical feints intended to assuage public feeling but not to be translated into action. An assurance by letter to this effect, he added, would much gratify him, for it was his own intention to summon a General Council, in which undertaking he looked for the co-operation of all Catholic monarchs, and the decrees of which he expected them subsequently to carry out.

Pius IV's reorganization of the nunciatures had from the first contemplated the removal of the Bishop of Fermo from France and his replacement by Sebastian Gualtieri, Bishop of Viterbo, a zealous and outspoken diplomatist who had previously been nuncio in France under Julius III and Paul IV and who was destined to play an important rôle at Trent as one of Pius' personal agents.¹ On April 22nd Fermo was recalled;² two days later Viterbo was appointed to succeed him,³ but his instructions are

¹ The Bishop of Angoulême, Feb. 20th; letter of Laynez, March 8th, in *M.H.S.J. Lainii Monumenta*, IV, 700; St Charles to the Bishop of Fermo, March 24th—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823; Pius IV to François II and others, March 29th—Public Record Office, Roman Transcripts, LXIX. Cf. Ancel, *Nunciatures de Paul IV* (1909), p. xxii.

² Public Record Office, Roman Transcripts, LXIX.

³ Ancel, p. xxii.

only dated May 15th—three days after Jean Babou's departure. They clinch the French policy already sketched by the Pope. The new nuncio was ordered in the most emphatic manner to keep absolutely clear of politics and to avoid all reference to the unpopularity of the Guises. Strictly confining his attention to ecclesiastical affairs, he was to reiterate and enlarge upon the points made by the Pope in his letter to Lorraine. If questioned on the General Council he was to reply that the Pope intended to resume the Council of Trent subject to the formal approval of the Catholic powers, but that if any strong desire manifested itself he would consider a translation to some other town. Such an assurance, he thought, should suffice to quash the National Council, but were this by some mischance to take place, the nuncio was to register a formal protest and remain aloof—but not to leave the country. An accurate knowledge of French conditions was revealed in the suggestions first that the Queen-Mother might well be encouraged to show greater zeal in religious affairs—her influence in the new policy was probably suspected—and secondly that an attempt might very cautiously be made to remove from her suite several ladies suspected of Protestantism. These ladies were destined to become very sharp and persistent thorns in the side of Rome, but it was never possible to extract them.¹

Pius IV was convinced that it was canonically necessary to complete the unfinished Council of Trent.² He did not think of a General Council except in terms of this necessary completion. He spoke quite irrespectively of summoning a Council and of continuing that of Trent, and he was not prepared for any distinction to be made between the two ideas. The strength of feeling in France against resuming the Council where it had been dropped in 1552 was not realized in Rome, and the Pope believed that there was a clear issue between a National Council

¹ Viterbo's instructions, on which Sarpi has the most unfounded fabrications, were first published in full by Ehses, VIII, 20-2. Cf. Pius IV to François II, Queen Mary and Catherine de Médicis, all of May 17th—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823. From a letter of Laynez, *Lainii Monumenta*, v, 58, it appears that Viterbo was still in Rome on May 20th.

² *C.D.P.* VIII, 431-2.

in France and a speedy resumption at Trent. Things were in this position in the latter part of May when the Bishop of Angoulême, discussing the situation with the Pope, neither disparaged nor applauded the idea of continuing the Council of Trent, but merely said that his master might be relied upon to act as befitted a Christian King.¹ The nuncios in Spain and Austria were directed to redouble their efforts to secure assent to the continuation, and to use the argument that only by this means could scandal or even possibly disaster be avoided in France.² Viterbo's instructions were repeated by letter soon after he had left Rome.³

What Pius did successfully foresee was opposition not to the continuation of the previous Council but to its resumption at the old site of Trent. He was willing to meet such opposition once the organic connection had been established and recognized by assembly at Trent in the first instance. He made enquiries whether the Venetian authorities would be prepared to place Vicenza or any other city at his disposal, and he assured the new Venetian ambassador, da Mula—one of his personal confidants—, that he would permit the Council to discuss even his own personal affairs, and that while he could not permit it to sit on territory under heretical control he had no wish to appear to prejudice its liberty by holding it within the states of the Church.⁴ To da Mula the Pope also confided his disappointment at the meagre response evoked by his offers of a Council. The Spaniards, he complained, had maintained a complete silence; the Emperor appeared cowed by his Protestant subjects and was tolerating the marriage of priests and the reception of the chalice by laymen. Worst of all, the French threatened independent action, and their ambassador in Venice had spread an unfounded rumour that papal sanction had been given to the National Council.⁵ This was not true, though in one interview

¹ The Bishop of Angoulême, May 27th.

² Ehses, p. 27; Steinherz, pp. 35-6.

³ St Charles to Viterbo, May 29th—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823.

⁴ Ehses, pp. 21, 28; Alberi, 2, IV, 24-5; Voss, p. 41. On da Mula see Pastor, VII, Appendix III (Engl. transl. xv).

⁵ Ehses, p. 29. Cf. Voss, p. 43; Steinherz, pp. 23-4.

with Angoulême Pius had certainly declared that Tournon might be empowered to take the advice of an assembly of prelates and doctors always provided that no alterations were made in traditional discipline and observance;¹ and this was a declaration to which he afterwards adhered.

But while the Pope himself thus bewailed that lack of support impeded his progress, certain spirits chose to interpret the delay as a disproof of his *bona fides*. Without stopping to reflect that he had prudently bound himself not to act except on certain conditions, they began to speak darkly of the unalterable antagonism of the Court of Rome to a Council.² Judicious advisers impressed upon the Pope how desirable it was that he should avoid giving any handle to his detractors.³ Accordingly on May 29th he spoke at length on the topic of the Council in a Consistory, and repeated himself the following day to the Congregation for Reform. He assured the Cardinals that he fully intended the Council, and thereupon dispensed all the diocesan bishops resident in Rome from the obligation under which he had recently laid them of returning to their dioceses, on the grounds that they would soon be obliged to repair to Trent. He told the Consistory that it was his intention to associate the all-powerful Cardinal of Lorraine with Cardinal Tournon in the Legation by which he hoped to prevent the National Council.⁴ Eager to vindicate himself still further, Pius hastily prepared his promised allocution to the diplomatic corps and delivered it on June 3rd without waiting for the arrival of the Emperor's permanent ambassador. The Bishop of Angoulême refused to attend owing to a dispute over precedence with the Spaniard Vargas,⁵ and the Polish ambassador was ill,

¹ See the Bishop of Angoulême's account of his audience of May 24th, in his letter of the 27th.

² *Archiv für die Geschichte des Bistums Augsburg*, II, 166, 169. Cf. Sickel, pp. 46-7; Steinherz, p. 32; Ehses, p. 27 and notes.

³ *C.D.P.* VIII, 431-2, 453.

⁴ It was said that Tournon himself made the joint appointment of Lorraine a condition of accepting the legation—*For. Cal.*, No. 386 (8). On the Consistory see Merkle, II, 345, and Ehses, p. 28 note 2, and pp. 34-5.

⁵ Vargas had first raised the question of precedence in Venice with the Bishop of Dax, and on coming to Rome he continued the dispute with Angoulême. The dispute was continued at the Council of Trent, where it

so that two of the larger Catholic powers were unrepresented. Pius, however, broke no new ground. He earnestly begged the ambassadors to commend to their respective sovereigns the proposals for a General Council which he had made through his nuncios and to which he had as yet received no replies. He spoke with evident anxiety of the French situation, the gravity of which rendered the quick reopening of the Council of Trent a matter of supreme importance. Had his desire for a Council not been genuine, nothing, he assured the ambassadors, would have been easier for him than to have spun out the preliminary negotiations for two or three years. But he had no desire to do this. The consent of the powers once given to the continuation of the Tridentine Council, a Bull of Convocation would be immediately published, and if a translation were desired he would remove the Council elsewhere. He believed that the German Protestant princes would be willing to attend, especially the Elector of Brandenburg.¹ The ambassadors made suitable but, on the whole, non-committal replies, though the ambassador of the Duke of Florence offered his master's arms and capital.²

The Pope quickly followed up his allocution by letters announcing a forthcoming Council—not however definitely specifying the continuation of the Council of Trent—addressed to the Primate of Hungary (the Archbishop of Gran) and all the Hungarian hierarchy, to the Bishop of Naumburg, the famous Julius Pflug, and to the Bishops-Elect of Osnabrück, Minden and Magdeburg—this last a Hohenzollern prince.³ By the

came near to having disastrous results. The French right of precedence was not formally acknowledged until several years later.

¹ Pius IV was encouraged in this illusion by the fact that the Hohenzollerns had introduced only the mildest form of Lutheranism into Brandenburg and had shown little hostility to the Holy See. The Archbishop of Magdeburg, a Hohenzollern prince, was actually still in communion with Rome (see Pastor, *Reunionsbestrebungen*, pp. 162-4 and cf. below p. 395), and the Pope had known Joachim II personally when the latter had been in command against the Turks in Hungary in 1542.

² Ehses, pp. 29-30; Reimann, vi, 594; Sickel, pp. 48-9; Voss, p. 45; *C.D.P.* viii, 464; *Archiv für die Geschichte des Bistums Augsburg*, ii, 171. Cf. Pastor, vii, 147-8 (Engl. transl. xv, 186-7).

³ Ehses, pp. 32-3.

middle of June his French policy came to completion. On June 13th Tournon was appointed additional inquisitor in France, a brief renewing the inquisitorial functions of Lorraine, Bourbon and Châtillon having, in reply to the French request, already been despatched free of charge.¹ On June 15th, Tournon and Lorraine were appointed legates *a latere* and empowered to summon, should they think fit, a small advisory body of bishops and other eminent men.² But though the French demands had thus been met to a certain extent, the restricted nature of the concession and the fact that the legates were appointed specifically to prevent rather than to direct the National Council, gave unmistakable point to the rebuke already expressed in the Pope's letter to the Cardinal of Lorraine. The Pope had parried, as he thought, successfully, and to consolidate his position wrote exhorting the King of France to join the Duke of Savoy in an attack upon Geneva.³ He expected no further opposition and regarded the encounter as terminated. In reality only the first round, and that not the most violent, had been fought.

¹ The Bishop of Angoulême, letter of Feb. 27th. Cf. above, p. 86.

² Raynaldus, 1560, Nos. 31 and 32. Cf. Ehses, p. 21 note 2, and Voss, pp. 61-2. Thomas (*Le Concordat de 1517*, III, 129) sees in these appointments the absolute trust reposed by the Pope in the French Government and speaks most inaccurately of the "brefs envoyés aux Cardinaux de Tournon et de Lorraine pour la célébration d'un concile en France."

³ Raynaldus, 1560, No. 29; Wirz, *Quellen zur Schweizer Geschichte*, XXI, 390-1.

CHAPTER V

Trent versus a New Council

Car l'exemple de l'Allemagne leur impose.

—The Cardinal of Lorraine to the Duke of
Württemberg at the Conference of Saverne.

I

THE royal Lent of 1560 had been one of quite unusual trial and mortification. Worn out by prolonged and exhausting nervous strain, the Court sought to spend Easter in the restorative calm of Benedictine peace. On Palm Sunday it reached the abbey of Marmoutier outside Tours, of which the Cardinal of Lorraine was abbot *in commendam*. Here the ceremonies of Holy Week were performed in all their impressiveness; and the Cardinal, taking up his residence in the abbey and sharing the lenten fare of the community, preached daily to large and enthralled congregations.¹

But the relief was only partial. The smouldering fires of discontent flickered continually, and premonitory rumbles seemed to foreshadow an even greater explosion in the near future. The interruption of one of the Cardinal's sermons by a brawling fanatic was characteristic of many other incidents; from all over the country came news of the emergence of Huguenot congregations into the light of day, while processions and other manifestations celebrated the release, by the March amnesty, of imprisoned brethren. Public demonstrations against the rule of the Guises took place. In Paris the Cardinal of Lorraine was hanged in effigy and publicly burnt in the Place Malesherbes. His château at Meudon, for which he had lately procured a large quantity of valuable marble from Portugal, was attacked by incendiaries, and attempts were made to fire his properties

¹ Ven. Cal., No. 149; *Revue Historique*, xiv, 352; Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, April 19th (Modena, Archivio di Stato); cp. de Thou, xxv, 5. In 1562 the abbey was sacked by the Huguenots and the library for the most part perished, though a few remnants are still in the Bibliothèque de Tours. Lorraine resigned it at the end of 1562.

at Dampierre and at the Hôtel de Cluny in Paris. In a jet of abusive and obscene pamphlets the Guises and the Queen-Mother were denounced with unimaginable ferocity and coarseness. The Cardinal was accused alternately, or simultaneously, of atheism and of slavery to the Pope. And, as at Amboise, these pamphlets, which included the famous *Epistre au Tigre de la France*, were found mysteriously distributed in the very apartments of their victims. Fearful of assassination, the Cardinal surrounded both the King and himself with a bodyguard of mounted arquebusiers.¹ The Queen of England and Condé were still suspected of fostering disaffection, and the news that an English army had crossed the Scottish border and had laid siege to Leith added to the disquiet. Curiosity finally got the better of prudence. At Chenonceau, on April 19th, the Guises opened and ransacked Condé's baggage in his absence, afterwards attributing the outrage to thieves—an explanation not wholly untrue. What was discovered is not known, but Condé in comprehensible fury left Chenonceau and retired to his brother's court at Nérac.

For the moment, however, the Guises were really fairly secure. Condé was their only serious enemy—and Condé's impotence was complete. The débâcle of the Tumult had shown that however widespread might be the disaffection against the Government, not even the most painstaking efforts could suffice to bring together a military force capable of upsetting it; while the strict control still exercised by Calvin and his pastors had saved the Huguenots from implication in political adventures. A process, however, was beginning which within the space of two years was to transform the meek *malsentants de la foi* into the Huguenot army upon which Condé was able to call in the spring of 1562, and which ultimately made the civil wars possible. This rapid change of spirit, fought step by step by the great majority of the pastors, was already in its initial stages at the time of the Tumult of Amboise, and was largely due to

¹ Ven. Cal., No. 151; Desjardins, III, 416; Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, April 19th; Brantôme, VI, 491; Regnier de la Planche, edition of 1836, pp. 100 *et seq.*

numerical expansion. Growing congregations, in many places several thousands strong, could no longer assemble in secrecy, and an illegal publicity became necessary which, though frowned upon, could not be checked by the authorities at Geneva. A very natural desire for protection led to the arming of many congregations, certain of which, grouped in their synods, entered into a kind of feudal connection with some local Protestant seigneur who undertook their protection, in many instances with the connivance of governors representing the central authority. The foundations of a Protestant *imperium in imperio* were thus being laid, to the dismay of the pastors, for the seigneur's protection tended to evolve into complete control, especially when he was anxious to make new religion serve ancient temporal ends. To many an impoverished nobleman who had long cast envious glances at Church property, the control of the local Huguenots would come as a godsend. Their organization as a military unit, ostensibly for their own protection, would provide him with a kind of neo-feudal army; the time would inevitably come when he would lead it into action.

The spring and summer of 1560 saw this movement definitely under way. The channels were being opened up through which began to flow the tide of new forces by which the doctrine of non-resistance was ultimately to be swept away. Alien motives and alien activities appeared to sully primitive religious purity, as the most spiritually-minded of the reformers were the first to admit. The Calvinist *Réforme* had inevitably attracted to itself aggrieved and discontented elements of many sorts, and it was not, on the whole, a decline in religious fervour which now allowed these elements to struggle to the surface: it was partly their own inherent strength, partly circumstances inseparable from growth, and partly the influence of a few definite militarists like Chandieu and Hotman. A sudden new sensation of power ran galvanically through the Calvinist ranks; and there is nothing like a feeling of power to make the idea of non-resistance seem an incongruity or to ensure that deaf ears will be turned towards its abstract recommendations. The faithful had been taught so extravagant a hatred of Catholicism that it

became difficult to check its practical expression when such expression became feasible. To mutilate statues, to deride religious and priests, to insult the Host, to seize Catholic churches and desecrate them with Calvinist worship—these were temptations of peculiar and almost irresistible strength; and they were temptations to which, as the consciousness of power increased, and as the craven pusillanimity of the Catholics in regions where they were outnumbered came to be regarded as axiomatic, many of the faithful ultimately succumbed.¹ But Condé had failed to rouse the Calvinists to arms in his cause because such an attempt was still premature. The Guises wrongly imagined that what Condé desired had in fact happened—that, as in Scotland, the religious and political opposition had coalesced into one hybrid movement. The materials for the explosion which they hourly expected would not be ready for the match for another two years. Had the government been more accurately informed, it would have done better not to have exempted preachers from the March amnesty. In stemming the revolutionary tendency the pastors were in fact the Government's natural allies. Everything was to be gained, from the political standpoint, by keeping them in touch with their flocks.

Though neither the amnesty nor the promise of a National Council had at all ameliorated the situation, the Government did not go back upon its policy. On April 18th letters patent were issued at Tours reaffirming the promise of a National Council,² which Lorraine continued to insist must be held by October; and the project of a colloquy with twelve Huguenot representatives even began to be mooted.³ But some discussion as to the desirability of an intensification of coercive measures must also have taken place, for the Ferrarese ambassador re-

¹ On the history of this vital change in the reform movement between 1559 and 1562 see Romier, *Le Royaume de Catherine de Médicis*, II, chap. iv, *passim*.

² Ven. Cal., No. 151; the Bishop of Fermo to St Charles, April 18th—Modena, Archivio di Stato.

³ Alvarotti, letter of April 8th: "Dicono che faranno un concilio nationale et che hanno fatto intendere a costoro che deputino dodeci et essi n' ellegeranno altri dodeci et saranno insieme a disputare queste materie."

ports that both queens—Catherine and Mary—spoke so vigorously against persecution as to incur the suspicion of heresy.¹ The amnesty had been a single exceptional act, involving no change of legal principle. But it had been made clear that some alteration in the law was called for. This was effected by the Edict of Romorantin, issued on May 18th, which restored the fundamental distinction between heresy and civil crime. The cognizance of heresy was again² restored to the Church courts, so that the fate of those released by the amnesty reverted to the bishops' tribunals; but the civil courts were confirmed in their powers in respect of illegal meetings and all Huguenot assemblies were again forbidden as such. Outwardly the edict thus contemplated no more than a rearrangement of machinery to the clerical advantage. It granted not an inch of toleration. What had previously been illegal remained illegal. The duty of suppressing religious dissent by force was specifically reaffirmed and it seemed as if the fires would soon be again burning brightly. The edict was well calculated to dissipate any queasiness over the amnesty, and the restoration of their natural jurisdiction to the Church courts could not fail to be welcome to Rome and to all sound churchmen.

If it be true that Catherine de Médicis was largely responsible for this measure, her intervention reveals considerable ingenuity. The edict was really calculated to have an exactly contrary effect to its ostensible provisions. It is inconceivable that Catherine should have followed up her attack on the policy of persecution by sponsoring an edict which appeared to restore this to full working order, had she not foreseen a very different result. Lorraine himself, we may suppose, welcomed an arrangement which removed an undesirable anomaly to which he had always objected and yet evaded the necessity of driving the Huguenots to open revolt by continuing the persecutions on the old scale, for the Church courts, through long disuse, through the slackness of bishops and officials, had become notoriously decayed.

¹ Alvarotti, letters of April 8th and April 19th.

² Cf. above pp. 54-6, 65-6.

It was true that the edict exhorted the bishops to repair to their dioceses in order to reset the rusty machinery in motion, but the exhortations went largely unheeded. The moribund system could not be resurrected. On the other hand, the civil courts resented their relegation to an inferior position; it wounded their pride to be bidden play the policeman to another legal system which they despised. And so strongly were they permeated with officials of undecided, fluctuating, and even definitely Huguenot views, that they were fast losing the capability of adopting any firmness of attitude towards the assemblies which it was their duty to suppress. Thus with the cognizance of heresy transferred to an effete system and the suppression of Huguenot meetings under the control of a largely unwilling one, the general outcome of the Edict of Romorantin was to leave the French Calvinist communities more or less undisturbed. Henceforward the main obstacle to their expansion came more from popular violence—where the Catholics were strong or angry enough—than from the incidence of legal repression.¹

II

Amid such distractions the question of the General Council did not go neglected. If local troubles called for local settlement, it remained true that they were recognized as part of a universal distemper which needed to be faced and met on an international scale. For this the Emperor's co-operation was recognized to be essential, and when, less than a week after the publication of the Edict of Romorantin, a resident ambassador was appointed to Vienna, the question of the General Council figured among his instructions.² The ambassador was a protégé of Lorraine, Bernard Bochetel, unconsecrated Bishop of Rennes and nephew of the statesman Bishop of Orleans. He was charged to re-

¹ Text of the edict in Isambert, xiv, 31-3. See the discussion in Romier, *Conjuration d'Amboise*, pp. 172-9. Cf. Isnard, I, Nos. 1500-1506. The following August a royal *Déclaration* reiterated that the King had not intended by the Edict of Romorantin to deprive the Parlement de Paris of its jurisdiction over illicit assemblies: Isambert, xiv, 49; Isnard, I, No. 1534.

² Dated May 23rd from Loches and published by Le Laboureur, *Additions aux Mémoires de M. de Castelnau*, I, 466-9.

present in Vienna that a General Council was highly necessary, especially for France, and to point out the favourable attitude of the Pope.

But on June 1st Jean Babou returned from Rome and made known the Pope's strictures on the National Council and his plans for the reopening of the Council of Trent. These created heavy disappointment, for some hope—based, possibly, upon misinterpretations of His Holiness' offers of a translation—seems to have been entertained that Pius IV would ultimately agree to summon the Council whithersoever the powers desired, in Germany, Spain or France.¹ Jean Babou now explained that in Rome there was no talk of a new Council, but only of a continuation. To the Cardinal of Lorraine this seemed a policy of the most profound unwisdom. He insisted that unless a new General Council were to meet, and at some place other than Trent, the National Council—for all the Pope's protests and denunciations—must be carried through.² The delicate task of explaining this resolution to Pius was entrusted, after the refusal of the Sieur d'Humières,³ to François de Bouliers, known as the Abbé de Manne, a relative of the du Bellay and one of the principal agents of the late Cardinal.

But before Manne started upon his mission the new nuncio, Viterbo, joined the Court at Pontgouin near Chartres and began immediately to discuss the conciliar question with Lorraine. The Cardinal still feared an explosion of more dangerous proportions than the damp squib of Amboise.⁴ He implored the nuncio, in judging the proposed Gallican Assembly, to take into account the growing discontent of which he must have seen many signs in his journey up the Rhone valley. The Assembly would consist of bishops and prelates, of the members of the *Conseil Royal*, of representatives of the Estates and delegates from the Parlements. Controlled by Tournon as papal legate, it would endeavour to restore public order. In describing it as

¹ Ven. Cal., No. 161. In Augsburg a palace began to be prepared for the Pope himself—Turba, *Venetianische Depeschen*, III, 135-6.

² Ven. Cal., No. 167.

³ Ven. Cal., No. 171.

⁴ Lorraine to the Duke of Nevers, June 10th—Paris, p. 419.

a "National Council" the printers of the announcement of March 31st had taken, so he alleged, but with what accuracy it would be invidious to speculate, an unwarrantable liberty for which they would be severely reprimanded.¹ The assembly would be immediately abandoned on the summons of a General Council, for which the King was genuinely anxious. But it would be essential to celebrate this General Council in some town not distasteful to the Lutherans, such as Trier, Worms, Speyer or Constance: Trent could never again be suitable.² The nuncio's remonstrances were ineffectual, and Manne left for Rome on June 20th with unaltered instructions.³

The Pope's reply to Jean Babou of May 2nd, to which Manne's mission was a rejoinder, had, like his letter to the Cardinal of Lorraine, promised a General Council in general terms only, and had not, like the allocution of June 3rd, specifically proposed the resumption of the Council of Trent. Thus, although private information from the Bishop of Angoulême, from Jean Babou himself, and from the nuncio, had made known the Pope's insistence on the resumption of the Council of Trent, in official communications it was still possible to ignore this. Manne was therefore at liberty to praise unreservedly the papal attitude, and to exhort the Holy Father to take speedy action; after which it was easier to offer—of course in all deference—some outspoken advice. The King of France, recognizing in the discontinuance of Councils the chief stimulus to the spread of heresy, counselled an entirely new Œcumenical Assembly at some city approved of by all the states of the Empire, both Catholic and Protestant. Trent, it was recalled, had been found inconvenient by the fathers who had met there under Paul III. The accommodation had been so straitened and the food supplies so inadequate that many Christians had refused to attend when the sessions were resumed under Julius III, and had denied the validity of the decrees passed at that period. It

¹ Ven. Cal., No. 174.

² The Bishop of Viterbo to St Charles, June 19th and June 22nd—*Estratti*, Modena, Archivio di Stato, Cancelleria Ducale Estensi, Estero, Italia, Roma, Serie 110, No. 22. Cf. Ven. Cal., No. 174.

³ Ven. Cal., No. 174. Cf. Le Plat, iv, 626-8; Bouillé, II, 31.

could hardly be expected that the Germans or the English, for instance, would submit to an assembly which had made so many decisions against them without hearing their case. Naturally, the King of France had no desire to appear as the champion of heretics, but he felt most strongly that wherever possible the obstacles to their attending and submitting to the Council should be removed. In Germany the whole heretical movement had originated. Any attempted solution which failed to consider German conditions and ignored German points of view would be doomed to inevitable sterility. The French ambassador at Vienna was impressing these considerations upon Ferdinand, and French consent would be given to any city agreeable to the Emperor and the Imperial princes. The Pope's best course, consequently, would be to open negotiations at once with Vienna. There was no dearth of commodious and well-provisioned German towns. Speyer, Aix, Worms, Trier, were all suitable. But best of all would be Constance, conveniently near to Milan, the Pope's native city, and easily accessible from all directions. The burden of military protection fell by tradition upon the Emperor and need cause no difficulties. In effect, the Pope was prayed to convoke a new Council of Constance. Only minor prominence was given to the question of the National Assembly: in regard to this there was absolutely no intention of innovating in doctrine or of creating new precedents, and no rearrangements even in discipline would be undertaken without the approval of Rome. The bishops were natural counsellors of the King; as such he might convene them at his will to discuss educational and administrative problems. The desire for the National Assembly was so strong that only the swift convocation of a General Council could justify its cancellation.¹

These instructions reveal the great store set in France upon Lutheran attendance at the Council. In French eyes the first duty of the General Council was not reform—that could better

¹ The text of Manne's instructions in Ehse, VIII, 35-8. Résumés in Pallavicino, I, XII, 14-16, Pastor, VII, 148-9 (Engl. transl. xv, 187-8), and Voss, p. 54. MS. copies in Rome, Berlin, London (Brit. Mus.) and probably elsewhere.

be done at home and with less risk to cherished Gallican privileges—but reunion; and of what use was it to talk of reunion without the Lutheran princes? The Protestant princes of Germany were the veterans of the new Gospel; they had succeeded to some portion of Luther's immense personal prestige; and as the great man had loomed a figure of giant proportions before the awe-struck gaze of his contemporaries, so now did those who had reaped a rich harvest of material wealth and political power where he had sown his psychological vagaries—his mysticism *manqué*—appear correspondingly inflated. Surmounting the bars-sinister on their political escutcheon, they had attained at length, after many crises, to a status of recognized legitimacy, and even in the eyes of Rome had acquired a position of quasi-respectability. By them the reunion of Christendom still seemed to stand or fall. Their high prestige caused it to be readily assumed that any severance of what seemed to be the main artery of Protestantism would inevitably result in the draining off of the life-blood from the whole diseased body. The French realized well enough the dependence of the French reformers upon Geneva, but they believed, and there is direct evidence that the Cardinal of Lorraine himself shared this belief fully,¹ that in the matter of attendance at and submission to the General Council they would be willing to follow German example.

It was, of course, an erroneous judgment—though formed in perfect sincerity. Within the decent limits of their new security the springs of the German reformation were bubbling up with fast-diminishing strength, and their waters were already showing distinct signs of stagnation. The mass reconciliation to the Church of German Lutheranism would have dealt a heavy blow to Protestantism, but not necessarily a mortal one. Lutheranism, for all its high prestige, was no longer the most fertile or dominant branch of Protestantism. Its capitulation to historic Christianity might perhaps have brought in its train the capitulation of the Scandinavian kingdoms—mere ballast in the Lutheran

¹ *Négociations par Hippolyte d'Este* (1657), p. 100. See also, p. 436, the Cardinal's remarks to the Duke of Würtemberg at Saverne in Feb. 1562.

vessel—but it is more than doubtful whether it would have entailed the surrender of Swiss and Scotch Calvinism, or of Anglicanism, the inspiration, force and outlook of which were far more independent than was realized in France. The French insistence on Lutheran attendance at the Council as a *sine quâ non* was thus based on more than one false judgment. Not only was an agreement with Lutheranism now quite beyond dogmatic possibility, but even had it been possible it would not in all probability have had a decisive effect on the general situation outside Germany.

The Bishop of Rennes, in addition to his main embassy, had been charged with the supplementary task of sounding several of the German princes in regard to their supposed connection with the Tumult of Amboise, a mission which he performed by deputy through a certain Dr Beier, and with reassuring results. But acting, it must be supposed, on orders which do not appear in the bishop's official instructions, Dr Beier went further. Drawing the attention of the princes to the papal offer of a General Council, he announced that the King of France viewed this with favour, provided the Council were "free, impartial and Christian". These ambiguous terms were met, for the most part, by a corresponding disinclination to indulge in precise statement. Philip of Hesse, looked up to as a veteran leader, replied that the Lutherans might not perhaps find it impossible to be represented at a Council held on the model of, and in accordance with the procedure that had obtained in, the Councils of the early Church, though he refrained from detailed explanation as to what he considered these stipulations would entail in actual practice. Frederick, Duke of Saxony, and Wolfgang, the Count Palatine, concurred, since they saw the unwisdom of appearing antagonistic on principle to any conciliar proposal. But the Duke of Württemberg recalled the experiences of his divines at Trent under the legate Crescen-
tius, and declared that the proposal of a General Council summoned by the Pope held out little or no hope of fruitful results. Dr Beier communicated the outcome of his mission to Bullinger, the prominent Swiss Zwinglian, so that we can here discern a

definite attempt, inspired by the Guises, to co-ordinate Protestant feeling in favour of a General Council. These overtures, sterile in every other way, at least had the effect of putting the German Protestants alive to the seriousness of the conciliar question, which thenceforward began to figure on the agenda list of their conferences.¹

These negotiations were facilitated by the close political relations, which were fast becoming traditional, between the French Crown and the German Protestants. We have seen how these relations, initiated by François I, had been strengthened by the alliance of 1552, to which the controversy over the Council of Trent had imparted a religious tinge, despite all the precautions taken to avoid this. It is clear from Manne's instructions and from the activities of Dr Beier that the sympathy which had then sprung up was again making itself felt—and on the old ground of opposition to the Council of Trent.

III

The severity with which Pius IV had condemned the National Council impelled the Cardinal of Lorraine to put forward a more personal statement of his own position than he had been able to do through the Abbé Manne. He wrote to the Pope a letter which does not appear to be extant,² but to Cardinals Tournon and Ferrara, from whom he had apparently received additional admonitory epistles, he addressed a long apologia, happily preserved, which he begged them to communicate to the Sacred College.³

He began with the Tumult of Amboise. The unexpectedness of the attack and the remarkable secrecy preserved by the conspirators, he said, had rendered it extremely difficult to foretell

¹ On Dr Beier and his mission see Heidenhain, *Die Unionspolitik Landgraf Philipps von Hessen*, pp. 173-4, 192-4; Kugler, *Christoph Herzog zu Wirtemberg*, II, 138-40; *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XLVI, No. 3239.

² See the Pope's reply, below, p. 139; also the concluding paragraph of Appendix III. Ehses does not refer to this letter, and there is no copy of it—to my knowledge—either in Paris or Modena.

³ Modena, Archivio di Stato, *Negotiato de Mgr. de Santa Croce*, ff. 32-6. A less accurate copy in the *Bib. Nat.*, *Coll. Dupuy*, 309, ff. 37 *et seq.* See Appendix III.

their movements or to calculate their strength. The King's advisers had been unanimous on the methods by which alone the danger could be met, and the amnesty offered to such heretics as would live henceforward as obedient Catholics had been granted with the unanimous approval of the *Conseil*, and in particular at his own—the Cardinal's—express persuasion. No ecclesiastical law had been contravened, the hands of no spiritual officials forced, for the released prisoners had been originally condemned by the civil courts; and there had been no improper condonation of heretical worship, either permanently or temporarily. Moreover, he alleged that the amnesty had justified itself by inducing large numbers of poorer insurgents to lay down their arms and retire home peaceably.¹ On the other hand, there was unfortunately no sign of any general return to the Church, and the policy of clemency could obviously go no further. By the Edict of Romorantin, proceedings for simple heresy had been handed back to the clerical courts, from which the Pope might infer that a resumption of severity was contemplated. The lay tribunals would thus be left free to attempt the restoration of public order without incurring the charge of poaching upon the Church's preserves. Much work still remained to be done; several of the leaders of the conspiracy were still at large, and the insurrection could not be regarded as finally quelled until these were captured.

His request for a papal legate, Lorraine continued, ought surely to have placed beyond question his desire to work in co-operation with the Holy See. In asking for the legate's faculties to be strictly confined to such as were necessary for the suppression of heresy and the reform of morals, he was actuated solely by a desire to preserve ecclesiastical order and to safeguard the Curia from reproach or contempt. He had suggested Cardinal Tournon because of his age, his long experience, his proved ability and his high prestige in France, because of his knowledge and grasp of French affairs, and finally because his loyalty to the Holy See would be a sure guarantee against the National Assembly overstepping its due

¹ I should imagine that there was little truth in this allegation.

bounds. This Assembly, failing a General Council, was France's only hope, though assuredly no one would be so crazy as to prefer it absolutely. Revival after periods of low religious life had always come through the agency of Councils, and not through General Councils only, which had been few, but Provincial and National Councils too, celebrated with the approbation of the Holy See. What fear of schism if a papal legate presided? If all were referred for confirmation to Rome? If the Most Christian King himself inspired the work? It was impious folly to charge the French with mad desires for a new Gospel and a new Church!

Abundant work awaited the National Assembly. The whole system of preaching and of popular religious instruction stood in need of intelligent overhauling, so that whether a man were scholar or unlettered, preacher or publisher, parish priest or layman, he might possess to the full extent of his capacity an adequate knowledge and understanding of the word of God and of the mysteries of religion. The enormities of heretical doctrine, its falsity, its blasphemous implications, needed to be exposed and denounced so that the infected might at length be brought to recognize the foulness of their disease. Grave abuses in ceremonial and in the administration of the Sacraments called for eradication; and most vital of all, the behaviour and morality of the clergy of all ranks and grades required to be completely reformed. Here was a substantial programme that could well be carried out at home under the guidance of a papal legate. More: what added force would be lent to the Catholic appeal for heretical submission to the General Council, if serious reforms already initiated locally could be pointed to! What a powerful inducement for the return of those who had lapsed through disgust at the decay of spirituality or because of the scandal given by the lives of the clergy! Such considerations made local reform prior to a General Council almost a definite desideratum. The saints had left the example of interior reform as a necessary preliminary to missionary activity, and if anything that he had said gave offence, it was behind the great saints of the past that the Cardinal declared himself prepared to take

refuge. With God's help he prayed and believed that, as in past ages, so now again in the present crisis would peace and unity be restored to distracted Christendom through the agency of reforming Councils.

Only the most disinterested zeal, the Cardinal protested in epilogue, inspired the frankness and prolixity of his expression. Any archbishop might legally congregate his suffragans in Council and submit their judgments to the Pope, and he entirely failed to perceive how such a policy when raised to national dimensions could be considered detrimental to the interests of the Holy See, his own loyalty to which was unimpeachable. The King had used the utmost care to usurp no prerogative of the Holy See. In his laudable project of reforming the French Church by means of a Gallican Assembly, should a General Council be unattainable, His Majesty was supported by the collective advice of persons of the highest experience and piety.¹

Apart from its implicit refusal to regard the Pope's plans for an immediate General Council as practicable, the Cardinal's case was not without its strength. Clearly he believed that reform was a matter best carried out locally by men with knowledge of local conditions, in conformity, however, to general principles laid down at, or at least not disagreeable to, Rome. The General Council, on the other hand, should mainly deal with wider issues affecting the general policy of the Church Universal and the restoration of Christian unity. There was thus room for both local and general action. The one might well be regarded as desirable spadework for the other; though, a General Council once summoned, it would clearly smack of schism to ignore it for a National Assembly. Yet there were elements of danger in the proposed National Council which Lorraine's vindication ignored but which to the Pope were of vital import.

¹ This letter also gave an explanation of the conduct of M. de Viole, whose reading aloud in the Parlement of a heretical confession, thrust into his hand in the street, had caused great displeasure at Rome (see Appendix III, p. 479). I do not know of any other reference to this incident. The de Viole were a prominent legal family. For some particulars see the references in the index of the *Mémoires de Condé*, especially I, 70 and I, 224: also Maugis, *Parlement de Paris*. One of the family had been arrested with du Bourg in 1559.

A simple gathering of bishops, to which he compared it, was one thing; a mixed assembly of churchmen and lay dignitaries directly convoked by the civil power, was quite another. How far would the influence of the legate be allowed to prevail against that of the statesmen and lawyers? To bestow on these latter an influence equal to that of bishops in ecclesiastical matters was a state of affairs to which Rome could never consent; it was playing directly into the hands of the extreme Gallicans. The situation was fraught with all the perils of 1551 raised over again, but the Cardinal's own double supremacy, in Church and State at once, seems to have blinded him to this, though it was precisely the double position which, as in the case of Wolsey, created the dangerous precedent. It was hardly congruous to appeal to Rome to put its trust in a prince—true a Most Christian Prince, but also a Most Gallican one.

In June the new chancellor, the famous Michel de l'Hôpital, joined the Court. He was a scholar and a thinker, but not a man of action, and his verses to his patron, the Cardinal of Lorraine, are conceived in terms of quite extravagant adulation. He was still cordially detested by the Huguenots and little independent influence can be ascribed to him at this period. In his first address to the Parlement de Paris on July 5th he announced that the King was determined to do his utmost to repair the worst defects of the Church. The Edict of Romorantin had ordered the bishops back to their churches in order to revive the clerical courts, but it had failed because no penalties had been attached to non-compliance. The abuse of non-residence was now attacked with greater success. Letters patent dated July 25th commanded all members of the hierarchy—with the exception of royal councillors and those employed in the diplomatic service—to be in their dioceses by September 11th, where they would be required to preach and to conduct canonical visitations on pain of the confiscation of their temporalities.¹ The threat was no idle one, and it had some effect. Many of the bishops did actually go to their churches, and the Italian Bishops of Fréjus and Viviers who were refused permission to

¹ Isnard, I, No. 1525. Cf. Paris, p. 437, and Dupuy, pp. 44-5.

leave Rome by the Pope, on the ground that they would soon be required to go to Trent, had their revenues confiscated. The nuncio, though gratified by such excellent results, nevertheless submitted to the Cardinal of Lorraine a written protest against the principle of forcing spiritual persons to carry out spiritual duties by means of civil authority and temporal penalties.¹

The Cardinal of Lorraine was still in close touch with the Parisian Jesuits. Père Cogordan was much admired by Lorraine and in return enjoyed the Cardinal's esteem and confidence to a very high degree. The two men frequently discussed Church affairs together. Père Cogordan continually emphasized the necessity of selecting suitable men for clerical preferment and submitted two written projects for the extirpation of heresy which it would be interesting to recover.² All the ablest Churchmen of the day admired the Jesuits and sought to make use of them. Following the example first set by Guillaume du Prat, who had not only lent the Jesuits his Hôtel de Clermont in Paris but had since founded their first French college at Billom, several bishops now came forward with requests for settlements in their dioceses. The Bishop of Orleans, a statesman whom his diocese rarely saw in his episcopal capacity, asked for two fathers to preach and establish a house there. The Cardinal of Bourbon, in whose episcopal city of Rouen a flourishing Huguenot Church of about 10,000 faithful had sprung up, also desired to avail himself of the Society's services. The Cardinal of Lorraine did not cease to commend the Society at Court, speaking in glowing terms of its excellent work and expressing his desire to see it spread all over France and Scotland. He was especially desirous of settlements in Reims and in Metz. In the latter city the heretics, though not yet organized into a Church, were by their increase in numbers and their growing influence in public

¹ Viterbo to St Charles, Aug. 10th—Modena, *Estratti*; St Charles to Viterbo, Oct. 3rd, Nov. 18th, 1560 and Jan. 18th, 1561—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823. In May 1562 the Bishop of Viviers, then at Trent, complained of such poverty owing to the sequestration of his revenue, that had it not been for the kindness of the legates he would have had to retire to Bologna and live on his friends and relations—Ehser, p. 498 notes.

² *M.H.S.J., Epistolae PP. Paschasii, Broëtii, etc.* pp. 243, 248.

life causing the Cardinal some anxiety.¹ With the Abbé Manne he sent a letter to the Jesuit General, Laynez, requesting him to make a foundation there, and offering for this purpose a house conveniently near to a church and with a good garden, for which he proposed an endowment of 2500 livres, or 1000 gold scudi, per annum. He pointed out the admirable opportunities that a house in Metz would enjoy for missionary work in Germany.² It was his desire to see a dozen really capable Jesuits established there, French or Italians rather than Germans or Flemings, and he was willing to defray the expenses of their journey from Rome. In time he hoped that the Society would cover his three dioceses of Metz, Reims and Verdun with a network of their preaching, and entrench themselves strongly in the duchy of Lorraine. Laynez was strongly advised by all the Jesuits in France to accept the Cardinal's offer. They wrote alarming letters to Rome describing the decay of religion in France, but they had great confidence in Lorraine and were anxious to support his reforming schemes. Père Broet's devotion to him was so great that had it not been for his duties as Provincial, he would willingly have offered his own personal services to preach for the Cardinal in Reims, in Metz, or anywhere else.³

Unfortunately neither the influence of Lorraine at home nor that of the French cardinals in Rome, who suggested sending a Jesuit to preach at Court,⁴ was able to mitigate the determined opposition shown by the Parlement and the Bishop of Paris to the Society. Angered by the Parlement's refusal to register his father's letters patent,⁵ François II had on April 25th issued

¹ See Meurisse, *Histoire de la naissance, du progrès et de la décadence de l'hérésie dans la ville de Metz* (1642), p. 138. Cf. Zeller, II, 40-4. A few months previously the King had ordered the expulsion from Metz of all who refused to conform, and large numbers of persons had voluntarily exiled themselves—Thirion, *Étude sur l'histoire du Protestantisme à Metz* (1884), pp. 436 et seq.; Zeller, II, 55-6.

² Lorraine to Laynez, June 20th, 1560—*M.H.S.ſ., Epistolae PP. Paschasii, Broëtii, etc.* p. 236. Viansson-Ponté, *Les Jésuites en Metz* (1874), knew of no attempt to plant the Jesuits in Metz earlier than that of 1571.

³ For this paragraph see *M.H.S.ſ., Lainii Monumenta*, v, 100-1, 119, 135, 145; *Epistolae PP. Paschasii, Broëtii, etc.* pp. 143, 241.

⁴ *M.H.S.ſ., Lainii Monumenta*, iv, 562, 681-2.

⁵ See above, pp. 86-7.

fresh ones of a similar nature, to take effect not only in Paris but throughout the whole kingdom, and expressly overriding the objections of Bishop du Bellay and of the Sorbonne. When called upon to register, the Parlement dared not risk a further point-blank refusal, but temporized by again handing over the letters and all the relevant documents to the examination of du Bellay. At this crisis Père Cogordan once more displayed his customary energy and skill. He placed all the documents himself before du Bellay, taking care however not to include the constitutions of the Society or the Bulls of Privilege which had been the original cause of all the trouble. He argued his case at length before the King and the Cardinal, on one occasion just forestalling by great expedition a deputation from the Parlement bent on an exactly opposite errand. But du Bellay had little difficulty in enlisting the support of the Parisian clergy and the University of Paris in a new condemnation of the Jesuits, this time on the pretext that their constitutions, though approved by the Pope, lacked the confirmation of either a General or a National Council. This infuriated the Society's supporters. Lorraine determined to spoil du Bellay's triumph, and Père Cogordan promised himself no rest until the evasions of Prelate and Parlement had been overcome.¹

IV

The Abbé Manne reached Rome on July 4th. Pius IV was very greatly displeased by his mission and by the tone of the Cardinal of Lorraine's letters. So great was his amazement at the demand for a new Council, that he afterwards confessed to an intimate friend that he had felt as if he were listening to a Protestant envoy. He would not hear of a new Council at Constance, and maintained that the feebleness of the Imperial power rendered any site in Germany insecure. The French could not fairly utilize Henri II's refusal to recognize the sessions under Julius III in order to evade the logical consequences of François I's original consent to Trent. Manne

¹ Fouquieray, I, 235-7; Maugis, *Parlement de Paris*, I, 718.

then seems to have suggested Lyons, an ill-timed proposal which was scouted at once. But Pius still hoped to meet the unpopularity of Trent by effecting a translation, once the Council had reassembled, to Vercelli or some other north Italian town.¹

After a week or so, the consternation created by Manne's embassy was relieved by more favourable news from Spain. Philip II had taken serious alarm at the idea of a French National Council, not for what it was in itself nor yet very much because of its erastian implications, but chiefly because of the evil effects it would be likely to produce across the Netherlands border where conditions were now thoroughly unsettled. A demand for a Netherlands National Council, once aroused, would be difficult to check, but disastrous to give way to. The recall of French bishops from Rome, part of the campaign against non-residence in which the Bishops of Fréjus and Viviers suffered, was interpreted in Spain as a sign of the imminence of the National Council, and only a little extra pressure from the nuncio sufficed in these circumstances to extort Philip II's consent to the resumption of the Council of Trent, which was represented to him as the only method of avoiding what he so much dreaded north of the Pyrenees.²

In consequence of this development, the French ambassador at Toledo, de l'Aubespine, Bishop of Limoges, was instructed to ply the Spanish Government with arguments counter to those of Rome. These were now all fully developed. Trent was lacking in accommodation; the food supply was unsatisfactory; and to continue the former Council would be simply asking for a Lutheran boycott. The "resumption of the errors of Trent" and the exclusion of Protestants would usher in an era of yet more bitter strife and division; the appalling nightmare of a permanently divided Christendom would become an actuality. On the other hand, the French National Assembly, to be held under the presidency of a papal legate, was urgently necessary,

¹ Angoulême's letters in Henry et Loriquet, *Séances et Travaux de l'Académie de Reims*, xxvii, 9, 20-1; Eheses, pp. 51, 53.

² Voss, p. 54.

and need cause no alarm.¹ These uncompromising expressions—which incidentally do not lend colour to Chantonay's report that by the summer the Government had repented of the hasty decisions it had taken at Amboise²—produced no effect upon Spanish determination. Philip informed the Pope that he was prepared, in principle, to support and co-operate in the continuation of the Council of Trent, provided that the Emperor and the King of France gave their assent, provided, too, that great care were used in the selection of legates—a hint that Cardinal Morone was not wanted—and provided that there were complete liberty of speech.³ His letters were examined on July 11th by the Congregation for Reform, together with the instructions given to the Abbé Manne.⁴

On the following day an important communication was received from Vienna. In contrast to the part it was playing in French politics, the conciliar question had not aroused much interest at the Imperial Court. Germany had already, under Charles V, passed through the conditions that were now distracting French statesmen, and in the Peace of Augsburg a settlement of the religious problem had been reached. Whatever its shortcomings and unpleasantnesses, Ferdinand did not want that settlement to be disturbed: a Council might so easily disturb it. Tortured by this disruptive possibility he had adopted an attitude of fabian inactivity. Count Prospero von Arco, his new ambassador to the Vatican, created heavy disappointment

¹ The Bishop of Limoges to François II, July 3rd—*Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, XIII, 593; François II to Limoges; the Cardinal of Lorraine to the same; Robertet du Fresne, Secretary of State, to the same; Robertet d'Alluye, Treasurer-General, to the same; all of July 28th—Paris, pp. 429-35, 442-4, 444-7, 447-8. The phrases "la reprise des erres de...Trente", "suyvant les erres d'iceluy" and "reprendre les erres de Trente" occur both in the King's and in the Cardinal's letters. But whether definitely dogmatic errors are meant seems a little uncertain.

² Letter cited by Paillard, *Revue Historique*, XIV.

³ Letters of the Bishop of Terracina in Ehsses, p. 27 note 2; of Philip II to Vargas and de Luna cited by Voss, p. 51; of Vargas and Tendilla to Philip, in Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, 337-9. Cf. various letters in the *Documentos Ineditos para la historia de España*, II, 558; xcVIII, 140-2, 149-52, 152-3, all throwing light on Philip's attitude.

⁴ Sickel, p. 86; Voss, p. 66 note 124; Cyprianus, *Tabularium Ecclesiae Romanae*, p. 101.

by confessing on his arrival that he had been given no instructions regarding the Council. The Curia had thereupon made renewed applications for the Imperial consent to the reopening of the Council of Trent,¹ and finally the nuncio Hosius prevailed upon Ferdinand to face the question seriously. A long memorandum detailing the Imperial standpoint was drawn up with typical German thoroughness. Though of extreme importance it can only be very briefly summarized here.² At least a year, in the Emperor's opinion, would have to elapse before the Council could meet. The war in Scotland must be brought to a conclusion, and measures must be taken to secure a better attendance than had previously been seen at Trent. He deprecated the continuation of that Council. A new Council at Cologne, at Constance, at Ratisbon, or elsewhere in Germany seemed desirable. A safe-conduct for the adherents of the Augsburg Confession must be given and the attendance of the Pope in person would greatly enhance the prestige of the Assembly and augment its chances of success. For the rest the Emperor exhorted Pius to apply himself seriously to the reformation of the clergy, and petitioned, as a preliminary to reform, for the immediate legalization in Germany of clerical marriage and the administration of the Chalice to the laity—practices which, though uncanonical, prevailed very widely throughout the Empire.

The close approximation of the French and Imperial standpoints greatly disturbed the Pope. He read into that disquieting circumstance a secret co-operation which was as yet non-existent,³ for the Bishop of Rennes had not taken up his post at Vienna when Ferdinand's memorandum was composed.

¹ See Sickel, pp. 49-50; Steinherz, 23, 40-1, 54-6, 57; Ehses, p. 51; *Documentos inéditos*, xcvi, 153-5.

² Text in Sickel, pp. 55-69, and Ehses, pp. 39-51. Textual discussion in Sickel, pp. 69-72. Summaries in Pallavicino, 14, xiii, 9-18; Le Plat, iv, 629-32; Raynaldus, 1560, No. 55, and Schmidt, *Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen*, II, 81. Cf. also Buchholtz, *Geschichte Ferdinands ersten*, ix, 678-81; Loewe, *Die Stellung Kaiser Ferdinands ersten zum Trienter Konzil*, pp. 17, 72-9; Eder, *Die Reformvorschläge Kaiser Ferdinands ersten*, p. 47; and G. Constant, *Concession à l'Allemagne de la communion sous les deux espèces*, I, 192-8.

³ Ehses, pp. 51-2.

Pius IV could neither appreciate the plausibility of the opposition case nor understand why it should have come into being simultaneously in France and Germany; and though during his conclave he had declared that he saw no canonical reason why the two concessions now demanded by the Emperor should not be granted, he shrank from the personal responsibility of granting them now that an actual demand had been made to him. He told von Arco that he was not prepared to make such important alterations in matters *de jure positivo* without the approval of a Council; an assertion which he repeated to Philip of Spain.¹ Many other considerations had undoubtedly to be taken into account over and above the bare canonical possibilities. But von Arco, fully aware that the two requests would cause scandal in Rome, however necessary and desirable they might seem in German eyes, asked the Pope to keep them secret from all but a very few advisers, so that their cause might not receive unnecessary prejudice. Pius, however, thought it his duty not to appear to have favourites in the Sacred College. On July 14th the Emperor's memorandum was laid in its entirety before a full Consistory, which came to the not unforeseen conclusion that the immediate grant of the two concessions, without the consent of a Council, would be in the highest degree imprudent. For the rest the cardinals thrust aside the Emperor's suggestions and advised the Pope to raise the suspension of the Council of Trent. Von Arco realized sadly that the conservatism of the Sacred College would always prove too powerful for the Pope's mildly liberal propensities.² His estimate of these was nevertheless too high. He seems to have believed that personally Pius would have been prepared to permit the rediscussion of matters already dogmatized upon by the Council of Trent, but the Pontiff's private conversations with his close friend da Mula, the Venetian ambassador, make

¹ Ehse, pp. 52-4.

² Sickel, pp. 84-5; Ehse, pp. 54-5; Constant, pp. 196-7; *C.D.P.* ix, 11-12. After this Consistory several cardinals unsuccessfully tried to delude von Arco into the belief that the French had capitulated to the Pope's wishes concerning the re-overture of the Council of Trent on hearing that the Spanish consent had been given.

clear his belief that such a course would certainly not have been legitimate. He was still willing, however, to effect a translation from Trent into the north of Italy, though never into Germany. This project unfortunately received a rebuff when the Venetian Government refused to offer any of their cities, alleging the risks of a Turkish invasion, and recalling not inappositely the capture of a General Council by Enzo in 1241. So unwilling, however, was the Pope to give a handle to those who questioned his sincerity in the whole matter of the General Council, and so anxious was he to vindicate his desire to meet the objections to Trent considered purely as a site, that he fell back westwards from Venetia upon Milan and Mantua, and even as far south as Bologna, in search of possible alternatives.¹

The attitude of the French and of the Emperor certainly took Pius IV by surprise. He had not contemplated the possibility of resistance to the continuation of the Council of Trent. Vargas seized the occasion to insinuate to him that behind the demand for a new Council there lay, though as yet unrevealed, a desire to repeal the Justification Decree of 1546—a step calculated to wreck the whole Catholic position against Lutheranism, and also considerably to embarrass monarchs, such as the King of Spain, who had put great numbers of persons to death for contrary beliefs. Hoping to nip the anti-Trent movement in the bud, Vargas urged Pius IV to raise the suspension forthwith and thus compel the Emperor and the King of France to submit to his wishes.² But the Pope clung to his first principles and refused to move without the properly given consent of all the Catholic monarchs, trusting still to the powers of his diplomacy. The committee appointed to draw up a reply to Ferdinand³ worked all through July without agreeing upon any draft. The Abbé Manne, too, was meanwhile left without an answer, and saw well enough that the Curia was concentrating what energies it possessed during the summer heat upon dealing

¹ Ehses, pp. 51-2; *Archiv für die Geschichte des Bistums Augsburg*, II, 176, 178, 184.

² Letters of Vargas to Philip II of July 13th—Döllinger, I, 337-9; and 16th, cited by Voss, pp. 67-8.

³ Ehses, p. 55; Sickel, pp. 84-5.

first with Ferdinand. The Pope believed that France would follow the Emperor implicitly and that by inducing the latter to accept his policy he would kill his two birds with a single stone.¹

It was during this period of waiting that Cardinal Tournon left for France, refusing the customary faculties of patronage which the Pope persisted in offering him despite all requests to the contrary.² French galleys sent from Marseilles, augmented by others lent by the Duke of Florence at the request of Catherine de Médicis, had at length arrived to escort him from Ostia.³ The Cardinal had hoped to take both a Jesuit to preach at the French Court and a Confession of Faith drawn up by Jesuit fathers to be imposed upon the French bishops. Neither proposal, however, had materialized. But Tournon's earnest appeals for the intervention of the Society to save France from heresy had so impressed Laynez that the Cardinal of Lorraine's offer of a house in Metz was accepted, even though no subjects could be promised before the end of the year.⁴ Tournon left Rome on July 25th. In company with Cardinal Armagnac, who had been appointed legate in Navarre, he sailed from Ostia to Cività Vecchia and thence to Marseilles. It was hoped that he would reach the French Court, by way of Lyons, early in September.⁵

The delay in the composition of the papal replies to Vienna and Paris threatened to be indefinitely prolonged when on the last day of July the Pope was struck down by a fever. The committee, however, continued to meet and within a week the Pope, after surmounting no less than three bad attacks, was able to move from the Vatican to St Mark's for a change of air.⁶

¹ Letters of Angoulême in Henry et Loriguet, x, 12-14; Ehses, p. 55 note 3; St Charles to Viterbo, July 29th—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823.

² Le Laboureur, *Mémoires de M. de Castelnau*, I, 759.

³ La Ferrière, *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, I, 133, 137; St Charles to Viterbo, June 3rd—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823.

⁴ *M.H.S.ſ.*, *Lainii Monumenta*, v, 135, 137-8, 154, 190; *Polanci Complementa*, I, 227, 229; *Bobadillae Monumenta*, p. 352; *Sancti Francisci Borgiae Epistolae*, III, 624.

⁵ Henry et Loriguet, p. 11; *M.H.S.ſ.*, *Lainii Monumenta*, v, 131; Romier, *Conjuration d'Amboise*, p. 160 notes.

⁶ Sickel, p. 86; Merkle, p. 347; *Archiv für die Geschichte des Bistums Augsburg*, II, 184, 194.

There, on August 7th, still visibly weakened by his illness, he received Manne and the Bishop of Angoulême in audience and gave them a summary of his proposed reply to Ferdinand. He firmly intended to reopen the Council of Trent despite all opposition, but he would be careful to imply neither confirmation nor invalidation of the former decrees, and would relegate to the conciliar fathers all questions of disciplinary modification. Once assembled at Trent the Council could, if it were desired, be translated elsewhere, but to no town under heretical influence, nor yet to one subject to the Holy See.¹ For the rest he was not disposed to make interim alterations of his own authority. Such, he said, would be the tenor of his reply; but when the note embodying these decisions would be ready for despatch to Vienna, he could not yet foretell: the Cardinals were mostly old men, and in weak health; the pressure of business was heavy upon them and the weather was at its hottest. In these circumstances he counselled the Abbé to return to France at once. He might rest assured that a formal communication to the Most Christian King would follow swiftly.²

Having already spent a month in Rome, Manne had no objection to a further prolongation of his stay. For all the heat and the pressure of business and the peculiar infirmities of the cardinals, he knew that fear of the National Council would in the end spur their Eminences on. He was not mistaken. On the very day of his audience the Congregation for Reform discussed the draft of a reply to François II, and a fortnight later his patience was rewarded. On August 21st, the Abbé at length set out for home with a papal letter in which Pius IV again expressed his firm intention of raising the suspension of the Council of Trent, once more condemned the National Council, observed that the original assent of François I to the city and Council of Trent outweighed the subsequent rejection of Henri II, and agreed to the plan of a league to coerce such as would not submit to the Council—a suggestion apparently made

¹ This of course ruled out Bologna, mentioned above.

² Henry et Loricquet, pp. 15-18.

by the Cardinal of Lorraine.¹ In a personal letter to the Cardinal the Pope referred to the latter's apologia of June. He made no attempt to meet its arguments but simply declared that though His Eminence's zeal and sincerity were in no way questioned, it was his plain duty to procure the abandonment of the National Council and to work in support of the Pope's wishes.²

Not until September 2nd did Delphinus, Bishop of Lesina, leave Rome with a similar but more detailed letter to the Emperor. The Pope defended the resumption of the Council of Trent on the ground that the wars of Charles V had interrupted without dissolving it. Trent was commodious, well-provisioned and easily accessible; yet he was willing to yield to its unpopularity by transferring the Council elsewhere—though not into Germany, where there would be no guarantee of safety and where it might become entangled with the question of the Imperial succession. He promised the most liberal safe-conduct to the Protestants, but uttered a warning against desiring an impossible and unnatural kind of reunion for political convenience. On the advice of his cardinals he had decided to submit the Emperor's requests for disciplinary relaxations to the Council. As for his own attendance, that was—in so many words—his own affair.³

Behind the confident tones of these papal communications there lurked great uneasiness. The possibility that the validity of the earlier Tridentine decrees might be challenged worried the Pope intensely, though an incorrect rumour spread that Pius IV himself sympathized with the many cardinals and other men of prominence and ability who, it was widely alleged, held that the possibility of a rediscussion with the Protestants was an open question.⁴ It was certainly true that he had instituted

¹ Text in Sickel, pp. 88–9, and Ehses, pp. 55–6. The latter publishes some textual alterations made to avoid the impression of expressing concurrence with Lutheran wishes.

² Appendix IV, Pius IV to the Cardinal of Lorraine, Aug. 21st—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823 (also letters of the same date to Catherine de Médicis, Cardinal Tournon and Cardinal Armagnac). Cf. above, p. 124.

³ Steinherz, pp. 98, 99–109; Ehses, pp. 56 note 3, 61–3; Sickel, p. 92 and notes. Cf. Voss, pp. 74–5, and Constant, pp. 197–8.

⁴ Cusanus to Maximilian, Aug. 10th, in Sickel, pp. 86–7. Pastor, VII, 152 note 5 (Engl. transl. xv, 193 note 5) denies this allegation. Cusanus is, on the whole, not trustworthy.

a committee of canonists and theologians to consider these decrees in connection with the Emperor's requests for the legalization of clerical marriage and lay communion *sub utraque*,¹ but it alarmed him considerably to see what grave and fundamental issues he had thus unwittingly raised. It crossed his mind to abandon the whole project of a Council if the Emperor would not give up his opposition to the resumption of the Council of Trent; in which case he could fall back upon the old expedient of an international body of bishops to undertake the reform of the Church Universal in Rome; or, again, simply attempt this by committees of cardinals.² Neither Ferdinand nor Philip of Spain would have much minded, both would probably have felt rather relieved, had he done so.

In this crisis in the history of the Council of Trent it was the French situation which proved decisive. The Pope was tormented by constant rumours of an interim, or of the definite convocation of the National Council, and simply dared not convert the ugly possibility into a still uglier certainty by relinquishing his own conciliar plans. His deep anxiety was betrayed by repeated questions put to the Bishop of Angoulême regarding the latest developments. He had already learnt to expect defiance from the French, and was quite prepared to hear that they had taken affairs into their own hands. But the ambassador had as yet no news to give, save always the same monotonous assurance that the Most Christian King would allow no prejudice to be done to the interests of the Holy See even though his actions might at first sight wear an air of unfamiliarity.³ Pius was exacerbated rather than assuaged by such vagueness. Putting off an intended visit to Bologna, and postponing a projected pilgrimage to Loretto, he delivered instead

¹ Von Arco to Ferdinand, Aug. 10th, in Sickel, pp. 82-3, who dates the letter July 10th. Voss has shown the right date in the *Mitteilungen des Instituts für oesterreichische Geschichtsforschung*, ix, 464.

² Von Arco to Ferdinand, Aug. 10th, as above; Delphinus' instructions, Sept. 2nd, as above.

³ Henry et Lorique, pp. 27-8. For independent witness to the extent of the Pope's anxiety see Sickel, pp. 82-3; *C.D.P.* ix, 32-3, and *M.H.S.J. Litterae Quadrimestres*, iv, 373, 691, 797.

an address on episcopal residence to the Consistory of September 4th. On August 18th the Congregation for Reform had praised the French enforcement of residence, and consequently Viterbo had been ordered to let pass uncriticized the implied assumption of ecclesiastical jurisdiction by the King.¹ The Pope now avowed his intention of following the excellent example set by His Most Christian Majesty. Hitherto the prospect of the Council had moved him to tolerate the presence of many bishops in Rome. Now that excuse would serve no longer, and a Bull was published requiring all bishops to retire to their churches. This was sent to France with a papal letter exhorting the King to facilitate its execution, and thus the anomalous situation created by the royal letters patent was regularized.² Other projects conceived in Rome at this time show how critical the position of Catholicism in France was considered to be. At one moment it was the despatch thither of all the Generals of all the Orders of Friars that was contemplated:³ at another, Tournon's idea of a confession of faith to be imposed upon all the clergy was revived. Such a confession was actually drawn up, but not in the end sent to France. It was prudently considered inadvisable to create the impression that the theology of the French bishops stood in need of being overhauled before they came to the Council.⁴

But they were all pathetically ironical—these desperate endeavours to placate or to harness the French. For already—though the Pope knew it not—the National Council was summoned.

V

The bellicose and iconoclastic movement within the Huguenot ranks had meanwhile made headway wherever the reformed congregations were strong. In parts of Dauphiné and Provence

¹ St Charles to Viterbo, Aug. 21st—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823. Cited by Ehes, p. 58 note 3, under the wrong date Aug. 29th.

² *Bullarium Romanum*, vii, 55-8; Ehes, pp. 67-9. See also Pius IV to François II, Sept. 11th, in Ehes, pp. 70-1, and the *Acta Consistorialia* of Sept. 4th—*ibid.* p. 66.

³ St Charles to Viterbo, Aug. 21st, as cited above.

⁴ St Charles to Tournon, second letter of Nov. 11th—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823.

the already existing elements of a separatist movement had accelerated the spread of the new Gospel, and by the late summer of 1560 there were regions, the magistrates conniving, where Catholic worship had been entirely suspended, where rioting had become frequent, and where authority, both local and central, had begun to collapse visibly. It was to these simmering regions that the escaped lieutenants of La Renaudie fled to rehabilitate their shattered fortunes. The Guises' fears of a new and more formidable rising were thus not entirely devoid of foundation, and as time went on their imputation of seditious motives to the Huguenots began to contain a larger element of truth. The disturbances in the Rhone Valley, coupled with extreme financial embarrassment, rendered impossible any aggressive foreign policy, and though erroneously convinced that Calvin was at the root of all their troubles, the Government did not feel strong enough to satisfy the papal request that France should join the Duke of Savoy in an attack upon Geneva. Even a personal letter from Pius IV urging King François to the Holy War produced no more than a loan to Philibert Emmanuel of 1500 men and 30 cannon,¹ while in Scotland the Guises were powerless to provide their sister with adequate assistance. Three months sufficed for Grey, after one serious repulse, to storm Leith. On June 6th there was signed the Peace of Edinburgh, whose disastrous terms Mary of Guise, beaten in the field and worn out by disease, did not live to see. The French negotiators, headed by Montluc, Bishop of Valence, could save nothing from the wreck, even by an offer of the interim exercise of Presbyterianism until the General Council.

¹ See the letters of Viterbo to St Charles of June 5th, July 2nd and 28th, and to the nuncio in Spain of June 28th—Modena, *Estratti*. Compare St Charles to Viterbo of June 19th and July 29th—C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823. See also Romier, *Conjuraton d'Amboise*, pp. 160-1 and notes. Philibert Emmanuel had sent Mgr di Colegno to Rome to negotiate for a league against Geneva—Sickel, pp. 51-2. In June this prelate announced to von Thurm, rather prematurely, that the King of France had promised military assistance on a large scale. An erroneous report came to Cecil from Germany that an alliance had been formed consisting of the Pope, the Duke of Savoy, the King of Spain and the King of France, the French National Council being only a pretext for the Guises to assemble Italian troops with which to destroy their enemies at home—For. Cal., 1560-1, No. 52.

No Frenchman was henceforth to hold important office in Scotland; all French troops were to be withdrawn; François and Mary were to abandon the English coat-of-arms, and the Regency was to be entrusted until Mary's return to a committee of twelve Scots. It was the omega of the French hold on Scotland.

Of the six months within which the National Council had been promised at the end of March, four had now elapsed, and it had become a matter of European importance whether or no the promise would be fulfilled despite Pope and King of Spain. It was probably due to the influence of Catherine de Médicis who was not, at this period, a supporter of the National Council, that the Guises decided to mark time by convening in August a special plenary meeting of the *Conseil Royal* swollen by the addition of the Chevaliers of the Order of St Michel, the financial secretaries and the *maîtres des requêtes de l'hôtel*. Much public show was to be attached to this assembly, and could it be induced to demand a National Council, the Government's hand would obviously be enormously strengthened, for it could then represent itself as under a kind of compulsion and swept along by a popular demand. The Queen-Mother, however, hoped that Cardinal Tournon would arrive in time to participate, and there could be little doubt into which scale he would throw his influence. It was decided also to summon Condé and the King of Navarre, for it was thought that they would not have the courage either to absent themselves, or, if they appeared, to attack the legality of the Government. But if they did appear it would be impossible for them to maintain that they were allowed no voice in public affairs, and their association with the Government might help to strengthen the latter in the provinces. Either way, however, the Guises felt secure.

But the strain of his administration was telling heavily upon the Cardinal, whose health, never particularly strong, was causing him repeated trouble. Engaged in the composition of his speech a fortnight or so before the opening of the Assembly, he expressed repentance at ever having shouldered the thankless

burden of government and confessed to the nuncio that he was almost at a loss to know how to continue. He spoke bitterly of the King of Spain, whom he reproached for not having cared to prevent the Scotch disaster and for having failed to render many other services to religion which it had been in his power to perform.¹ Spanish jealousy of France had indeed greatly facilitated the establishment of Protestantism in England and Scotland.

Fifty-five persons assembled in the Queen Mother's apartments at Fontainebleau on August 21st to give the King and his ministers the benefit of their combined wisdom. Montmorency was there, and the three Châtillon brothers, but the Bourbons had not risen to their opportunity, and had sent their excuses, after some hesitation, alleging weakly that it was not possible for them to arrive in time. They dared not air their grievance in public; they shrank from giving it away by public support of the Guise régime. As a device for reuniting the great families around the Throne, the Assembly of Notables was already a failure.

On the first day the Duke of Guise and the Cardinal of Lorraine gave accounts of their stewardship, military and financial. They emphasized the immense difficulties confronting them, and revealed the unsatisfactory state of both departments. The Chancellor then described from a more general standpoint the religious and administrative problems whose urgency had impelled the Government to summon the present Assembly as an alternative to the États-Généraux, the convocation of which, it will be recalled, was a cardinal point in the programme of the Bourbon shadow government.

Two days, August 23rd and 24th, were then occupied by the speeches of the nineteen councillors. Remarkable unanimity of opinion was revealed, and after the first two speeches from Montluc, Bishop of Valence, and Marillac, Archbishop of Vienne, no one—with the exception of Coligny—found any-

¹ Viterbo to St Charles, Aug. 19th—Modena, *Estratti*; Ven. Cal., Nos. 188, 189.

thing further to say beyond short and vague expressions of concurrence. The two prelates made lengthy and impressive speeches.¹ Both cast the gravest reflections upon clerical morality and upon the lack of energy and ideals among the vast majority of priests, Montluc stressing the shameful contrast with the self-sacrificing and virtuous lives of the Huguenot pastors. They insisted that the residence of bishops and curés and the stamping out of simony were the first essentials of reformation; and in regard to the treatment of heretics advocated toleration for simple misbelievers free from political or worldly motives, though neither doubted the duty of the Government to repress sedition of all kind. Marillac pointed out that persuasion, not persecution, had been the weapon of the early Church. He advocated the restoration of public confession and public fasts, and pleaded for a frank admission that both sides had been guilty of unjustifiable violences. A free General Council figured on the programme of both bishops, but both considered that the impediments to one warranted immediate local action being taken. Marillac embroidered this theme with strongly worded attacks upon the Holy See which he charged with having persistently sown disunion between princes in order to avoid a General Council. Both prelates strongly advocated the National Council, supporting their view with numerous historical precedents, of greater or less relevancy. Neither shrank from the declaration that papal opposition could and ought to be overridden. The contagion was spreading so rapidly that no remedy not immediately applicable could be waited for. Montluc even suggested a colloquy with the Huguenot leaders to explore avenues of dogmatic agreement.

A traditional misreading of the reign of François II, due to the sinister and misleading influence of the pamphleteer Regnier de la Planche, has led most writers to see in these two speeches an explosion of pent-up feeling against the Guises. It is perfectly clear, on the contrary, that they were more in the nature of expressions of confidence. Montluc and Marillac

¹ For Montluc's speech see *Mémoires de Condé*, I, ³555-68; for Marillac's, Regnier de la Planche, edition of 1836, I, 373-94.

gave every appearance of having been briefed not to attack but to defend the Government, to create and fortify the impression that its policy was solidly backed by responsible councillors. Their proposals coincided, with remarkable completeness, with the Government's policy since March. The amnesty of that month had drawn the distinction between simple heretics and those politically compromised; virtual toleration had followed the Edict of Romorantin; the Cardinal of Lorraine's championship of the National Council it has been one of the objects of this book to elucidate, and even the proposal of a colloquy was not new. Both prelates had close connections with the Guises. Montluc, a loose-living, sceptical and secularized Dominican, whose connivance had made possible the growth and public emergence of the Huguenot community in Valence, who had engaged suspected preachers to preach the Lent in his cathedral and who had been denounced as a heretic by the dean of his own Chapter,¹ had none the less been long a trusted and confidential agent of the Cardinal of Lorraine.² Marillac, a middle-aged diplomatist of solid worth and real piety, a prop of the monarchy, was the very last person to embark upon political adventure in the Bourbon interest and had deliberately repudiated the suggestion that responsibility for the prevalent discontent rested solely upon the Guises' shoulders. Avowedly indebted to Lorraine for his ideas on religious reform, he had gained the Cardinal's friendship and admiration.³ That these should have been the two men chosen to denounce the rule of those to whom they were attached by so many links, whose creatures in fact they were, is not to be believed. The traditional interpretation of the Assembly of Fontainebleau as an attack upon the Guises must be abandoned for one diametrically opposite.⁴

Definite criticism of the Government, and that of no very

¹ See J. Flèche in the *B.S.H.P.F.* for Jan.-March 1928, pp. 31-5.

² Romier, *Origines Politiques*, I, 87. A son of Montluc became a noted captain of the League.

³ Pasquier, *Lettres*, IV, 192; Paris, p. 773.

⁴ I had convinced myself of this even before reading M. Romier's account of Fontainebleau in his *Conjuration d'Amboise*.

dangerous type, came only from the phlegmatic Coligny. After the suppression of the Tumult of Amboise the admiral had been sent by the Queen-Mother into Normandy to report on the ecclesiastical situation. At the opening of the session on August 23rd he presented two documents to the King and the Queen-Mother in which the Huguenots of Normandy and Picardy professed their loyalty to the Crown and respectfully petitioned for public places of worship. That such a petition could be delivered on such an occasion showed how rapidly the situation had developed since the death of du Bourg. For though in March the right of petition had indeed been granted to the Huguenots, yet even allowing for this M. Romier is probably right when he argues that the graceful reception accorded to Coligny must show that the whole incident was prearranged with the object of impressing outside observers with the strength of the Huguenots. The following day Coligny declared in his speech that he could easily have obtained 50,000 signatures to the petition, and pleaded that it should be granted. He—and he alone—voiced the grievances universally felt against the Government, reproaching the Guises for having shut off the King from his people by means of a bodyguard, and demanding the convocation of the États-Généraux as a vent for popular discontent. Though not in league with the Bourbons, unaware even of their underground plans, he was nevertheless in sympathy with much of their programme.

The Guises replied immediately to the speeches of the councillors. It is significant that they made no comments on those of Montluc and Marillac, but concentrated upon the attacks of Coligny. The Duke spoke acidly upon the need of respect to the King on the part of those who offered him advice. The royal bodyguard was amply justified by the insurrection at Amboise, which he maintained had been directed as much against the King himself as against his ministers. He was aware that discontent existed. But the demobilization of troops had been essential, and if wages and pensions had in many instances been delayed, this was due to the heritage of debts left by Henri II. As for the disgraceful petition and its 50,000

supporters, at least a million signatures could easily be collected for a counter-petition.

The Cardinal spoke with greater restraint than his brother. How, he asked, could the Norman Protestants pretend that fidelity to the King was compatible with the acceptance of heretical doctrines which it was the King's sworn duty to repress? Was it such innocents, then, who were composing and circulating libellous pamphlets against the King's ministers? Dramatically he flung down some twenty examples upon the table before him. There could be no two opinions; sedition must be put down ruthlessly. Yet he was prepared to believe that there were, in addition to the unruly, many peaceful though misguided heretics who merited toleration so long as they remained orderly and inoffensive. For his own part he much regretted the violence done to sincere misbelievers in the past. It were better to send earnest bishops and priests to preach the true faith to them. In future the bishops would be held strictly to the performance of their duties. Already they had been sent to their dioceses, and he proposed that in two months they should be summoned to discuss in the light of their new pastoral experience the necessity for a National and the possibility of a General Council. In the meanwhile the best prelude to reform would be the exercise of careful self-restraint by all parties.¹

The speech was cleverly contrived. The Cardinal had not openly advocated the National Council, but he had not condemned the two bishops, and he had suggested an arrangement calculated to throw the onus of a decision on to the collective shoulders of the episcopate. It was his aim to appear as though urged forward by others. At the same time though his language was more moderate and less committal than that of either Montluc or Marillac, he had identified himself in a general way with their point of view. At least one Protestant observer noted this, and ascribed it to the shock given to the Cardinal's mind by the Tumult of Amboise.² The nuncio's comments, too, are

¹ For the speeches of Coligny, the Duke of Guise and the Cardinal of Lorraine see Regnier de la Planche, edition of 1836, I, 369-72, 396-9; *Le Laboureur*, I, 47-8.

² Hubert Languet, II, 69-70.

enlightening. The speech, he wrote to Rome, was highly prudent and could cause no offence. He suspected, however, that Lorraine, not daring to speak his real mind openly, had inspired the anti-Roman remarks of his close friend Marillac, and later on when the examination of the Vidame de Chartres was entrusted by Lorraine to the Archbishop, the nuncio felt that his suspicion had been justified.¹

On the 25th the remaining speakers, who included Montmorency, Cardinal Châtillon and d'Andelot, declared in very few words their general approbation of Lorraine's sentiments, and the Assembly was closed on the next day. The Government, it was then revealed, had taken two important decisions, both containing some element of surprise. The National Council was not to await the maturer consideration of the hierarchy. Failing the previous convocation of a General Council by the Pope, the French bishops would meet in Council at Paris on January 20th; meanwhile they were to show leniency towards heretics not implicated in sedition. The second decision was much more unexpected. The États-Généraux were summoned to Meaux for December 10th. The Government had seen during the course of the Assembly that the thing would have to be given serious consideration. Marillac had advocated it; there had been—it seems—pressure on the part of the provincial Parlements and, most important of all, it appeared to be the only way left of relieving the financial imbroglio.² In his closing speech Lorraine himself had pronounced in its favour.

The decision turned out to be a stroke of almost unexampled luck. Convinced that they had not yet got the truth about Condé, the Guises could enjoy no peace of mind while the Bourbons refused to come to Court, while the disturbances in the south-east waxed, while Theodore Beza, Calvin's right-hand man, remained at Nérac with Anthony of Navarre. On the last day of the Assembly of Fontainebleau a courier of Condé, by name La Sague, was arrested. Papers in his posses-

¹ Viterbo to St Charles, Aug. 25th, Sept. 11th—Modena, *Estratti*.

² Chantonay, cited by Romier, *Conjuration d'Amboise*, p. 213, gives this explanation of the Government's sudden *volte-face* on the question of the États-Généraux.

sion revealed the existence of a fresh plot in which Anthony, Condé, the Vidame de Chartres and several lesser personages were involved; and revelations extorted from La Sague by torture—a process to which he afterwards pleasantly referred as “a confession to please the Cardinal of Lorraine”¹—confirmed the evidence of the papers. The Guises plumed themselves in triumph: the truth was out, and it was as they had always suspected. The King burst into furious invective against his cousins; the Queen-Mother was palpably dejected. The Bourbon plans for a new rising, based on the disturbances in the Rhone valley and therefore organically connected with La Renaudie’s attempt, were just coming to maturity. Successful negotiations for financial assistance had been in progress between Condé and some German princes, perhaps with Elizabeth as well, and though Calvin persistently but quite impotently condemned the resort to arms, he was unable to prevent the raising of troops even in his own city of Geneva, let alone the arming by Condé’s lieutenants of many Huguenot congregations. The Prince had taken one step further in the conversion of a religious movement into a military and political instrument. His plan was to seize Lyons—the military key to the South of France—on September 5th, and to assemble the États-Généraux there for the purpose of overthrowing the Guises.

The news that the Guises had themselves summoned the États-Généraux took the wind completely out of the Bourbon sails, and capped the heavy discomfiture which the invitation to Fontainebleau had already caused them. Hastily the plans were rearranged. Countermanding the attack on Lyons, Anthony ordered his troops to meet him instead at Limoges, and conceived the grandiose idea of arriving at Meaux with an armed following to claim at last his just constitutional rights from the Estates.² Not so simply, however, nor yet so heroically, were the Princes of the Blood to escape the consequences of their secret machinations. The Government acted with great

¹ Layard, *Despatches of the Venetian Ambassadors*, p. 29.

² Regnier de la Planche himself describes in detail the plans of this revolt. See the account, based chiefly on this source, in Romier, *Conjuration d'Amboise*, pp. 215-31.

promptitude and vigour. A general mobilization was ordered; the Vidame de Chartres was placed in the Bastille, and Condé's arrest was determined. A messenger was sent to Nérac bearing news of the decisions taken after the Assembly of Fontainebleau, and with a peremptory order for the King of Navarre and his brother to appear at Court.¹ The would-be heroes would arrive only as disgraced and humiliated conspirators.

It was thus the happy if unpremeditated outcome of the Assembly of Fontainebleau to upset a second and more dangerous rebellion on the very point of coming to birth. But even apart from this it had fulfilled its original purpose. When an edict appeared on the last day of August embodying the summons both of the États-Généraux and of the National Council, it could be pleaded that the Government was forced to yield to the pressure of the greatest in the land; that its ecclesiastical policy was not the passing whim of an individual but rested on broad foundations. The Assembly of Fontainebleau was in the nature of a public rally around the Cardinal of Lorraine in respect of the ecclesiastical policy which he had pursued since the beginning of the year, and as such is an important landmark in the relations of France towards the Council of Trent.²

¹ Paris, pp. 481, 482-6, 490-7, 501-5.

² A printed notice of the decisions of Fontainebleau may be seen in the Bib. Nat., fonds français, 20459. The edict of the 31st is in Paris, pp. 486-90; Italian extracts sent to Rome in Ehses, pp. 57-8. Cf. Isnard, I, Nos. 1536-7. A report became current that Montluc and Marillac would be sent to Rome and Vienna respectively to give news of the National Council, but that Montluc eventually declined—very wisely—"for certain causes between the Pope and himself"; while Marillac, though willing, was understood to be unacceptable to the Emperor, who with Throckmorton and the Pope considered his orthodoxy to be not unimpeachable—see For. Cal., Nos. 274, 284; Ven. Cal., No. 193; Steinherz, 2, I, 125, and de Ruble, *Antoine de Bourbon*, II, 468-9. The biographies of Marillac and Montluc by de Vaissière and Reynault (1896 and 1893) respectively do not throw any light on this part of their careers.

CHAPTER VI

Ad Ecclesiae Regimen

A Rome on aime assez les vieilles choses.

—Duchesne, *L'État Pontifical*.

I

THE Bishop of Rennes did not reach Vienna until the last days of July.¹ He found the Emperor and his advisers convinced—as well they might be from past experience—that French policy regarding the General Council was fundamentally selfish.² Though the document which Hosius had persuaded the Emperor to draw up, and which had caused so much uneasiness at Rome, had coincided to a large extent with the instructions given to the Abbé Manne, the similarity was not due to any co-operation or conscious sympathy with the French: the memorandum simply represented the traditional German policy initiated by Charles V. That the Lutherans must attend the Council if it were to be productive of good, and that concessions in discipline must be made to regularize an uncanonical state of affairs too firmly established to be forcibly abolished, were long-standing German points of view. The legitimization of the Lutheran princes in 1555 had not altered the fact that their reconciliation to the Church was regarded as the key to the whole question of reunion. They were persons the road to whose return it was not politic finally and irrevocably to bar. The Pope was right when he said that Ferdinand was frightened of the Lutheran princes. He was frightened lest a Council held without them, and animated only by the harshest feelings towards them, should lead to a revival of civil strife. The present condition, unsatisfactory though it was, was at least better than that. In short, Ferdinand feared a Council which the Lutherans might refuse to attend and which they might therefore attack, while he saw little chance of obtaining

¹ *Documentos inéditos*, xcviII, 169.

² Sickel, p. 50.

such a one as they would be willing to patronize. The whole conciliar proposal therefore appeared to him as hardly deserving of encouragement. Hence the listlessness and lack of interest which had disappointed Pius IV, and against which Hosius was striving.

The arrival of the Bishop of Rennes added a new and vigorous element to the situation. Bochetel set to work with an air of great confidence, and soon made it evident to the Emperor that his interest lay in a policy of active support for the French demand for a new Council at Constance. Not only did he urge such a Council as conducive to the general good of Christendom, but he let it be seen clearly that only its swift convocation could prevent a National Council in France. This eventuality Ferdinand dreaded almost as much as did his nephew Philip. The question of a National Council had been simmering in Germany for some forty years and the moment was highly inopportune for it to be brought again to boiling-point. A German National Council in 1560 would have stood helpless between the Scylla of domination by a Protestant majority and the Charybdis of attack and dispersal at the hands of this majority were it denied attendance. But the demand for a National Council would certainly be revived if the French led the way, and would probably be supported by Ferdinand's son and heir, Maximilian.

Shortly, then, after Rennes' appearance in Vienna, Hosius perceived a distinct hardening in the Emperor's opposition to resumption of the Council of Trent. Gratified at his success, the Frenchman turned in triumph upon Hosius himself and discoursed at considerable length upon the need for the reform of the Papacy, upon the desirability of reconsidering the Tridentine decrees, and upon the absolute necessity of procuring Protestant subscription to the decrees of the forthcoming Council. Hosius, though startled, was ready with his reply. How could it be considered reasonable, he enquired, for three petty princes such as the Dukes of Württemberg and Saxony and the Elector Palatine, together with a few Protestant towns, to lay down the law to the Pope, the Emperor, the Kings of France and Spain, the Dukes of Bavaria and Brunswick and the many Catholic

prince-bishops who between them ruled about half the Empire? Why should such deference be paid to men who proclaimed that they were bound to submit to no council whatsoever? If some Germans chose to speak and to act thus madly, cutting themselves off from God's Church, if indeed all Germany should condemn itself to spiritual death, was that any valid reason why the rest of the Christian and Catholic world should be precluded from taking necessary and salutary measures? Hosius' antitheses, nevertheless, were not quite accurately put. By the omission of several Lutheran States and by the assumption—then indeed current in Rome—that Brandenburg would be prepared to comply with the papal wishes,¹ the nuncio definitely understated the Protestant strength in Germany. But he was shrewd enough to touch the weak spot of the anti-Trent case as presented by a Frenchman. How, he asked, could Lutheran support of the Council possibly ameliorate conditions in France where the dissenters, as Bochetel himself could not deny, were Calvinists to a man and at theological loggerheads with the Germans? It seems that Rennes was unable to parry this thrust, though he ought surely to have been prepared for it. He replied a little tamely that at any rate the King of Spain agreed with the French. But a few minutes' conversation with the Condé de Luna, Philip's ambassador in Vienna, sufficed to put Hosius wise on this point.²

Distressed at the influence which the nimble Frenchman was establishing over Ferdinand—and by means of arguments so feeble—Hosius wrote a lively account to Rome of his conversations with Rennes. There they made the worst impression. Pius IV could not bring himself to believe that the French would deliberately incite the Emperor to oppose him. He chose to assume that Rennes had over-stepped his instructions; and contrasting his aggressive conduct with the respectful attitude shown personally by Manne, turned the force of his wrath upon the person of Bochetel. Uttering vague accusations of

¹ See above, p. III.

² Steinherz, *Nuntiaturreichte*, pp. 84, 89, 90-1; *Documentos inéditos*, xcvi, 169-72; Turba, *Venetianische Despeschen*, III, 153 and note 2. I have summarized several separate conversations between Rennes and Hosius.

Protestantism he held back his Bulls of Institution as Bishop of Rennes, with which he had not yet been provided; while St Charles, scarcely less moved than his uncle, described the ambassador's conduct as "imprudente, scandaloso et impio", and ordered Viterbo to make the strongest protests to the French Government.¹

Again it was towards Spain that the Pope turned. Not, however, that he was prepared to throw himself unreservedly into Philip's hands. If he was clear in his own mind that he ought not to satisfy the French and the Imperialists with a new Council, he was equally determined not to issue a formal confirmation of the Tridentine decrees, a step by which he could have bought Spanish support unreservedly, yet at a price which he was still very unwilling to pay—that of finally extinguishing all prospect of Lutheran attendance. What he actually did was to make a request for Spanish intercession against the French National Council;² but towards the middle of September he was much gratified by the news that Philip II had of his own initiative already decided, late in August, to send an embassy into France for this amongst other purposes, and to entrust it to no less a person than Don Antonio di Toledo, his Master of the Horse, and one of the most important figures in the kingdom.³ Philip's terror lest French opinions should spread over the Netherlands border had impelled him not only to remonstrate seriously with the Cardinal of Lorraine but also to offer military help towards the suppression of heresy: if the French Government's policy were merely the result of weakness, Spain was willing, nay eager, to remedy that defect. Don Antonio left Spain early in September, before news of the decisions of Fontainebleau had come through.⁴

¹ St Charles to Viterbo, Sept. 3rd—Ehses, p. 60 note 1; Turba, p. 155 notes.

² Ehses, p. 54 note 3.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ His instructions are printed by Weiss, *Papiers d'État du Cardinal Granvelle*, vi, 137-43, and by Ehses, pp. 63-6. He was appointed as early as Aug. 26th—Ven. Cal., No. 192. For the origin of his mission see also Paris, pp. 523-4; Ehses, p. 59 and notes; Raynaldus, 1560, No. 49; the *Miscellanea di Storia Italiana*, v, 1043-5; and Ven. Cal., No. 194—uncomplimentary remarks on Don Antonio by Tiepolo.

The Pope, as unaware as Philip of the latest developments in France, conceived great hopes of this embassy. Feelings of renewed optimism began to manifest themselves in Rome and, as Cardinal Morone wrote to the Emperor, the topic of the Council was again, after the reserve noticeable in August, on everyone's lips. Jerome Seripando, formerly General of the Augustinians and an expert on Justification, was summoned to Rome from his archdiocese of Naples,¹ and from Portugal, where the Cardinal-Infant Henry ruled for his seven-year-old nephew King Sebastian, there came to the Pope continual expressions of support.² Pius IV now saw quite clearly that he must hew his way forward as best he might, rather than risk the perils of retreat.

II

After landing at Marseilles Cardinal Tournon had begun to make his way north up the Rhone Valley, and soon became painfully aware of the disturbed condition of the country. His progress was melancholy in the extreme. Around him he saw the Catholics timid, paralysed, asleep; the Huguenots alert, active, aggressive. Hardly a town which remained uninfected; hardly a locality where disorder of some kind had not taken place. Worst of all, posters announcing the National Council for January 20th met his horrified eyes. Confronted with the *fait accompli* of what he had come expressly to prevent, he halted at his Château of Roussillon, a little south of Lyons, and, perplexed by his awkward situation, sent word to Rome asking for further instructions.

While the legate was at Roussillon the attack on his archiepiscopal city of Lyons, planned by the Bourbons but countermanded at the last minute,³ was delivered by mistake, on September 5th, owing to the indiscipline of the troops. It failed utterly, and the Bourbons' cup of embarrassment was filled to overflowing. Heavy reprisals followed, which passed a scarring hand over many fair districts of the south-east, but had the

¹ Ehses, p. 77; Sickel, p. 97 notes; Merkle, p. 461.

² See *C.D.P.* ix, 12-13, 18-19, 20-1, 39, 47.

³ See above, p. 150.

desired effect of crushing a variety of minor risings. Again the prisons were crowded out, many of the victims being Huguenots and Huguenot pastors. But no single person was taken or put to death for religion only.¹ The repression was political, and evidence cruelly torn from prisoners taken in arms once more inculpated Condé and his brother.² It was during the excitement caused by these events that the Abbé Manne returned from Rome. In deference to the will of the Supreme Pontiff, the Cardinal of Lorraine abandoned Constance and the other German cities proposed as sites for the Council, replacing them by Vercelli, a very real concession. But on the fundamental question of a new Council *versus* a Continuation there was no yielding. Nor would the Cardinal consent to give up the National Council. He affirmed once more to the nuncio that it would not be a National Council in the strictest sense, and assured him that not more than two or three bishops and councillors could justifiably be suspected of heterodox tendencies.³ Indeed a new edict now reiterated the summons of the bishops for January 20th,⁴ and an official account of the Government's intentions was at last sent to Angoulême in Rome.⁵ Very politely, the Cardinal of Lorraine was snapping his fingers at the Pope.

But Pius had now become aware that the sword so long suspended in menace above his head had at last descended. On September 21st he received Cardinal Tournon's urgent letters announcing that the National Council was summoned. Stirred to his depth by the untoward tidings, which, nevertheless, he had half expected, he hastily summoned the Congregation for Reform and revealed the painful situation. The cardinals urged him to wait no longer for the consent of the Emperor, but to raise the suspension of the Council of Trent at once and to promise a translation, after the first session, to some town in

¹ See Chantonay to Philip II, Paris, Nov. 13th (Arch. Nat. K. 1493, No. 119): "En las cosas de la religión se procede tan libremente como he avisado, no castigando ni prendiendo ninguno por ellas".

² See the account in Romier, *Conjuration d'Amboise*, pp. 235-41.

³ Viterbo to St Charles, Sept. 5th—extracts in Ehses, p. 65 note 1, and p. 74 note 2; Ven. Cal., No. 502 (6).

⁴ Paris, pp. 594-7; Isnard, I, No. 1542.

⁵ Le Plat, iv, 650-1; Henry et Loriquet, p. 27.

the north of Italy. Fresh instructions were drawn up for Cardinal Tournon. He must proceed at once to Court and register a vehement protest; he must take no part in the National Council nor appear to recognize it in any way. Letters were also sent to Viterbo exhorting him to work upon the feelings of the French cardinals, especially the two Guises; to endeavour to rouse them to a better appreciation both of their duty as Princes of the Church and of the schismatical implications of the National Council, and to implore them to boycott the latter in whatever form it might meet.¹

This climax of French disobedience was by far the hardest blow which Pius IV had yet been called upon to sustain. He decided to take the advice of his cardinals and to raise the suspension of the Council of Trent without further diplomatic ado. If this entailed an abandonment of the policy which he had hitherto pursued so steadfastly, an abandonment which only the most critical circumstances could justify, he felt convinced that such circumstances had now arisen. Summoning the diplomatic corps on September 23rd, he addressed them on the French situation. The absence of the Bishop of Angoulême, again occasioned by his refusal to appear at the same ceremony as Vargas, enabled him to speak with unrestrained severity. In scarcely veiled terms he attacked the Guises. The blame for the scandalous convocation of the National Council, in deliberate opposition to his wishes, lay not with the King, but with those advisers whom on account of his tender years the King was unable to control; while many of the French bishops were clearly suffering from Lutheran complexes. He would raise the suspension of the Council of Trent at once, and transfer it later to Vicenza, Vercelli, Mantua, or any suitable town in Savoy or the Milanese. With warmth he protested that it was his genuine desire to treat the heretics in all paternal tenderness. No concession compatible with the preservation of the faith would be too large for him to make. The earlier

¹ Pius IV to Cardinal Tournon; St Charles to Cardinal Tournon; St Charles to the Bishop of Viterbo; all of Sept. 24th (not despatched until the 26th). See also Ehses, pp. 58 note 5, 71, 72 note 2; Sickel, p. 95; Voss, pp. 97-8 and note 186.

Tridentine decrees he would neither confirm nor annul; but it was not fitting that he should be dictated to; he was determined to preserve his independence and would yield to no threats. Von Arco alone among the ambassadors criticized the Pope's utterances. He pointed out that this new and sudden decision conflicted with the message sent to Vienna by Delphinus in which the general consent of the secular powers had again been laid down as essential to the reopening of the Council of Trent. He spoke of the dangers of over-hasty action and painted a gloomy picture of Catholic bishops meeting hurriedly at Trent only to be dispersed by Lutheran attacks. Pius did not take this well. The fear of physical violence from the Lutherans, which haunted many German Catholics, only irritated him. There were Italian arms enough and to spare, he retorted, to break the heads of any Lutheran invaders. If the powers would not support him he would have no alternative, in view of the French situation, but to celebrate the Council alone. This was a course, however, to which he was extremely reluctant to be driven, and von Arco at length persuaded him to await one more communication from the French and the Imperial Courts before taking action.¹

Two days later the turn of the Bishop of Angoulême came. Hurrying to the Lateran with the despatch from France giving official news of the decisions taken at Fontainebleau, he found the Pope, now prepared and fortified, eagerly awaiting his arrival. The Bishop started with a short sketch of the motives which had prompted the Assembly of Notables, and went on to speak of the forthcoming États-Généraux, with regard to whose constitution and function the Pope put several searching questions. He then announced that the Assembly of Prelates would meet on January 20th if the General Council failed to materialize. The Pope listened with attention and with apparent sympathy. Then, playing what he regarded as his trump card, he declared that there would be no need for this episcopal

¹ This allocution is described by von Arco and Cusanus in Sickel, pp. 95-6 and 97 notes; by Vargas in letters cited by Voss, p. 99; and by Lourenço Perez de Tavora in *C.D.P.* ix, 49-55.

meeting, for he himself had decided to summon an Œcumenical Council without delay. But he had miscalculated the strength of his opponent's hand. The Bishop replied that the simple promise was not enough. A guarantee would be required that the Council would be so constituted as to obtain the support of the Emperor and all the Princes and States of the Empire, Protestant as well as Catholic.

With admirable self-restraint Pius IV suppressed an outburst of wrath, but betrayed by a sudden change of colour the extent of his displeasure. The naked fact was plainly exposed: the French were going to insist on their own terms. The Pope broke out into heated self-vindication. He had been shabbily repaid for his kindness in discussing with the secular powers a matter which rightly pertained to himself alone. It had been misplaced kindness; but it would cease. He would be his own master. He intended to raise the suspension of the Council of Trent immediately, and the Fathers might confirm or reconsider the former decrees as they judged best. In France a policy of stern repression was needed. The idea of a National Council at such a juncture was intolerable. If the French Protestants feigned a desire for one, it was not because they contemplated submission to its findings but because they sought an opportunity to massacre the leading Catholics. It was utterly incomprehensible that the Most Christian King should lend a favourable ear to shameful demands which were calculated to render a General Council impossible and would justify the deposition of any Pope so base as to yield to them.

The Bishop of Angoulême represented respectfully that in much pain and travail France had come to realize the uselessness of persecution. The roots of heresy had struck deep; only the action of a Council could pull them up. It was only logical that German co-operation should be regarded as an essential in the search for a universal settlement of religion, seeing that in Germany the heresy had originated. Not for one moment did the King of France entertain the idea of schism. He desired to preserve unimpaired the authority of the Holy See, but if proper œcumenical means were not to be obtained recourse

must be had to national ones. Sardonicly the Pope begged that he might not be credited with such simplicity. He had no intention of allowing himself to be lulled into a false sense of security. He knew very well that there was a movement afoot to establish a Gallican Church free from papal control. At Vienna the French ambassador was deliberately urging the Emperor to reject papal authority, and he would listen to no defence of Rennes. At last, the flow of his anger subsiding, he was prevailed upon to await further letters from Cardinal Tournon before raising the suspension. But a month's delay was the most he would contemplate.¹

Von Arco and the Bishop of Angoulême had thus between them stayed the Pope's hand. In his calmer moments Pius lent himself the more easily to their pleadings not only because he was really very loath to take the independent action which he felt it incumbent upon him to threaten, but also because he placed great reliance upon the mission of Don Antonio. He confessed privately to von Arco that the allocution of the 23rd had been very distasteful to him. If, however, through the mediation of Don Antonio or even through the direct intervention of the Emperor, the French could be induced to postpone their National Council, at least until the attitude of the German Protestant princes had been ascertained, then immediate action would be rendered unnecessary.² Nevertheless the preparations for the Council were hurriedly pushed forward. The Italian bishops in Rome were once more exempted on its account from the obligation of residence,³ and the names of Cardinal Morone and of Hosius and Seripando were variously mentioned as possible papal legates.⁴ The King of Portugal was informed that the Pope was on the point of resuming the interrupted Council at Trent, which would perhaps be afterwards translated elsewhere.⁵ For deeply as it ran counter to his

¹ For this interview, see Henry et Loriguet, pp. 27-35.

² Sickel, p. 96.

³ Merkle, II, 348; Henry et Loriguet, p. 40.

⁴ Merkle, II, 461; Sickel, p. 48; Voss, pp. 45, 102; Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, 340-1; *C.D.P.* IX, 70.

⁵ Ehses, pp. 77, 78; *C.D.P.* IX, 47.

natural inclinations, thoroughly distasteful as it would have been to his personal feelings, Pius IV was in deadly earnest when he threatened in the last eventuality to resume the Council even without the Imperial consent, if only by this means could disaster be averted in France.¹ His fears of a French schism may have been exaggerated and his diagnosis of the situation there was certainly crude and misinformed; but his point of view, taken as a whole, did not lack cogency. If he must choose, finally, between allowing the National Council to take place and raising the suspension of the Council of Trent without a guarantee of Imperial and French support, he had no doubt but that the latter course would represent the lesser of the two evils. And he still believed that if he adopted it the French would not ultimately dare to defy him.

But the reception accorded to Don Antonio di Toledo revealed, on the other hand, how firmly the French policy was set. Don Antonio remained four days at St Germain-en-Laye, from September 23rd to 27th. He was entertained on a lavish scale; and his offers of military assistance were eagerly accepted in view of the recent outbreaks. But on the question of the National Council he could obtain not the smallest concession. The French Government was under no illusions as to Philip II's real motives, and the Cardinal of Lorraine felt convinced that neither in Rome nor in Toledo were the peculiar difficulties of the French situation adequately understood.² The French ambassador in Spain, by happy reference to the ancient Councils of Toledo, had extorted from Philip the damaging admission that on principle he had no objection to the French putting their own house in order for themselves, and a confession that it was chiefly the bad example that would be given to the Netherlands which frightened him. Most political and religious questions of the day were judged in Spain by the Dutch touchstone. It had been mainly for the sake of the Low Countries

¹ Cf. Steinherz, p. 115.

² See the Bishop of Orleans to the Bishop of Rennes his nephew, letters of Sept. 22nd and 30th in Le Laboureur, *Mémoires de M. de Castelnau*, I, 471-2.

that Philip had looked on quietly while Elizabeth fashioned her Church Settlement and assisted in the overthrow of Catholicism in Scotland; it was for protection of the English Queen against a possible French revenge that he was now forcing the Pope to recall his envoy, Parpaglia, destined for Westminster; and it was haunted by suspicions of Franco-German designs on the Netherlands that he turned jaundiced eyes upon Manne's mission to Rome and Bochetel's embassy in Vienna. For not only did Philip II fear the National Council in France; at heart he felt definitely uneasy even over the General Council. Undeceived as to his real motives, the French were therefore not anxious to take his advice.¹

Don Antonio's pitch was queered, too, by the prevalent but inaccurate belief that his mission had been arranged at the direct instigation of the Pope.² The Cardinal of Lorraine forcefully restated to him the case for the National Council, but showed himself willing to negotiate over the question of a suitable site for the General. The nuncio in Spain had made great play with the Pope's idea of a translation from Trent into the north of Italy, and in this connection Don Antonio now spoke of Vercelli in Savoy or Besançon in the Spanish territory of Franche-Comté. Lorraine himself had already put forward Vercelli; but perhaps seeing in Besançon a means of egress from Italy towards France, now followed it up with the suggestion of Lyons—a town which had just repulsed an assault by armed rebels! But in the reply which Don Antonio took back to Spain the French expressed their willingness to support a new council either at Vercelli or at Besançon. Politely but firmly they intimated that only the convocation of such a Council would suffice to procure the abandonment of the

¹ Letters of the Bishop of Limoges of August and September in Paris, pp. 458 and 459 *et seq.*; and in the *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, XIII, 598-9.

² Viterbo to St Charles, Sept. 27th. This idea the Pope repudiated as a calumny (St Charles to Viterbo, Oct. 9th) and it is clear that Philip had decided upon Don Antonio's mission before the Pope made a request for his intercession (see above, p. 155). Yet the nuncios Terracina and Santa Croce seem to have influenced him to a large extent—see the *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, XIII, 598; Ehses, p. 59 and notes; *Miscellanea di Storia Italiana*, V, 1043-5.

assembly of French bishops summoned for January 20th.¹ Don Antonio had failed, and his failure was to bring bitter disappointment to the somewhat extravagant hopes of the Curia.

The advantage remained entirely with the French. The bellicose atmosphere now reigning at Court had been heavily bolstered up by the Spanish offers of military aid. On September 29th there was an unprecedented simultaneous creation of twenty-eight chevaliers of the Order of St Michel, a step which revealed the anxiety of the Government to hedge itself around with support. Three days later the rendezvous of the États-Généraux was transferred from Meaux to Orleans, whither the Court betook itself on October 18th. The move south was one of aggression, a challenge to the Bourbon enemy. Word was sent to the Pope that it had not been possible to yield to the persuasions of Don Antonio; that the situations in Spain and France, being highly disparate, stood in need of different treatments; that failing a new General Council the King of France had no choice but to content his subjects with a National Assembly. It was pointed out in tones of reproachful regret that by January, when this Assembly was to meet, a whole year would have elapsed since his Holiness' election and first promise of a Council.²

III

By an unusual procedure intended to serve as a precedent at least for the immediate future, all the cardinals resident in Rome were summoned to attend the Congregation for Reform on October 6th. The Pope had just received the text of Don Antonio's instructions, and waxed optimistic over the mission, showering praise upon the King of Spain. The cardinals therefore expressed their approval of the concession made to von

¹ See the reply to Don Antonio published by Le Laboureur, *Mémoires de M. de Castelnau*, I, 459-64; by Paris, pp. 615-22; and by Ehses, pp. 75-6. See also Viterbo to St Charles, Sept. 27th, and for further details of the mission, Romier, *Conjuration d'Amboise*, pp. 246, 258-9; For. Cal., Nos. 577 (3) and 619; Paris, pp. 544-8, 605, etc.

² Henry et Lorique, pp. 51-6; Le Plat, IV, 653-5; Ehses, pp. 95-7.

Arco and Angoulême, and were now all in favour of a delay in raising the suspension of the Council of Trent until the receipt of fresh letters from France, which it was confidently expected would bring the welcome news of a change of attitude.¹ But three days later Vargas had to break the sad news of Don Antonio's failure,² and the Pope's distress was increased when he learnt how a belief in his own inspiration of the mission had largely contributed to its failure. It was also an added blow to hear that Lorraine, who had lately suggested Vercelli,³ was now talking of such places as Lyons and Besançon, both outside Italy, as the General Council's site. Of all the towns suggested by the opponents of Trent, Vercelli had least displeased the Pope. After the shock of the convocation of the National Council, Pius had sent word to Tournon and Viterbo that personally he was willing to have the Council at Vercelli; but that he could not make the suggestion himself, lest he should appear to be weakening on the question of Trent, though he would nevertheless graciously accede to it were it to come officially from the Powers.⁴ Now even this faint hope seemed to fade away. It began to be whispered that only by a breach of the Anglo-French peace could the National Council be avoided.⁵

The failure of Don Antonio emphasized the immovability of the French, but also made it evident that the Pope was not really comfortable at the prospect of possibly having to act on Spanish support alone. Philip wanted the Tridentine decrees, especially the Justification Decree, to be solemnly confirmed before another session of the Council was held, and Pius would

¹ Henry et Loriguet, p. 42; Voss, pp. 101-2; *Archiv für die Geschichte des Bistums Augsburg*, II, 215; *C.D.P.* IX, 48-55. The account of Cusanus (Sickel, p. 102), though accurate in some respects, has the unacceptable story that the Pope offered Pisa as the site of the Council in a congregation held on Oct. 12th, and that it was then decided to raise the suspension of the Council of Trent on the first Sunday of Advent. The equally unreliable *Avvisi di Roma* of the Codex Urbinatensis repeats this. But Cusanus and the *Avvisi* often represent only one ultimate source. See Ehses, pp. 85-6 notes.

² Voss, p. 102; Henry et Loriguet, p. 44.

³ See above, pp. 157, 163.

⁴ St Charles to Tournon and to Viterbo, Sept. 24th; to Viterbo Sept. 30th. See also Ehses, pp. 86 and 90; Voss, pp. 102-3.

⁵ Sickel, p. 98 notes.

not take this step because he was loath to extinguish the possibility of Lutheran support. He did not believe that ratification was a point on which it was his bounden duty either to placate the Spaniards or to irritate unnecessarily the French and Imperialists. He consulted frequently with Seripando, who at Trent had led the mediating party on Justification, thus greatly disturbing the Spaniards who desired neither Seripando nor Morone to have that control of the Council for which rumour was already marking them out.¹

Meanwhile the news that came from France did not seem to foreshadow any lifting of the clouds. The assurances of the Bishop of Angoulême that nothing of a subversive nature was toward were unable to outweigh the jeremiads of the Bishop of Viterbo, who wrote despairingly and repeatedly that safe-conducts to attend the National Council would be issued to the Huguenot leaders, even to those at Geneva, and that several of the bishops would use the strongest language against papal authority, against appeals to Rome and against annates. Lorraine's conduct he frankly could not fathom. The Cardinal's opinions changed and veered with such bewildering rapidity that he was the despair of all who had to deal with him. His friendship with Marillac, who had used such undesirable language at Fontainebleau, was highly suspicious, and there were the usual rumours that he cherished aspirations to an independent patriarchate. The force of these sinister conjectures was enhanced by Don Antonio's report that the Guises, aided by some nobles and a few bishops, were favouring heresy for their own private advantage, but this was clearly the reflection of a rather obtuse and narrow man on a situation which he was incapable of comprehending. The Guises had nothing to gain, but much to lose, from the spread of the Calvinist organization in France. But an inability to revive the clerical courts, and the consequent suspension of formal persecution, may to Antonio's Spanish way of thinking have been equivalent to direct favouring of heresy. In Rome his words fell on well-prepared soil, and credence was easily lent to Lorraine's alleged intrigues for a

¹ Voss, p. 101 notes; Döllinger, I, 340-2; Ehses, pp. 78-9.

patriarchate.¹ Thus goaded on, the Pope delivered a frontal attack on the Guises at the next meeting of the Congregation for Reform, on October 13th, all the cardinals in Rome being again present. He charged them with deliberate selfishness and declared that Tournon was the only good Catholic in France. His lead was taken up by Cardinal Carpi and Cardinal Puteo, who reproached the Cardinal of Lorraine with seeking to obstruct the General Council. The Cardinal of Ferrara attempted to defend the sincerity of his kinsmen's motives, but he could deny neither that they were frankly opposed to Trent as the Council's site nor that, failing the attendance and submission of the German Protestants, they prophesied little fruit from it. The views of Cardinal Tournon, he added, who was senile and invalid, could no longer carry their pristine weight. In an altercation with the Cardinal of Trent, Ferrara questioned that prelate's wisdom in offering his city for the Council with such eagerness, in view of the unfavourable attitude of the Emperor. But the general feeling of the meeting was strongly critical of Ferrara. When Cardinal Sermonetta rose in his support the other cardinals would not suffer him to be heard and forced him to resume his seat.²

Lorraine was well aware of the odium into which he had fallen in Rome and in Spain, where the nuncios, taking their cue from Viterbo, had not minced their words. They had produced a considerable effect upon Philip II by representing the Cardinal as the author of the National Council, from whose mind the idea had first sprung, and by whose stubbornness it was now kept alive. Apprised of this through the Bishop of Limoges, Lorraine was not sluggish in his defence. He protested that many excellent measures for the defence of the Faith in France lay to his credit: it was manifestly unjust that he should find himself under a cloud because some of these measures seemed strange when viewed through Roman spectacles. The King of Spain, he exclaimed—and for that matter the Pope too—had

¹ Viterbo to St Charles, letters of September 7th, 11th, 12th, 17th and 27th. Cf. *C.D.P.* ix, 59.

² Sickel, pp. 116-17; Ehses, pp. 88-9.

not shown overmuch concern for the good of Christendom as a whole.¹ He also took up the cudgels on behalf of the disgraced Bishop of Rennes. The real trouble in that quarter, he observed, was the jealousy of the Italians and Spaniards at the excellent news system of the French; they would have given anything to have been able to cut the French communications with Germany. Not for one moment would he hear of recalling Rennes. All Viterbo's papally-inspired requests for this to be done were sharply and trenchantly dealt with. The King himself wrote to the Pope disavowing for his ambassador any anti-papal sentiments; Rennes' uncle, the Bishop of Orleans, saw to it that his nephew's cause was kept continually before the Cardinal; and it was on Lorraine's own advice that the ambassador at length wrote himself to the Pope in self-justification.²

The Emperor Ferdinand had taken the ambassador's disgrace very much to heart, and sharply bade Hosius write instantly to Rome in his favour. Certainly, he said, Rennes had tried to dissuade him from consenting to the continuation of the Council of Trent, but if that were a symptom of Lutheranism then he himself, Emperor though he were, must also be dubbed Lutheran. Hosius was very distressed. He had never intended to pass judgment upon Rennes' private beliefs or to question his personal orthodoxy; his letters, he said, had been misinterpreted by meddlesome busybodies in Rome. Rennes held firmly to his guns, and, when Delphinus arrived in Vienna, greeted him with the old statement that the French could neither support the reopening of the Council of Trent nor desist from a National Synod failing the summons of a new General Council. Nevertheless Delphinus willingly co-operated with Hosius in penning long assurances to Rome that Rennes was in every respect a person of exemplary life and perfect faith, his attitude over the matter of the General Council being entirely dictated by his superiors. So crestfallen was Hosius at having unwittingly raised such a storm, that he went so far as to plead that none of his letters might henceforward be shown

¹ Paris, pp. 532, 535-6.

² See various letters in *Le Laboureur*, I, 471-2, 474-6.

to anyone—least of all to any diplomatist—outside the closed circle of the Pope's immediate entourage.¹

The Pope, however, was not easily to be appeased. For him Rennes' case was merely one among many, and the scandal of the National Council had convinced him that the time had come to strike at those French prelates whose conduct seemed more particularly reprehensible. Of these Cardinal Châtillon was the most prominent. How far the mind of this curious and reserved man had moved away from Catholicism in the summer of 1560 seems impossible to decide. His concubinage was at least not yet openly paraded, though his orthodoxy was already being questioned.² But the Pope had been told that Châtillon had spoken at Fontainebleau against the Papacy and in favour of the Huguenots, and that he had sent Calvinist preachers into the archdiocese of Toulouse, of which he was administrator. Actually he seems with characteristic brevity to have uttered no more than a few bland and non-committal expressions of pleasure at the fact that the Gospel was becoming better understood;³ and Viterbo, from whom the Pope's information must have been derived, had not been present at Fontainebleau.⁴ Nevertheless St Charles now instructed Tournon and Viterbo to draw up in secret a legally-attested report on Châtillon's conduct, on the receipt of which the Pope would summon him to Rome for trial. Similar action was threatened, but not actually ordered to be taken, against Montluc and Marillac. Marillac escaped unscathed by dying early in November, though not before St Charles had had time to invoke God's pardon on whomsoever should think well of him. But, Montluc's turn was only postponed—while the Bishop of Paris, who

¹ Steinherz, pp. 126-8; Le Laboureur, I, 470-1; Turba, III, 157-60, 161, 162; Cyprianus, *Tabularium Ecclesiae Romanae*, p. 118.

² Chantonay to Philip II, Aug. 31st and Nov. 4th, analysed in de Ruble, *Antoine de Bourbon*, II, 468, 491.

³ Romier, *Conjurat[i]on d'Amboise*, p. 208. For the development of Châtillon's apostasy, see the same author's *Royaume de Catherine de Médicis*, II, 250-2. Cf. below, pp. 242-3.

⁴ Viterbo had certainly complained of the prevalence of heresy at the French Court. Doubtless Cardinal Châtillon was among those mentioned—see de Ruble, II, 491.

had steadily opposed the naturalization of the Jesuits, was praised by the Pope for his zeal and energy in defence of the Faith.¹

IV

Meanwhile Cardinal Tournon, awaiting new instructions at Roussillon, had not found time hanging on his hands. He disbursed papal grants to the commanders engaged in clearing the papal territory of Avignon, and reconciled both to Church and State his nephew Montbrun, who had taken up arms in Provence. At Tournon itself he discovered the college of his own foundation a prey to the new doctrines, notwithstanding the struggles of its rector against the contamination. In the endeavour to restore better conditions the Cardinal's person was insulted and his exhortations derided by the students. The rebuff drew tears from him, for he had cherished a special affection for the college. But he could not escape the fact that it had failed, and after consultation with Père du Coudret, whom he met at Vienne, Tournon offered his college to the Jesuits, a step which he had earlier contemplated. The offer was accepted and the Jesuits took possession in the following May. Wherever he went, the legate endeavoured to stir up the Catholic clergy. In Lyons, which he entered on September 22nd, he applied himself with the greatest energy to his difficult task, rallying the parish priests around him in spite of his poor health and at least one bad attack of fever. Whilst thus engaged, he received the Pope's instructions to proceed to Court. Accordingly he left Lyons and made his way to Orleans, where he was received on October 24th with every demonstration of affection.²

He was in excellent time to witness the final humiliation of the Bourbons. Frightened by the general mobilization and the strong measures taken by the Government after the abortive attempt at Lyons, Anthony of Navarre and the Prince of Condé had rejected the spirited advice of Theodore Beza that they

¹ Pius IV to Cardinal Tournon, Oct. 14th; St Charles to Cardinal Tournon, Oct. 14th; St Charles to Viterbo, Oct. 18th, Nov. 7th, 15th and 18th.

² Fleury, *Histoire du Cardinal de Tournon*, pp. 315-38; Fouqueray, I, 290-3; Languet, II, 89; Ven. Cal., No. 202; Paris, pp. 669, 796; Romier, *Conjuration d'Amboise*, pp. 226, 236, 238, 260, 267-8.

should appear at Orleans with an armed following, and arrived on the last day of October without arms or attendants. After a furious interview with the King, Condé was arrested, while his brother was placed on parole and subjected to constant surveillance. Before the King's rage and the cold aloofness of the Guises, the clumsy pleadings of Cardinal Bourbon brought no help to his brothers. The birds were caged at last—and the doors were not going to be left open.¹

The legate brought offers of military assistance from the Pope. These were very welcome to the Guises, though less appreciated by the Queen-Mother, who deplored the severity which the Government was now showing. If she had begun to chafe under the Guise dominance, it may have gratified her to hear the Cardinal of Lorraine rebuked by the legate in the King's presence, though not, perhaps, to hear him rebuked for having tolerated the speeches of Coligny and Châtillon at Fontainebleau and for having summoned the États-Généraux. All his life Tournon had fought for autocracy. Deference to popular outcry was to him a sign of weakness—and at the present juncture, of criminal weakness. He had counselled François I to abolish the États altogether.² But there were points in the Guise administration which won his approval. An enquiry into diocesan conditions had revealed the interesting fact that quite a large proportion of the bishops, including even some Italians, were now in residence amongst their flocks,³ while the Cardinal of Lorraine was lending his personal assistance to Père Cogordan in order to overcome the objections raised by the Bishop of Paris to the naturalization of the Jesuits. The *Conseil Privé* devoted no less than four meetings to the examination of the Bulls to which exception had been taken. The Chancellor, who was no great enthusiast for the Society, suggested that the Jesuits should be content with a simple permission from the King and from the ordinaries to set up their houses, after which the *Conseil* then proposed to recognize the

¹ Romier, pp. 268–70.

² Viterbo to St Charles, Oct. 25th and Oct. 30th—extracts in Ehses, p. 85 note 2. Cf. Picot, *Histoire des États-Généraux*, II, 30.

³ References in Romier, pp. 255–6.

legality of the Society on its own authority and ignore the Parlement. Père Cogordan would have been content with this solution, but the Chancellor and the Cardinal of Lorraine both represented with reason that such a course, besides being illegal, would certainly confirm for ever the rancour of the Parlement. Full legal recognition was at length seen to be essential, and fresh *lettres de jussion*, signed for the King by the Cardinal of Lorraine, were issued on October 9th. They again summoned the Parlement to register the Society's Bulls, which were declared to carry no prejudice either to the rights of ordinaries or to the terms of the Concordat—the opinions of the Bishop of Paris and the theological faculty of the Sorbonne notwithstanding. The Parlement being then in vacation, Père Cogordan employed the interval in collecting letters of recommendation, which he obtained written at his own dictation from the King, the Queen-Mother, Cardinal Tournon and Cardinal Armagnac. It was thought that the Parlement would not be able to resist such powerful pressure. But for the third time it obstinately handed back the matter to the Bishop of Paris, despite the royal declaration that His Lordship's objections were valueless. Du Bellay gave way with sufficiently bad grace. Driven at last to advise the registration of the Society's Bulls, he added provisos calculated to place the Jesuits strictly under the control of the ordinaries and to deprive them of the special privileges granted by Paul III. In the opinion of the Society this was naturally insufficient, but it was at least a beginning; and in recognition of his success Père Cogordan was allowed to become professed of the four vows on November 15th.¹

V

The conciliar negotiations prior to the Bull of Convocation now enter upon their final and most intricate period. The diplomatic threads cross, recross and intertwine bewilderingly and in rapid succession, and it becomes no easy matter to grasp and present as a whole the complete complicated pattern. But for all the complexity of detail the main issues remain constant

¹ Fouqueray, I, 232, 238-42.

and clear cut. The Pope's position is simple if awkward. He desires to continue the Council of Trent, but owing to the opposition of the French and Imperialists will not go so far as formally to confirm its previous decrees. He is willing to leave to the reassembled fathers the decision as to the ultimate validity of their earlier acts; though this concession, very great on paper, is not really so large in actuality, since the whole German and French hierarchies can, should necessity arise, be comfortably outnumbered by Italians and Spaniards. But for what it is worth, and contrary as it is to those personal inclinations which would have led the Pope, *ceteris paribus*, to confirm the former decrees without hesitation, this concession indicates a real desire to placate the Opposition wherever possible. The same spirit of conciliation is also indicated by the Pope's offers of a translation from Trent into the north of Italy. Yet these are all, in effect, only secondary considerations. What Pius IV will not do under any circumstances is to call a specifically new Council—or call it to Germany. But such a Council, on the other hand, is the only one that the Emperor feels it possible for him to support. He is haunted by a fear lest the continuation of the Council of Trent should upset the political settlement made at Augsburg in 1555. If any Council at all is to be held he will have it new, so as to attract the Lutheran princes, who, he knows perfectly well, will not attend a continuation of the Council which they have already rejected, and by which indeed they have already been condemned. All things considered, therefore, the Emperor thinks the proposal of a Council full of perils, and not at all conducive to peace within the Church. The Spanish standpoint is not, *mutatis mutandis*, dissimilar. Philip II and his advisers have also small use for a Council of any kind. Trouble is definitely brewing in the Netherlands, and a Council may only complicate matters there; while the interior condition of the Spanish Church is not such as to call for one urgently. But if a Council there must be, then let it be the continuation of the Council of Trent, and at all costs let the former decrees be first placed beyond all question by a solemn confirmation: men have been burned on their account.

Had there been merely the Emperor and the King of Spain to consider, Pius IV might well have deferred to their common lack of enthusiasm. Their mutually exclusive conditions would have given him ample justification, on his own principles of taking no action without strong lay support, for abandoning his conciliar projects altogether. Certainly he did not want to have to do this. But that he actually could not, without incurring the gravest risks, was due to the pressure from France—from the Cardinal of Lorraine. The French did honestly desire a General Council, but they wanted it constituted according to their own recipe, and they threatened to take their own independent action if they did not get it. This general situation remains constant throughout all the complication of diplomatic detail. Neither side will give way on the fundamental point of Continuation versus a new Convocation: both will yield a little on the less important question of place. The Cardinal of Lorraine insists on a new Council, not at Trent, preferably in Germany, perhaps in Franche-Comté or the north of Italy—otherwise it will be the National Council in France. The Pope will not call a new Council, but he will transfer the Council of Trent from Trent into the north of Italy, and he is willing to leave the ultimate validity of its earlier decrees to the decision of the Council itself. Thus he hopes to placate the opposition by certain definite, if at bottom illusory, concessions. He believes, with a fluctuating and variable degree of confidence, that, whatever the French may threaten, they will not in the long run feel it possible to defy him and proceed with their National Council if he resumes the Council of Trent with these two definite concessions regarding site and confirmation. The cross-fire of the triple bombardment to which he is exposed, coupled with the peculiar circumstances and dangers of the French attack, make it equally impossible for him either to give up or to give in.

On the news that Don Antonio had proved a broken reed, many of the Pope's advisers urged him to fulfil his threat of raising the suspension of the Council of Trent at once. But he

was disinclined to go back upon his promise to the Bishop of Angoulême, and decided to wait until Martinmas, November 11th. Conversations with Angoulême left him with the uneasy impression that he would not be justified in expecting immediate submission on raising the suspension, but whether he was faced with bluff, or a genuine threat of disobedience, Pius could never quite decide. In public, however, he would not admit the possibility of French defiance, or concede that all problems would not be solved when he should in fact proceed to raise the suspension. He had put the French Government under some kind of obligation by offering it military help, but this had also laid him open to the unworthy taunt of seeking to stir up civil war in order to impede the National Council.¹

In Vienna, meanwhile, the diplomacy of Rennes was now in conflict with that of Delphinus. The Emperor had been hurt by the abrupt rejection at Rome of his recommendations for the General Council, and disappointed at his failure to secure the relaxations of discipline for which he had petitioned. But Delphinus' task of reconciling him to the policy of Rome was facilitated by the impression made upon Ferdinand's mind by the summoning of the French National Council, an impression so profound that for a time Delphinus hourly expected his complete capitulation to the Pope. Rennes, however, was not to be thus balked. He laughed away all alarmist conjectures of a withdrawal of French obedience from Rome, of heterodox doctrinal decisions to be taken at the National Council, of the creation of an independent French patriarchate. And so ably, that for a moment Delphinus, driven swiftly from one extreme to another, feared that Ferdinand would even be induced to utter some word of definite approbation of the French policy. But by reiterating with emphasis that it was absolutely vain to look for the convocation of a new Council, the nuncio recovered his lost ground and induced the Emperor to write a personal remonstrance to the King of France. Tortured on this diplomatic

¹ See the reports of the Congregation of Oct. 13th as above p. 167. Also Sickel, *Zur Geschichte des Concils von Trient*, pp. 104, 115, 116, 118-19, 120, 127; Sickel, *Römische Berichte*, v, 62-4; Ehses, p. 89; Merkle, II, 461; Henry et Loriquet, pp. 44, 47-9.

rack, Ferdinand at length confessed to Rennes that he did not feel it would be possible in the long run to resist His Holiness' persistently reiterated desires, however distasteful they might be. Yet in the reply which he sent to Rome on October 9th he repeated all the points of his June statement, including his demands for clerical marriage and lay communion of the Chalice. He added, however, that while he thought Innsbruck a more desirable site, he would not feel justified in resisting if the Pope forced the issue by a sudden summons to Trent.¹

This concession was the first step of Ferdinand's retreat towards the morass of ambiguity and indecision in which he finally lost himself. Though conditioned by a proviso that it must not be interpreted as implying his consent to Continuation, it greatly pleased the cardinals who examined his letter on October 26th. They judged it in the light of letters received from Hosius and Delphinus containing assurances that the assumption might now be confidently acted upon that the Emperor would ultimately accept as a matter of principle any suggestion made by the Pope.² They therefore made light of Ferdinand's repetition of his former points, assuming that this had been done more out of formality than from conviction. But after the Consistory, von Arco, who now lived in perpetual dread of a surprise raising of the suspension, successfully demonstrated to the Pope by the aid of his master's last despatch,³ of later date than the nuncios' letters, that the Emperor's position had been wrongly interpreted by Their Eminences, and that Ferdinand was as disinclined as ever to surrender his main objection to Continuation. It was now noticed that there were discrepancies and inconsistencies not only between the letters of the nuncios and the letters of the

¹ Ferdinand to Pius IV, Oct. 9th—Ehse, pp. 79–85. Cf. Steinherz, pp. 135–9, 141–2, 145–6, and Turba, pp. 157–60, 163. Ferdinand evaded a request from Hosius and Delphinus that his two demands might not be repeated, by pleading that he had already communicated the text of his letter to Rennes and so could not alter it.

² Delphinus to St Charles; Delphinus and Hosius to St Charles, in Steinherz, pp. 133 *et seq.* and 137 *et seq.*

³ Ferdinand to von Arco, Oct. 18th—Sickel, pp. 109–15.

Emperor, but also between the letters of the two nuncios themselves.¹ This put a distinct damper upon the cardinals' confidence, and they again advised the Pope to delay raising the suspension.²

It was evident that it was largely a question of words. The nuncios in Vienna were studiously and perhaps not too scrupulously endeavouring to find precision in utterances that were deliberately vague. They were as eager to seize upon some definitely committal phrase as the Emperor was to avoid letting one drop. The same policy would appear to have been pursued by Viterbo. St Charles records that early in November such excellent news came from the French nuncio that expectations were at once kindled of an early and favourable solution of the whole conciliar deadlock.³ But no confirmation of these evasively hopeful tidings was given by the Bishop of Angoulême, who, on the contrary, presented the Pope on November 5th with an Italian translation of François II's letter of October 14th in which the alternatives of a new General Council and a French National Synod were again laid down.⁴

The persistence of the Pope's agents in Vienna and in France had thus met so far with little or no direct success. The Emperor had, indeed, shown the first signs of weakening, but his only definite concession was a declaration that he would not openly resist a Bull summoning a Council to Trent, and he still resolutely opposed a simple continuation. The value of this admission, however, was depreciated by his declaration that he could not guarantee his ability to prevent the Protestants attacking a Council at Trent—let alone induce them to attend it. But Pius IV, for all his offers of a later translation, clung to Trent as the place of assembly in the first instance because this seemed to him half the battle for Continuation. The double

¹ Sickel, p. 123.

² Sickel, pp. 122-3; Ehse, p. 94 (notes); Cyprianus, *Tabularium*, p. 119; C.D.P. ix, 86-9; *Archiv für die Geschichte des Bistums Augsburg*, II, 217, 219.

³ St Charles to Viterbo, Nov. 7th—extract in Ehse, p. 95 note 3. But I saw nothing in the *Estratti* of Viterbo's correspondence at Modena to warrant St Charles' observations, nor apparently did Mgr. Ehse. There is no reason, however, for supposing that these *Estratti* are complete.

⁴ Henry et Loriquet, pp. 57 *et seq.* Cf. above, p. 164.

deadlock with France and with the Emperor appeared completely insoluble.¹

Nevertheless a solution was near at hand, and it came as the result of a move which may be regarded either as a successful stroke of diplomacy or as a blunder due to a disastrous piece of misunderstanding. On October 10th, unknown to the Bishop of Angoulême, the Cardinal of Ferrara wrote to François II and to the Cardinal of Lorraine.² He told them, apparently, that the Pope had decided to open the Council very shortly at Vercelli or Casale. Now there can be little doubt that Pius had never expressed any such intention. He had always insisted upon an initial assembly at Trent, and all talk of other sites had been as places of possible translation only. It may well be, however, that in conversation this distinction had not always been clearly impressed upon the minds of some of the French representatives in Rome; for the Pope seems to have been fully aware that Ferrara had written to France saying that Rome would not be unwilling to see the Council ultimately established at Vercelli, and later on, when the Bishop of Angoulême was told of the Cardinal's letters, he declared that they had not misrepresented the papal attitude.³ But whether Ferrara was in good faith and under a misapprehension, or whether he had determined to perpetrate a pious fraud in order to resolve the diplomatic deadlock, it is certain that his letters produced in France the impression that the Pope had given in to the demand for a new Council. For this reason they succeeded in revolutionizing French conciliar policy in a way that no amount of diplomatic pressure or pleading had yet been able to effect.

¹ See Pius IV's laments to Amulius—Ehse, p. 96 note 2.

² The texts are not extant; but see the replies—François II to Ferrara, Oct. 31st—Ehse, p. 91; and the Cardinal of Lorraine to Ferrara, Oct. 31st, for which see Appendix V (an extract in Ehse, p. 91 note 2). Cf. Raynaldus, No. LI.

³ Henry et Loricquet, pp. 44, 53 *et seq.*, 73. Ferrara's communications were brought by Étienne Boucher, now Bishop of Quimper, whom the Pope disliked and distrusted, but who, he hoped, by reason of his close acquaintance with the Cardinal of Lorraine, would be able to explain to the latter more accurately than the nuncio could respectfully do, the extent to which His Eminence had incurred the papal displeasure—St Charles to Viterbo, second letter of Nov. 18th.

A new site seemed indubitably to imply a new Council; the possibility that the Pope might only intend to continue the old Assembly at a new city did not present itself to the minds of the French statesmen. The papal stock had recently risen sharply at Orleans, and the natural predisposition to interpret any papal offer in the most liberal sense had been consequently enhanced. The Pope's offer of mercenaries had been much appreciated, and when Cardinal Tournon brought word that Pius IV was seriously contemplating Vercelli as the Council's eventual site, the proposals of Lyons or Besançon had been put deliberately aside.¹ Then, as a culmination, the Cardinal of Ferrara's letters arrived on October 31st. It seemed as if the opposition had triumphed. On the same day, before there was time or opportunity to question this assumption, a letter was immediately sent to the Bishop of Angoulême empowering him to give the French assent to either Vercelli or Casale.² The Cardinal of Lorraine wrote to the Cardinal of Ferrara saying that owing to his welcome news it would now be possible to cancel the National Council and to exhort all Christians to rally round the Holy Father.³ The King also wrote to him in a similar strain.⁴ What high, not to say extravagant, hopes Ferrara had succeeded in raising can be seen more clearly from several letters sent on November 1st to the Bishop of Rennes in Germany. The Pope, Rennes was informed, was about to call a General Council to Vercelli or Casale. Ample safe-conducts would be issued to all who desired to attend, and a rediscussion of the decrees of Trent would be permitted. The question of Continuation versus a new Convocation consequently lost its importance; it became a mere question of words; and Delphinus might be permitted to say and do as he liked with the Emperor in regard to it. And the National Council was cancelled. But one fly hovered near the ointment. A rumour had come to

¹ Viterbo to St Charles, Oct. 25th and 30th.

² The text is not extant; but that such a letter was sent appears from François II to the Cardinal of Ferrara, Oct. 31st (Ehsses, pp. 91-2), and that it was received, from Henry et Lorique, p. 67.

³ See Appendix V.

⁴ François II to the Cardinal of Ferrara, Oct. 31st—Ehsses, pp. 91-2.

hand that the Emperor had at last agreed to Trent as the Council's site: if this were true it would be disappointing in the extreme, but there would be no alternative but to follow suit.¹

The rumour was quite soon to give every appearance of being verified. While Ferrara's letter was being perused at Orleans with such gratification, Chantonnay at Paris was receiving a packet from Vienna containing three important documents—the text of the Emperor's reply to the Pope of October 9th, the Bishop of Rennes' accounts of Ferdinand's latest conversations with the papal nuncios, and Ferdinand's personal letter to the King of France dissuading him from the National Council.² These were forwarded to Orleans where they must have arrived either late on November 1st after the correspondence of that date had been sent off, or else early on November 2nd.³ Their combined effect was to create a quite definite impression that the Emperor had agreed to Trent, and as this was an impression which the French were loath to receive, the Bishop of Rennes' letter must have been couched in quite unmistakable terms.⁴ At any rate the news came at a moment when it would have been all to the French advantage to have misconstrued it, for it ruined their short-lived triumph over Vercelli. But they made no effort to misconstrue it, and allowed their triumph to tumble about their ears. A fresh despatch went off to Rome authorizing Angoulême to declare that the French would adhere to the Imperial decision in regard to Trent,⁵ and on November 6th a reply was sent to Ferdinand informing him that the National Council would be cancelled provided the Bull of Convocation

¹ François II to the Bishop of Rennes, Nov. 1st—Le Plat, iv, 655-7; the Cardinal of Lorraine to the Bishop of Rennes, Nov. 1st—Le Laboureur, i, 474-5; the Bishop of Orleans to the Bishop of Rennes, Nov. 1st—*ibid.* i, 472-3.

² See above, pp. 175-6.

³ Paris, p. 630; Ven. Cal., No. 269.

⁴ Cf. above, p. 176.

⁵ The text of this letter is—again—not extant, but its content and date, Nov. 2nd, are known from a later letter to Angoulême of Nov. 25th (Le Plat, iv, 661), and from the letter to the Emperor Ferdinand cited in the following note. In Angoulême's correspondence there is no sign that he ever received it. Cf. below, p. 182.

for the General Council were issued before the meeting of the États-Généraux.¹

This proviso may have been intended as a hint that the Pope would not be allowed to rest on his oars and dally with his Bull. The anger of the French Government at having been robbed of its supposed victory and forced in the end to accept Trent as the site of the Council was intense.² But Lorraine, trusting no doubt in Ferrara's alleged inside information, still felt that in other ways a certain degree of optimism was justifiable. He still nourished hopes that all the essentials of a new as opposed to a resumed Council might be fulfilled and that the former decrees would be permitted to be re-discussed.³ Ferrara had not, in all probability, deliberately deceived. Most likely he had seized upon the conciliatory aspects of the Pope's programme and strained them further than they would really go, urged by his innate ambition to play the *Deus ex machina* in every difficult situation. The French had been misled successively on two points—first on the real extent of the Pope's compromise proposals, and then on the finality of the Emperor's assent to Trent. They had not waited for confirmation in either case but had hastily readjusted their policy first to the one then to the other. That "l'in vraisemblable se passe de preuves" may well be true; but it is no maxim for diplomatists.

It is undeniable, however, and adds greatly to the difficulties of the situation, that contradictory instructions had been issued to different ambassadors. The Bishop of Rennes had certainly been informed on November 1st that the Pope's attitude now made the question of Continuation versus a new Convocation a matter of pure form.⁴ But this does not seem to tally with the instructions transmitted to the Bishop of Angoulême, who on receiving the letters written to him on October 31st and

¹ François II to the Emperor Ferdinand, Nov. 6th, in Le Plat, iv, 657-9, and Ehses, pp. 97-9.

² Viterbo to St Charles, Nov. 3rd—an extract in Ehses, p. 95 note 1. Cf. Chantonay to Philip II, Nov. 4th, analysed by de Ruble, *Antoine de Bourbon*, II, 491.

³ The Cardinal of Lorraine to the Bishop of Rennes, Nov. 11th—Le Laboureur, I, 475-6.

⁴ See above, pp. 179-80.

November 1st¹ first took counsel with the Cardinal of Ferrara, as was his usual custom, and then sought an audience with the Pope in order to convey the French assent to Vercelli or Casale. His Holiness, having expressed his great satisfaction thereat, added that it would be necessary for the Council to start at Trent before being translated into the north of Italy, and promised to raise the suspension of the Council of Trent in such a way as to give general satisfaction, and without pronouncing upon the validity of the former decrees. He evinced complete confidence that Continuation under these conditions would ultimately be accepted by the French. But Angoulême denied this stoutly, showing that his instructions did not coincide with those given to the Bishop of Rennes; and after the audience,² having been quite unable to modify the Pope's belief, he reiterated to von Arco that he had received no instructions to accept Continuation. In return von Arco confided that the Emperor, though personally inclined to Innsbruck, would in the last extremity not refuse Trent as the Council's site.

Now though the Bishop of Angoulême nowhere mentions the fact in his published correspondence, it is necessary to assume that the instructions sent on November 2nd ordering him to give the French assent to Trent³ must have reached him shortly after this audience of the 13th, seeing that on the 14th St Charles was able to inform the nuncio in Spain that this assent had in fact been given, albeit in terms that did not cover assent to Continuation.⁴ The Curia had won its first point and suffered no more time to be lost. Casale and Vercelli were silently set aside, and in a Consistory held on November 15th the Pope

¹ See above, p. 179.

² For which see Henry et Loriquet, p. 77. While waiting in an ante-chamber, Angoulême had a brush with Vargas whom he forced into the admission that the King of Spain disliked the idea of a new Council for fear of its repealing the decrees of its predecessor. The Frenchman enquired ironically whether Vargas did not credit the Holy Ghost with sufficient sense or memory to guide with equal surety a Council whether newly convened or merely continued. Vargas seems to have found no retort.

³ See above, p. 180 note 5.

⁴ St Charles to the Bishop of Terracina, Nov. 14th—Ehse, p. 98 note 1.

announced in carefully chosen words that, since the King of France had agreed to cancel his National Council provided a General Council were "prosecuted" at Trent, he therefore intended to raise the suspension made in 1552 and proceed forthwith to such a "prosecution". Complete freedom of access to Trent was promised, and though the former decrees were meanwhile to be maintained together with those of other General Councils—this was not theoretically equivalent to their confirmation—Pius expressed his willingness to conciliate the Protestants to the extent of permitting the old decrees to be re-discussed for explanatory purposes. Three cardinals—Puteo, Cicada and Sarracena—were appointed to draft the Bull of Convocation, and it was hoped that this would be ready for publication on November 24th, for which date various ceremonies were appointed.¹ Papal letters were then addressed to François II, to Catherine de Médicis, to Cardinal Tournon, and one in the Pope's own hand to the Cardinal of Lorraine, containing assurances of the speedy summons of the General

¹ *Acta Consistorialia* of Nov. 15th—Ehse, p. 100. See also Voss, p. 127; Sickel, pp. 141–2; Henry et Loriguet, p. 75; *Archiv für die Geschichte des Bistums Augsburg*, II, 222. Angoulême reports the consistory in a postscript written the same day and transmits without comment the papal decision to summon the Council to Trent "attendu que tous les princes y concordent", which confirms the supposition that he must already have received his instructions of Nov. 2nd. Pastor, VII, 165, simply concludes that he received these some time between the 11th and the 15th of the month, but the gap can be closed up much further, for we have seen that he had not done so at the time of his audience of the 13th, while the letter of St Charles makes it clear that he had, on the other hand, done so by the evening of the 14th. Voss, pp. 128–9, used Angoulême's silence on the arrival of his new instructions to suppose that the papal decision of the 15th was due more to the influence of the Duke of Florence, who was then in Rome, than to the French consent to Trent, of the existence of which he was doubtful. He points out that von Arco had not yet given the definite assent of the Emperor to Trent either. He thus represents Pius IV as acting behind the backs of both Angoulême and von Arco, and notes that he called the Duke "the first mover"—but only *gewissermassen*—of the Council. But Angoulême had certainly given the French consent by the evening before the Consistory, while the Curia knew that the Emperor would not resist Trent. It would have run counter to Pius IV's whole policy to have acted as Voss, interpreting the evidence a little arbitrarily, makes him act. In *Le Laboureur*, I, 489, there is printed a letter of Oct. 19th in which Delphinus informs Angoulême, as he had already informed the Curia (see above, p. 176), that the Emperor had agreed to defer in every way to the Pope's wishes. There is no mention of this in Angoulême's correspondence nor is there any MS. trace of it.

Council and exhorting the French Government to measures of severity against heretics and rebels.¹

Faced at last with the near prospect of a Bull of Convocation, the ambassadors in Rome all directed their attention towards securing that it should be worded clearly in the particular sense which each desired. All denounced ambiguity and all pleaded for clarity, but for clarity in contrary senses. Von Arco still maintained that the Emperor could only accept Trent on the express condition that the Council should be new. Should it be summoned as a Continuation, a National Council would certainly be held in Germany, at which the Catholics stood to be either overpowered or ignored, alternatives almost equally distressing. A rumour that the Pope had in the Consistory announced the consent of the King of France to Continuation sent the Austrian off in dismay to Angoulême, who quieted him by pointing out the distinction between "continuation" and "prosecution", the word actually employed by Pius. Vargas, on the other hand, was brimming over with arguments for a clear declaration of Continuation, urging, not without force, the extreme unlikelihood that any Protestants would attend the Council whichever way it were summoned, and declaring that even in the improbable event of their attending it would be quite out of the question—whatever the French might wish—to go back upon doctrine already defined.²

The Pope, however, could well congratulate himself upon the position now reached. Casale and Vercelli were dropped with all the greater relish when it was discovered that the Bishop of Quimper, on arrival in France, had attributed the papal adoption of these places to the dismay caused by the failure of Don Antonio's mission.³ And the victory in regard to the city of Trent was in reality more than a victory over the simple question of the Council's site. Considerations of place could hardly, in the peculiar nature of the circumstances, be kept entirely apart from those of constitution. The theoretical

¹ All in C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4823, dated Nov. 16th and 17th.

² Henry et Loriquet, pp. 75-9; Ehses, p. 100; Sickel, pp. 141-3.

³ St Charles to Cardinal Tournon, Nov. 15th; to the Bishop of Viterbo, Nov. 18th.

question of Continuation might by skilful handling be kept unresolved right up to and even perhaps beyond the moment of assembly—such indeed was eventually to be the case. In reality the question was already hopelessly prejudiced in advance by the choice of Trent. It would have been well-nigh impossible, given the attitude of the Pope and of the large majority of Italians and Spaniards, to have started a new Council at Trent. The mantle of the former Council could hardly have been prevented from descending imperceptibly upon it. A thousand considerations, both subtle and obvious, would have banded together to prevent a break with roots that stretched back twenty years into the past. St Charles himself saw clearly that the one decision would inevitably entail the other, and that already the Papacy had made good its essential point.¹

VI

The Pope had made his decision, but its execution was left to others. Pius' intention was to raise the suspension of Trent, to summon the Council anew by the use of the non-committal word *indicare*, and to leave all further decision to the judgment of the Council itself. Beyond this, all responsibility for the wording of the Bull lay with the committee.² The three Cardinals unfortunately did not see eye to eye. Cardinal Puteo was an old man of extreme conservative views, and stood unhesitatingly for Continuation; Cicada supported a policy of ambiguity and was in favour of yielding as far as possible to German opinion; Sarracena shrank from a decisive use of his casting vote.³ But in a Bull of Indulgence for the Council issued on November 19th the phrase "concilium indicare et continuare" made its appearance.⁴

This drew an immediate protest from the Bishop of Angoulême. He was hastily assured by Cardinal Cicada that the wording of the Bull of Convocation would not follow this

¹ Ehses, p. 104 note 1.

² Sickel, pp. 141-3.

³ Henry et Lorient, pp. 78-9

⁴ Ehses, pp. 100-2.

model.¹ Indeed, a first draft, completed by the following day, seemed in spite of some contradictions and ambiguities to signify on the whole a new indiction. The work, probably, in the main of Cardinal Cicada, it contained the phrase “de integro indicimus”, balanced, however, both by “illud (*i.e.* concilium Tridentinum)...renovandum esse censuimus”, and by the raising of the suspension in the words “suspensionem... tollentes et abrogantes...concilium revocamus”.² The draft was sharply criticized by Vargas, who was of course violently hostile to “de integro indicimus” and interpreted “revocamus” as “de nuevo llamamos o convocamos”.³ Similar criticism came from other quarters, notably from Campeggio, Bishop of Feltre, who pointed out the distinction between *revocare* and *renovare*, being himself in favour of substituting the latter.⁴ Nor could the various canonists and theologians deputed to assist the Cardinals come to any unanimity with them.⁵ November 24th arrived, in consequence, and the Bull was not yet ready to go forth to the world. The appointed ceremonies were nevertheless carried through, and the Pope repaired in procession on foot with cardinals, ambassadors and officials of the Curia to Santa Maria Minerva, where a Mass of the Holy Ghost was sung by Cardinal Carpi.

The discussions over the wording of the Bull brought home the immense difficulties involved in a policy of attempting to satisfy conflicting interests. While Vargas and Campeggio attacked Cicada's draft on the ground that it plainly signified a new Council, the theologians assisting the committee, chief among whom was Laynez, disapproved of it on the score of ambiguity. Though satisfied that *revocare* could indeed mean “call again in order to continue” rather than “call afresh”, the theologians pointed out that the contradiction with “de integro

¹ Henry et Lorient, p. 79.

² Ehses, pp. 109-111.

³ Voss, pp. 131-2; that is, “we call afresh” rather than “we continue again”.

⁴ See the notes of Campeggio and others on this draft published by Ehses, pp. 109-111, and dated by him c. Nov. 25th. Ehses, however, did not remark that this draft is the one on which Vargas' criticisms are to be found in Voss, pp. 131-2. Vargas sent these to Spain on the 20th. The date of the draft is thus some days earlier than Ehses' computation.

⁵ Henry et Lorient, p. 78.

indicimus" tangled the issue hopelessly and was deceitfully calculated to give a false hope to supporters of a new Council. *De integro*, too, according to Laynez, implied the possibility of a re-discussion of the former decrees, since Virgil and Terence both used the phrase as equivalent to *ab integro*. But the canonists, as opposed to the theologians, were for the most part inclined to favour a fresh indiction.¹ They argued that it would be almost a scandal for the Pope to refuse a request which was certainly within the limits of divine law, and which proceeded from quarters so eminent as the Emperor and the King of France. But greater scandal, retorted Laynez, would be given should the Pope depart from the traditional custom of the Church always to complete a Council once begun. The real question was to know which course was more in the Church's interests, for Providence was not to be tempted: the Emperor and the King of France, having already deferred to the Pope over the choice of a site, might well be content to leave in his hands the solution of all other questions; having made their requests, they had no right to insist upon their being granted, especially against the opposition of the King of Spain.

The canonists then submitted that the draft contained nothing prejudicial to the former Council, the security of which was guaranteed by the Pope's personal attitude. To this it was replied that on the contrary the whole tone of the draft was prejudicial to the earlier decrees on Faith; that this, if hidden from the canonists, was quite clear to trained theologians; and that in an official pronouncement the private opinion of the Pontiff could not be invoked as a safeguard. The canonists then brought up the well-worn argument that no heretics would appear at a Council which was simply a continuation of one that had condemned them, and that it was their attacks rather than their attendance that were more to be expected. Laynez at once waived away the bogey of a Lutheran assault. The peaceful state of Europe, he urged, rendered this eventuality very improbable. And to be deterred by it showed an unworthy lack of trust in Divine Providence. These were valid contentions;

¹ Voss, p. 133.

but it must be admitted that Laynez's precedent of the reconciliation of the Greek Church at the Council of Florence, a continuation of the Council of Bâle, was hardly an encouraging example, or one that bore much analogy to the situation in 1560; while the appearance of some Lutherans at Trent in 1552, which he also adduced, had certainly rendered their reappearance a decade later rather less than more probable. But Laynez thought otherwise; the definitions of Faith were undoubtedly irreformable, but it might well be possible to effect some reconciliations by suitable explanations and interpretations. Many important points on which there was disagreement with the heretics still remained to be treated—the Sacraments of Order and Marriage, the Eucharistic Sacrifice, Purgatory, Indulgences, the questions of clerical celibacy and lay communion under one kind only. Where it was possible to do so without infringing what was *de fide* or of divine law, heretical points of view on all these subjects might still be heard and considered.

If so little had been done at the earlier sessions, replied the canonists, then surely a new Convocation would not really make much difference. This belittling of the earlier decrees, however, was hardly an appropriate weapon for those who represented them as an insuperable barrier to Protestant attendance, and the answer of the theologians was easy. The Creed, the Canon and Interpretation of Scripture, the Vulgate, Original Sin, Justification, Nature and Grace, the Sacraments in general, Baptism, Penance, Confirmation, the Holy Eucharist and Extreme Unction in particular, many decrees of reform—this was not so empty a catalogue; enough, at any rate, said the theologians, to annoy the devil and other opponents of the Council; a good beginning, and already half the achievement.

The anti-continuationists then asked whether the large number of absentees and the many protests which it had aroused could not be held to invalidate the œcumenicity of the Council of Trent? Laynez, however, was quite clear that no Catholic might doubt the Council's legitimate œcumenical status. The argument from numbers was a Protestant argument. Œcumenicity was dependent upon other considerations. If a Council were called by legitimate authority and to a suitable

place, if it were conducted with a reasonable amount of discussion and freedom of speech, then its claim to œcumenicity might not be questioned on the ground that it was ill-attended. Absentees from Trent had been either heretics, contumacious persons, or such as were kept away by legitimate excuses. All with a right to attend had been summoned; none such, who came, excluded. Full power rested, therefore, with those present, however scanty in number.

The opponents of Continuation then fell back upon their strongest position. The decrees of Trent, they urged, might be re-discussed because they had not yet been solemnly confirmed by the Holy See. Laynez fought this contention minutely and his argumentation seems to leave little loophole for escape. The Holy Ghost, he laid down, is present in a General Council legitimately assembled, and dictates the decrees, particularly those on matters of faith. The subsequent confirmation of the Pope could not confer a kind of retrospective attendance upon the Holy Spirit had He not really been there. And unless His Presence were at the time a matter of certainty, the Council would have no right to speak of itself either as defining or as assembled in the Holy Ghost. As a consequence General Councils properly convened cannot err and no Pope has refused or ever can refuse to confirm a Council except for some illegality of summons or impropriety of conduct. Thus the *Latrocinium* of Ephesus was rightly condemned, and thus also the Council of Rimini, where the bishops were deceived by the Arians. Thus, too, Leo the Great rejected the decree of the Council of Chalcedon exalting the position of the Bishop of Constantinople because it had been passed in the absence of his legates. The Pope is present in a Council through his legates: papal legates were present at Trent: they consented to all that was decreed, and nothing was decreed against their wishes. The decrees of Trent, concluded Laynez, are therefore infallible and cannot be questioned.

Very well, said his opponents. Granted that the Tridentine decrees possess in substance the approval of the Pope and are actually free from error. Yet it cannot be denied that they have not yet been subjected to that official papal confirmation which

is traditional, customary and necessary, and which cannot be regarded merely as an empty form. The reason, replied Laynez, lies in the incompleteness of the Council. It is not customary for the Pope to confirm an incomplete Council, but it is definitely customary for him to condemn an incomplete Council should he see any reason for doing so. Four successive Popes have not condemned anything done at Trent, and it must therefore be assumed that they approve, and that no flaw in convocation or procedure can be found on which to invalidate its decisions. Moreover, Rome herself, following many ancient precedents, has actually sent formulated decisions to Trent which the Council has subsequently promulgated, and which have been immediately received and taught all over the Catholic world. To doubt them now would be to doubt the Church, to doubt the Holy See, to doubt the Holy Ghost—more, it would be to play direct into the hands of heresy. Certainly the Pope would be required after the conclusion of the Council to confirm it solemnly, but only with the object of publicly demonstrating the Council's validity and its union with the Holy See, not to confer upon it, retrospectively, the infallibility which it already possessed.¹

¹ Grisar, *Jacobi Laynez Disputationes Tridentinae*, II, 1-17. For a full treatment of the relations of Pope, Council and Infallibility, see the art. "Église", section headed "Dogme catholique sur le magistère infaillible de l'église" (cols. 2175-200), in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*; the art. "Conciles", section IX (cols. 664-5) in the same dictionary; the art. "General Councils" in the *Catholic Encyclopedia*, and the discussion in the opening chapter of Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles*, where all M. Leclercq's customary erudition and caution are fully if rather inconclusively displayed. This much may perhaps be said here. The Pope in certain circumstances is infallible alone. A General Council is infallible if and when it is in unison with the Pope. This unison may be achieved either by the actual presence of the Pope, as at the Vatican Council, when papal confirmation takes place at the actual sessions at which the decrees are promulgated; or it may be achieved through papal legates. In this latter case the subsequent confirmation of the Pope is necessary because legates may be, and have in historical instances been, subjected to misleading influences, making it afterwards necessary for the Pope to disavow them. But Laynez's argument was that at Trent the relations between the legates and the Curia had been so close that the legates had been the directly-controlled instruments of the Pope, who had thus been virtually present, consenting to all that was done. Confirmation could not therefore be refused, though it was delayed simply because the Council was not yet finished. On this question of confirmation see the art. "Conciles", section VIII (cols. 655-64) in the above-mentioned *Dictionnaire*.

Not content with demolishing the arguments raised against the continuation of the Council of Trent, Laynez advanced a variety of independent reasons demonstrating the impossibility of a new Council. In all Church history there was no precedent for entering upon a new Council while another still remained unfinished. To leave the suspended Council in the air by convoking a fresh one would be to degrade it to the level of such *conciliabula* as Pisa, Bâle or Rimini, the rectification of whose deficiencies and errors had necessitated the action of new legitimate Councils. Nor would it be any solution to pronounce a formal closure of the old Council before convoking the new, because it was definitely uncanonical to terminate a Council until its work had been completed and all its objects achieved. It was particularly desirable to avoid the creation of dangerous precedents. The discontented minorities of future generations should not be encouraged to appeal lightly from councils which displeased them to new ones which they hoped to dominate, and Papal Infallibility was no warrant for arbitrary departure from custom. The General of the Jesuits even went so far as to carry the war into the enemy's territory by maintaining that a continuation would be more in the interests of reunion than a new convocation, arguing that at a new Council the Lutherans would be likely to cause prolonged delay by adverse criticism of the old decrees, by pressing for drastic revision both of procedure and of relations with the Pope, even, perhaps, by creating new schisms. He made capital out of the Bull of Indulgence of November 19th, urging that consistency demanded the retention of the word *continuate* in the Bull of Convocation, though Cardinal Cicada had promised otherwise to the Bishop of Angoulême.¹ And since the Council was to be at Trent, Laynez did not hesitate to assert that mere common-sense would assume it to be a continuation. Finally he pointed out that the decree of 1552 had suspended the Council for two years only or to such a time when all impediments should have been removed. The two years were long up, the impediments—war—at last removed: the Council might be considered to be

¹ See above, pp. 185-6.

actually revived already! On the contrary, countered the Opposition, the Council by specifically failing to come to life again had clearly died! But there existed, in addition to the suspension made by the Council itself, an earlier papal brief suspending it *ad voluntatem pontificis*.¹

In this debate, whose outcome was critical for the course which the Counter-Reformation was to take, the Continuationists under Laynez had without question an overwhelming theoretical case. Yet their replies to the practical considerations of the Opposition—the desirability of soothing German opinion, the impossibility of reconciling the Lutherans to a continuation—were unconvincing and strained. If the truth be admitted, there were no convincing replies. It was impossible, without breach of vital principle, to satisfy many of these considerations, plausible as they sounded, strongly as they were supported, overmastering as they sincerely appeared in the eyes of those who brought them forward. It partook of tragedy that a point of view so pacificatory in its objects, with such an appearance of reasonableness and cogency, and urged by men of real piety and devotion to the Church, could not, even though at bottom it were delusive, receive greater deference. Each side was stressing a different set of values. Both sets had weight; but where they conflicted there could be no doubt as to which the Papacy must prefer.

The canonists bent before the storm. After one or two heated meetings the ambiguous “revocamus” and the more committal “de integro indicimus” were both struck out of the draft of the Bull.² But Pius IV was displeased. He earnestly desired to retain the ambiguity, in order to avoid a clear declaration sure to infuriate one party or another. To gain time for reflection he commanded the triumphant theologians to present their reasons to him in writing.³

Meanwhile the cardinals of the Franco-Imperial party were begging him to put a stop to the interminable discussions and

¹ Grisar, II, 3*-10*, I. On the suspension see Ehse, p. 45 note 3.

² Voss, p. 133.

³ Grisar, II, publishes Laynez's notes made on this occasion. They are the only ones available, and show the great Jesuit's extreme thoroughness.

simply to do what appeared to him best. They appealed to his sense of independence, to his personal authority. Cardinal Madruzzo himself now declared that the widespread opposition to a resumption of the Council of Trent could not be ignored; and the Cardinal of Ferrara, rallying the party round him, spoke most vigorously against Continuation, insisting, in spite of all Laynez's arguments, that the former decrees, including even the Justification decree, were neither final nor irreformable until fortified by papal confirmation. The Dukes of Florence and Urbino, who were then in Rome and were both strong Continuationists, foresaw with fear and trembling the triumph of Ferrara's influence with the Pope. They therefore persuaded Vargas to go and talk seriously to the Cardinal. From the ensuing interview the outspoken Spaniard returned in triumph, proclaiming that the discomfited Prince of the Church had begun to wish that he had never opened his mouth against the Tridentine decrees.¹ Indecision thus reigned within the Curia, while the conflicting parties fought for mastery over the Pope. But time could not be deliberately wasted. The King of France, or more accurately the Cardinal of Lorraine, had threatened that unless the Bull of Convocation were in his hands when the États-Généraux assembled on December 10th, the National Council might still have to take place. Pius IV fixed upon November 29th as the ultimate limit of his irresolution.²

It was well that he did so. He had struck while the iron had seemed hot; but in truth it had been only just hot enough and already was showing alarming signs of rapid cooling. The Emperor seems to have been hardly conscious of having given a specific pledge to support the papal choice of Trent. Early in November he reflected that there had been a talk of Besançon during Don Antonio's stay at Fontainebleau, and began to discuss this suggestion with the Bishop of Rennes who eagerly urged him to place it before the Pope. Delphinus bestirred himself to break up so dangerous a combination. Using a well-tried argument he represented that further delay in the Council's

¹ Voss, pp. 134-5; Cyprianus, pp. 122-3.

² Voss, p. 133.

summons would assuredly hasten the French National Council, after which warning Ferdinand intimated to Rennes that a month ago he would have supported Besançon had he thought of it, but that now it was too late. At the end of the month, nevertheless, he was still bracketing both Besançon and Innsbruck with Trent.¹ Evidently he considered himself free to the last to advocate alternatives. The papal nuncios had certainly been successful in interpreting his pronouncements in a more precise sense than he had intended them to bear.²

A similar reaction took place in France when it became known that Innsbruck was being mooted in Vienna. The possibility of a last-minute escape from Trent was eagerly seized upon and word was sent to Angoulême bidding him support the new suggestion should opportunity occur.³ Tournon and Viterbo took refuge in reproach. It was morally impossible, they pleaded, for the Most Christian King to go back upon his word; the French stood to gain nothing, but rather to lose much—in exactly what way it is not clear—by having the Council moved north of the Brenner. Viterbo in exasperation declared that Lorraine had invented the Imperial proposal of Innsbruck, suggesting spitefully that he had done so in order to impede the General Council which would probably deprive him of his rich pluralities, and in order to facilitate the National Council in which he hoped to add to his power and reputation. But the nuncio's soured temper was running away with him and Lorraine dealt with these charges very sharply.⁴

These movements of opinion in France and Germany made it very lucky for the Pope that he was able to produce the Bull before they were sufficiently developed to interfere seriously with his plans. On November 29th the Bull in its final form was read out in Consistory and approved by a majority of the cardinals. After a reference to the sessions at Trent under Paul III and Julius III, couched in words implying that their

¹ Sickel, pp. 128 notes, 133-4; Steinherz, pp. 155-7, 160.

² Cf. above, pp. 176-7.

³ François II to the Bishop of Angoulême, Nov. 25th—Le Plat, iv, 661.

⁴ Viterbo to St Charles, Nov. 19th—an extract in Ehses, p. 89 note 7; Ven. Cal., No. 210.

work could not be subjected to revision, the Bull summoned a General Council to Trent for the following Easter, stating that this step had been taken after consultation with the Emperor and other Christian princes. The vital words ran thus: "Concilium œcumenicum ac generale... in civitate Tridentina... indicimus, et ibi celebrandum, sublata suspensione quacumque, statuimus".¹ They were composed and inserted at the last moment by Pius IV himself.²

By his own personal action the Pope had thus secured what seemed to him the one thing necessary—a form of words that did not definitely exclude the requirements of either party. Laynez was extremely disappointed at the ambiguity, but merely observed that since the Bull had now been issued with the intention of satisfying both parties, it should be made quite clear that it was possible for both to accept it without any abandonment of their particular point of view. Beyond that, nothing could be done but to await in patience the inspired decision of the Council on the all-important subject of its own identity.³ Several of the cardinals shared Laynez's dissatisfaction with the ambiguous phraseology, which recommended itself neither to von Arco nor to the Bishop of Angoulême nor yet to Vargas.⁴ The Portuguese ambassador told the Pope frankly that the inconclusiveness of the Bull had caused his sincerity to be again suspected. But Pius could reply with complete truth that only his refusal to tolerate an undisguised continuation had avoided an alienation of the French and the Germans that might have wrecked the whole conciliar project.⁵

But whatever else the Bull might or might not have achieved, Pius felt satisfied that it had at least quashed the French National Council. Yielding to pressure from all sides he at length received the Bishop of Rennes back into favour and supplied him with his Bulls.⁶ On Sunday, December 2nd, the Bull

¹ The latest edition of the text is in Ehses, pp. 104-6.

² This seems to me quite clear from Voss, p. 135.

³ Grisar, II, 21-3.

⁴ Sickel, p. 149; Ehses, p. 105 notes; Pastor, VII, 168 note 3 (Engl. transl. xv, 214 note 4).

⁵ *C.D.P.* IX, 127-8.

⁶ Pius IV to the Bishop of Rennes—*Le Laboureur*, I, 477.

of Convocation was made public, and four days later was despatched to France. It was entrusted, however, not to the dignified portorage of an episcopal courier, as Pius had originally intended, but simply to the Abbé Niquet, a French secretary who for over twenty years had gone constantly between France and Rome.¹ With the Bull went papal letters to François II, to Catherine de Médicis, to the Cardinals of Lorraine and Tournon, and to every French ecclesiastic entitled to a seat in a General Council. All were exhorted to accept, support and attend the Council now happily indicted. Lorraine and Tournon—papal legates—were significantly bidden to avoid all scandal.² On November 29th when the Bull had been read out in Consistory, the Pope had turned to the Cardinal of Ferrara with the question—"Nonne, putatis, concilium nationale Franciae hac via sublatum iri?" And magnificently the answer had come from that pompous prelate—"Concilium illud jam extinctum est!"³

¹ St Charles to Viterbo, Nov. 29th and Dec. 4th—extracts in Ehses, pp. 105 and 112-13 notes; Henry et Loriquet, p. 83.

² Ehses, pp. 112-14 and notes. See also Raynaldus, Nos. 71 and 72, and Le Plat, IV, 663-4.

³ *Acta Consistorialia* in Ehses, pp. 103-4. Cf. Sickel, p. 149.

CHAPTER VII

The Regency of Catherine de Médicis

To promote a woman to bear rule, superiority, dominion, or empire, above any realm, nation, or city, is repugnant to nature, contumely to God, a thing most contrarious to his revealed will and approved ordinance, and finally, it is the subversion of good order, of all equity and justice.

John Knox, *The First Blast of the Trumpet*.

I

BY the middle of November the restored strength of the Guises seemed on the point of becoming impreguably consolidated. The King was not only young, but devoid of all interest in public affairs, so that his uncles might reasonably look forward to an indefinite prolongation of their ascendancy. Moreover the revelation of his cousins' treason had stung François II into almost ungovernable fury, and his demonstrations of rage revealed a hidden energy that had hitherto found its sole outlet in the pleasurable exertions of the chase. It was a perfect situation for the Guises. They had but to exercise a little patience, to remain disdainfully aloof, while the King took into his own hands the destruction of the common enemy. The sporadic outbreaks into which the Bourbon *coup d'état* had disintegrated had been easily crushed, and grateful offers of help had come from Spain and from the Papacy. The King's person was carefully guarded by a military force.

With soldiers—yes, but with immortality his uncles could not hedge the King. The royal fury was the ironic prelude not to the ruin of his cousins but to the King's own destruction. A fever brought on by an abscess in the left ear transformed his cries of wrath into cries of anguish which, while they wrung the hearts of the bystanders, could leave no doubt in their minds that the reign was nearing its end. Though the Cardinal of Lorraine might invoke the powers of Heaven with prayers and processions, and the Duke of Guise with violence and vituperation abuse those of physic, both soon saw that the wheel had come full circle. The heir to the throne, the King's brother, would unquestionably be a minor. And equally unquestionably the

Bourbons would be the natural regents. A few days, and the Bourbons might hope to pass gracefully from the lowest depths of ruin to dizzy heights of power, and to grasp through the sheer gift of Providence a prize to obtain which by treasonable means they had come within an ace of destruction.¹

The way seemed clear, but there was one obstacle upon which they had not calculated. Whatever might be her feelings towards her adopted country, Catherine doted upon her own children. She was loath to see their kingdom, their royal estate, perhaps even their persons, become the playthings of the family rivalry of Guise and Bourbon. By their treasonable conduct the Bourbons had forfeited all moral claim to stand for the monarchy: Catherine saw that she alone, a woman and a foreigner, had any real title to represent the interests of the Crown, to gather around her the traditions of the "Grande Monarchie" of France. She resolved to seize the Regency for herself and guard the throne from the encroachments of the rival families until her son should have reached man's estate. The bold and patriotic design was encouraged—perhaps even suggested—by Cardinal Tournon. The staunch defender of royal absolutism, though perhaps not sorry to witness the collapse of Lorraine's political hegemony, had no desire to see him replaced by the rebel Bourbons with their heretical connections. Tournon turned to the Queen-Mother as to the potential saviour of the monarchy, and supported her with all the powerful backing of his great experience in her inevitable duel with Anthony of Bourbon.²

For several days, with her dying son's cries ringing in her ears, but with Tournon ever at her elbow, Catherine fought with the King of Navarre for the Regency. Her adversary, always weak in a moment of crisis, threw himself, pitifully cringing, upon the mercy of the Guises. He conceived a sudden fervour for the General Council; he boasted of having sent an

¹ M. Romier asserts that there is no documentary evidence of Condé having actually been condemned to death. The story, universally accepted and repeated, rests, it seems, entirely upon later pamphleteers.

² Desjardins, *Négociations avec la Toscane*, III, 432; Alberi, *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneziani*, Série I, III, 439.

agent to Rome to offer the obedience of his kingdom to the Pope; he spoke of the Cardinal of Lorraine as the worthiest man in the realm, without whose advice he would never act; he paraded a belief that the whole responsibility for Condé's arrest lay personally with the King.¹ These manœuvres were as fruitless as they were unworthy. The Cardinal was not inclined to heap coals of fire upon a head impervious to their shameful heat. Anthony was left to fight single-handed, for Condé was under arrest, and the Cardinal of Bourbon rather worse than useless in a negotiation of this nature. As a consequence the Bourbon family attained the zenith of its inefficiency, and allowed legitimate claims—for which when they had been illegitimate it had dared conspiracy, revolt and treason—to slip through its fingers at the instance of an inexperienced woman backed by a Cardinal fast approaching senility. Anthony agreed to content himself with the title of Lieutenant-General and to leave the Regency to Catherine. The Queen-Mother had won her first diplomatic triumph. It was the prelude to many others, but perhaps to none quite so far-reaching in its consequences. And it came just in time. On December 5th the King received the Last Sacraments from the Cardinal of Lorraine; during the night he died. "Seigneur," is said to have been his last prayer, composed for him by the Cardinal, "Pardonnez-moi mes fautes et ne m'imputez point celles que mes ministres ont commis sous mon autorité".²

Early the following morning Lorraine broke the old seals in front of Charles IX and the Regent, to whom the new ones were committed. In a few words he and his brother offered their allegiance and services to the Queen-Mother; the Cardinal, with perhaps unnecessary humility, expressing his readiness to render implicit obedience to whomsoever she might think fit

¹ Viterbo to St Charles, Dec. 3rd; Scipio di Piovene to the Duke of Ferrara, Dec. 8th—Modena, *Dispacci della Francia*, busta 54; Ven. Cal., No. 221. Cf. Romier, *Conjuration d'Amboise*, pp. 273-4. Yet in Chantonnay's correspondence there is recurrent mention of plans for a marriage alliance between the two families of Guise and Bourbon.

² Paris, p. 735 (from the *Maison de Lorraine* of Canon Lacourt of Reims). Every Sunday the Cardinal of Lorraine had made François II study the Gospel for the day—Brantôme, v, 284.

to set above him.¹ But it was not in his nature to obey where he had formerly commanded; and although both Duke and Cardinal were included in the new *Conseil d'État* in which Catherine endeavoured to balance the opposing factions, it was not expected that they would take an active part in the new Government. As soon as François II's illness had been seen to be incurable the Cardinal had made known his intention of retiring to Reims. The strain of his eighteen months' administration with its immense difficulties and bitter disappointments had caused a revulsion of feeling, and he was seemingly only too pleased to hand over the reins of power. He had no aptitude for perseverance at ungrateful and uphill tasks, and though he took misfortune with outward dignity, failure did not ennoble him. At heart he was a bad loser; and he protested his indifference too much.

But there were problems confronting the new Government in regard to which he desired to see some decision taken before his retirement. The seriousness of the financial situation, which had impelled him to summon the États-Généraux, had not been in any way lessened, yet the cancelling of the États was already being mooted. Cardinal Tournon besought Catherine not to proceed with them, reinforcing his former arguments with the prophecy—afterwards verified—that they would surely attack her hard-won Regency. But Catherine showed her independent spirit in preferring the advice of Lorraine, who urged her to carry on with the original plans, arguing that she would lose prestige by turning away the delegates already assembling, and reassuring Tournon by pointing to the large number of troops in Orleans, through whom control of the Estates would be easy.² Actually he expected to establish his own personal control over them by being elected common orator for nobility, clergy and Tiers-État at once. There had been no deliberate attempt to pack the Estates. It has been shown conclusively

¹ Detailed and vivid accounts of the last days of François II's reign and the first days of Charles IX's may be read in M. Romier's two works, *La Conjuration d'Amboise* and *Catholiques et Huguenots à la Cour de Charles IX*.

² Chantonnay to Philip II, Nov. 13th—Arch. Nat. K. 1493, No. 119.

that it would have been impossible for the Guises to have done so, and that actually they had not tried.¹ The military display and the Cardinal's election as orator had been considered ample precautions. But contrary to expectation the Noblesse and Tiers-État refused to follow the clergy in electing Lorraine to speak for them, the deputies of the Tiers-État saying that they did not wish to be represented by the very man against whom their complaints were going to be directed. In high dudgeon the Cardinal rejected even the curtailed honour of representing the clergy alone.

The Estates were opened on December 13th and chose separate orators. In his inaugural speech the Chancellor referred to the pressing need of a General Council.² The legacy of the National Council, now in a state of suspension, was not one that Catherine received too gladly. But she had from the first shared the common desire for a General Council, and one of her earliest acts as Regent was to put a stop to the revived efforts to obtain Innsbruck instead of Trent as its site, reserving the suggestion until such time as there should be talk of a translation.³ For the rest there was nothing to do but await the promised Bull of Convocation which it was still believed would be couched in terms agreeable to the French wishes. At length on December 17th the Bull *Ad Ecclesiae Regimen* arrived. It was laid without delay before the *Conseil d'État* where everyone—bishops, chancellor, princes of the blood—was at once overjoyed to find that it did not specifically announce a resumption of the former Council of Trent. Unfeigned expressions of gratitude to Pius IV sprang to the lips of all.

Of all—that is—but one. Grimly the Cardinal of Lorraine poured the cold water of accuracy upon the overhastily kindled glow of satisfaction. Three words, he observed, ruined the Bull—words whose significance had evaded everyone else.

¹ Paul van Dyke in the *E.H.R.* xxviii, 472-95.

² Dufey, *Œuvres de Michel de l'Hôpital*, I, 375-407, especially 395-405.

³ Catherine to Rennes, Dec. 6th—La Ferrière, *Lettres*, I, 155-7; also in *Le Laboureur*, I, 478-9.

"Sublata suspensione quacumque"—the little phrase was as vinegar to the rock of united Catholic opinion. By it, as the Cardinal pointed out, there had been safeguarded the interpretation of the Bull which the Pope himself desired; a loophole had been left for Continuation; and while this loophole remained the Bull was deceptive and could not possibly commend itself. In addition, it was a legitimate cause of complaint that the Bull should contain no direct mention of the King of France who alone of the Catholic monarchs had continually pressed for a Council.¹ Lorraine's unchallenged authority in ecclesiastical affairs was perhaps never better displayed. At his dictation opinion swung round completely and all agreed that until the views of the Emperor were ascertained the Bull as it stood could not be accepted. Tournon's protests passed unheeded. For the second time it was borne in upon him that though he had made the Regent he could not make her policy.²

The Bishop of Rennes was at once instructed to discover the Emperor's opinion of the Bull. But Catherine and Lorraine were not satisfied with mere wait-and-see. Rennes was further instructed to suggest that Ferdinand should petition the Pope for a revision of the text—in other words for the removal of the obnoxious clause. As a lever the threat of a National Council was revived, though Catherine confessed that she disliked it, as being "contre ce que j'ai fait jusques ici en cette affaire".³ A royal mandate dated January 4th, 1561,⁴ summoned the French bishops to meet on February 25th, ostensibly for the purpose of discussing what policy should be pursued at the General Council and what arrangements were to be made for attending it. The

¹ The Bishop of Feltre had prophesied that offence would be taken at this omission and had recommended a specific mention of the King of France such as Paul III had made in various documents regarding the Council—Ehsses, pp. 109–11.

² Viterbo to St Charles, Dec. 19th, Dec. 28th, Jan. 1st, Jan. 5th (extracts in Ehsses, p. 139); Viterbo to the nuncios in Germany, Dec. 24th (Raynaldus, No. 73); Charles IX to the Bishop of Rennes, Dec. 24th (Le Plat, iv, 668–70); to the Bishop of Angoulême, Dec. 31st (*ibid.* pp. 670–2).

³ Catherine to Rennes, Dec. 24th, in La Ferrière, I, 159–60, and Le Laboureur, I, 479.

⁴ Ehsses, pp. 122–3; Isnard, I, No. 1593.

move showed great ingenuity and insured the French both ways, for while His Holiness was thanked for the Convocation, all implication of a formal acceptance of the Bull was carefully avoided, and even Viterbo, furious at the result of the Cardinal of Lorraine's intervention and at the attempt to obtain a recasting of the Bull, could hardly fail to see that the meeting of the episcopate could, if necessity arose, be transformed into the National Council by a mere stroke of the pen.¹ "*Concilium illud jam extinctum est!*"—it had been indeed a premature post-mortem.

The cahiers of the États-Généraux and the speeches of their orators revealed both the large extent to which the mind of the country was preoccupied with religious affairs and the peculiar colour which its speculations tended to assume. A minority of the lesser nobility apart, the deputies all protested their desire to uphold the old religion, but allowed themselves a wide latitude in criticizing the shortcomings of the clergy, together with a notable liberalism in their attitude towards Calvinism. The Noblesse and the Tiers-État proposed the toleration of heresy until the restoration of unity by a Council; but they also recommended the institution by the bishops of missionary movements of prayer and instruction. All three Estates showed hostility towards the Concordat, demanding the abolition of annates and the election of bishops. The clerical cahier, which was based upon resolutions passed by the Sorbonne in the previous October,² urged the termination of the Concordat on the ground that it was responsible for episcopal slackness, and demanded a Council—either General or National—to undertake the work of reform. The clergy demanded also the immediate suppression of all heretical preaching and outlined a suggested system of local commissions to enforce the practice of Catholicism, the members of which should be sworn in by a solemn declaration of Faith. Many other proposals for the betterment of the Church, including some afterwards adopted at Trent, were to be found scattered among the three cahiers, such as the

¹ Viterbo to St Charles, Jan. 17th.

² Le Plat, IV, 657. Cf. Thomas, III, 121-3.

compulsory residence and annual visitation of their dioceses by bishops, the reform of monasteries and the tightening of episcopal control over exempt houses, the union of poor parishes and the abolition of vagrant and unattached priests, and the institution of regular religious instruction for the young—to be undertaken gratis, said the Noblesse and Tiers-État. Requests for a Council, General or National—it seemed hardly to matter which—, figured prominently.¹

The Government's stand against the Papacy could not fail to be strengthened by this indication, perhaps foreseen by Lorraine, that the agitation for a National Council was something more than a convenient diplomatic fiction. Conversely, the representatives of the Pope could not fail to be gravely concerned. They took fright at the strength of the demand for the abolition of annates, at the undisguised anti-clericalism of the two non-clerical orders, and at the proposals of toleration. Viterbo did not stick at declaring that for all their protestations of orthodoxy most of the deputies deserved the stake, while Tournon broke out into gloomy prophecies of the inevitable victory of heresy and schism everywhere outside Italy and Spain. The Venetian ambassador tells us that it was in fact only due to the influence of Tournon himself, already in significant co-operation with the Duke of Guise and the Constable Montmorency, that demands of an even more radical nature were not made. This may well be believed. Yet the Estates were subservient enough in political matters. The military display had successfully overawed them, and it needed only a little show of firmness on the Queen's part to nip in the bud an attempt to question her Regency.

But the knowledge that things might have been even worse than they actually were, was but cold comfort to the legate and the nuncio, who turned the weight of their combined reproach upon the Cardinal of Lorraine, blaming him both for having

¹ On the Estates of Orleans see Lalourcé et Duval, *Recueil des Pièces Originales concernant les États-Généraux*; A. Desjardins, *Les États-Généraux*, pp. 296-314, and Picot, pp. 1-292. Cf. van Dyke in the *E.H.R.* as cited above, and Thomas, III, 120-30.

called the Estates in the first instance and for having later on dissuaded Catherine from cancelling them. It must have been exasperating to be assured by Montmorency of the Cardinal's practical impotence under the new régime when he had just given such striking instances of his continued ascendancy. No terms were too strong for the papal statesmen to condemn the manner in which, by himself alone, Lorraine had jeopardized the acceptance of the Papal Bull. "Faceva il diavolo", wrote Viterbo. The campaign against him was aided by the Bishop of Fermo, who had returned to France bringing the papal congratulations to the new King, and by Don Juan Manriquez, performing the same duty for Philip II, the severity of whose strictures reduced Catherine to tears. The basest motives were assigned by these ultramontane critics to Lorraine's championship of the National Council. A mania for autocracy, they said, drove him to seek a new background for the display of his diverse talents; his plea that Huguenot opinion must be satisfied was the merest blind; the truth was that he was frightened of being stripped of his pluralities by a General Council, while he was frightening the King with the prospect of losing the royal décimes in the same way.

Lorraine retorted that it might have been extremely difficult to dissuade the Estates from a complete abandonment of Catholicism had not some hope of a National Council in default of a General been held out. In the matter of the Bull he defended his action with great vigour. He maintained that the old Tridentine decrees ought to be reconsidered; that Trent, indelibly associated with their enactment, was not a suitable place in which to reopen them to discussion; that the clause "*sublata suspensione quacumque*" implied their confirmation and could not for this reason be accepted. The more he pondered over the wording of the Bull, the more convinced he became that the whole object of its studied ambiguity was not the safeguarding of French requirements but the defeat of the National Council. This was only a half-truth: the Pope's last-minute alterations had certainly been undertaken with the avoidance of the National Council in view, but also in the hope of rendering

the Bull itself more acceptable to anti-continuationists than it would have been as originally drafted.¹

But alas for these well-intentioned efforts! They had satisfied no one. Close upon the heels of the blow administered to the Curia by the Cardinal of Lorraine, there followed the news that Philip II was making difficulties of a diametrically opposite nature because it seemed not impossible to regard the Bull as signifying a new Convocation. What, wrote St Charles to Viterbo, tearfully triumphant amidst misfortune, what would the Cardinal of Lorraine have to say to that?² For the moment, at any rate, Rome had plenty to say about the Cardinal. Talking to Vargas the Pope described His Eminence as “dañado y... hereje, ó de los Protestantes, por hablar con más honesto vocablo”,³ and secret instructions couched in terms of considerable severity were sent to regulate the nuncio's relations towards him. His attitude was intolerable and he must be taught not to lay down the law to the Pope; Viterbo must gradually shake off intimacy with him—without however causing an open breach—and attach himself more to Catherine and the party in power, even should the Cardinal abandon his opposition to the Bull.⁴ There can be no doubt as to the extent of the

¹ These last paragraphs are based upon Viterbo's letters of Jan. 17th, 18th and 20th; Suriano's despatches published in the Ven. Cal., No. 228 and by Layard, *Reports of the Venetian Ambassadors*, pp. 10-11, 11-12; and the letters of Alvarotti and Fiaschi to the Duke of Ferrara during January. See also Steinherz, pp. 187, 189, 190; Sickel, pp. 153-4, 165; Desjardins, *Négociations avec la Toscane*, III, 427-32; Cyprianus, p. 139; and Ehses, p. 139 note 2.

² St Charles to Viterbo, Feb. 7th.

³ Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, 349.

⁴ St Charles to Viterbo, Jan. 10th: “et però S. Stà vuole che a poco a poco si ritirate de la prattica del Cardinal di Lorena, stringendovi et addomesticandovi tanto più con quelli che hanno l' autorità in mano, con usar però ancora un certo temperamento di non abbandonarlo del tutto, ne mostrargli diffidenza, et di non dar ombra et sospetto col praticar seco a l' altra parte, come per la prudenza vostra saprete molto ben fare, et questo haverete a fare tanto più se vedrete che il detto Cardinale perseveri in far le opposizioni che scrivete che egli ha fatto sopra la bolla del Concilio. Ma etiam che cessasse di farle, non havete a conversar seco tanto domesticamente come prima, per non sdegnar l' altra parte al presente più potente nel governo. Et questa commessione potrete tenerla in Voi solo, senza altramente comunicarla ne con Turnone, ne con altri, et circa la detta bolla S. Stà non vuol per hora replicar altro, se non che ella è da ogni banna [banda?] buona et santa, e tal che ogni buon Christiano sene satisfara et ne restera bene edificato, et il Cardinal di Lorena non ha da dar lui legge a S. Stà”.

Pope's anxiety lest the combined opposition of Cardinal and Emperor should become overwhelming. A fortnight later Cardinal Morone addressed a letter to Lorraine in which he ingeniously censured his opposition to the Bull by asserting his own inability to believe the rumours current to this effect, and exhorting him, with adverse reflections upon the Abbé Manne's mission of the previous summer, to advance the cause of the General Council and to use his influence against the National.¹

The Bull had not of course been definitely rejected in France: its acceptance had been postponed until the Emperor gave a lead one way or the other, though it was certainly hoped that the Emperor would reject it or at least call upon the Pope for its revision. Consequently, no official acknowledgment of the Bull was yet sent to Rome from France. The Bishop of Angoulême, while protesting at the omission of the French King's name from the Bull, could only declare that on the main issue of acceptance or rejection his superiors were waiting for a lead from Vienna.² Thus no offence could be taken if the Pope encouraged the French bishops to support the Council. He sent letters to Cardinal Bourbon, Cardinal Lenoncourt and Cardinal Châtillon urging them to start for Trent with their suffragans.³ It was not a particularly well-chosen trio. Bourbon was practically without influence; Lenoncourt was about to depart not for Trent but for the next world; and the evidences of Châtillon's heresy, duly attested by sworn witnesses, had by now reached Rome. But he had not yet been cited for trial, for in conversation with the nuncio Catherine de Médicis had hotly defended the Cardinal,⁴ and would certainly have taken offence at his citation.

The French appeal to Vienna and the attempt to jockey Ferdinand into a campaign for the excision of the "sublata suspensione quacumque" clause seemed to foreshadow a

¹ Ehses, pp. 139-40 (Morone to Lorraine, Jan. 27th).

² Henry et Loriquet, pp. 118-21.

³ Ehses, p. 131.

⁴ Chantonnay to Philip II, Dec. 9th, 1560, cited by de Ruble, *Antoine de Bourbon*, III, 319-20.

renewal of the diplomatic battle between Rennes and Hosius. Actually, however, no engagement was destined to take place. The Emperor shared Lorraine's dissatisfaction with the Bull, but his tone was one more of sorrow than of anger, and he quickly assured Rennes that it was not his intention to defy the Pope. Greatly as he disliked the "sublata" clause, he was not prepared either by threats of rejection or by diplomatic representation to take steps for its removal: he did not think it proper for him to deafen the Pope's ears with advice which after months of continuous reiteration the Holy Father in his wisdom had seen fit to reject. He even doubted whether the removal of the clause would reconcile the Lutheran princes to the Council. Even the renewed threat of a French National Council, which he would have done almost anything to avoid, failed to move Ferdinand either to demand a revision or to reject the Bull *in toto*, though he disliked it for more than one reason. The Convocation for Easter Sunday, for instance, left him insufficient time in which to consult the Princes of the Empire, and he was not anxious to have to call a Diet especially for this purpose. At length, however, he told Rennes that, sceptical though he was about the Bull, he could not openly resist it, but would nevertheless refrain from an official pronouncement until he had consulted the Protestant princes who were shortly to assemble at Naumburg to discuss the redrafting of the Confession of Augsburg. The French move had thus failed, and Hosius might have spared himself the penitential exercise of rising from a sick bed on a bitterly cold morning for the purpose of parrying Rennes' ineffectual thrusts. He improved the occasion, however, by once again scolding the ambassador for his master's strange subservience to Protestant wishes.¹

The Emperor's refusal of support forced the Cardinal of Lorraine to retreat. Having always paraded his readiness to conform to whatever decision might be come to at Vienna,² he could not now decline to fulfil his word. With a tolerably good grace he dropped his opposition to the Bull, observing that

¹ Steinherz, pp. 195-9.

² Ven. Cal., No. 228; Layard, pp. 10-11.

though the "sublata" clause left it open to the Pope eventually to declare the Council a continuation, it did not throw upon him an absolute necessity of so doing. He made it no secret that personally he harboured little expectation of the Bull being productive of much good; but since its issue was past recall, and the only avenue to its reformation effectually blocked, he was willing to make the best of a bad job and advocated that no time ought now to be lost in despatching papal legates to Trent.¹ This change of attitude was probably encouraged by his brother. The Duke of Guise does not seem to have shared the Cardinal's objections to the Bull, but he was convinced that Lorraine was the only man in France capable of dealing satisfactorily with the Huguenot peril,² and the papal representatives, delighted at his conversion, saw that they might now with greater propriety enlist the Cardinal's help in combating the policy which the Regent was initiating in conformity with the wishes of the Estates.

It had seemed merely a scandal that the Estates should have been permitted to give open expression to sentiments of so anti-clerical and pro-Huguenot a nature. But it was more than a scandal, it was a distinct peril, that the Regent should see fit to defer to their clamour. Catherine, again in complete disregard of Tournon's advice, issued an edict on January 28th granting an amnesty to all prisoners *pour le fait de la religion*, this time not excluding preachers, from whom the benefits of the earlier pardon of Amboise had been expressly withheld.³ Furthermore, the condition that the released should thenceforth live in accordance with "the Catholic Faith" was more or less nullified by Catherine's deliberate refusal to alter this to "the Roman Catholic Faith", an unmistakable hint that the Huguenots might confidently rely on their usual quibble. Steps were also taken to restrict and limit the jurisdiction restored to the Church courts by the Edict of Romorantin,⁴ and an

¹ Viterbo to St Charles, Jan. 31st—extract also in Ehsses, p. 140 notes; Alvarotti and Fiaschi to the Duke of Ferrara, Jan. 31st.

² Alvarotti and Fiaschi to the Duke of Ferrara, Jan. 30th.

³ Isnard, I, No. 1594.

⁴ See Isambert, XIV, 62, No. 5.

ordonnance was known to be in preparation embodying a number of the Estates' other recommendations.

It was in alarm at these measures that Viterbo, Tournon and several of the Catholic ambassadors turned in supplication towards a Cardinal of Lorraine now rehabilitated by his capitulation over the Bull. However strongly Viterbo might have criticized Lorraine's conciliar policy, he had always been obliged to regard with admiration his admitted zeal and activity as a reformer.¹ A concerted attempt was now made to use him as a bulwark against the Regent's policy, which already threatened to lead eventually to the full toleration desired by the Noblesse and Tiers-État. It was represented to Lorraine that he alone had the capacity to restrain Catherine. His duty to the Pope and to the Catholic Faith was clear; would he not remain at Court and cancel his visit to Reims seeing that the situation had taken so ugly a turn? No, the Cardinal did not feel so disposed. Once the Estates had been dismissed he was bent upon retirement, and he was able to appeal to a recent order insisting that all the bishops must reside in their dioceses during Lent. It was his duty to visit his church, and there could be no question of a return to Court until Easter. He spoke also of the great unpopularity which he had incurred during his administration, and added that he had displeased the Regent by supporting the proposal to restore the election of bishops; though it seems that he had not disapproved of the amnesty.² And he had other reasons for retirement which touched his personal reputation. In Rome, and not in Rome alone, rumour whispered that he was intriguing for a papal legation at the Council as compensation for his political abasement, while the old *canard* about a patriarchate was still flourishing. He observed that nothing would have been simpler for him than to have arranged for the gratification of this latter ambition, had it had any real existence, during the reign of his nephew—and he might pertinently have added a reference to his conduct ten years pre-

¹ See Viterbo to St Charles, Dec. 3rd, 1560.

² Or so Catherine asserted later—see *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 367—and there seems no reason to disbelieve her.

viously in the Gallican crisis of 1551. He intended to give the lie to these fables which he knew were very widely spread and often accepted quite uncritically. He would also refute the calumnious report that he was at doctrinal variance with his Chapter at Reims—in other words, that his orthodoxy was questioned. It is true enough that vague accusations to this effect were floating around him;¹ even the Pope, as we have seen, had spoken a little wildly;² but the case of the Bishop of Rennes is proof enough of the ease with which an ecclesiastic guilty of nothing more than opposition to the policy of Rome might find himself in the uncomfortable position of a suspect. Such accusations do not deserve serious consideration, but Lorraine felt them keenly. All Viterbo's persuasions, even the paradoxical argument that he could pay no more profitable visit to his church than by remaining where he was, failed to produce the desired effect. The Cardinal was determined to go; but he promised, however, to return after Easter—as indeed he had always intended.³

The deputies of the États-Généraux left Orleans on the last day of January. They had come unfurnished with financial powers, and it had been necessary to prorogue them so that they might return to their constituencies for the necessary mandates. But they took with them the Chancellor's promise of a free Council at which all afflicted with religious doubt would obtain a fair hearing. The Cardinal of Lorraine, however, wrote to the King of Spain, in answer to enquiries from that monarch, that the Estates had shown no inclination to demand innovations in religion and that the Catholic religion would be fully maintained.⁴ On the same day he wrote to the Bishop of Rennes

¹ "Si era sparsa una voce ch' el Signor Cardinale di Lorena haveva qualche mala opinione nella cosa della religione et che l' haveva detto qualche cosa che no stava punto bene"—Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, Jan. 31st. And more openly Hubert Languet, II, 112: "Cardinalis Lotharingicus a rigidioribus Pontificiis accusatur Lutheranismi".

² See above, p. 206.

³ Viterbo to St Charles, Jan. 13th, Feb. 7th; the Bishop of Fermo to St Charles, Jan. 30th—extracts in Ehses, pp. 139 note 5, 187-8 note 4.

⁴ Cited by Bouillé, *Ducs de Guise*, II, 123; cf. Thompson, *Wars of Religion*, p. 97.

asking to be kept advised as to Viennese opinion regarding the Council and stating that he intended to return to Court after Easter.¹ On February 1st he left for Reims after a touching farewell with the King and the Queen-Mother.² Brantôme relates that as he went he heard with disgust and apprehension the cry taken up from street to street and window to window, "Adieu M. le Cardinal, la messe est fessée".³

An exodus of bishops followed. Only two exemptions were permitted from the general obligation of residence during Lent.⁴ They were in favour of Montluc of Valence, appointed Lenten Preacher at Court, and Cardinal Tournon, on whose retention by her side the Regent insisted, though she continually rejected his advice. The two prelates typified the lines on which French Catholics were to divide in the course of the next few months. Tournon represented the mind of the Triumvirate—ultramontane, uncompromising, aggressive; Montluc stood for the mentality and outlook of the party which was to produce the Colloquy of Poissy, and with which the Queen was already beginning to associate herself—national, liberal, eirenic.

II

It may seem trite to say that had the temper of Ferdinand I been other than what it was, the history of the Council of Trent under Pius IV might well have been very different, or indeed even non-existent. But it was certainly the Emperor's attitude of non-resistance towards Rome which enabled the Bull *Ad Ecclesiae Regimen* to fructify. Though he sincerely believed that the peace which the settlement of 1555 had brought to Germany would be endangered by a resumption of the Council of Trent, Ferdinand refused either to reject the Bull outright or to take steps for its modification. The postponement of its official acceptance until such time as he had ascertained the views of

¹ Le Laboureur, I, 525-6.

² Chantonnay to Philip II, Feb. 1st, cited by de Ruble, *Antoine de Bourbon*, III, 331.

³ Brantôme, IV, 229.

⁴ See Isambert, XIV, 101, No. 15.

all the Princes of the Empire was the furthest limit to which he would push the show of resistance, and he made no secret that his objections were political rather than personal, a consideration upon which the nuncios were not slow to concentrate. Indeed in letters to Rome, and by word of mouth to Hosius, Ferdinand repeatedly declared that he had no private criticisms to make against the Bull.¹ But he fought shy of accepting it officially in his Imperial capacity; and this despite the fact that the Bishop of Rennes continued to threaten the French National Council, his latest instructions being to press in this way for some definite lead either of rejection or acceptance. This lead was exactly what the Emperor was for the time being unwilling to give. To play for time was still his main object, to avoid premature self-committal, to discover before crossing any Rubicon precisely what measure of support or opposition he could expect when once he should stand committed on the other bank. Thus the same contrasts still prevailed: the French were the champions of hustle, the Emperor the advocate of wait-and-see; and the conflicting policies were both the inevitable outcome of local conditions. But it was a rather sobered Rennes who now plied the Emperor with his exhortations. He now admitted that most of the French opposition to a continuation of the Council of Trent lay in an unwillingness to recognize the œcumenicity of the sessions held under Julius III. He warmly denied that there was any dislike *per se* of the doctrines there promulgated; and nothing is indeed clearer than that the whole French case for their re-discussion was based on grounds not of theology but of utilitarianism and the vindication of the monarchy's honour. Hosius expressed great moral indignation that the Most Christian King should be more concerned with a theoretical point of honour than with the peace and safety of the Christian world. But the Emperor would not repeat to Rennes even those declarations of purely personal satisfaction with the Bull that he had made to the nuncios. It may be that he had a

¹ Ferdinand's attitude towards Rome and the Bull may be studied in the many documents published by Sickel, Steinherz, Ehses and in the *Documentos inéditos*.

sense of having said too much, of having already provided more handle to the Curia than he had really intended.¹

The Curia was certainly looking round desperately for handles—and it found one. Ferdinand's communications were vaguely worded, non-committal in tone, almost self-contradictory. But his denials of personal hostility towards the Bull, though accompanied by protestations that he could not yet formally accept it as Emperor, were seized upon as a sufficient warrant for the view that for all practical purposes the Imperial acceptance of the Bull could be regarded as assured and certain. Ferdinand's distinction between his private and his imperial capacity was overruled; and when after long hesitation he at last allowed the Bull of Indulgence for the Council to be published in Vienna considerable strength was lent to the papal assumption. Before the end of January Pius had reappointed the Bishop of Cava² to be Commissary for the General Council, an office he had held under Paul III and Julius III. Shortly afterwards there followed the reappointment of Angelo Massarelli, Bishop of Telesse, to the important position of Secretary, and both officials immediately started out for Trent. On February 14th Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga of Mantua, a cardinal of Clement VII's creation, an experienced man of affairs, large-minded, tolerably able and commanding universal respect, and Cardinal Puteo, who had been the stout champion of Continuation on the committee which had drafted the Bull, were created legates for the Council. Gonzaga accepted his responsible post only after extreme pressure.³ Morone had felt obliged to decline the prize which the Pope had been eager to bestow on him, owing to the intensity of the Spanish opposition.⁴

¹ Steinherz, pp. 210 and notes, 212, 215-18; *Documentos inéditos*, IX, 196.

² He had suffered for alleged liberalism under Paul IV.

³ See Giovanni Drei in the *Archivio della Società Romana di Storia Patria*, XL, 205 *et seq.* Father Drei ascribes the choice of Cardinal Gonzaga to the influence of St Charles Borromeo and of the Duke of Florence. See also his articles on Gonzaga's correspondence in the same periodical, XL, 65-115, and XLI, 171-222, and in the *Archivio Storico per le provincie Napolitane*, nouvelle série, XVII, 185-242, XVIII, 29-143.

⁴ See, for details, Pastor, VII, 188, 190-1 (Engl. transl. xv, 242-3, 246-7).

The corner-stone of Catherine's regency was the equilibrium of parties, and towards the maintenance of this equilibrium all her endeavours were directed. Suddenly in February the balance swayed violently. The King of Navarre, taking umbrage at the continued detention of Condé, made a surprise demand for more effective powers and attempted to drive the Duke of Guise from Court. The *coup d'état* was frustrated by the defection of Montmorency, who on Cardinal Tournon's persuasion withdrew his support from Anthony at the critical moment, so that the latter was again forced to recognize the plenitude of the Queen-Mother's regency, receiving as a kind of consolation prize the illusory promise of the use of the royal seal and powers equal to those possessed under François II by the Cardinal of Lorraine.¹ This momentary disturbance revealed for an instant what jealousies still smouldered beneath the thin crust of an artificial union. Once the crisis was over, the nuncios—Viterbo and Fermo—sought audience with the Queen and informed her that the Emperor had accepted the Bull of Convocation. The Curia—as we have seen—had felt justified in spreading and making use of a statement which in one sense was as yet no more than an optimistic prophecy. Catherine fully intended to stand by the Holy Father if the Emperor and the Princes of Germany did the same, and she had not given up hope that under these circumstances the Council of Trent might eventually restore religious unity. She had replied thus to the Duke of Bedford whom Elizabeth had sent to France—amongst other reasons—in order to exploit the differences of opinion between the French and the Pope.² Faced with the allegation that the Emperor had actually accepted the Bull, Catherine could not but reply that she would be happy to follow suit, and added that the Cardinal of Lorraine would be instructed to prepare a list of prelates suitable to attend the Council.³ It now became

¹ See an excellent account in Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, pp. 61-6.

² Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations*, pp. 82-3.

³ Šusta, I, 169, 170, 179—Viterbo's letters from the Modena *Estratti* (the more important passages of which, from March 1561 onwards, are published in the *Beilagen* to Professor Šusta's work). Cf. Paris, pp. 827, 830; Le Laboureur, pp. 480-1; For. Cal., No. 49.

necessary to make some official reply to Rome. This was duly done on March 3rd. A note was composed promising support for the Council in very general terms but making the despatch of ambassadors and bishops conditional upon the lead being first given by both the Spaniards and the Imperialists.¹

This was not saying very much. The French support was not really whole-hearted; it was grudgingly and conditionally given, and Rome was not blind to the unsatisfactory nature of the declaration. But the Pope and St Charles decided that it would be possible, and more profitable, to proceed as if the Queen-Mother's promise of support were complete and unconditional, an assumption justified, as it seemed, by Viterbo's statement that in private conversation Catherine had admitted her full adhesion to the papal desires.² News was therefore spread from Rome that France was at last properly to heel, and Viterbo was instructed to see that the most intelligent and the most orthodox of the French prelates were chosen to represent the Gallican Church at Trent.³ It was clearly all to Rome's advantage to carry on as if the many dark clouds lowering upon the horizon were not really there. To wait for the Emperor would be to risk waiting indefinitely, and such modified expression of support as had in fact come from France and Vienna were not insufficient to warrant the pursuance of preparations for the Council. To rest upon his oars until it should please their Highnesses the Princes of the Empire, as well Lutheran as Catholic, to decide whether they would or would not help propel the conciliar vessel, would have put the Pope in a position both undignified and dangerous. Three more legates were created on March 10th. They were Girolamo Seripando, of whom we have spoken before in relation to the Justification question; Stanislaus Hosius, the well-meaning but

¹ Instructions to the Bishop of Angoulême of March 3rd—Le Plat, iv, 673. The date is to be found in the earlier edition of Dupuy's *Lettres et Instructions*. Cf. Ehses, p. 167, who certainly errs in regarding the note as final and definite. See also Charles IX to Angoulême, March 3rd—Le Plat, iv, 694.

² Šusta, I, 6; Henry et Lorique, pp. 144-52; *Archivio della Società Romana*, xli, 172.

³ Šusta, I, 175; Ehses, p. 167 notes.

rather brusque Polish nuncio at Vienna; and Ludovico Simonetta, a distinguished and able canonist entirely devoted to papal interests. All three had just been raised to the cardinalate in Pius IV's second creation on February 20th.¹

But with the one exception of Portugal, where the Bull had been unhesitatingly accepted—the saintly Archbishop of Braga, Bartolomeo de Martyris, being the first non-Italian prelate to appear at Trent²—the activity shown by Rome in the affairs of the Council unfortunately remained exceptional and isolated. All hope of an Easter opening was fast receding. After consultation with the Emperor, the nuncios Delphinus and Commendone, who had been sent into Germany to announce the Council, proceeded to Naumburg, and presented the Protestant princes there assembled with the Bull of Convocation and with letters from the Pope promising a safe-conduct and just treatment. But the letters were instantaneously returned, the Princes being unable to tolerate the papal address of “beloved son”; and the Bull was made the subject of comment so uncomplimentary that no further doubt could be entertained as to the attitude which the Lutherans would inevitably adopt towards any papal proposal for a Council, however couched. Retiring with dignity from Naumburg,³ the nuncios started to tour Germany with the Bull, Commendone in the north, Delphinus in the south. The Emperor, pressed to send bishops and ambassadors to Trent, and deeply chagrined by the attitude of the Lutherans, temporized and at length embarked upon a long-drawn-out and inconclusive correspondence with the Catholic electors. Soon however the obstructionist attitude of Spain rendered this unsatisfactory situation less disagreeable to the Curia. Philip II was so dissatisfied with the Bull that he refused to accept it unless a clear declaration came from Rome that the

¹ See Pastor, VII, 188-91 (Engl. transl. xv, 243-8).

² May 8th—see Šusta, I, 24.

³ For the meeting at Nauniburg and its results see Calinich, *Der Naumburger Fürstentag*. For the rejection of the Bull see Pastor's account, VII, 170-5 (Engl. transl. xv, 218-25), based on Commendone's letters of which the best and latest edition is that of Ehses, VIII, No. 80 *et seq.* An earlier edition by Finazzi in the *Miscellanea di storia Italiana*, vi.

Council was not to be a new Convocation. To obtain this Don Juan de Ayala was sent to Rome, where he arrived during April. Philip had taken, but for a diametrically opposite purpose, the step which the Cardinal of Lorraine had vainly urged upon the Emperor: he had demanded an official gloss upon the ambiguous Bull. The general result, however, was that no prelates were going to Trent, while the powers were all waiting for each other to take the first step. Spain was waiting for further enlightenment on the Bull. France was waiting for a lead from Germany. In Germany the Lutherans had washed their hands of the Bull in rather muddy water, and the Emperor was waiting to see what the Catholic electors had to say.

Under these circumstances it was only to be expected that the cause of the French National Council should revive, and the apparent failure of the Bull *Ad Ecclesiae Regimen* was certainly one of the main factors which went to stabilize Catherine's conversion to it. Another was the influence of Michel de l'Hôpital. Still popularly regarded as a creature of the Guises, de l'Hôpital had ardently supported Lorraine's opposition to the Bull, and after the Cardinal's retirement to Reims kept before Catherine's eyes, in skilful contrast with the series of reverses which the Bull was encountering, the advantages that might reasonably be expected to accrue from an attempt to solve the problems of reform and reunion by local methods undertaken at home. To so little indeed had Catherine intended to pledge herself by the pronouncement of March 3rd, that only four days later the possibility of a National Council was mentioned in the instructions given to M. de Rambouillet,¹ a young diplomatist sent as interim ambassador to Rome until the arrival of a permanent successor to the Bishop of Angoulême who had just been raised to the cardinalate. Nor was this mention a mere empty form. The meeting of the French bishops in February had, indeed, not materialized, but the idea of a National Council continued to revolve in Catherine's mind and to take more definite shape as the chances of an early meeting

¹ In Le Plat, iv, 695-7, dated March 7th.

at Trent became more and more remote.¹ This disturbed the nuncio very gravely. It was not however his sole cause of alarm. An ordinance—later to be known as the Ordinance of Orleans—was being prepared by the Chancellor, granting many of the reforms demanded by the Estates and instituting a new procedure by which candidates for the episcopate were to be presented for the King's selection by a mixed tribunal of laymen and ecclesiastics. It was known, too, that a clause abolishing annates and the whole system of preventions had only been left out at Cardinal Tournon's express pleadings,² and the President du Ferrier had been sent to Rome to negotiate for a revision of the Concordat. But it takes two to make a negotiation—and Pius IV would not be one. He defended annates and preventions with such eloquence that du Ferrier was said to have himself become a convert to the justice of their cause.³ But what was far more serious than the jeopardizing of such financial and beneficiary arrangements, was the theological tone of the Lenten sermons of the Court Preacher, who gravely shocked Cardinal Tournon and many others of his audience, and occasionally disturbed even Catherine de Médicis herself. The Bishop of Valence did not merely criticize the cult of images and the invocation of the saints; he gave the clear impression of desiring modifications of doctrine in order to conciliate the Huguenots. And as if to add piquancy to the situation Catherine appointed as permanent ambassador to Rome a man whom she can scarcely have honestly believed would be acceptable to the Curia. The Sieur de l'Isle was the son of the Sieur du Mortier, a notorious suspect, and his appointment showed a deliberate and almost insulting disregard for the Pope's feelings. Yet upon all Viterbo's protests, both

¹ Alvarotti and Fiaschi to the Duke of Ferrara, March 22nd; Catherine to Rennes, March 29th—La Ferrière, *Lettres*, I, 181, and Le Laboureur, I, 483.

² Viterbo to St Charles, letters of January, especially Jan. 31st.

³ Šusta, I, 154-5, 178-9, 207, 208 notes; Layard, p. 29; Henry et Loriguet, pp. 150-1. Cf. Thomas, *Le Concordat de 1517*, III, 130-1. Du Ferrier's instructions are published by Launoy, *Regii Navarrae Gymnasii Parisiensis Historia* (1677), pp. 322-4. In the Bib. Nat., fonds français 20099, ff. 45-53, may be seen the *Remonstrances baillées par M. le Président du Ferrier à N.S. Père le Pape* 1561.

personal and inspired, Catherine turned a deaf ear and a mordant tongue. Infuriated with the nuncio for having reported that she was prepared to accept the Bull of Convocation unconditionally, her rudeness—for this was not the first time that Viterbo had misrepresented her in Rome—brought about a crisis in their personal relations.¹ Though he had been less than ten months in France, Viterbo's nunciature was already a failure and his personal position was now rendered intolerable. The Queen's intense dislike made it impossible for him to exert the smallest influence over her. He finally asked for his recall. This was not refused; but the unhappy man was destined to be the reluctant witness of many distressing events before the arrival of his successor in October brought him relief.

Perhaps the most significant feature of the situation, and that which boded the greatest menace for the future, was the Government's marked impotence to preserve order in the provinces. The aggressive movement within the Calvinist body had again received a new impetus. Catherine's attitude had made the Calvinists feel that they were really winning, and had given them a sense of ample security. When rioting between rival congregations almost assumed the proportions of pitched battles, the breakdown of the central administration seemed to be perilously near. That excesses were committed on both sides is of course undeniable; the Catholics were inflamed by the refilling of long-silent pulpits as the Huguenots by excited ministers just released from jail; and perhaps the worst result of all was the gradual undermining of the general respect for authority in any form, civil or ecclesiastical. It must have been difficult even for those who deplored these tendencies not to be swept away by them, and it is all to the credit of the large majority of the Calvinist ministers that they did all in their power to prevent the capture of a sober religious movement by thoughtless hotheads and military adventurers. Yet they had themselves stirred up the passions against Catholicism which

¹ Šusta, I, 177; the Bishop of Orleans to the Bishop of Rennes, March 6th—*Le Laboureur*, I, 480-1.

would not now be denied practical outlet, and which proved in the end too strong for the old tradition of docility. The Huguenot Lent, as it came to be called, was but a prelude to the Calvary of the Civil Wars.

If the weakness of Catherine's rule gave encouragement to the Huguenots, the disbanding of the troops who had garrisoned Orleans produced a marked effect upon the temper of the Estates. Incited, it was said, by Condé, who on his eventual release had left the Court, the delegates of the Prévôté de Paris, formerly so amenable, openly refused during March to turn their attention to the pressing financial business in hand until the King of Navarre—or on his refusal Condé—should be made Regent. In addition they demanded that the Guises, Montmorency, the Chancellor, and all ecclesiastics should be excluded from the *Conseil*; and that Coligny, the only professing Huguenot at Court, should supervise the education of the royal family and leave Catherine with no more than the personal care of the King. The Queen was aghast to find Anthony himself, whom she thought finally to have pacified, supporting these insolent demands. Again the balance was in deadly peril; and since Catherine had no army on which to fall back, while Condé was rumoured to be secretly engaged in raising troops, it seemed as if she must at last throw herself unreservedly upon the mercy of either Guise or Bourbon. Passions had become so inflamed that this might well have been the signal for civil war. But the Queen's own interests were those of the nation and of the monarchy, and desperately she clung to her post, though never was her diplomatic ability more sorely tried. Navarre was at length pacified by the offer of political power equal to Catherine's own, together with complete military supremacy. On these heavy terms, heavy at least on paper, Catherine retained her title of Regent and Anthony ceased to demand the retirement of the Duke of Guise. But the Regency had tasted death, and the balance of parties could never be quite so secure again.¹

The partial victory of the King of Navarre added the final

¹ Romier, pp. 88-98; van Dyke in the *E.H.R.* as above.

touch to the exasperation of the stricter Catholics. It was the culminating point of a process whose development they had watched with dismay. Had the Queen merely lacked the material power to put down Huguenot assemblies and to prevent riots; had she confined herself simply to deception and annoyance of the Pope, to dalliance with the National Council and to demands for the revision of the Concordat—all good and traditional Gallican activities, her conduct could not have been regarded as fundamentally perilous to the preservation of the Catholic religion. But that she should choose as her Lenten Preacher a suspect bishop, that she should appear to lack the willingness as well as the ability to control Calvinist aggression, that she should tolerate the eating of meat during Lent, that, finally, she should consent to share supreme power with a man so committed to Huguenot interests as the King of Navarre—these were things too fraught with menace to be endured. What cannot be endured must be cured. The Duke of Guise and the Constable had lately found themselves in more than one situation of unusual but prophetic co-operation. Opposition to the demands of the Estates had drawn them near to each other, and in the political crises of February and March the support of Montmorency, due ultimately to Cardinal Tournon, was on both occasions the deciding factor in preventing the retreat of the Duke from Court. During Lent their disgust at Valence's spiritual fare completed the rapprochement. In a small chapel in the servants' quarters Duke and Constable took their places among a group of nobles and courtiers who, having no use for the sensuous thrills of Montluc's heterodoxy, had deserted him to hear sound Catholic doctrine preached to humble menials by an obscure friar. Common religious interest and common distrust of the new religious tone beginning to predominate at Court had cemented their entente, and with the Marshal de St André they formed an alliance to defend the Catholic Faith. To this alliance, largely of his own inspiration, Cardinal Tournon stood godfather. In the decline of his influence and the weakening of his powers he handed on his mantle to these three men for whom the defence of Catholicism had come to count for more than the most

deeply ingrained rivalries of blood or politics. The pact, religious in basis, character and objects, was solemnly ratified on Easter Sunday, when, after the adjustment of long-standing differences, the Triumvirate received Holy Communion from the Cardinal's hands.¹ A watch-dog had been set over the Regent, one ready to bite the moment she should set her foot upon the sacred ground of which it had become the self-constituted guardian, though it was neither the Triumvirate's desire nor its policy to bring about an open breach unnecessarily. It was not disposed to question the Queen's position, only to control her use of it, and its members did not retire from Court. It conceived its functions as preventative rather than directly aggressive, and in this respect it resembles the Ligue in its earlier stages. In a sense it foreshadows the Ligue. At bottom their objects were the same.

Sacramental seal had been affixed to the Triumvirate on the very day appointed for the opening of the Council of Trent. Those who looked for a sign might recognize the divinely arranged recompense, for the Council had not in point of fact opened. The presence of no more than a handful of Italian prelates, and two only of the legates, Gonzaga and Seripando, had made a postponement inevitable, and it was not without some plausibility that cynics added "*usque ad Kalendas Graecas*".² The rejection of the Bull by the German Protestants, the halting attitude of the Emperor, the opposition of the Spaniards, and the failure of the Council to come into being on the appointed day, formed an undeniably strong array of arguments, which convinced Catharine de Médicis and de l'Hôpital that little could ever be expected from the Council of Trent. The nuncio testified that the General Council had no bitterer enemy in France than de l'Hôpital, who held that nothing could come of it, even in the improbable event of its ever really getting under way, but the perpetuation of the rupture of Christendom. Catharine might maintain that the French

¹ See M. Romier's full account of its evolution, pp. 99-101.

² For. Cal., 1561-2, No. 147.

prelates were ready to start for Trent the moment the Spanish and Germans gave the example, but Chantonmay for one frankly disbelieved her,¹ and it seems unlikely that any delegation had yet been chosen. The Queen had now definitely resolved to attempt a national settlement of the religious problem, and in the preparations that this involved, a certain amount of deceit was an essential ingredient.

Three weeks after Easter letters patent were issued proroguing the États-Généraux until August and announcing that a National Assembly of bishops and learned men would meet about the same time. Catherine began to talk freely and pointedly of uniting her subjects into one religion.² It was her intention to summon Huguenot representatives to the National Council, and though this intention was studiously kept from those in whose ears it might sound offensively, the Prince of Roche-sur-Yon indiscreetly revealed to Chantonmay a few weeks later that a conference was being arranged between representatives of the two religions.³ The moment was favourable. A National Synod of the Huguenot Church, held in March, had appointed a committee to consider what further use might be made of the right of petition conceded during the Tumult of Amboise. Through the mediation of the King of Navarre the Government established secret communication not only with the Synod but also with the higher powers of Geneva,⁴ and thus the perpetually recurring danger that foreigners might succeed in making the French Council the nucleus of an international anti-papal assembly again began to make itself felt. This idea was popular in Germany where the King of Navarre's correspondence with the Duke of Württemberg and other princes had created the illusion that the Roman Church in France was on the verge of overthrow.⁵ And though Catherine

¹ Šusta, I, 183-4.

² Catherine to Rennes, April 11th and April 22nd, in La Ferrière, *Lettres*, I, 186-7, 191; Viterbo to St Charles, April 15th, and Chantonmay's letters of March 28th and April 13th, in Šusta, I, 181, 182-4; reports of Soranzo in Ven. Cal., No. 252 and Layard, p. 23.

³ Šusta, I, 202-3.

⁴ See the proofs collected by M. Romier, pp. 137, 143.

⁵ Correspondence of Navarre and Württemberg in Stuttgart, Staatsarchiv, Frankreich, büschel 16; also Kluckhohn, *Briefe Friedrich des Frommen*,

herself had never openly admitted the possibility of rejecting the Council of Trent root and branch, Anthony for his part had given every encouragement to English and German enquirers to believe that France might yet play a central and unifying rôle in an anti-papal conciliar movement.¹ Coligny, too, was negotiating with Elizabeth in the hope of attracting English representatives;² and when the Sieur de Vieilleville, Governor of Metz, was sent through Germany on a diplomatic mission to Vienna, he spoke soft words on the subject of reunion to the Duke of Württemberg, the Elector Palatine, the Count of Neuberg and other Protestant princes, assuring them of the conciliatory disposition of the French Government.³

Fresh regulations were then issued which, though interpreted to complainants as the completion of the January amnesty, actually went a good deal further than this had done. By permitting private assemblies for any purpose whatsoever, the Government thus legalized by implication Calvinist worship if privately performed. Another clause put before exiles the choice either of a permanent return to France and submission to Catholicism, or a temporary return, if they were hardened in heresy, in order to dispose of their goods. And for the third time within twelve months the governors of prisons were ordered to release all those detained *pour le fait de la religion*.⁴ The storm of protest which greeted this measure was not able to impede it from being registered by the Parlement de Paris. The Queen

pp. 169 *et seq.*; Kugler, *Christoph Herzog zu Wirtemberg*, II, 290 *et seq.*; Heidenhain, *Unionspolitik Landgraf Philipps von Hessen*, pp. 291-300; Hauser, "Antoine de Bourbon et l'Allemagne" in the *Revue Historique*, XLV; Blanchet, *Recueil de lettres-missives adressées à Antoine de Bourbon*, pp. 123-5.

¹ See the account of Bedford's mission in February, in Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations*, pp. 80-4.

² For. Cal., Nos. 151, 180.

³ *Documentos inéditos*, xcVIII, 222. On Vieilleville's mission see the Abbé Marchant, *Le Maréchal François de Scépeaux de Vieilleville et ses mémoires* (1893), pp. 183-90. His instructions are printed by the Abbé as an Appendix on pp. 344-9. In these he is not charged specifically to broach religious subjects with the German princes to whom he is accredited—they were both Catholic and Protestant—but to the Emperor he is told to say that the French prelates and ambassadors are ready to start for Trent "sitost qu'il (le Roy) verra la chose enchemynée comme il désire".

⁴ *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 334. Cf. Isambert, XIV, 99-101; Isnard, I, Nos. 1612, 1613, 1615 and 1623.

felt strong enough to waive aside the representations of the Sorbonne, of the nuncio, of the Spanish ambassador, of the Parlement itself.¹ She also felt strong enough to brave the displeasure of the Triumvirate which, probably not so opposed to her conciliar policy,² was fiercely antagonistic to the idea of eventual toleration towards which the edict was an undisguised advance. Yet though the three-headed watch-dog showed its teeth and snarled on several occasions, it did not yet bite. Catherine thought to placate it by arranging for the King to be crowned at Reims, thus turning public attention away from the Huguenot question. But so great was the scarcity of ready money—"almost incredible" said the Venetian ambassador—that it was only with the greatest difficulty that enough could be collected to move the Court from Fontainebleau. And when the financial difficulties were at length surmounted, the King of Navarre took fright that he was being lured into the Guises' web at Reims for the purpose of being assassinated—whereupon the Châtillons raised similar objections of their own.³ The illusory nature of these suspicions being, however, at length satisfactorily demonstrated, the Court set out for Reims, where it arrived on May 13th and was honourably welcomed by the Cardinal of Lorraine.

III

It was a dismembered province and an uneasy archdiocese to which the Cardinal of Lorraine had retired in February. The province of Reims had been shorn by Paul IV, in 1559, of three of its sees, Arras, Cambrai and Tournay, which, with territory similarly taken from the province of Cologne, had gone to make up the new province of Malines.⁴ Both despoiled archbishops had made vain attempts to obtain from Pius IV the

¹ Romier, pp. 114-8.

² Guise had supported his brother's conciliar policy in 1560, but had not shared his extreme aversion to the Bull. Montmorency had entertained the lowest opinion of the whole business, regarding it, curiously enough, as a bribe held out to the Protestant electors to elect Maximilian as King of the Romans—Viterbo to St Charles, Sept. 17th, 1560.

³ Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, April 20th; Ven. Cal., No. 256; Layard, p. 24. Cf. Romier, pp. 130-4.

⁴ See Pirenne, *Histoire de la Belgique*, III, 411-14.

reversal of his predecessor's act,¹ but the giving of the hat to Granvelle, the first Archbishop of Malines, was soon followed by the final confirmation of the new province. The Cardinal of Lorraine felt the loss of his dioceses heavily. Three years later, when he was *persona gratissima* in Rome, he renewed his efforts to regain them,² and at his Provincial Council of 1564 he actually sent a summons to their bishops and registered a solemn protest against their transfer.³

The archdiocese of Reims had been administered for the Cardinal since the death of Henri II by Louis Guillard, who had been in turn Bishop of Tournay, Chartres, Chalon-sur-Saône and Senlis, and whose resignation now ended an episcopal career of forty-two years.⁴ The Champagne country controlled by the Guises was one of the parts of France less seriously infected with heresy. The Cardinal, while at Court, had kept strict watch over his diocesans and auxiliaries, and there had long been no organized community in Reims. But a Protestant community of about a thousand persons existed at Châlons-sur-Marne, where the bishop, Jérôme Bourgeois, a man of zeal and the Queen's confessor, but lacking both ability and personality, made some praiseworthy though ineffectual attempts to check its growth. The extraordinary activity of the Calvinist pastors was now having results everywhere, while the counter-attacks of Catholic propaganda were too few and as yet too feeble to produce much effect. Outrages to crucifixes and statues had lately occurred even in Reims itself.

The Cardinal of Lorraine applied himself at once to the reform of the clergy. The cathedral Chapter was lectured on the wickedness of the times, and exhorted to attend with greater regularity and devotion to the daily recitation of the Divine Office and the other cathedral services. New regulations were promulgated and approved on February 26th. The canons

¹ Weiss, *Papiers d'État de Granvelle*, v, 257; vi, 19, 46-8, 89-90, 291; Henry et Loricquet, pp. 3-5, 64-5; Ehses, pp. 189, 217; For. Cal., No. 245; Ribier, II, 805, 842; Paris, pp. 829, 835.

² Šusta, iv, 409; G. Constant, *Légation du Cardinal Morone*, p. 583.

³ Marlot, *Hist. Reims*, iv, 356, 695-7, 707-10.

⁴ Paris, p. 735; Marlot, p. 340.

were to attend the office and the Capitular Mass with reverence, and absenteeism was to be punished by a curtailment of salary. The chant was to be decently performed, the pauses made distinctly, the words clearly articulated. No attempt at descant was to be permitted, except in such places where the octave, the fifth, or even the third, might be inserted. The organ was not to be used except on greater feast-days, and then only in moderation. The Cardinal himself appeared in choir frequently and criticized the singing. A profession of faith was imposed upon the clergy under pain of enforced resignation, and the one canon who seemed inclined to send his in—Regnault Grossaine—yielded after a serious admonition, and on the direct order of the King.¹ The profession comprised belief in the Apostles' Creed, the Commandments, the Seven Sacraments, the sacrificial nature of the Mass as an offering for the living and the dead, the Substantial Presence in the Eucharist. Lutherans, Calvinists and Zwinglians were condemned by name.² Visitors visited six of the priories dependent on the abbey of St Remi-de-Reims, and their reports are still extant.³ Mischievous busybodies could no longer question the Cardinal's orthodoxy nor hint at disagreements with his chapter.

In Rome Lorraine's star was now in the ascendant. His opposition to the Bull of Convocation having been dropped, he was regarded as the most effective makeweight against the dangerous tendencies of the Regent's policy. He appears to have written personally to the Pope explaining the position in which the accession of Charles IX had placed him and exposing his views on the Council. So much at least can be gathered from Pius IV's reply, couched in the most amicable and laudatory terms. It praised the Cardinal for his pastoral zeal and for the fortitude with which he had borne his fall from power; it

¹ Cf. Henry, *La Réforme et la Ligue en Champagne*, p. 15. Grossaine was afterwards forced to resign—*ibid.* p. 38.

² Marlot, *Hist. Reims*, pp. 342, 693-4; also *Historia Met. Rem.* II, 812-13. Cf. Bouillé, II, 125.

³ G. Robert, "Visite des Prieurés de St Remi-de-Reims en 1560-1", in the *Revue de Champagne*, Jan.-April 1913. The priories were Rethel, Chagny and Senuc in the Ardennes, and St Thomas, Condes and La Chêne in the Marne region.

even thanked him for his advice on the conciliar question.¹ Nor was this all. The erstwhile "heretical" and "presumptuous" prelate was now honoured with an invitation to Rome. For the Pope believed that only in private conversation could he reach a satisfactory solution of all the difficulties raised by the Cardinal in regard to the Council. To Catherine and to the Duke of Guise he wrote that he desired the Cardinal's presence in Rome that he might witness and assist in the conciliar preparations. The Bishop of Viterbo was instructed to resume relations of intimacy with him as soon as he should return to Court.²

This scheme to bring the Cardinal over to the papal standpoint, foreshadowing as it did a later more important and very much more successful attempt in the summer of 1563, came to nothing. The prospect of a splendid reception in the Holy City left Lorraine unmoved. For the moment there were other matters that demanded his attention, and in view of the fluid and rapidly developing situation at home, he did not care to put himself out of touch with current events by leaving the country. During Lent he was the model bishop. Mounting the cathedral pulpit alternately with his theologian, Jacques du Prés, he held spellbound the audiences that flocked to hear him, while news of the phenomenon again flew round Europe. "The Cardinal is preaching at Reims with no small praise", wrote his enemy, Hubert Languet. "And would", he added spitefully, "that he had never done anything else!"³

With a different implication Claude d'Espence said much the same. He tells us that the Cardinal wrote to him of this Lent, entirely devoted to preaching, pastoral activity and spiritual reading, as one of the happiest periods of his life, one in which he had felt a sense of freedom such as he had rarely known.⁴

¹ Pius IV to the Cardinal of Lorraine, March 3rd. Text in Appendix VI.

² Šusta, I, 180; Sickel, p. 189; Ven. Cal., No. 261; St Charles to Viterbo, Feb. 18th—an extract in Ehses, p. 139 note 5.

³ Languet, Arcana II, 112, 116; C.R., *Op. Calv.* XVIII; *M.H.S.ŷ.*, *Lainii Monumenta*, v, 405, 477; Marlot, *op. cit.*, *ibid.*

⁴ "Mentior nisi eius quae in Evangelii ministerio est beatitudinis, quemdam velut gustum praesentiebas, cum novissima Quadragesima alternis cum ordinario Ecclesiasta concionans, et privatae lectioni horas reliquas impendens, scripto mihi persancte jurabas, nullam antea te majorem libertatem sensisse,

There is no reason to regard the self-revelation with scepticism. The Cardinal felt very strongly the call and the attraction of the priestly life, and d'Espence urged him to give up all else for it.¹ But this was a sacrifice he could never make. He was too deeply involved in secular affairs, too implicated in mundane ambitions, for the pursuit of spirituality to become a passion of overwhelming intensity. The religious life pure and simple could never be more than one strand in the multi-coloured rope of his varied existence.

Easter over, the Cardinal, whose health had been much restored of late, showed no intention of returning to Court, despite his earlier promises. He remained deaf to the pleadings of Chantonay and of the nuncios who implored him to come back and strengthen the opposition to the Government.² Surely this is unaccountable action on the part of one who has been described as the "Soul" of the Triumvirate—a most curious disconnection of soul from body! It would doubtless be absurd to maintain that the Cardinal felt no sympathy with the Triumvirate or that he was completely detached from it. But he was in no sense its inspiration or its genius—whether evil or benevolent. We must transfer to Cardinal Tournon the epithet of Hotman, and infuse a new soul into the old body; and it may be of comfort in some quarters that the soul will still be a Cardinal. Lorraine did not stand so whole-heartedly with the Triumvirate as did Tournon. He was later to pursue a policy by no means agreeable to its members. As ever, he appears an isolated figure, a free-lance disliking committal. Disliking it so much that he would give no public indication that he stood with the Triumvirate against Catherine de Médicis—much of whose policy, indeed, was but the continuation of his own—by coming to Court in deference to the appeals of the nuncios.³

nece ullam unquam aliam tibi vitam magis placuisse"—d'Espence, *In Priorem D. Pauli Apostoli ad Timotheum Epistolam Commentarii* (1561), epistle dedicatory to the Cardinal of Lorraine.

¹ d'Espence, *op. cit.*

² Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, May 11th.

³ Professor Šusta states that there is no trace of any independent negotiations between the Triumvirate and Philip II during the summer of 1561—*Römische Kurie*, I, 210. The letters which passed between Philip and its

On the Thursday in Easter Week, April 10th, he left Reims for Joinville. Before leaving, he addressed a tardy reply to Cardinal Morone's letter of January, and his rehabilitation with Rome enabled him to treat Morone's scoldings with a certain reproachful asperity. Preoccupation with the affairs of his see, he said, had precluded an earlier reply. But he was happy to be able to state that his personal exertions during Lent had completely eliminated all forms of scandal from his diocese. He flattered himself that in regard to the reform of the higher clergy he had given the kind of lead by which alone the serious attention of the secular power could be attracted and retained. As for the Bull of Convocation he protested that he had been the victim of calumny. No one could desire the General Council more than he did. The Government was arranging for the departure of bishops for the seat of the Council; he would spare himself no trouble or inconvenience in order to attend in person and had exhorted his suffragans to follow his example. An opportunity would then doubtless present itself of visiting the Pope; for the moment he could not see his way to doing so.¹ There was certainly an element of exaggeration in these statements. Lorraine cannot have been ignorant that opinion at Court was settling down strongly against the Council of Trent, and there is no proof that any bishops had been selected or told to hold themselves in readiness. The Cardinal was probably sitting on the fence. The trouble was that everyone else was doing so as well.

The Bishop of Fermo had made a visit to Reims with a papal brief inviting Queen Mary to send her Scotch bishops to Trent.² Mary had not been able to give a very encouraging reply. But her uncle was on the look-out to supply her with a new husband who would be powerful enough to undo the work of Cecil and Knox and re-establish the Catholic religion in Scotland.

members, and Philip and the Cardinal of Lorraine, have not the exaggerated significance sometimes ascribed to them, as for instance by Thompson, *Wars of Religion*, pp. 99-100.

¹ The Cardinal of Lorraine to Cardinal Morone, Reims, April 10th (Thursday in Easter Week)—Ehses, pp. 186-8. Cf. Šusta, I, 188.

² Ehses, pp. 173-4 and notes.

Immediately after Mary's widowhood, the Cardinal had suggested Don Carlos, son and heir to Philip of Spain. No alliance, he said to Chantonnay, could be more fitting or proper.¹ Catherine, however, had other views. She disliked Mary, and looked with horror upon the possibility of a Guise domination in Spain combined with the union of the Scotch and Spanish Crowns. She would seem to have placed at least this last point of view frankly before the Guises, exhorting them to prefer the interests of their country to the ambitions of their family.² And apparently not without success. For the Cardinal had next approached the Austrian envoy, Baron Polviller, with the proposal that Mary should be married to the Archduke Charles, the Emperor's grandson. He explained to Polviller that various reasons rendered her union with Charles IX impossible, and that Don Carlos was also out of the question, not only because he would not be able to reside permanently in Scotland, but also because the French for all their amity with the Spaniards could not but oppose for reasons of State the establishment of Spanish influence in Great Britain. The Emperor welcomed this proposal and laid down but two conditions—that Mary should be duly recognized and received as Queen in Scotland, and that she should remain Catholic. It was possible to reassure him on both points. His niece, said the Cardinal, would prefer abdication to apostasy; as for the first condition, the Scotch Parliament had sent Mary's half-brother, Lord James Stuart, to beg her to return, which she would consequently do in the summer.³

Two envoys had in fact come to Mary from Scotland. The first, Leslie, future Bishop of Ross, warned her against her half-brother and counselled her to arrest him on arrival. He

¹ Chantonnay's letters cited by Mignet, *Histoire de Marie Stuart*, I, 193-4.

² Mignet, I, 135, with references.

³ *Documentos inéditos*, xcvi, 220-1. It was rumoured—For. Cal., No. 113 (4)—that Vieilleville's mission to Vienna was connected with this matrimonial scheme. But his instructions contained, in the matrimonial line, only proposals for Charles IX (see Marchant, Appendix II). An Austrian marriage for Mary appealed to the Pope and to Cardinal Morone, who had visions of placing the pair upon the throne of a re-Catholicized England—see Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations*, pp. 121-2.

urged her to throw herself entirely into the hands of the Scotch Catholics who would rally round her if she landed at Aberdeen. But on the next day Mary met James at Joinville and welcomed him cordially. She was fond of her brother, despite his Protestantism and identification with the English party. So she put Leslie's warnings on one side and agreed to return to Scotland in the summer by way of Protestant Leith. Nevertheless, with her uncle, she made great efforts to convert James, even holding out the promise, it was said, of a cardinal's hat and the enjoyment of rich French benefices. But all he wanted was the Regency in Scotland until his sister's return. This she seems to have promised but not actually conferred, and James Stuart afterwards betrayed her confidences.¹

Towards the end of April the Cardinal of Lorraine went to Nancy, where the Duke and Duchess of Lorraine presided over a family reunion, after which he assembled the vassals of the Bishopric of Metz at Vic and took their homage.² Mary was at Nancy too, ill and unhappy, but the question of her marriage must have been discussed freely in the privacy of the family circle. Catherine de Médicis was convinced that secret negotiations were still afoot for the Spanish match,³ and though Philip II denied that this was so,⁴ and though it is certain that the hand of an Austrian archduke was in fact being solicited for Mary by the Cardinal, the Queen-Regent worked herself up into a state of considerable alarm and fuss. There are indications indeed that the plan had perhaps not yet been entirely laid aside,⁵ but historians have been on the whole far too quick to endorse Catherine's condemnation of the Cardinal for double-dealing.⁶ By May, however, she was convinced that she had

¹ For. Cal., 1561-2, Nos. 77 (6), 151 (22), 158 (2).

² Brantôme, I, 253; Ehses, p. 195.

³ La Ferrière, *Lettres*, I, 784, 787, 804, 818, 844, 855, 863, 872.

⁴ Weiss, *Papiers d'État*, VI, 255.

⁵ See Chantonay to Margaret of Parma, May 13th and 27th, cited by Šusta, I, 180.

⁶ Mignet, however, was non-committal. One of the latest biographers of Mary to approach this question—Mahon, *Mary Queen of Scots* (Cambridge 1924)—thinks that the trouble was caused by the misinterpretation of proposals which were being made in the Netherlands, not however by the Guises, to marry Mary to the Prince of Orange. See, for the widespread

outmanœuvred a design that had probably been long moribund; and Lorraine returning to Reims had left Mary safe at Joinville.

Mahomet had not gone to the mountain—and so the mountain came to Mahomet. On May 13th the Cardinal of Lorraine received the Court at Reims. Two days later he performed the Sacre of the last but one of the Valois, and more than the tired and tearful child, stupefied almost to the point of mummification by the long pageantry of the ritual, was the giant imperious Cardinal the central figure of the ceremony. "One of the finest things", exclaimed the Venetian ambassador, "was the manner in which the ceremonies of the consecration and unction were performed by the Cardinal of Lorraine."¹ And though we hear hints that the poverty of the Court cast an air of unavoidable shabbiness over the decorations, the tapestries and hangings in the cathedral nevertheless made an impression upon the Venetian.² In his harangue the Cardinal dwelt upon the virtues of the French monarchs and the traditional obedience of the French people to their sovereign and to their religion. He called upon Charles IX to show himself a worthy descendant of his great sires, to emulate their nobility and their piety, to keep their religion pure and unsullied and to preserve it from insult and degradation.³ Circumstances gave special weight to these traditional exhortations.

reports of the alleged Spanish negotiations, Kervyn de Lettenhofe, *Relations Politiques*, II, 605; Le Laboureur, I, 555; Spanish Calendar, p. 422. Late in April the Admiral surprised Throckmorton with the news that the match was as good as concluded, fraught with danger though it was to France—For. Cal., Nos. 151 (3), 152. But the unexplained monk with his strange papers, of whom the Bishop of Limoges wrote from Spain—La Ferrière, *Lettres*, as cited above—could not, on the bishop's own admission, be connected with certainty with any matrimonial negotiations.

¹ Ven. Cal., No. 261.

² Cf. Ven. Cal., No. 261, with For. Cal., Nos. 248 (7) and 225 (5).

³ *Harangue faite par le Cardinal de Lorraine au roy Charles IX à son Sacre à Reims* (Lyon 1561). Copies in Bib. du Mans, MS. 13, ff. 40-3 (eighteenth century), and Bib. de Tours, MS. 1061, ff. 106-10: a bound copy once belonging to the Abbey of Marmoutier.

CHAPTER VIII

Eirenicon

*Quand on veut s'assurer de l'identité d'un individu,
on ne songe pas à le faire rentrer dans son berceau.*
—Loisy, *L'Évangile et l'Église.*

I

TO misjudge the position of an important turning-point may be as disastrous to the advance of historical understanding as to more physical forms of progression. The beginning of Catherine de Médicis' regency is not the important turning-point in French history that it is often supposed to have been. The ecclesiastical policy of the Regent shows in its main lines little or no departure from what has gone before; there has been no violent break of continuity, no replacement of a blindly reactionary Cardinal by a liberal but hitherto repressed Queen and Chancellor. The Queen's growing dislike of the Cardinal of Lorraine rested more on personal antipathy than on opposition to his public policy. Of this, indeed, she was largely an imitator. From him she had taken the idea of the National Council, becoming at last, from a sceptical critic, the most fervent of converts. From him, too, she had learnt to oppose Rome, and to seek a national solution of the religious problem on the widest lines of Gallican autonomy compatible with a theoretical recognition both of the papal supremacy and of the eventual claims of a General Council. In the matter of the États-Généraux and the Bull of Convocation she had followed his guidance. He had been the master and had pointed the way; and the real turning-point is not the December of 1560 but the previous March, when the Guises had taken the first steps towards a new policy in regard to the Huguenots and had started on its long career the idea of the National Council.

But Catherine and the Chancellor were not merely imitative pupils. They added of their own initiative the one important

element that was required to transform the ideas of the Cardinal of Lorraine into the ideas of those who were later known as the *Politiques*. In 1560 the Cardinal had sought to draw a new line of distinction between political offences and religious misbelief: he had punished for rebellion—*le fait politique*, but had offered a pardon and had publicly advocated leniency in regard to simple misbelief—*le fait de la religion*. Nevertheless he had never contemplated the possibility of legalizing Huguenot worship, of tolerating two religious cults in one state. Catherine and de l'Hôpital, on the other hand, had germinating in their minds the notion that this avowedly undesirable solution might, until Christian reunion were effected by a Council, be the only course of action compatible with hard circumstances. It was on this issue that they were to break away from the Cardinal. And it is because they were ready to carry to its logical conclusion the separation of citizenship from orthodoxy, that they are the true parents of the *Politiques*, while Lorraine is only their unnatural and unintentional step-father.

Since the failure of the Council of Trent to open at Easter, Catherine had been quietly laying her plans for a National Council in the summer, to be composed of a mixed assortment of laymen and ecclesiastics and to be accompanied by a religious colloquy. Such a course committed her to the theory that the secular power might, without legitimately incurring the charge of schismatic behaviour, summon a mixed National Assembly to settle religious problems on a national footing at the very moment when the Pope was calling the Catholic bishops of the world to an Œcumenical Council. Before the issue of the Bull of Convocation it had been possible to interpret the National Council simply as an alternative to the General Council; but now, in the spring of 1561, the General Council was actually summoned and the plea of *faute de mieux* could no longer be invoked to justify what was in reality a claim to reject, or at least ignore, an Œcumenical Council not summoned according to French prescription.

In practice, great care was taken to veil the sharp angles of this highly debatable position. Catherine acted on sheer ex-

pediency, and if the underlying implications were sometimes awkward she was content to let them lie concealed, trusting to her own powers of prevarication to keep them in hiding. But, as she was well aware, the political Gallicanism of the day could be invoked in her support, and during the summer of 1561 a Gallican treatise was circulated which seems to have been written specifically for the purpose of justifying the Government's action. It was entitled *De la puissance et autorité des rois, et de par qui doyvent estre commandez les Diettes ou Conciles solennels de l'Église*,¹ and its author was Claude Gouste, Prévôt of Sens. The book, originally done in Latin, was translated into the vulgar tongue, a sure sign that it was intended not as an academic essay but as fodder for a wide public.

Its main object was to establish the divine right of the King to summon councils of bishops, to associate lay dignitaries with them, and to give effect to their ordinances touching things both spiritual and temporal. With the usual Gallican horror of canon law and all forms of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, it asserted the supreme power of the monarch over all persons and causes: "La surintendente charge de l'Église et du Royaume appartient au Roy par l'ordonnance de Dieu: et par consequent il est, après Dieu, le gouverneur général des Églises".¹ This position is bolstered up by a shower of alleged proofs and precedents, adduced pell-mell without arrangement or order, proportion or suitability—indeed without the smallest sign of critical sense of evidential value. The Pope, damned with faint regard as "head of the Church and chief bishop", becomes a wooden figurehead on the ship of State. In no way is Gouste among the more convincing of Gallican writers, but, the weakness of his argument apart, it must be confessed that much of it is also beside the point. For the point at issue during 1561 was not whether the royal power might not freely co-operate with the Church under normal circumstances in managing the Church's affairs, which was all that Gouste's precedents could possibly prove, but whether the Gallican "Royal Supremacy" entailed a right to direct such affairs in specific opposition to the requirements

¹ Paris, 1561.

of Rome, and at a moment, moreover, when the Pope was putting forward a scheme of international action which made independent local action seem to border on the schismatical. The fundamental question of the hour concerned the claims of the Pope in regard to a General Council; whether or no these did not in certain circumstances, and for reasons exclusively spiritual, override even the loftiest of Gallican privileges. Gouste does not face this question squarely because he does not properly face the Papacy. His book, with its cumbersome collection of precedents, is mere antiquarianism. Sweep away, if you will, the whole system of canon law and Church courts: you will not have abolished the Papal Supremacy and its implications. The Papacy existed: it had its modest place even in Gouste's scheme of things. He should have faced its implications in current affairs, in the question of the General Council—but he failed to do so. Perhaps he dared not. It was indeed a case where fear would have been more comprehensible than blindness.

In one of his subdivisions Gouste specifically promises to answer the question: "Qu'est-ce que nous (à sçavoir, le Clergé et le Peuple) avons à faire en ceste Assemblée et Colloque, qui de bref se doit faire?" But even the most easily satisfied of readers could hardly feel that he had received equitable treatment when he is complacently assured at the end that all his enquiries have been answered. Gouste is so eager to justify his Assembly that he seems to lose sight of its functions. Here is a most significant dislocation between his book and the situation which it was intended to illuminate. For Catherine and de l'Hôpital intended to stage a colloquy with the heretics, with the avowed object of arriving at a basis of doctrinal reconciliation; but Gouste does not point to a single example of such intrusion in doctrinal affairs being made by secular authority—a diatribe against the introduction of auricular confession is his nearest approach!—nor does he face directly the question whether the secular power may legitimately direct the discussion of purely doctrinal matters and afterwards enforce on its own authority, even as an interim, any accommodation that may

be made. It had been precisely because they were promoted by the secular power and thus vitiated at the outset by begging, in a sense, one of the fundamental questions of the whole Reformation, that the German reunion schemes of the 'thirties and 'forties, to which these French events of 1561 form a later parallel, had been looked upon askance by stricter churchmen. Paul III had only consented at the last moment to accredit Contarini to Ratisbon because it might have been even more unfortunate to have sent no one at all. And Pius IV, in sending Cardinal Tournon to France with power far less ample than Contarini's, had been actuated by similar motives. The parallel between the earlier reunionist movements in Germany and the evolution of ideas in France which led up to the Council and Colloquy of Poissy is one that, allowing for the difference in political conditions, is profoundly instructive. When religious dissent has triumphed over persecution and has become a tool for political ambitions—for Condé was to the French King what the Lutheran princes were to the Emperor—then we find the sixteenth-century state entering of necessity upon the thorny path of religious eirenics and looking around for liberal theologians to pacify the warring creeds. The German efforts associated with such names as Pflug and Nausea, Witzel and Melchior von Ossa—all deriving their theoretic inspiration from Erasmus, and their immediate impulse from lay potentates like William of Cleves, George of Saxony, Joachim of Brandenburg, not to mention the Emperor Charles himself and his brother and successor, Ferdinand¹—all these form a background to the earlier sessions of the Council of Trent analogous to that supplied by the French to its last period. The origins and aims of the movements were cognate,² and their progresses ring with the same battle-cries and the same catchwords—"National Council"—"Formulae of Reconciliation"—"A free General Council". Circumstances, however, gave to the French movement even smaller chances of success than those enjoyed by its

¹ Pastor, *Die kirchlichen Reunionsbestrebungen während die Regierung Karls V* (1879).

² Montluc, for one, definitely defended Catherine's policy by a reference to that of Charles V—see his *Apologie contre certaines calomnies* (1562).

forerunner. The rock of Calvinist theology and organization presented to eirenic endeavour a problem very different from the shifting sands and unco-ordinated being of Lutheranism. The theological emphasis had passed from Justification to the Holy Eucharist; nor did such great names arise to guide what was in all respects a less powerful movement.

It was not until the seventeenth century that the new political *gallicanisme du roi* began to be adopted to any large extent by the French clergy.¹ Its doctrines were not, as we have seen, those of the Cardinal of Lorraine, who now intervened to modify Catherine's plans, though this course certainly entailed a renunciation of the very policy which he himself had pursued in the previous year. Perhaps the erastian implications of the mixed National Council had become more evident to him since he had become a mere onlooker, and since the management of affairs had passed into lay and female hands.² At any rate he now persuaded the Queen-Mother, during the Court's short sojourn on the Guise estates after the Sacre, to separate the hybrid National Council into its two component parts. At his instance, and against the wishes of de l'Hôpital, the Queen decided to summon two assemblies in the autumn, one exclusively ecclesiastical, to deal with the spiritual and doctrinal issues, the other purely lay, consisting of a joint session of the Parlement de Paris and *Conseil Privé*, reinforced by delegates from the provincial Parlements, to offer advice upon the legal and administrative aspects of affairs.³ This programme would enjoy the additional advantage of diminishing the prestige of the États-Généraux when they should re-assemble, thus making it more difficult for them to develop their attack upon Catherine's regency. But more important still, it would safeguard the independence of the Church and the independent expression of clerical opinion, which was on the whole strongly conservative.

Without the help of the Cardinal's influence in clerical circles, Catherine could hardly have hoped to bring her plans to

¹ See V. Martin, *L'Adoption du gallicanisme politique par le clergé français* (Bib. de l'institut de droit canonique de l'université de Strasbourg, v, iii, 1929).

² Cf. above, p. 105; also pp. 127-8.

³ La Place, *Commentaires*, pp. 127-8; Paris, p. 865.

fruition. But if he now lent her his oar it was to propel a vessel that he himself had originally launched and whose course he himself had just materially deflected. Even the Colloquy was an idea of his own original mooting. To assume airily that it was no more than a love of show and the expectation of cutting a sensational figure in controversy that moved him to support Catherine, or to assert that his support was no more than a facile self-adaptation to preserve the goodwill of those in power, would be a singularly shallow judgment. For such goodwill the Cardinal cared little; and had it been merely a case of personal reputation or aggrandizement, would it not have been infinitely more advantageous to have thrown his weight upon the side of the papal representatives, of the Parlement de Paris, of the vast majority of French ecclesiastics, of the citizens of Paris organized into protest by their bishop, of the Sorbonne itself, which indignantly refused an invitation to send delegates to the Colloquy, laying it down that Trent was the right place for doctrinal discussions though in point of fact there was nothing to discuss, the points at issue having all been decided irrevocably by the decrees of General Councils which could be neither rescinded nor questioned?¹ The Cardinal chose to run the gauntlet of this formidable array of critics, and for a course of action which, though admittedly full of obvious openings for display of all kinds, was only too likely to end in failure and rebuff, with their inevitable companions, loss of credit and lowered prestige.

It would have been the act of a peculiarly foolish man to have chosen out of sheer caprice so hazardous a road to the gratification of personal vanity. We cannot refuse the Cardinal the honour of deeper motives; and they are easily to be found. He supported the Colloquy because he genuinely believed that by means of those exceptionally effective powers of persuasion and oratory with which Heaven had endowed him, he could force upon others, from Scripture and the records of the early Church alone, the proof of the essential positions of Catholicism. To this task he could bring that old delight in delimiting the

¹ Féret, *La faculté de théologie de Paris, Époque moderne*, 1, 232-3.

frontiers of dogma and opinion which had characterized his student days¹ and which it was soon to be apparent had never left him; though he might seem at times hazy as to where exactly the line was to be drawn, or even not quite honest in drawing it. On the crest of his wave of confidence he offered to convert the Duchess of Ferrara by the Scriptures alone.² And he persuaded Catherine of his ability to overcome and reduce the Calvinist champions by texts from the only period which they would accept as compelling or decisive—the first five hundred years of Christianity. It is certain that his ambitious assurances reconciled to the prospect of the Colloquy many who might otherwise have stood out against it.³

Catherine and the Cardinal were thus in alliance. A small body of influential opinion, forming the nucleus of a kind of middle party, supported them. Among laymen there were prominent, besides de l'Hôpital, the Sieur du Mortier and Paul de Foix, later to be Cardinal Archbishop of Toulouse. A few ecclesiastics were in active sympathy. Of the speakers of Fontainebleau Marillac was dead, but Montluc, as his Lenten sermons had shown, realized to the full all the advantages of a liberal attitude. Diplomatist rather than theologian, he may not perhaps have seen the implications of all that he proposed, or even realized that there were any implications. He claimed to have reconciled about 40,000 persons to the Church and to have prevented the secession of many others by permitting lay communion under both kinds in his diocese.⁴ While on embassy in England he had disturbed the Spanish ambassador by his friendship with Cecil,⁵ and he may well have admired the Elizabethan settlement. But though heavily suspected and later cited to Rome, he never left the Catholic Church. Cardinal Châtillon, on the other hand, may perhaps have felt more deeply—certainly he talked less—and he lies buried in Canter-

¹ Cf. above, p. 4.

² *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xviii, 508.

³ *Apologie contre certaines calomnies* (1562).

⁴ *Cassandri Omnia Opera*, p. 1132.

⁵ *Spanish Calendar*, 1, 175. "Perhaps I am too suspicious," de Quadra goes on, "but with these people it is always wisest to think the worst."

bury Cathedral. He was a strong supporter of the Colloquy and may even have hoped for personal enlightenment from it. Cardinal Armagnac seems to have wavered, being classed by some with the middle party¹ and by others not.² Statesmen bishops like Morvilliers of Orleans and others such as Troyes and Uzès, who afterwards either apostatized or were cited to Rome, may safely be classed among the Colloquy's advocates.

Among the professional theologians who were picked out to serve the Government, Claude d'Espence, Jean de Salignac and Jean Bouteiller must be mentioned. D'Espence was a lifelong enemy of persecution and had had to live down at least one condemnation and retraction; but he had held firmly—an engaging and admirable character—to his own ideals, and though he had engaged in secret conversations with Bucer and Calvin he was thoroughly loyal to the Church. His hour, the hour of counsels of moderation and lenience, of sane discussion and reasonably conducted argument, seemed to have again struck, and throughout the Colloquy his outlook was similar to, though not identical with, that of his patron the Cardinal of Lorraine.³ Salignac was a very different sort of person, unrestrained and outspoken where d'Espence was deliberately moderate and unprovocative. He came of a noble Périgord family and his talents as a linguist and especially as a hebraist were praised by no less an authority than Scaliger. In 1561 he was professor of theology at the Collège de Marmoutier, but his Calvinistic leanings had a long history behind them and some time later he yielded to the persuasions of Calvin and passed out of the Church, not a very clear-cut figure.⁴ Bouteiller, however, is even dimmer. A native of Caen, he was Châtillon's vicar-general for the archdiocese of Beauvais. But beyond this and

¹ E.g. by Baudouin, *Cassandri Omnia Opera*, p. 1131, and by the nuncio, who spoke of him as "very weak"—Šusta, I, 242.

² Ven. Cal., No. 280.

³ On d'Espence see my "Claude d'Espence et son Discours du Colloque de Poissy", in the *Revue Historique*, mai-juin 1930, with the authorities there cited.

⁴ On de Salignac see La Haag, *La France Protestante*, IX, 113-14; *Bibliothèque de la Croix et de du Verdier* (1772), I, 587; Féret, I, 340.

the fact that at Poissy he played Castor to de Salignac's Pollux he remains almost completely unknown.¹

II

Chance was to forge a personal link, slender indeed and ultimately ineffective but none the less real, between the French reunion movement and its German counterpart. The Low Countries are the cockpit of Europe: they are also—in happy compensation—the motherland of a remarkable succession of distinguished men who have placed the reunion of Christendom by pacific means among the main objects of their life. The name of François Baudouin will flit vaguely through these pages, leaving indeed but little permanent mark upon events, but it has its modest niche in the gallery which stretches from Erasmus to Cardinal Mercier. About the same age as the Cardinal of Lorraine, Baudouin was a native of Arras, then part of the Spanish Netherlands. He had been an early convert to the Calvinist *Réforme* and for a time had enjoyed at Geneva the intimate friendship of Calvin himself. But youthful vacillations and an outward conformity first to Catholicism and subsequently to Lutheranism at Bourges and Heidelberg, where he held successively the professorships of Civil Law, indicated clearly that he did not approach the ethics of conformity in any severe spirit. Though a student of law there was little that was legalist in his religious ideas, and his commonsense *modus vivendi*, though condemned by Calvin, was a convenience adopted by many laymen of the day and one which did not always spring from any real scepticism on the question of relative confessional values. Neither at Bourges nor at Heidelberg had Baudouin formally renounced Calvinism. But as he grew older the always unexpected broad-mindedness of middle

¹ Napoléon Peyrat, in his monograph *Le Colloque de Poissy* (1868), spoke of Bouteiller as *aïeul de Rancé*, but I do not know on what authority. He must not be confused—as Hilarion de Coste confused him (*Vie de François Le Picard*, 1658, pp. 347-9)—with Louis Boutiglier, a Calvinist minister killed by the mob after celebrating *à la mode de Genève* in Beauvais Cathedral with Cardinal Châtillon's approbation on Easter Sunday 1561. But they may well have been relatives.

age began to encroach more and more upon the vestiges of youthful intransigence. There was, in consequence, a marked cooling-off with Calvin.

Baudouin, also, was not a professional religious—though his early acceptance of exile and destitution in order to follow his conscience is proof enough of real religious feeling. By profession he was a civil lawyer who had gained a certain amount of distinction. Fame he first achieved by a book on Constantine,¹ the publication of which in 1556, when he was thirty-two, also marked the starting point of a fresh religious evolution which ultimately was to bring him back into the Catholic Church. The study entailed by the book opened the author's eyes to the real character of the early Church and gave him the beginnings of a proper valuation of continuity and tradition in ecclesiastical affairs. His excursion into Church history brought him the acquaintance of an eclectic circle of persons prominent in the German religious world—Melanchthon, Witzel, Omphalius, Vergerius the apostate nuncio, and several of the Magdeburg Centuriators. But most of all he fell under the influence of his own countryman, George Cassander. Cassander, though a Belgian, may be called the leader of the second generation of German eirenic writers. He resided normally at Cologne and had been employed on conciliatory missions by Frederick Weid, the famous Archbishop of Cologne, and by the Emperor Ferdinand when King of the Romans. He had disciples of all nationalities—the Portuguese Ximenes, the Frisian Joachim Hopper, the German Bærsius whose opposition to the Lutheran tendencies of Conrad of Heresbach had been decisive in preserving Catholicism in the duchy of Cleves. Cassander's minimizing works were widely read in the Low Countries where many of the nobles—including the Prince of Orange—and many of the higher clergy and educated laity professed themselves his supporters, some no doubt in order to justify their own indifference, others from serious adhesion to his teachings. Occasional

¹ *Constantinus Magnus sive de Constantini Imperatoris legibus ecclesiasticis atque civilibus commentariorum libri duo* (Bâle 1556). Later edition by Joachim Cluten, Strassburg 1612. The book figured on the Tridentine Index.

friction with the University of Louvain did not materially affect his reputation or following, though some of his disciples, notably the theologians Torrentius and Vendovilius, later gave up the struggle and threw in their lot with the militant Counter-Reform, the former becoming first Bishop of Antwerp.

Cassander's ideal of a wide yet moderate reform on traditional lines, and with the early Church of the first five or six Christian centuries as a model, made a strong appeal to Baudouin's new historical perspective. But it was Cassander's aim to escape doctrinal disagreement by a return to a simpler and more primitive liturgy. The complete example of the attractive but ineffectual liberal professor, he made ritualistic proposals interesting enough to antiquarians but completely academic and sterile in face of the seething and shouting controversies of the day. Nevertheless Cassander definitely turned Baudouin's mind back into religious channels, guided its progress through their mazes, enriched his stock of Church history and developed his sense of tradition and continuity. Together they attended the Colloquy of Worms in 1557; and in the following year when Baudouin represented Henry-Otto, the Elector-Palatine, at the Assembly of Frankfort, he kept in close touch with Cassander.¹ He was also in communication with Anthony of Navarre, who, having just started his connection with the Calvinists, wrote that the time was ripe for the introduction of moderate counsels into France. Baudouin replied that Cassander was Anthony's man, and henceforth followed French events closely. In the spring of 1561 the situation seemed so full of interest and so pregnant with opportunities for the propagation of Cassandrian ideas that Baudouin decided to make a personal inspection of the ground. Having first obtained leave of absence from the new Elector-Palatine Frederick, surnamed the Pious, with

¹ On Cassander see Fritzen, *De Cassandri ejusque sociorum studiis eireniciis* (1865); Birck, *Georg Cassanders Ideen über die Wiedervereinigung der Christlichen Confessionen in Deutschland* (1876). His *Omnia Opera* (Paris 1616) contains many of his letters. Others are in Heinsius, *Illustrium et Clarorum Virorum Epistolae selectiores* (1617). For the extent of his influence in Belgium see Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, III, 407, 409, 433, 451 (with further references).

whom he felt a little out of sympathy, Baudouin made his way into France. He still professed himself a Calvinist and supported Calvin in a eucharistic controversy with the Lutheran Heshusius; but Calvin was more than ever inclined to disown him and would soon break out into furious invective.¹

Baudouin found the French Court near Reims late in May. Through the agency of Paul de Foix he obtained an interview with the King of Navarre, with whom he discussed the religious situation, recalling their correspondence of three years previously. Anthony's own religious position was by now hopelessly dissolved in a solution of politics, and yet he was as far as ever from the attainment of his political ends. In correspondence with the German Protestant princes he had discussed the Council of Trent, which he had been urged to reject by the Elector Frederick, Baudouin's patron.² He had given very exaggerated accounts both of the decline of the Church of Rome in France and of his own prestige as a Protestant champion, and he had encouraged the princes in their scheme of sending a combined embassy to Catherine. This scheme, however, had broken down over the religious issue and Anthony had not benefited much from his efforts. What he wanted was assistance in making a new attempt on the Regency or else in putting himself in a better bargaining position in regard to his claims on Spanish Navarre: what he received was excellent advice against the employment of violence for spiritual ends—his regency having

¹ On Baudouin see Heveling, *De Francisco Balduino* (1871); Wicquot, "François Baudouin", in the *Mémoires de la Société Royale d'Arras*, 2e série, t. xx and xxi; and J. Duquesne, "François Baudouin et la Réforme", a paper read before the Académie Delphinale in May 1914 and published in the *Bulletin* of the Académie for 1917, pp. 55-108. Duquesne defends Baudouin from the charge of scepticism brought against him by most Calvinist writers, e.g. by Doumergue in his works on Calvin. He maintains, and I think successfully, that throughout his Bourges and Heidelberg periods Baudouin remained a Calvinist at heart, his outward conformity to other faiths being a matter of form and one widely practised at the time. He traces the steps of his return to the Church in 1561-3, but adds that to the end he was out of sympathy with the militant ideas which dominated the Counter-Reform. For a modern Calvinist attack on Baudouin see the scathing references in M. Viénot's *La Réforme en France* (1926).

² Blanchet, *Recueil de lettres-missives adressées à Antoine de Bourbon*, pp. 123-5.

been thus represented—and, from the Duke of Württemberg, direct instructions in the Lutheran faith with the offer of Lutheran missionaries.¹ He wanted none of these: he wanted Spanish Navarre; and he began to see that failing Protestant support it might repay him not to alienate the Catholics too far. Already his envoys were dancing attendance on the Pope and on the King of Spain,² and to assist their prospects Anthony now began to show surprising regularity in attendance at Mass, while the devotion with which he had performed his Easter duties had excited the unfavourable comment of non-Catholics. But if it would have embarrassed him to give an acceptable account of his dealings with the Lutheran princes to the papal nuncio or the Spanish ambassador, it actually demanded almost greater ingenuity to explain to English and German friends why his envoy in Rome had made so laudatory and submissive a speech to the Holy Father, or indeed why he was there at all.³ The religious split, in short, affected his political aspirations in a peculiarly aggravating way; so that Baudouin's exposition of Cassandrian ideals, with their facile promise of a quick return in the shape of reunion all round, made an instant appeal. It was Pentecost, and Anthony may well have indulged the fantastic blasphemy that his guest's enthusiastic discourse on reconciliation came as some new descent of the Holy Ghost. He overwhelmed him with flattery and bade him go on to Paris, there to await the arrival of the Court.⁴ He then wrote to the Elector-Palatine asking for an extension of Baudouin's leave.⁵

The Court returned to the capital in the last week of May,

¹ Kugler, *Christoph Herzog zu Württemberg*, II, 287–304; Heidenhain, p. 365; H. Hauser, "Antoine de Bourbon et l'Allemagne, 1560–1", in *Revue Historique*, t. 45.

² A detailed account of Anthony's unsuccessful negotiations with Philip during the earlier part of 1561 in de Ruble, *Antoine de Bourbon*, III, cap. v. He was also in touch with the Emperor's eldest son, Maximilian, through Vieilleville, the Governor of Metz. Sienna and Sardinia were among the substitutions for Spanish Navarre proposed about this time.

³ See For. Cal., No. 194.

⁴ See the accounts of this interview in *Cassandri Omnia Opera*, pp. 1161–2, and the *Responsio ad Calvinum et Bezam pro Francisco Balduino Jurisconsulto* (1564), pp. 91–2.

⁵ Kluckhohn, *Briefe Friedrich des Frommen*, I, 190.

leaving the Cardinal of Lorraine at Reims. Catherine then received Baudouin, immediately convinced herself of his utility and determined that he should meet the Cardinal. Accordingly he was presented as soon as the Cardinal was back in Paris early in June.¹ Their interview was crowned with success, but Baudouin certainly received a greater impression than he gave, and immediately succumbed to the Cardinal's personality. Lorraine talked animatedly for over an hour on the necessity of returning to the practices of the primitive Church as a preliminary step towards reunion, declaring that on such lines alone lay any hope for the future of Christian unity. Baudouin was immensely pleased. His account of the interview—written, indeed, a year later and as part of a polemic against Calvin—brims over with enthusiasm.

I affirm before God that the conversation was more religious than any I ever had with you [that is Calvin]. Would that I were able now to expound and include in this book for the everlasting memory of posterity all its particular heads, which, for fear of forgetting, I that day set down in writing and repeated to several men of piety. . . . Our conversation was not dissimilar from that which I hear the Cardinal had lately in Germany with Brentius and his most illustrious prince.²

The notes to which Baudouin here refers—unfortunately they are not preserved—he communicated to the King of Navarre and to Cassander.³

But the self-accredited ambassador of Cassandrianism was taken both by the nuncio⁴ and by the Huguenots as an inspired missionary of Lutheranism. Calvin, Chandieu and others believed that he had an official mission to urge the adoption of

¹ In letters to the Bishop of Verdun and to the Chapter of Paris dated June 5th and June 3rd respectively (*Petite Bibliothèque Verdunoise*, II, 123-5 and *Mémoires de Condé*, I, 38-9) the Cardinal states his intention of leaving for Paris on the 6th. He had certainly arrived by the 10th (Layard, pp. 26-7). The *Petite Bibliothèque Verdunoise*, II, 125-6, also publishes another letter from Reims dated June 15th, but this date must certainly be erroneous.

² This refers to the famous Conference at Saverne in February 1562, for which see below, chap. xii.

³ For this interview see Baudouin's *Francisci Balduini Responsio alter ad Joannem Calvinum* (1562), pp. 53-4; the *Responsio ad Calvinum et Bezam pro Francisco Balduino*, pp. 91-2; and *Cassandri Omnia Opera*, pp. 1131, 1161-2.

⁴ Šusta, I, 209.

the Augsburg Confession, and from Geneva there went forth virulent letters against the alleged apostate who had made himself the champion of a hostile creed.¹ Colour was lent to these assertions by the fact that the Augsburg Confession was being freely circulated in view of the approaching Colloquy; liturgical and doctrinal works of all kinds were being collected, and the selected theologians were being allowed to purchase and peruse prohibited books with impunity.² The English envoys, Smith and Weston, together with the ambassador Throckmorton, heard rumours that even the Cardinal of Lorraine might show favour to the Augsburg Confession, and sent home hurried appeals for a French or Latin translation of the English Prayer-Book, suggesting that it might be accompanied by a delegation of divines learned in the ancient tongues and early fathers.³ Baudouin himself, though he made no secret of his preference for Calvinism over the other reformed religions,⁴ probably did much to give form and clarity to the vague ideas of the middle party. Gradually these ideas took on definite shape; and though no formally tabulated or detailed scheme existed, a fairly clear impression can be gained of the kind of reforms and concessions by means of which it was hoped both to reconcile the lapsed and to guard against a recurrence of their lapsing. Baudouin had pressed Cassander to come in person to France; but the master was now firmly established in his rôle of armchair theologian, and constant ill-health was an extra deterrent against activity far from home: by letter, however, he reiterated that the main endeavour should be the compilation of a more primitive and universally acceptable liturgy for the Mass.⁵ This consequently became the chief aim of the

¹ *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xviii, 569-70; Languet, II, 114; La Place, p. 296. Cf. Duquesne, pp. 64-5.

² Šusta, I, 242; Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, p. 205 and notes.

³ *For. Cal.*, Nos. 218, 265 (4), 269 (1).

⁴ Report of a conversation between Catherine and Baudouin published from the Staatsarchiv of Stuttgart by Kluckhohn, p. 189 note 1; and later in a French translation in the *B.S.H.P.F.* xxiv. Its authenticity is defended by Duquesne, pp. 95-6, against authors with whose thesis that Baudouin had gone over to Lutheranism it conflicts.

⁵ *Cassandri Omnia Opera*, pp. 1123-5.

reunionists. They desired the liturgical use of the vulgar tongue, the administration of Holy Communion to the laity under both kinds, the removal of images from churches, and the simplification of baptismal ceremonies. They sought to reduce the numbers of the friars and secular clergy, to apportion no more than two or three priests to each church, to abolish private Masses and to legalize clerical marriage. There seems to have been a feeling in favour of recognizing the papal primacy to be only *de jure humano*, with limited and carefully defined powers, powers not to bind or loose, dispense or exempt, but simply to admonish, advise or remind—a kind of “constitutional” Pope with the functions of a moderator or a chairman rather than of a universal pastor.¹

These proposals were never a formal programme. They were rather ideas proceeding from a certain state of mind. Their weakness lay in the fact that whatever recommendations some of them may possibly have been considered to possess regarded simply as proposals for interior reorganization, or even as precautionary measures against apostasy on an even larger scale than hitherto, as steps towards the reconciliation of the Calvinists they were entirely useless. It was quixotic in the extreme to suppose that the peaceful absorption of the Calvinist *Réforme* into the body of the Catholic Church could be brought about by a forced and artificial return to the exterior forms of earlier centuries, or by the wholesale jettisoning of all that a few liberal, non-representative clergy and laymen considered as not vital to the essence of the Church's life and being. Such a policy necessarily ignored the root questions. Indeed the whole Cassandrian scheme was a short-sighted attempt to cover these up. The reunionists were impressed by the more obvious characteristics of the Calvinist reform, its polemic against ceremonial in general, and in particular against eucharistic processions and the perhaps occasionally overdone cultus of images. But to suppose that the most drastic reforms on these matters would meet the whole problem was the merest scratching on the surface. Reforms that a Briçonnet or a Lefèvre might have

¹ See Desjardins, *Négociations avec la Toscane*, III, 464-5.

welcomed had no appeal to make to a Beza or a Chandieu. Calvinists were not to be appeased by a "constitutional" Papacy and a teaching Church which agreed not to teach too much—they wanted Calvin with his organization and his dogmas. They were not to be fobbed off with an eighth-century liturgy translated into the vernacular and celebrated weekly in a bare, imageless church by a sparse, married, but sacrificing priesthood—they wanted the Calvinist *Cène*, with Calvinist ministers, and plenty of them. Bare intercommunion can never be either a substitute for unity of faith or an advance towards it; and contemporary doctrinal differences, which are the results of past theological speculation, can be neither resolved nor relegated by the simple yet impossible process of putting back the hands of the liturgical clock.

The Cardinal of Lorraine, for his part, believed that the Cassandrian scheme of liturgical reform could only be put to eirenic use if it reposed upon a previous dogmatic agreement on the question of the Real Presence. But Catherine aimed simply at a restoration of the happy state of general intercommunion, with little or no thought for the underlying doctrinal position. She drifted rudderless upon the theological ocean, unable, it seems, to grasp the most elementary distinctions necessary for an intelligent approach to any kind of safe harbour. Dogma and Ritual, Divine Law and Ecclesiastical Obligation—it was all one to her¹; and on being told by Lorraine that the withholding of the Chalice from the laity was not of Divine ordinance, she was unable to comprehend why she should not immediately drink of it herself.² The dangers involved in such an attitude of uninformed complacency on the part of the head of the State need not be stressed. Catherine's muddleheadedness was deliberately exploited by the Huguenot ladies of her entourage who hoped that she would one day commit herself beyond the possibility of withdrawal.³ Rome had not overestimated the force of the petticoat influence at the

¹ See the statement of the Venetian ambassador in Ven. Cal., No. 280.

² Šusta, I, 230.

³ Le Laboureur, *Mémoires de M. de Castelnau*, I, 723.

disposal of the Reformers.¹ But its removal had been not a matter of practical politics, and like Victoria after her Catherine had clung to her ladies.

Baudouin's part in encouraging and supplementing the ideas of the middle party did not go unacknowledged. Montluc attempted to procure for him a professorship at Valence University, but was frustrated by Beza who put forward Hotman's candidature in rivalry.² In the meanwhile Baudouin improved the occasion by delivering a course of lectures on the relationship between Law and History, which he published in book form with dedications to de l'Hôpital and Anthony of Navarre.³ During July Anthony sent him back into Germany to collect vernacular liturgical forms, especially in connection with the Mass and Baptism. He also entrusted him with a letter to Cassander explaining his great desire to re-establish Christian unity.⁴ Cassander, indeed, had written to Baudouin that if officially approached by the French Government he might be prevailed upon to produce even greater treasure from his stores of eirenic divinity.⁵

III

The play had been chosen and the *dramatis personæ* cast. Parlement and Conseil were to meet jointly in June to prepare the ground for a fresh edict regulating *le fait politique*, while in the subsequent National Council the Cardinal of Lorraine would demonstrate before Huguenot delegates the conformity of the essential principles of Catholicism with Scripture and the writers of the early Church. Reforms on Cassandrian lines would then be decreed, revealing to the Calvinists the vision of a reorganized and purified Church, and finally every one would kiss and be friends again, and the ingenuous play would come to a naïvely happy ending. It only remained to prepare the stage and assemble the properties.

¹ Cf. above, p. 108.

² *C.R., Op. Cal.* xix, 133; Duquesne, p. 58.

³ Baudouin, *De Institutione Historiae Universae et eius cum Jurisprudencia conjunctione προλεγόμενων libri duo* (1561).

⁴ Kaussler und Schott, *Briefe Vergcrios*, p. 278; Duquesne, p. 66.

⁵ *Cassandri Omnia Opera*, pp. 1123-5.

On June 12th an apparently straightforward summons was issued ordering the French bishops to assemble in Paris on July 20th in order to select representatives for attendance at the Council of Trent, to discuss what proposals should there be made, and to make provision for the care of their dioceses during their absence.¹ They were also to discuss the question of making a financial subsidy to the Government, as a preparation for which an assessment of all Church goods and property, warmly resented by the bishops, had already been demanded.²

The veiling of the National Council and the designs associated with it under colour of a simple gathering of bishops preparatory to the Council of Trent was a very skilful move. The strictest papist in the world could pick no quarrel of principle. Catherine, however, had become too heavily suspect for her bluff to pass entirely unchallenged. Although the words "National Council" did not figure in the summons and were probably excluded deliberately, the gravest misgivings were widely aroused and numerous protests poured in from the Sorbonne, from the Parlement de Paris and from the Catholic ambassadors. The weight of these protests must not be underestimated, nor did constant repetition detract from their force. A Government that could afford to brush them aside repeatedly showed great determination and self-confidence, and Catherine certainly had her full share of both these qualities. Curiously enough, the one person to be put at ease by her declarations that the summons was to be taken purely at its face value, was the nuncio. Viterbo had been greatly alarmed at the prospect of a mixed National Assembly. In such a gathering he thought it would have been quite possible for a handful of heterodoxically inclined prelates and politicians to break the bonds linking the Gallican Church with Rome and to carry through changes of a definitely Protestant nature. Consequently the convocation of the whole hierarchy

¹ Text in Ehsses, p. 225 and Le Plat, iv, 704. Cf. La Ferrière, *Lettres*, I, 207.

² The Cardinal of Lorraine had promised the Chapter of Paris, in rather non-committal language, to do what he could in the matter. There had been many protests against the declaration. See *Mémoires de Condé*, I, 27-39.

to an exclusively clerical synod came to him as an immense relief. He was certain that as a body the French bishops were loyal to the Pope and had no desire to upset or even seriously to modify the established order. And though the majority of French prelates might be ineffectual as churchmen, badly informed or only moderately interested in things ecclesiastical, dependent for the technicalities of their profession upon subordinate officials, events were to prove the correctness of the nuncio's forecast.¹

But it was a significant comment on Catherine's protestations that she had nothing to conceal, that the summons of the bishops was immediately followed up by the presentation to the King by the Huguenots of a copy of their latest confession of faith, and of a petition to be allowed to build chapels at their own expense—in other words for their cult to be publicly legalized.² It has been argued that this action had been pre-arranged, and certainly the suggestion has a good deal of plausibility. It was seen at once that the request for public places of worship could be discussed in the special Parliamentary sessions, while the confession of faith might suitably be laid before the bishops. And the initiative having to all outward appearance come from the Huguenots themselves, Catherine could continue to wear her mask of surprised innocence.³

Simultaneously with these events a brilliant demonstration of the Government's orthodoxy was arranged. Since Lent the religious tone of the Court had greatly improved. This had been due in part to the action of the King of Navarre⁴ and in part to the Court's visit to the Guise estates after the Sacre. Condé, Cardinal Châtillon and even Coligny himself seemed to have become better disposed towards the old religion,⁵ perhaps in

¹ Šusta, I, 200-2, 207-8.

² *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 370-2.

³ Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, pp. 143-4. Cf. La Ferrière, *Lettres*, x (supplement), 42-4.

⁴ Cf. above, p. 248.

⁵ Romier, p. 135; Bouillé, II, 139. The Admiral was the only professed Calvinist at Court. In April the nuncio had written: "Solo l' ammiraglio haveva vanità di farsi tenere Hugenotto, dissimulando tutti gli altri"—Šusta, I, 181.

the belief that if reunion were really so close at hand as the middle party seemed to think, there would be little point in accentuating present divisions: Cardinal Châtillon, indeed, went so far as to deny before the Parlement that he had ever had any connection at all with the Reformers. June 13th was the octave of Corpus Christi, and a eucharistic procession outshining in splendour even that of the Feast itself wound its way through the streets of Paris from the abbey of St Germain-des-Prés. The Cardinal of Lorraine carried the monstrance containing the Host, and the King of Navarre followed in the cortège, bareheaded and reverent.¹ It seemed hardly possible that the bishops summoned together by the proclamation of the previous day could be expected to take any steps in the slightest degree harmful to the old, traditional religion of the French.

But at this very moment when the great ones of France were thus engaged in testifying to the strength of their belief in the Eucharistic Presence, far to the south across the Pyrenees the face of the conciliar situation was being entirely changed. Philip II had capitulated to the Pope. Alarmed by the continual threats of a National Council made by the French ambassador, and tormented by the knowledge that his own reluctance to accept the Bull of Convocation had been used by the French Government as cover for a dangerously independent policy, he had given way with unusual precipitance, and even before the results of his negotiations for the reconstruction of the Bull had come to hand.² On June 13th he issued an order for the Spanish bishops to prepare to start for Trent by the beginning of September.³

It was a turning point in the story of the Council. Rome's victory was decisive. That independent and unconditional lead which each of the three great Powers professed to be awaiting from the other two, but which none had hitherto been willing

¹ *Mémoires de Condé*, I, 39. Yet within a fortnight a Calvinist minister was heard to be preaching and conducting services in the King of Navarre's house—*For. Cal.*, No. 265 (13).

² Cf. above, p. 218. See also Šusta, I, 193-4.

³ Šusta, I, 194; Gachard, *Correspondance de Marguerite de Parme*, p. 291.

to give, had at last been given.¹ An enterprising prophet might now have safely foretold the groups of bishops from all nations taking their cue from their Spanish brethren and making their way towards the Trentino; for in May the Emperor, despite the failure of his negotiations with the Protestants, had at last given a pledge to send ambassadors—on condition that someone else did so first;² and the French were officially in much the same condition. But Philip alone, albeit for special reasons of his own, had summoned courage to take the independent plunge; and he was amply rewarded. Pius IV would not alter the non-committal terms of the Bull, but he despatched a secret brief to the King of Spain giving him a formal assurance that the Council was to be a continuation of the former Council of Trent, and accompanying it by an autograph letter affirming the validity of the earlier decrees.³

“Fidelis servus—et prudens!” Yet though the act of fidelity towards the Pope bore abundant fruit in definitely assuring the materialization of the Council, the prudence in regard to the Gallican peril was less well rewarded. When Chantonnay triumphantly informed Catherine of his master’s decision, and suggested that propriety and the fulfilling of contracted obligations bade her retrace her own wayward steps to follow in those of Philip, the skill with which the French Synod had been summoned became even more apparent. The Queen expressed her very great pleasure at the news from Spain, and pointed out urbanely that precisely because the French Synod was to be one of preparation for the Council of Trent, was it now all the more necessary to proceed with it. And as she was convinced that Philip’s move was simply a ruse to force her own hand,⁴ she must have derived considerable satisfaction from her ability to repay him in his own supposedly false coinage.

It was lucky for her that being now definitely committed to

¹ Portugal and Poland had both officially accepted the Bull but their good example was of little weight.

² Sickel, pp. 194–7; Ehses, pp. 200, 204 *et seq.*

³ Sickel, *Römische Berichte*, II, 107; Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, 366.

⁴ Šusta, I, 210–11; Le Plat, IV, 709; La Ferrière, *Lettres*, I, 208–9.

tread the dangerous alleys of deceit, she had already prepared her second line of camouflage. The earlier excuse that the Council of Trent was hanging fire no longer corresponded with facts, but she had been able to fall back on the expedient of disguising the National Council, by means of which she hoped to push through the programme of the middle party, in the respectable garb of an assembly preliminary to the General Council. But concealment may often be a sign of weakness. Certainly it was all-important that for all her own personal misgivings, those of de l'Hôpital, those even of the Cardinal of Lorraine, Catherine dared not give in to the pressure of English and German Protestants and openly declare the truth—that she had no confidence in the Council of Trent.

The Papacy is not an institution that allows the grass to grow beneath its feet. Its Latin heritage frees it both from Teutonic melancholy and the more philosophic fatalism of the East. The series of rebuffs which Pius IV had received from France had alarmed him without exhausting the supply of energy with which he met them. The helplessness of Cardinal Tournon, the self-confessed failure of Viterbo, and the strange refusal of the Cardinal of Lorraine to join forces with the Triumvirate, together constituted an accumulation of ineffectiveness that pointed clearly to the need for a new papal representative at the French Court. Whatever confidence it might affect in public, the Curia was well aware of the unsatisfactory nature of Catherine's attitude towards the Bull of Convocation. It had been irritated by du Ferrier's mission in regard to the Concordat, flouted over the appointment of de L'Isle as ambassador, and perplexed by the contrast provided between Anthony of Navarre's relations with the English and German Protestants—of which it was not ignorant¹—and the submissive attitude of his envoy in Rome. As far back as March, Pius had contemplated sending the Cardinal of Ferrara as a third legate to France²; and as Ferrara had so confidently pronounced the post-mortem

¹ Šusta, I, 216, 225.

² Pastor, VII, 402 (Engl. transl. XVI, 163).

verdict on the National Council it seemed only suitable that he should go in person to trample out the embers that were so unconscionable a time dying. His relationship to the Guises, his long association with France, and his part in the conciliar negotiations of the previous year all helped, in the Pope's eyes, to equip him for this task. The news of the Easter disturbances, the reports of Montluc's sermons, and the effects of the April edict decided Pius; and on June 2nd Ferrara was appointed legate *a latere*.

Thus when later tidings arrived of the summoning of the French bishops the papal parry could be said to have already been made. Ferrara was given instructions to delay at all costs and if possible entirely to prevent the Synod, and to urge Catherine to send bishops and ambassadors to Trent. He was also instructed to tempt Anthony's firmer allegiance by hints that the recovery of Spanish Navarre might best be secured by papal intervention with Spain, and to contrast these fair prospects with the blind alley in which Anthony then stood. A deposition against Montluc having been drawn up similar to that already made against Châtillon, briefs summoning both these prelates to Rome for trial were entrusted to the legate, but he was told not to serve them unless both Tournon and Lorraine thought it advisable. Pius reflected that the suspected prelates could not be prevented from appearing at Trent if they felt disposed to justify themselves there; whereas if the papal citations had previously been made public it might appear, most undesirably, that they were appealing from the Pope to the Council. On the other hand, letters of approval and benediction were showered upon the Triumvirate.¹

On June 27th the legate received the Bulls and Cross of his legation. Five days later he was hurried out of Rome with under three weeks in which to forestall Catherine. Much perturbed lest he should arrive too late, Pius IV spoke of his mission as an "extreme unction", and was far from feeling that confidence which in view of Philip of Spain's acceptance of the

¹ On Ferrara's mission see Šusta, I, 35, 44, 188, 189, 191, 195, 200, 209, 214, 215, 221, 225, 233; Merkle, p. 541.

Bull he felt obliged to maintain in his public utterances, even in the midst of the consternation caused by the summoning of the French Synod.¹ A vague, undefined mistrust of the whole of the French hierarchy seems to have been felt in Rome. Commendone had written from Germany that many of the Lutherans hoped to be able to join forces with the French and English against the Holy See,² and Rome was not in a position to take this indigestible morsel of information at its true value. Both the Emperor, however, and the Cardinal of Mantua, who was now waiting at Trent for the Council to come and be presided over, hoped that the French relations with the Protestant princes might eventually lead to Lutheran representatives coming to the Council where Mantua would willingly have received them—had they come in a fitting spirit of humility and repentance.³ But the Pope now began to think that it would be safer if the French did not arrive at Trent until the Italians and Spaniards had formed a strong nucleus. For the moment he was more eager to stop them congregating in France than to see them deploying their forces at Trent.⁴

There was another important aspect to Ferrara's mission. The legate himself made the suggestion that he should be accompanied by some fathers of the Society of Jesus who should lend their powerful aid towards the revival of clerical life in France. The Pope chose the General himself, and bade him act as private adviser and theologian to the Cardinal. Laynez then selected three other Jesuits to go with him, Fathers Polanco and Coudret and a lay-brother called Louis Gippus. It was extraordinary testimony to the position which the Jesuits had won for themselves that a Cardinal of the old régime should turn spontaneously towards them, when it was a case of fostering a movement of reform which it would have been bare-faced hypocrisy for him to have claimed to represent in person.

¹ Šusta, I, 38, 45-8; Ehses, pp. 212-13. Compare the two letters written by St Charles to Ferrara, the one strictly confidential, the other so worded as to be capable of being shown to others—Šusta, I, 214, 215.

² Ehses, pp. 212-13.

³ Šusta, I, 198; *Documentos inéditos*, xcvi, 231.

⁴ Šusta, I, 195.

It was also extraordinary testimony to Laynez's own reputation with the Pope—as well as to the extremity of the Pope's anxiety over French affairs—that his routine work as General, not to mention his many personal services to Pius IV, should have been allowed to be thus interrupted.¹ But the Jesuits were not Ferrara's only assistants. The legate also took with him in his large retinue Fra Angelo Giustiniani, a Franciscan Recollect and a renowned Roman preacher, several other theologians, and a number of Italian bishops.

In a personal letter to the King of France the Pope appealed to him to cancel the National Synod and to follow the example of the King of Spain by sending his bishops to the Council of Trent. Similar appeals were sent to Catherine, to the King of Navarre, and to Condé²; while, in order to gain time for Ferrara, Viterbo was instructed to enlist the help of Lorraine and Tournon in securing the postponement of the Synod at least until the legate's arrival. The Pope pointed out that, as Lorraine and Tournon were themselves both legates *a latere*, they could hardly refuse to carry out his wishes. Should Viterbo find it impossible to obtain the desired postponement, he was to adopt the same attitude that had been laid down for him when he had found himself in a similar position the previous year, and when it had been Tournon instead of Ferrara who had been hourly expected from Rome. That is to say, he was not to take part in the Assembly, but he was to make no public protest unless measures prejudicial to the Faith or to the authority of the Holy See were undertaken.³ Though weighed down by the heaviest anxiety, Pius IV was still inspired by a desire to avoid all unnecessary recrimination or show of hostility.

The Parlement de Paris reassembled on June 18th. In a carefully prepared speech the Chancellor unfolded the Government's plans. He said that the joint treatment of religion and

¹ *M.H.S.ſ.*, *Lainii Monumenta*, v, 562, 595; Fouqueray, I, 249.

² Šusta, I, 216, 219.

³ Šusta, I, 214-15. Cf. above, p. 108.

politics, though traditional, had only led to instability of policy: edict had followed upon edict, each as ephemeral as its predecessor, and the credit of the Government had sunk lower at each turn. It was now hoped that by separating the religious from the political issues some measure of permanence and stability would be secured for the settlement which the Government sought to make. *Le fait politique* would be debated by the Parlement, reinforced for a series of extraordinary *ad hoc* sessions by the *Conseil Privé* and by delegates of the provincial Parlements. *La mérite de la religion* would be dealt with in the Episcopal Synod summoned for that purpose.¹

The Queen and de l'Hôpital both hoped that, when the Huguenot petition for places of worship was laid before the Parlement, it would be possible for them to create a majority in its favour, as the only method of restoring public order.² It was supposed that the support of a more or less suppressed minority of parliamentarians could be counted upon, and the Queen was anxious that these should speak their minds freely and without fear of the consequences. The sittings began on June 23rd. The Assembly numbered 138 persons all told, each of whom was called upon in turn to give his opinion on the Huguenot petition. The parliamentarians led off, but the courage of many must have failed them at the last moment, or else Catherine's estimate of the support she was likely to get had been inaccurate from the start, for there was an almost complete unanimity against even the smallest measure of concession, only one or two voices dissenting from the opinion of the majority.³ The nuncio was of course highly satisfied. He reported that well over a hundred of the parliamentarians had spoken admirably.

¹ Dufey, I, 419-28, especially 424-5; *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 396-401.

² In the *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 409-23 there is an "Avis donné au Roy de l'assemblée tenue en la cour Parlement à Paris sur le fait de la Religion, le 23 Juin 1561". As this is a tract in support of Toleration and demanding a National Council on the plea that the expectation of a General Council is vain, the designation must be considered inaccurate.

³ Bourdin to the Bishop of Rennes—*Le Laboureur*, I, 705. Among those who spoke on behalf of Toleration was the M. de Viole whose action had given offence to the Papacy early in 1560—*Layard*, p. 29; cf. above, p. 127. The Guises complained too that du Ferrier had voted "un-Catholically", which even Viterbo denied—*Susta*, I, 229.

Much the same impression resulted from the speeches of the councillors. The Bishop of Paris would have had the fires relit, and the three members of the Triumvirate spoke in terms of complete intransigence. Of the opinions expressed by Condé, de Foix, or Montluc, no report seems to exist, but Navarre made an embarrassed and hesitating speech which though largely inaudible was understood to be fervently Catholic. Cardinal Châtillon urged briefly that no violence should be done to the persons of heretics, and was supported by du Mortier. As previously at Fontainebleau, only Coligny stood forward as a whole-hearted supporter of the Huguenot cause. He openly demanded equality of cult, and so far wandered outside the proper scope of the business to hand as to embark upon a spirited defence of the principles of the new religion.

The Cardinal of Lorraine spoke last. He did not commit Coligny's error but kept strictly to the point. By so doing he disappointed many curious expectations, for his association with the eirenic party had given rise to the wildest rumours as to the erosion to which his doctrinal position had been subjected. It had been variously said that he was intending to propose the adoption of the Confession of Augsburg,¹ to urge the abolition of images or the liturgical use of the vernacular.² Even the suspicious but excitable Throckmorton, following up earlier premonitions,³ seems to have written definitely of the Cardinal's "conversion", for we find the envoy Jones replying that this news did not take him entirely by surprise, and prophesying that were it true—for it might be no more than a cunning ruse—then there could be no "stay in the reformation of religion".⁴ But the Cardinal in his speech did not touch upon doctrinal matters: that would not have been pertinent. Less bitter than his brother, whose ardour it was known that he was anxious to moderate, he none the less spoke of dissent as equally dangerous to Church and State, and, true to his principles, opposed the

¹ Languet, II, 120; For. Cal., Nos. 265 (4), 269 (1).

² *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XVIII, 643.

³ For. Cal., No. 218.

⁴ Jones to Throckmorton July 4th, B.M., Add. MSS. 35830, f. 140. See Appendix VII.

grant of places of worship to the Huguenots. But consistently with his attitude since at least the Assembly of Fontainebleau, he condemned the death penalty for simple heresy—though this had been demanded by the Triumvirate—and counselled the substitution of banishment as the punishment for simple but loyal and peaceful heretics who were unwilling to recant. This was a lonely furrow, as remote from the ferocity of the Triumvirate as from the toleration desired by the Queen and Chancellor. But though lonely it was successful. The Cardinal's oratorical talents easily enabled him to dominate the Assembly. He reaped all the advantages of the final word and it was decided to draw up a fresh edict to give effect to his proposals.¹ This was done immediately, and on July 12th Lorraine wrote to the Bishop of Verdun preening himself on his triumph and speaking of:

ce parlement ou nous avons esté vingt-quatre heures durant pour dire et ouir les opinions des uns et des aultres: qui n'a pas esté sans grande peine de corps et d'esprit. Mais la fin en a esté si bonne et si favorable pour la religion que, Dieu mercy, vos predicans seront contrains de quitter le pays, et demeurera l'autorité à la Sainte Église Catholique Romaine: qui est la meilleure nouvelle que je vous puisse mander.²

Sentiments, indeed, of unimpeachable orthodoxy.

IV

A certain quality of unexpected variety was a frequent characteristic of the Cardinal of Lorraine's activities. Very different in tone from the account of the Parlement with which he provided Psalmeus of Verdun, is a remarkable memorandum drawn up by him during the course of this very assembly and intended for circulation among the German Protestant princes. Envisaging, as he did, the whole problem of reunion from a European point of view, and convinced of the necessity of procuring the return of the Lutherans to the Catholic Church, the Cardinal felt that circumstances had provided him with a

¹ On these extraordinary sessions of the Parlement see Šusta, I, 217-18, 220, 221; Layard, pp. 30-1; Languet, II, 125-6; *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 402 et seq., and Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, pp. 153-7 and notes.

² *Petite Bibliothèque Verdunoise*, II, 126-7.

peculiarly suitable opportunity for publishing in Germany his views on the nature of the reunion problem and on the means by which it might be approached with most chance of success. It had long been plain from the works of earlier writers who had used the Stuttgart archives, that a document of this nature existed,¹ but until the present writer called attention to it three years ago² its contents remained unknown. It is long and rather jerkily written; not very profoundly conceived, but of remarkable interest.

The Cardinal lays down his main object immediately and clearly. It is the re-establishment of Christian unity; which is vital for the preservation of Christianity itself and is demanded alike by the honour of God and the safety of the State. There can be only one true religion, and it can logically tolerate no other. The question is not whether unity is desirable but how it is to be restored. Religious disputations, he says, are rightly forbidden by law, and serve but to embitter and harden. He concludes therefore that as a beginning an enquiry should be made into the grounds of the present schism, to discover whether such divisions as have come about are really warrantable. This can only be done by means of a conference—to be clearly distinguished from a disputation—at which a systematic and dispassionate study of opinions shall be undertaken. Such an undertaking will require much mutual charity and restraint, rational enquiry and a firm dependence on the teaching of Scripture. But encouraging precedents will not be lacking; a case is cited from Eusebius,³ while St Augustine proposed such a conference with the Donatists, which they however refused, unjustly taunting him as a “disputer”.

A conference then is necessary. Where shall it take place? No other epoch has stood in such dire need of a Council, yet though the demand for one has been constant for forty years,

¹ See Pfister, *Herzog Christoph zu Württemberg*, p. 399; Kugler, II, 295; Kluckhohn, I, 190.

² *Cambridge Historical Journal* for October 1927, where MS. references will be found. Text in Appendix VIII.

³ He refers to the *Ecclesiastical History*, cap. xxiv, lib. 7—the conversion of Coraccio and his followers by Dionysius of Alexandria.

it has been impossible even to make a start, let alone reap much harvest. We foresee that few bouquets will be offered to the Council of Trent. The Pope, continues the Cardinal, is said to desire the continuation of that Council, but it is a matter of general agreement among most people—and the point needs no embellishment—that this will be no remedy. There has also been talk, he goes on, carefully distinguishing, of some General Council, and indeed the success of the first General Council of Nicaea has justly taught us to hold in great reverence the name and authority of General Councils. But, he laments, there is no modern Constantine to call the bishops of Christendom together!

It may seem strange that a sincere Gallican should not at this point break forth into loud praises of Constance and Bâle—or even of Ephesus and Chalcedon, but the truth is that the Cardinal is not out in this memorandum to serve the cause of a new Conciliar Movement. The only other General Council he mentions is just that one whose title to the appellation can be most easily disputed, resting as it does purely on later papal acceptance—the first Council of Constantinople. By what sanction, he asks, was this Council general? There were no westerners present and it legislated only for the East. This enables him to point the moral towards which his very insufficient treatment of General Councils has been tending. The West, he declares, followed the example of the Orient and celebrated its own Council, with the result that by a double action unity and order were re-established throughout the universal Church. He refers of course to the Council of Aquileia celebrated by St Ambrose in 381, and presses home his point by the assertion that St Ambrose did not scruple to persevere with his own condemnation of the Arian Palladius at this Council even though the Bishop of Rome was simultaneously making great efforts for a larger Council, and though Palladius himself was reluctant to be judged by anything less than an Œcumenical Assembly.¹ From this one hard case the

¹ It has recently been shown, however, that St Ambrose at Aquileia was not acting in so independent a manner in respect of Rome as used to be assumed. This appears from the complaints of Palladius himself. See Batiffol, *Le Siège Apostolique* (1924), pp. 23–30.

Cardinal coolly proceeds to make his desired universal law. Provincial Councils, he pronounces, are competent to deal with the highest matters, and to deny that National Councils may deal with doctrinal questions¹ is to betray ignorance of history. If further proof be required, the condemnation of Pelagianism at the Gallican Council of Orange is surely decisive. The intended climax of this facile reasoning is then finally reached. The King of France has already summoned his bishops to meet on July 20th, and it only remains for them to convene suitable persons to a conference for the sifting and collation of opinions.

The methods and ends proposed for this conference are then enlarged upon. Its goal will be the fashioning of a formula acceptable to everyone, some kind of *henoticon* which will terminate the evils of the schism. With curious logic the Cardinal applauds the example of the Emperor Zeno, who, however, in attempting to treat the Council of Chalcedon much as Lorraine would have appeared to desire to treat Trent, only succeeded in creating a thirty-five years' schism between East and West.² Lorraine's only precaution against a similar contingency is to insist that the formula must be based on arguments so cogent and evidences so incontrovertible that no sane man would dare reject them. To ensure this it will be necessary, he says, to be freed from all rigidity of procedure and to have continually in mind the guiding presence of God; and he draws encouragement from the fact that while past controversies and heresies have centred around some definite article of the creed, there is now general acceptance of the Apostles' Creed, and disagreement is only in regard to what he terms the "administration" of those basic doctrines. That this was so however, that in other words Protestantism was not just a simple doctrinal heresy but implied a whole questioning of first principles and a subtle revolution of religious feeling, was the

¹ "tractare de causis religionis."

² Zeno's *Henoticon*, published in 482, was intended to stop discussion between the Orthodox and the Eutychians, but was condemned by Pope Felix III. The subsequent schism between East and West was only terminated in 517, when the East under the Emperor Justin submitted to the terms of Pope Hormisdas.

very reason why such schemes as the Cardinal's were from the start doomed to failure. They failed to perceive the real issues, to diagnose the real complaints. Even the Cardinal of Lorraine, alive as he was in many ways to new ideas, and sensitive as he was to new influences, yet felt compelled to seek for some specific problem of theology round which to construct his proposed conference. He found it not in the question of the Papacy, but in the question of the Real Presence in the Eucharist. It was on the Real Presence, he said, that turned the disputed questions of Transubstantiation, the Adoration of the Host, Reservation, eucharistic processions, private Masses, Masses for the dead, Communion under one or two kinds, the invocation of the Saints in the Canon, a Latin or a vernacular liturgy. And if he erred in supposing that an agreement on the Real Presence could have exerted any decisive influence towards the reunion of Catholics, Lutherans and Calvinists into one Church, the Cardinal was at least right as against the Cassandrians in holding that a foundation of dogmatic agreement must precede liturgical rapprochement. The origins and history of things eucharistic, he said, would have to be studied from the earliest records, and diligently pursued from the time of Christ and His Apostles up to the present day. Reverence and discretion, ripe judgment and sound learning would need to be brought to the task; rashness of speech or action sedulously avoided. Members of the conference should look upon themselves as fellow-judges in consultation rather than as hostile litigant parties, and the admission of hardened and prejudiced minds would only degrade and pervert the meeting into an embittered disputation. It should be quite possible, he believed, for the right people, setting about their task in the right way and animated by the right spirit, to reach some consensus of opinion in the detection and eradication of abuse and error, producing as a result of their examinations of Scripture, of the records of the primitive Church, and of the fathers—whom all agree in accepting as models and examples—a formula of eucharistic belief so reasonable that none would ever be able to cavil or at any future time call it into question. Then would the way lie open for a general

reform; and though this would necessarily take time, and though opposition must inevitably be expected where abuses have created vested interests, the prospect would not be without fair promise if a foundation of doctrinal agreement had first been laid.

In true scholastic wise the author then deals with possible objections. Some people, he says, belittle the import of the religious split and demand freedom of thought for all: others maintain that the differences of opinion have become too fundamental to admit of composition and that nothing is left but trust in Divine providence. Both are wrong, he maintains, alike in premise and conclusion. For, on the one hand, it is abundantly clear that religious discords have produced immense political difficulties and will continue to do so with increasing force, while premature despair, on the other, is apt to indicate fundamental indifference. Difficulties at first sight insurmountable will often crumble before the assaults of courage and resolution, and matters are far from being in that final despairing stage when, further struggle being useless, the powerless charioteer—as Virgil has it—is swept along at the mercy of his horses:

Ut cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae
Addunt se in spatia, et frustra retinacula tendens
Fertur equis auriga nec audit currus habenas.¹

He admits no relevant precedent for toleration in the fact that the early Christians demanded general freedom of belief from the pagan Empire, and the Catholics from the Arian tyrant Constantius. The choice is no longer one between general toleration and enforced subscription to a false religion. A better precedent would be the toleration of the Novatians by many Catholic bishops and princes. But though moderation and lenience are all very praiseworthy, it is not wise that the reins should be too loosely held. On the other hand it is equally true that the old policy of fire and sword, which still numbers many supporters, has been utterly discredited. As the Chancellor has

¹ Virgil, *Georgics*, I, 512-14.

so wisely demonstrated, the need for gentler methods has been proved up to the hilt: experience, the master even of fools, has shown the impossibility of exterminating whole multitudes, and has taught that persecution only serves to increase the numbers of the persecuted. Here nevertheless the Cardinal is careful to add his caveat. The arguments against persecution are admittedly arguments of convenience rather than principle, and it is well to remember that the abstract justice of a policy cannot be held to be entirely dependent upon the practical possibilities of its execution.

Two new points of importance here arise. Are the French dissenters really heretics? And, if so, is it desirable to inflict the death penalty upon them? It will immediately be said—the Cardinal goes on—that there can be no two opinions, that their heresy has been conclusively demonstrated time and again. Granted: but they have appealed from this judgment; they have thrown back the charge of heresy on to their very judges. And therefore since opinion is divided, and since the traditional definition of heresy can be held to be inapplicable here—for what reasons the Cardinal does not say—it is only equitable that the dissenters should be given a reasonable opportunity of presenting their case. Only when the proposed conference shall have completed its labours will the validity or invalidity of their contention be apparent.

Assume them, however, to be convicted of heresy. What should be their punishment? The Cardinal would distinguish. Atheists and blasphemers, sedition-mongers who take cover under a cloak of religion, heretics guilty also of other undeniably capital offences—all these undoubtedly merit the extreme penalty. But for those whose only crime is a false opinion sincerely held without malice or sedition, the death penalty is justifiable, says the Cardinal, on no legal or rational grounds. Heresy is a disease; and it is a barbarous remedy which kills rather than cures. And if it be objected that one member must suffer amputation for the good of the whole body, it may be replied that if a way can be found of saving both, then the destruction of the member is sheer unnecessary wantonness.

The Cardinal knows perfectly well that the death penalty for heresy is not primitive. The early Christians, oppressed though they were by fierce heresies, used, he says, the metaphor of a disease to be cured exactly as the Chancellor has lately done, and he appeals for proof to St Augustine, St Martin and St Ambrose among Western doctors, and to St Cyril and St John Chrysostom among Orientals. He cites also the anger of the Emperor Maximus at the judicial murder of Priscillian by bishops at Treves in the year 385, and, having pronounced as spurious interpolations two passages in the Code of Justinian¹ where mention is made of the death penalty for heresy, concludes that the mind of the primitive Church was adverse to this extremity. The memorandum then closes with a short, coda-like return to the main theme, in which the writer reiterates his hope that the Synod which is to meet on July 20th will rise to its opportunity, and by producing a formula of agreement on the Eucharistic Presence pave the way to a satisfactory reformation and to Christian reunion.

No reasonable judgment can be passed upon this document unless it be considered in relation both to what we already know of the Cardinal's views during the summer of 1561 and to the purpose which it was intended to serve. It clearly contains a substratum of genuine opinion, subjected, however, to various tactful omissions and seasoned with certain misleading exaggerations, all obviously with the intent of rendering the whole dish more agreeable to the German Protestant palates to which it was offered. No surprise need now be caused by the Cardinal's championship of the high functions of a National Council or by his depreciation of the Council of Trent, though these opinions were probably expressed in a more ruthless and decisive manner than they would have been in other circumstances; and incidentally it could well be argued that if Councils of less than œcumenical status may make irreformable definitions of doctrine then the case against the earlier decrees of Trent becomes very much weakened. Equally in harmony, too, with

¹ See the text, p. 496, and note. Earlier he similarly condemns a law favourable to the Arians in the Theodosian Code—see p. 493, and note.

sentiments that the Cardinal had previously expressed in public, is his attack on the death penalty for simple heresy, in regard to which we have only to recall his speech at the Assembly of Fontainebleau and the manner in which, actually during the period when he must have been composing this memorandum, he was forcing this opinion upon a fiery and intransigent majority of councillors and parliamentarians. It is only when we come to the proposal of an impartial "collation of opinions" and the necessity of suspending judgment on the definition and content of heresy that we find ourselves confronted with something unexpected and difficult to account for. It would be too much to expect the doctrines of the Vatican Council from a sixteenth-century Gallican cardinal; too much, perhaps, even to expect an analytic treatment of the functioning of the doctrinal magisterium of the Church; but it would certainly not be excessive to expect the bare idea of this magisterium to be at least brought forward for discussion as an authority standing quite apart from the consensus of interpretations—if indeed such could ever be obtained—placed by intelligent and learned men upon Scripture and the records of the early Church. But for this we look in vain, and the question must be faced—does the document here represent the Cardinal's genuine opinions?

It is at this point that the memorandum must be pronounced to be most deceptive. And yet if doctrinal discussions are to take place at all, or any interchange of opinion be made with a view to eventual agreement, it will not help immediately to raise the issue of authority. It is sufficiently clear that it was the question of the Real Presence in the Holy Eucharist that the Cardinal intended first to submit to the impartial "collation of opinions", and it is also sufficiently clear—as his later attitude at Poissy fully bears out—that he believed that an impartial examination of the opinions of the early fathers and of the data of Scripture could only result in an acceptance of the Catholic doctrine of an objective and substantial presence of our Lord's Body and Blood in the eucharistic elements. Thus if he advocated a suspension of judgment on this point—perhaps, too, on any other—it was certainly with a

firm conviction that the traditional judgment of the Catholic Church would have to be resumed. For himself it would be a fictitious, artificial suspension: the revolution would be for the other people—with himself as their mentor. Such an attitude is of course open to the criticism, amongst others, that it is bad policy to convince people of the right things on the wrong arguments. The appeal to history and scripture certainly plays an important part in the Church's approach towards a decision on doctrine, yet the compelling motive of belief is in the last resort her own *ipse dixit*. It would undeniably have been more logical for the Cardinal to have attempted to prove from Scripture and history, and by means of all the accumulative apparatus employed by theologians, the existence of the Church's right to an *ipse dixit*. It was, however, the aim of the middle party which he now represented, to avoid the more fundamental issues, to find short cuts, to cross the deeper chasms by means of ingeniously constructed bridges designed to avert the gaze of travellers from the depths they were traversing. This ideal was at once the attraction and the weakness of the whole movement. The Cardinal of Lorraine had an eye towards immediate practical results; the Eucharist had been divinely instituted as a bond and token of union; unhappily it had become the chief source of strife and discord; but for that very reason what could be more profitable or more consonant to the Divine purpose than the attempt to restore Christian unity and charity on a eucharistic foundation? Of all bridges, of all meeting-grounds, the Eucharist could be held the most fitting, for it was the supreme bond instituted by Christ himself.

Thus when we have made allowances for tactical exaggerations and omissions; when, too, we have finished priding ourselves that to-day, from our position of vantage down the centuries and with our finer and subtler perceptions, we are able better to realize the inadequacy of the diagnosis and the illusory nature of the remedy with its rather pathetic appeal to scholarship, open-mindedness and goodwill; when all this has been done and weighed, it still remains true that we have in this document a genuine attempt to devise and justify some machinery for the

calm and thorough investigation of the religious differences which had riven the unity of Christendom. Far-fetched and unworkable though its proposals may be, yet they represent a more detailed and intelligent effort to face the problem of reunion, on some basis other than that of pure force, than anything else that the French eirenic movement produced. And if the Cardinal chose to concentrate on the Eucharistic Presence rather than on the deeper question of authority, it was because the restoration of intercommunion in the Eucharist, based on unity of belief, seemed the most practical need of the hour.

It would be tempting to discern traces of the influence both of de l'Hôpital and of Baudouin in the Cardinal's memorandum. The idea of the "collation of opinions", for example, can be found more than once in Baudouin's works,¹ while the Cardinal's agreement with de l'Hôpital is specifically stated in more than one place. But it is more probable that Claude d'Espence, if anyone, was the chief inspirer in the composition. The Cardinal's old tutor welcomed the prospect of a Colloquy with enthusiasm. It was the chance that he had so long desired of giving a fair trial to his theories concerning the desirability of private conversations with the heretical leaders. And though he was no Gallican, though he challenged the right of the State to convene Synods without the consent and co-operation of the Church and deplored the prevalent fashion of attempting religious settlements on national bases, which he ascribed to the lack of a satisfactory General Council, nevertheless he considered the opportunity of the Colloquy, however provided, to be far too good to be missed. Like Lorraine, he could not stomach the idea of two religious cults being allowed to co-exist side by side, but he confessed to a horror of persecution on grounds both of practicability and sheer humanitarianism, and expressed this horror in terms more eloquent and more inspiring than the dry phrases of the Cardinal. But as surely as the Cardinal, he was brought by his principles to see the absolute necessity of re-establishing unity of faith, and his suggestions on this point bear a close similarity to those of his patron.

¹ And compare the notes on pp. 493 and 496.

He preaches the necessity of a return to the original fountain-head of the Gospel and the tradition of the Apostles, for only thus can it be discovered where and how the pure Christian stream has been subjected to later accretions and pollutions. But he sees that the bare appeal to antiquity will give no finality. He advocates the production of what he calls "some moderate syncatabasis"—hardly distinguishable from Lorraine's "henoticon"—in the composition of which both sides should be prevailed upon to make mutual concessions. But he is more cautious than the Cardinal: nothing, he says, must be changed at the whim of any one individual; fundamental doctrines, public ceremonies and all matters originally settled by universal and public authority can only be amended by that same authority. On the other hand d'Espence preaches the necessity of concession more openly than the Cardinal. He utters a solemn warning lest obstinate refusal to moderate should lead to the ultimate shipwreck of the whole Christian cause.¹

This close approximation of ideas would seem to point naturally to close personal co-operation. It is not at all improbable that d'Espence should have assisted the Cardinal in the writing of his memorandum. But there is no reason to suppose that this assistance was in the nature of a dictation, or that the Cardinal was the mouthpiece of a stronger guiding mind. D'Espence could certainly never have penned the unsatisfactory passage on General and Provincial Councils, and the several points on which it is apparent that the two men disagreed, as well as their later differences of opinion on tactics during the Colloquy of Poissy, are sufficient to establish the Cardinal as an independent agent. D'Espence was certainly

¹ D'Espence's views are contained in three *Epistles Dedicatory*, written in the summer of 1561 and to be found in a single volume of that date containing his *Commentarii* on the First Epistle to St Timothy, his *Digressiones* on the same, and his *De Clandestinis Matrimoniis*. They are addressed to the Cardinal of Lorraine, to Cardinal Bourbon, and to de l'Hôpital respectively. For a fuller account see my article "Claude d'Espence et son Discours du Colloque de Poissy" in *Revue Historique* for May-June 1930. In Baronius' *Annales* extracts from two of these letters, and containing the passage on the *Syncatabasis*, appear anonymously under the year 1560 (Nos. xxxiii and xxxiv).

a trusted adviser, but it would be inadmissible to regard him as an earlier *Éminence Grise*, playing the Père Joseph of popular fable to Lorraine's Richelieu.

V

In order to bring the Cardinal of Lorraine into touch with the German Protestant princes for whose benefit the memorandum had been composed, the Duke of Guise bethought himself of resuming his own youthful friendship with the Duke of Württemberg and of opening a correspondence with the Elector-Palatine and the Landgrave of Hesse. On July 2nd, during the sessions of the Parlement in which he spoke so fiercely against any kind of concession being made to the Huguenots, the leader of the Triumvirate addressed a letter to Christopher of Württemberg recalling their former intimacy and defending himself and his family against the slanders which he assumed could not have failed to reach his old friend's ears. He assured Christopher that a very thorough reform of the Church was afoot in France. It was hoped to restore unity by means of a Colloquy, and the Cardinal of Lorraine had set down in writing some suggestions in regard to this task, having studied the Augsburg Confession and found it not without attraction. This document he now enclosed with his letter. Though the French Calvinists, he continued, were almost as hostile to the Lutheran religion as to the Roman, the Cardinal believed none the less that the Lutheran princes could play an important part in the re-establishment of unity by sending him copies of their Confessions of Faith, and particularly of statements of their eucharistic belief, for examination at the Colloquy.¹ Similar letters containing copies of the Cardinal's memorandum and requests for

¹ Guise to Württemberg, July 2nd, published in the *B.S.H.P.F.* xxiv, 71. The whole Guise-Württemberg correspondence of 1561-2 is preserved in the State Archives of Stuttgart, and the greater part may be found published in the *B.S.H.P.F.* and the *Mémoires de Condé*, III. In 1563, when he was angry with the Guises and thought of revealing their correspondence, Christopher himself copied it all out and sent it in a bound volume to the Landgrave of Hesse. This volume, consisting of more than 100 pages and containing 35 pieces, still exists in the archives of Marburg.

theological data were sent by the same messenger to the Elector-Palatine¹ and the Landgrave of Hesse.²

This messenger was a personal servant of the Cardinal of Lorraine named Rascalon. By verbal exhortation he supplemented the requests made in the letters, assuring the princes that their Confessions would be examined judicially at the Conference and that the Cardinal's memorandum had been laid before the *Conseil Privé* and had obtained its approval—a story which is certainly not impossible, though perhaps a little improbable. The Elector-Palatine, however, was not attracted. He profoundly mistrusted the Cardinal, and his sensibilities were acutely offended by the person of Rascalon, whom he suspected of adding atheism and loose living to the disagreeable vulgarities of his manner, and whose real business he believed to be the raising of German troops in the Guise interest. He felt that it was beyond endurance to discuss religion with so unpleasant an individual; he would not even entrust him with copies of his creed. Guise's letter apparently went unanswered, and Frederick, when informed by Rascalon that Catherine de Médicis and the King of Navarre inclined to a reform on Lutheran lines, retorted that he knew through Baudouin that the Mass was to be retained. According to the authors of the *Histoire Ecclésiastique des Églises Réformées*, Rascalon had been raised by the Cardinal from the gutter—"de *povre coquin*"—to be the King's *valet-de-chambre*, but the fact that a brother of his was medical adviser to the Elector-Palatine would seem to throw some doubt on this story of a humble origin. It was through this brother that he was now able to outwit Frederick and secretly procure a copy of the Augsburg Confession with the new Naumburg Preface, which he sent back to the Cardinal.³

Philip of Hesse shared Frederick's repugnance to confer with the Guises or their representatives on matters of religion, but he acted with greater politeness than his pious colleague had shown. He replied to the Duke's letter—and in quite a friendly

¹ Guise to Frederick, July 2nd, published in Kluckhohn, I, 187.

² Guise to Philip, July 2nd, cited by Heidenhain, pp. 320-1.

³ Kluckhohn, pp. 187-8, 190-1; For. Cal., No. 319.

tone—admitting that many anti-Guisard pamphlets had found their way into his hands, but protesting that he would not allow them to influence him unduly. He urged general toleration until the meeting of a really free General Council, in which the princes of Germany would willingly take part. But at heart he was as afraid as the Elector-Palatine that the Guises were attempting to make use of Lutheranism as an anti-Calvinist weapon, and he was careful to send them only such theological matter as he thought could not be turned against the Huguenots—the New Testament with the *Loci Communes* of Melancthon, Bucer's Commentary on the Psalms, and Luther's Commentary on Galatians.¹

In contrast both to the caution of the Landgrave and the open hostility of the Elector, the Duke of Württemberg welcomed the Guisard advances with open arms. This was due partly to his own trusting nature, partly to the fact that the Guises were the friends of his youth. Already he had had information of a change of attitude on the part of the Cardinal of Lorraine,² and he sincerely believed, as he wrote to the Elector, that God might well choose this moment to turn a new Saul into a new Paul. He put aside as unworthy a faint suspicion that the misgivings of the Elector and the Landgrave might prove true in the end, and in his enthusiastic idealism he conjured up visions of the establishment of the Augsburg Confession in France through the joint labours of a converted Cardinal and an evangelical King of Navarre. Swallowing his dislike of Rascalon—"a strange bird" was his comment—he entrusted to his care a copy of the Württembergish Confession as laid before the Council of Trent in 1552, together with a detailed article on the Eucharist signed by all his theologians. He offered to supplement these if necessary by the loan of learned divines, and rejoiced exceedingly that the dawn of the Gospel light was breaking in France; its warm rays would surely bring to germination the seeds already scattered; let the Duke

¹ Heidenhain, pp. 322-3.

² *Zeitung aus Frankreich*, Stuttgart, Staatsarchiv, Frankreich, büschel 17, No. 79 b.

of Guise read diligently in his Bible and in his Fathers, and compare what he found therein with the legalistic ecclesiastical structure raised by the Papacy.¹ He had a French translation made of Lorraine's memorandum which he sent to Anthony of Navarre, exhorting both him and Condé to support the Christian cause of the Guises.² He also had a German translation made, and this he sent to Wolfgang, the Count-Palatine.³

It seems uncertain whether the Guises opened up communications with any other German Court. But from Stuttgart Rascalon appears to have gone on into Saxony,⁴ where delegates from eight cities of the lower circle had met at Lüneberg in July to protest against the alleged Calvinistic tendencies of the Naumburg Preface.⁵

The issue of the Parlement had thoroughly displeased Catherine. It had been the first serious check to her ambitious schemes. Unable to obtain any kind of toleration for the Huguenot cult, she had been forced to draw up an edict merely substituting banishment in the place of death as the punishment for simple heresy. The immediate publication of this decision would certainly not have been calculated to enhance the prospects of the Colloquy, and so, in order not to prejudice her negotiations with the Huguenot pastors, Catherine decided to keep the edict back until these negotiations had come to fruition, hoping that the results of the Colloquy would then render it unnecessary.

But even without this extra embarrassment her negotiations with the Huguenots, carried on through Coligny, were by no means plain sailing. Though there were plenty of lesser ministers eager to rush headlong into the theological fray, the wiser heads—and Coligny with them—realized that a debate with the

¹ Christopher to Guise—*B.S.H.P.F.* xxiv, 73.

² Christopher to Anthony, Aug. 1st, Stuttgart, Staatsarchiv, Frankreich, büschel 17, No. 92 a.

³ Christopher to Wolfgang, Aug. 6th—*ibid.* No. 96.

⁴ Kaussler und Schott, *Briefe Vergerios*, p. 279; Kluckhohn, pp. 191-2.

⁵ For this see Salig, *Historie der Augspurgischen Confession*, III; Calinich, *Der Naumburger Fürstentag*, pp. 259-63; and Heidenhain, pp. 326-7.

Cardinal of Lorraine would be anything but child's play. Where fools would have rushed in, the angels of the Calvinist hierarchy were not eager to tread. It was notorious that the Cardinal was preparing himself with alarming diligence. Throckmorton, whose dislike of the Cardinal never blinded him to his talents, warned the Huguenot leaders that their champions must be persons deeply versed in the fathers and the early councils, on which authorities the Catholics intended to rely; and he exhorted them seriously to face the fact that they were up against an opponent endowed with an immense oratorical ability and an extraordinary skill in the management of affairs.¹ Gradually the glamour of battle faded away from the ministers, and their uneasiness was increased by the activities of Baudouin, and by the ever-growing likelihood that the question of Lutheran doctrine would intervene to complicate a straight issue with Catholicism.² For a moment Catherine contemplated inviting Calvin himself; but this idea did not last; and finally Theodore Beza consented on pressure from Anthony of Navarre to accept the captaincy of the Huguenot team. By July 25th a list of twelve champions had been drawn up. It was decided to invite no foreigners, and thus the danger of an international assembly in opposition to the Council at Trent was finally averted. One exception, however, Catherine insisted upon making. An invitation was sent to her fellow-countryman Peter Martyr, the ex-Augustinian, who had had great experience of religious conferences; and after some negotiations the Senate of Zurich consented, on the promise of a safe-conduct, to loan its beloved pastor.³

In the meantime a postponement of the Synod had become necessary. The Cardinal of Lorraine had gone to Calais to say good-bye to his niece, the Queen of Scots, whom he would never see again. On his return he fell ill, the ordinary symptoms of chill and indigestion giving rise to the customary suspicion of poison. The bishops were consequently put off until July 31st,

¹ For. Cal., No. 344.

² *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xviii, 569-70; La Place, p. 296.

³ *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xviii, 548, 552, 568, 578; xix, 3. Cf. For. Cal., No. 343.

while the rendezvous was transferred to Poissy. On July 25th, when the list of Huguenot champions was already secretly completed, the Government issued a general safe-conduct to all persons who might desire to appear before the Synod.¹ Bishops and theologians now began to arrive upon the scene, and the audience sat awaiting the rise of the curtain in a flutter of divers hopes and fears.

Ensconced peacefully in his well-curtained box, entirely unaware that he had been positioned so as to enjoy a view of only one carefully selected portion of the stage, the nuncio alone seems to have been lulled into a state of complete and unsuspecting security as to the nature of the piece he was about to witness. It was true that he had had moments of uneasiness with the Duke of Guise, moments of difficulty with the Cardinal of Lorraine; but they had not been over such matters as affected the main current of events. Lorraine had complained that the object of his invitation to Rome by the Pope had been the removal of his influence from Court, and that Pius' strong words to du Ferrier on the subject of pluralities had been aimed at himself. Viterbo had hastened to placate him with the assurances that nothing could give Rome so much pleasure as his continued residence at Court, and that far from wishing to diminish his pluralities the Pope was even desirous of increasing them—assurances which won full papal approval.² Thus easy in his mind on the score of the Guises, with great confidence also in the influence of Montmorency whose speech in the Parlement had been much to his liking, Viterbo easily swallowed Catherine's reiterated statements that the Synod had no other object than the grant of financial assistance from the clergy and the making of preparations for the Council of Trent. So great was his complacency that when the Huguenots boasted that they were to take part in the Assembly he dismissed their assertions contemptuously, and even the safe-conduct cast for him no shadow of future calamity.³ His simplicity seems to

¹ Dupuy, p. 79. Cf. Isnard, I, No. 1635.

² Šusta, I, 222-3.

³ Šusta, I, 217; Delaborde, *Les Protestants à St Germain*, p. 79.

have been quite unique. Chantonnay, for instance, was fully aware that the Government was in secret communication with Calvin, Beza and Peter Martyr, and felt certain that all the talk of a conference and of an interim would not be allowed to peter out ineffectually.¹ The blindness of the nuncio can only be ascribed to the powerful dazzle of the Queen's deceptive arts.

That skilled illusionist, as she had quickly become, was now ready to perform her last preliminary trick before the curtain rose upon the main performance. On July 31st she made public the text of the edict drawn up three weeks earlier. Its first clauses, in accordance with the decisions of the Parlement, forbade all assemblies of Huguenots with or without arms, and all non-Catholic worship whether performed in private or in public, under pain of banishment and forfeiture of property. These severe provisions commended themselves to most of the Catholics,² but helped to increase German suspicion in regard to the Guises' secret advances.³ They were almost completely nullified, however, by the remainder of the edict, which forbade in comprehensive terms all violence of speech or action over matters of religion, declared private houses to be inviolable, recommended lenience to the judges and again extended a general amnesty to prisoners. Finally the settlement was pronounced to be only temporary, until the final decisions of a General Council or of the forthcoming Synod.⁴

But the Synod was actually opening on the very same day! For all practical purposes the edict was stillborn, killed by the arts of the mother who had borne it so unwillingly. Not inaptly has it been called "a miracle of calculated incoherence and deceit".⁵

¹ Šusta, I, 209-10, 212 notes; *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 12-13.

² E.g. to the Venetian ambassadors—Layard, pp. 30-1.

³ For. Cal., No. 399.

⁴ Text in *Mémoires de Condé*, pp. 42-5; and Isambert, xiv, 109-11. Cf. Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, pp. 158-64, and Isnard, I, Nos. 1629-33.

⁵ Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, p. 160. All further references to M. Romier indicate this book.

CHAPTER IX

The Assembly of Poissy

La dicte assemblée a porté et porte encore grand préjudice à la religion chrestienne, parce que furent mandez tous les grands hérétiques de Genève. Et de là sont sortiz tous les maux qui s'en sont puis après en suivys.

François Grin, *Mémoires*.

I

THE Seine after it has passed through Paris describes a series of leisurely loops to the north-west, turning back repeatedly upon its course as if loath to tear itself away from the neighbourhood of the fair city. In the neck of one of these loops, commanding an extensive view towards the capital, stands St Germain-en-Laye, and three or four miles to the north, screened off by a belt of woodland, lies Poissy, where the river, which in the meanwhile has come round a loop flung several miles out to the east, is again met and is spanned by one of the finest of French mediæval bridges. The late Romanesque church dates from the early twelfth century, witnessed the baptism of St Louis and survived to be restored by Viollet-le-Duc. The castle, pointing back to earlier times when Poissy had been an important residence of the Carolingian Emperors, was given by Philip the Fair to the Dominican nuns, who transformed it into one of the most fashionable convents in France.¹

Perhaps Catherine did not forget the town's connection with Charlemagne and St Louis² when she summoned the French bishops thither. But sentimental considerations were never, with her, a determining force. Poissy was a "royal" monastery conveniently near to St Germain-en-Laye; there was ample space for their Lordships' accommodation; the abbey church was large enough for the daily Masses that would be said, and the spacious refectory formed a perfect assembly hall. But more

¹ Its twenty-six nuns (in 1561) were all of noble family, and had six chaplains. The Abbey had been reformed in 1507.

² For the cult of St Louis at Poissy see the monograph of Henri Parguez, *St Louis et Poissy* (St Germain-en-Laye 1914). Cf. also Edmond Bories, *Histoire de la ville de Poissy*, 1901 (new edition 1925).

than half the hierarchy refrained from putting in a personal appearance; and Claude Haton would have us believe that unless the Council had had the support of Lorraine there would have been no response at all to the royal summons. Only forty-six archbishops and bishops, including six cardinals, were gathered at Poissy out of the 113 for whom arrangements had been made, when the Cardinal of Lorraine, still convalescent and carried in a litter, arrived on July 29th.¹

His arrival enabled a start to be made, and on the last day of the month, in the afternoon, the Assembly was formally opened in the presence of the King, the royal family, the Constable and many ladies and gentlemen of the Court.² The Government now began to reveal its hand, rekindling the suspicions of the nuncio and confirming those of the Spanish ambassador; for after a few official words from the King the Chancellor addressed the bishops and outlined for them a programme of much wider scope than that laid down in the summons of June 12th. They were to deal, it appeared, with the urgent religious and administrative problems which could not be left unattended to pending the removal of the difficulties standing in the way of a General Council. They were to propose comprehensive measures for the pacification of the realm, the healing of religious divisions, and the paternal, persuasive shepherding back into the fold of those errant sheep whom force had failed so signally to replace on the right paths. The delay in the General Council had necessitated a National Council, and it was neither unprecedented nor unreasonable that the King should seek a national prescription for national ills. De l'Hôpital even em-

¹ *Journal du Colloque*, ed. de Ruble in the *Mém. de la Société de l'hist. de Paris et de l'Isle de France*, 1889, pp. 11-13. I have given my reasons for questioning d'Espence's authorship of this *Journal* in the *Revue Historique*, May-June 1930. The cardinals were Tournon, Armagnac, Bourbon, Lorraine, Guise and Châtillon. Cf. the *Mémoires de Claude Haton*, ed. by Bourquelot for the *Collection de Documents inédits*, 1, 157-8; but Haton's subsequent account of the Colloquy is confused and untrustworthy. Throckmorton relates that he and other foreign diplomats were turned out of Poissy and sent to Paris in order to make room for the bishops, *For. Cal.* 1561-2, No. 336 (11).

² The *Journal du Colloque*, p. 13, includes the Duke of Guise, but he was still at Calais with Mary Stuart and did not return to court until the 23rd. His return on that date is later noted by the *Journal* itself, p. 21.

barked upon an historical justification of this position, conceding however that if the designation of "National Council" gave offence, that of "National Assembly" would do equally well. No difficulties would be raised in regard to placing the Assembly's decisions before the General Council—should this happily eventuate—or to submitting them to the Pope. His Holiness could surely be relied upon to sanction any measures taken in the service of God and for the welfare of the kingdom.¹ Thus it was still theoretically possible to interpret the Assembly as one of preparation for a General Council, and this was the explanation given in letters to Rome,² in answer to Viterbo's anxious enquiries, and as a retort to Chantonnay's blunt remark that the Queen was totally ignorant of the business of government.³ None the less the implications of the Chancellor's speech could hardly fail to be perceived. Tournon saw instantly that it involved a virtual repudiation of the Council of Trent and was entirely out of harmony with the original summons convoking the bishops. Taken by surprise, he requested permission to consult the Assembly in private and to be furnished with a copy of the speech before making his formal reply, adding however that the bishops were perfectly willing to accord a kindly reception to any of the Huguenots provided they came prepared to accept, rather than to deal out, admonitions. But it was found impossible, even after repeated endeavours, to extract a copy of his speech from the Chancellor, a circumstance at first regarded with extreme suspicion: the excuse, however, that the speech had been unwritten, and delivered more or less extempore owing to enforced changes made only a few hours beforehand, at length

¹ *Diario dell' assemblea de' Vescovi a Poissy*, published by Mgr. Roserot de Melin in the *Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire (École française de Rome)*, 1921-2, pp. 91-4; *Journal du Colloque*, pp. 13-14. These accounts seem to indicate that the text published by Dufey, I, 485-92, as the Chancellor's speech of Sept. 9th, must in reality be a draft, very likely a first draft, of his speech of this day, July 31st. Allowing for the extempore alterations which he claimed to have been forced to make, it fits in perfectly with the accounts of those who heard the speech.

² Le Plat, IV, 716. This letter also contained a refusal to return to the policy of fire and sword, as the Pope desired.

³ *Susta*, I, 227-8; *La Ferrière*, I, 607.

decided the Assembly that the fruitless request was not worth further pursuit.¹

Obedient to his orders the nuncio refrained from participation in the Council. But in his new-born anxiety he interviewed the leading ecclesiastics with great assiduity, emphasizing the dangers of the situation and urging caution against the designs of the Government. Here, at least, he found consolation. Although governmental nominees, the bishops were for the most part in complete antagonism to the Regent's policy, and under reasonable leadership they might be relied upon to offer stubborn opposition to any project that smelt—however faintly—of heresy or schism. This leadership they found in Cardinal Tournon whose influence, despite his age and feebleness—or perhaps because of them—was very powerful in ecclesiastical circles. He and Lorraine both assured Viterbo that the Assembly's activities would be kept within canonical bounds, and that its findings would take the shape of advisory opinions rather than of formal decrees.² These assertions, coupled with repeated assurances on the part of Catherine and Anthony of their great regard for the Pope, quieted Viterbo, who replied with an emphatic "No" when asked by Cardinal Armagnac whether it were true that Tournon and Lorraine had papal authority to assemble a National Council.³

The bishops showed at once that they had no intention of allowing themselves to be committed above their heads by the Chancellor. Meeting by themselves on the next day they passed at Tournon's instigation a unanimous declaration of loyalty to the Pope and solemnly asserted their determination to do nothing contrary to his wishes. They repudiated the title of "National Council", and by a self-denying ordinance limited their sphere of action to reform and the correction of abuses, declaring that questions of doctrine must be reserved for the General Council already opened at Trent. A more decisive contradiction of the Chancellor's thesis could hardly have been imagined. The bishops had vindicated the independence of the

¹ *Diario*, pp. 94-5, 97, 98-9; *Journal du Colloque*, p. 17.

² Layard, p. 38; Šusta, I, 228, 229, 230, 236.

³ Šusta, I, 229.

Church, they had rejected the claim of the State to manipulate them in its own interests and in defiance of Rome.¹ Even Cardinal Châtillon is said to have distinguished himself by a speech in warm praise of the Pope.²

After the definition of status and competence came the settlement of procedure and the drawing up of a programme. The conduct of business was placed jointly in the hands of Lorraine and Tournon, but as Dean of the Sacred College, Archbishop of Lyons and Primate of France, Tournon was recognized as president. The bishops sat in a large semicircle by seniority of consecration, Chartres, in whose diocese Poissy lay, being allowed precedence over the rest. Two secretaries furnished with hour-glasses sat at a table within the semicircle, one of them being a private secretary of Lorraine's named Le Breton. The business fell into four divisions: the financial subvention, the reform of abuses, the selection of prelates to attend the Council of Trent, and the general question of applying remedies to the prevalent religious disorders. A committee of twelve theologians under Lorraine's presidency met in his house and drew up twelve heads of reform covering a wide field.³ It was decided to hold general Congregations

¹ *Journal du Colloque*, p. 15; *Diario*, pp. 95-7, 101; Šusta, I, 231; For. Cal., No. 361. The Assembly came to be known as the first of the General Assemblies of the Church of France (see Duranthon, *Collection des Procès-Verbaux des Assemblées-Générales de l'Église de France*, 1767-8, I, and Serbat, *Les Assemblées-Générales de l'Église de France*, 1906). The notoriety of the Colloquy and the traditional reliance on the Calvinist sources only—La Place, the *H.E.*, de Serres and de Thou, who may be regarded as following the Calvinist tradition in this connection—has had the effect of largely swamping the Assembly itself, which is ignored by many writers (see Roserot de Melin, *Rome et Poissy*, introduction to the *Diario*).

² This is on the authority of the *Diario*, p. 95. Soranzo however says that Châtillon was purposely absent on this important day—Layard, pp. 35-6.

³ i. Quid est praescribendum episcopis. ii. De dignitatibus Ecclesiarum cathedralium. iii. De canonicis et eorum exemptionibus. iv. De curatis et eorum institutionibus, sive per praesentationem, sive per collationem ordinariam. v. De portione congrua eis assignanda. vi. De minoribus sacerdotibus et eorum effrenato numero. vii. De Reformatione monasteriorum. viii. Quid est sentiendum de Commendis. ix. De Beneficiorum numero et incompatibilitate. x. Num remedium tantis litibus inveniri posset. xi. Qua via in posterum providendum sit Ecclesiis et Monasteriis vacantibus. xii. De censuris ecclesiasticis.—*Journal du Colloque*, p. 16. See also *Mém. de Condé*, II, 507-8; I, 48-9 with the editor's note. Copies also in the Record Office, For. Cal., Nos. 361 and 362.

twice a week, on Mondays and Thursdays, at 7 a.m. and 2 p.m., but actually Congregations came to be held daily. Twelve theologians and twelve canonists were chosen to make elucidatory speeches for the benefit of the bishops, but were not granted votes as Lorraine had at first desired.¹ The same restriction was placed upon the proxies of absent bishops. The principle, as later at Trent, was "No bishop, no vote".²

After these preliminaries Pontifical High Mass was sung in the abbey church on Sunday, August 3rd, to inaugurate the sessions. The celebrant was Cardinal Armagnac, and with a few exceptions all the ecclesiastics gathered at Poissy received Holy Communion from his hands. The exceptions were significant, all the more so in that it had been laid down that absentees should be excluded from the Assembly. A few hundred yards away, in the parish church, the Bishop of Uzès celebrated what can only be termed an opposition Mass, preaching—illogically enough—on the text "Coena Domini, Sacramentum Concordiae et Charitatis", and distributing Holy Communion under both kinds to a congregation which included Cardinal Châtillon and the Bishop of Valence; while the Abbé de Salignac similarly communicated the well-known theologians Bouteiller and Toussaint Gibou,³ the vicars-general of the dioceses of Beauvais and Toulouse which both belonged to Châtillon. This unwarranted public affront to the disciplinary regulations of the Church on the part of eminent ecclesiastics made a deep

¹ Šusta, I, 229.

² *Journal du Colloque*, pp. 13, 15-16; *Diario*, pp. 96, 101.

³ On Salignac and Bouteiller see above pp. 243-4. Toussaint Gibou, a doctor of the Sorbonne, had become vicar-general of the archdiocese of Toulouse in 1552, after a retraction of Calvinistic doctrine. Later, however, he became a Calvinist minister at Dieppe, where he seems to have been something of a stormy petrel, causing scandal both by his quarrels with other ministers and his *mœurs galantes*. In 1580 he was suspended by the Calvinist authorities and in 1581 reconciled to the Church by Cardinal Bourbon. He was then made curé of St Jacques in Rouen where he died the following year—(Féret, I, 290-1, and Hardy, *Histoire de l'église protestante de Dieppe*, 1896, pp. 113-17). De Ruble has a piece of characteristic negligence here. In a note on p. 10 he tells us that d'Espence was one of the three theologians who communicated *sub utraque specie* on the 3rd. But his reference is to the relevant passage in the very document which he himself is editing and which of course only mentions Bouteiller, Salignac and Gibou!

impression. Whether it was a deliberate *ballon d'essai* to test public opinion or merely an impulsive demonstration on the part of a few liberals, it was entirely without justification or excuse. And while it shocked Catholic opinion it does not seem to have succeeded in creating a favourable impression among the Calvinists. The bishops were so enraged that it was only with the greatest difficulty that they were prevailed upon to admit the six ultraquists to their places in the Assembly on the following day.¹

Some ten days were then spent in a discussion on the duties of bishops, the first of the twelve points; while concurrently financial negotiations were begun with the Government.² The twelve theologians spoke first, followed by the twelve canonists, and it was only on August 11th that the turn arrived of the bishops themselves, who found much less to say. On the 13th it was voted that the decree *Quid est praescribendum Episcopis* should be constructed on the model of Lorraine's speech, which had dealt with the subject exhaustively. He had suggested that the King might be petitioned not to include bishops among his councillors, and had maintained that any bishop forced to be continually at Court ought to resign in preference to perpetual non-residence. He had also recommended that Rome should not permit the creation of so many suffragan (*i.e.* assistant) bishops and should refuse to institute any candidate presented for a bishopric who did not fulfil all the conditions prescribed by the Concordat.³ During these discussions the attitudes of Châtillon, Uzès and Valence were irreproachable. Perhaps they hoped by dint of good behaviour to disperse the cloud that had settled upon them. But the cloud around Valence increased rather than diminished, for on August 5th the Sorbonne censured and placed on its index several passages from his books and published sermons, while his proposal for regular diocesan communions of the "Body and Blood of Our Lord" was

¹ *Journal du Colloque*, pp. 16-17; *Diario*, p. 97. Cf. Languet, II, 129-30. The incident figures in practically all accounts or reports of the Assembly.

² The detailed course of these may be followed in Serbat, *op. cit.* See also Laferrière, *Le Contrat de Poissy*, 1905.

³ *Diario*, pp. 102-3. These conditions were often ignored.

taken, in conjunction with certain passages in his catechism, as a virtual recommendation of lay communion *sub utraque specie*.¹ Châtillon, after urging that the Assembly should send an account of itself to the Pope, maintained that dissenters ought to be regarded by the bishops rather as strayed sheep than as adversaries—though their behaviour did not always conform to this description. The Cardinal's harking back to one of the Chancellor's principal themes was probably intended as a personal *apologia*, for he was at the moment offering hospitality at St Germain to the Huguenot ministers who were already assembling for the Colloquy. This was indeed no secret; it led the bishops to suspect that Châtillon had inside knowledge of the Government's plans. They turned down, it is true, a proposal of Tournon's to sign a general Confession of Faith, but their agreement to regard the general communion of August 3rd as of equal significance struck a powerful, if indirect, blow at the three utraquist prelates and their followers.²

On August 13th discussion opened on the next five articles.³ At their own request Condé and his Protestant cousin, the Prince of Roche-sur-Yon, were admitted to listen to Bouteiller and Salignac and thus heard the criticisms made by both these theologians. Bouteiller did not confine himself to condemning the use of organs in church or to censuring various liturgical customs. He attacked the rights, the powers, and indeed the whole institution of assistant bishops, denied the superiority of bishops over priests to be *de jure divino*, and, worst of all, appeared to question the papal supremacy by placing the Roman Church fourth only in a list of patriarchal sees. Lorraine, interviewed afterwards by Viterbo, made excuses for Bouteiller, but took the opportunity of reminding the nuncio of the strength of feeling in clerical circles against annates and preventions.⁴ This feeling was amply demonstrated on the ensuing days. A pro-

¹ Féret, I, 270; *Diario*, p. 103.

² *Diario*, pp. 101-3, 104; *Journal du Colloque*, pp. 18-20.

³ The theologians spoke in the following order: Salignac, Bouteiller, d'Espence, Cotignon, Vigor, du Pré, Coquier, Gibou, Brochot, Seneschal, de Saintes and Civy.

⁴ Susta, I, 236.

posals to restore the election of parish priests was only dropped after long discussion, but it was decided to petition the Pope to abolish preventions, to restore their full rights to patrons and to abstain from the grant of dispensations from impediments of age. Lorraine himself spoke forcibly of the disorder created by wholesale dispensations from canonical requirements, but did not question the principle: Salignac, on the other hand, maintained that the Pope had no more power to exempt clergy from the jurisdiction of their ordinary than he had to dispense a son from obedience to his father. The Italian Bishop of Troyes, whom the Tuscan ambassador described as a "diabolic man",¹ irritated the Assembly by delivering a long prepared speech in Latin—so far the proceedings had been in French—which though of a sensational nature is reported as having been largely irrelevant to the topics under discussion. He intimated that permission to imitate the Apostles in the following of some useful trade might have the gratifying effect of thinning out the swollen ranks of pauper clergy, and followed Bouteiller in questioning the distinction between priest and bishop and in condemning the ceremonial censuring of ministers. The Bishop of Paris, who spoke next, replied to Troyes with heat, and pointedly deprecated such attempts to waste the Assembly's time with irrelevancies. The next day, August 21st, the discussions were suspended, the first six articles having been now dealt with.²

The length of time devoted to these, especially to the first, had much disquieted the nuncio, who complained to Lorraine and Tournon and remonstrated vigorously with the Queen. That a whole fortnight and more had been consumed in the discussion of matters which could easily have been disposed of in two or three days did not lend support, he observed, to Catherine's assurances that the Assembly was merely one of preparation for the General Council. The question of electing representatives to go to Trent had not even been so much as

¹ Desjardins, *Négociations*, III, 462. By name Antonio Caracciolo, this prelate apostatized to the Calvinists a few weeks after the close of the Assembly.

² For these discussions see the *Journal du Colloque*, p. 20, and the *Diario*, pp. 104-8.

broached, and it was a public scandal that matters lying outside the Assembly's proper sphere should have been dealt with, in pointed disregard of all pledges to the contrary.¹ The Government's alleged respect for the Pope and for the rest of the Catholic world assembling at Trent seemed no more than lip-service. Yet Viterbo was forced to admit that much of the blame for the slow progress lay with the bishops themselves. It had been supposed that the woods between Poissy and St Germain, together with the pleasant and extensive meadows lying on the far side of the river, would offer ample facilities for recreation and exercise after the labours of the day.² Unfortunately these rustic attractions proved insufficient, and while the theologians were bearing on their shoulders the main burden of the debates, many of the bishops spent whole days in Paris, where their daily presence in the streets seems to have given some scandal.³ The Queen promised to remedy this state of affairs, and having informed the Synod through Cardinal Châtillon of the nuncio's complaints, laid down that none of its members were to leave Poissy without her knowledge and ordered the discussions to be speeded up.⁴

No one, however, knew better than Châtillon himself how far it was from Catherine's intentions to impose a hurried closure upon the Assembly. The surprise move which lay up her sleeve would have been effectively blocked had the bishops finished their discussions and broken up within a few days. Châtillon's own marked restraint, the discreet conservatism of his ex-

¹ Presumably Annates and Preventions and Dispensations. The question of giving the Calvinist divines a hearing had not yet been officially brought forward.

² *Journal du Colloque*, p. 12.

³ Many of the bishops having received their sees as rewards for diplomatic or other services, or even for reasons of a more personal nature, their lack of interest in and knowledge of things canonical and theological is hardly surprising. The Parisians however were not unaccustomed to the sight of bishops. According to Montluc's speech at Fontainebleau in August 1560, some forty lived habitually in the capital. Doubtless it was much more scandalous that they should neglect an important and critical Assembly than that they should habitually leave their dioceses to be managed by vicars-general. A contemporary proverb said "extra Parisium [*sic*] nullum esse Paradisum". Standards of pleasure are surprisingly static.

⁴ Šusta, I, 236, 257; Layard, p. 38.

hortations to a more strict observance of the Canons, did not dissipate the suspicion with which his Protestant house-party was regarded at Poissy. By August 17th more than a dozen pastors and as many lay delegates were enjoying his hospitality, discussing eagerly—presumably with his sympathetic co-operation—the terms on which they would consent to engage in debate. They were hoping to be able to discuss the use of images, the Mass, the vocation and ordination of ministers, the administration of Baptism and Holy Communion, the customs of the early Church. They were even prepared to explore avenues of agreement.¹ On Sunday, August 17th, they again presented the King with their Confession of Faith, coupling it with a petition for a Colloquy and a list of conditions which they considered essential. These were that the King and his Court should be present; that the arbiters of faith should not be their adversaries the Catholic bishops but the Bible, the Hebrew text for the Old Testament, the Greek for the New; and that two secretaries, one of each religion, should be present to record the proceedings accurately.²

But they were in no hurry to begin. For Theodore Beza was not yet arrived, and without their great champion they felt as powerless and ineffective as bees without their queen. Moreover they were apprehensive lest, should Beza not come quickly, the bishops might close the Assembly without hearing them. This would have left them at St Germain in a position of some embarrassment, with an out-of-date safe-conduct, and the stern July edict hanging over them.³ It was Catherine's real policy, therefore, not to press the bishops. The spinning-out of their debates, the loquacity of the theologians, served her purpose admirably. And her position was strong. She could well afford to ignore the nuncio's repeated complaints that everything possible was being done except to prepare for the Council of Trent and even answer him with a severity amounting to

¹ For. Cal., No. 422. Cf. La Ferrière, *Le XVI^e siècle et les Valois*, p. 55.

² *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 512-13. All the subsequent Protestant sources supply this piece—La Place, the *H.E.*, de Serres, etc. See also Baum, *Theodor Beza*, II, 219; and For. Cal., No. 421.

³ *C.R., Op. Cal.* XVIII, 602-3. Cf. Claude Haton, *Mémoires*, p. 158.

personal rudeness,¹ for she had taken the precaution of having his courier robbed at Turin. Much of what Viterbo had written to Rome since the opening of the Assembly never reached its destination as a result of this piece of royal highway robbery, Catherine's subsequent disavowal of which deceived nobody. With his faith in the Queen rapidly evaporating, even though he was as yet unaware of this last outrage, Viterbo turned to Lorraine and expressed his alarm at the Huguenot request for a Colloquy. He received an assurance that there would be no public debate, and that the reformers would only be heard if they consented to abide by the bishops' censures.²

How far Viterbo's fears can have been quieted it is difficult to surmise. The attitude of the bishops was certainly encouraging. They had given the lie to the Chancellor and had received the speeches of Bouteiller, Salignac and the Bishop of Troyes with marked disapproval. Under Tournon's leadership they could be relied upon to fight hard against surrender to the Government's unpalatable designs. But it was also evident that they were easily swayed, and that though Tournon might serve an excellent purpose as a figurehead, as a venerable personality in whom resistance might find a rallying point and an inspiration, it was in point of fact the Cardinal of Lorraine who held in his grasp the actual management of the Assembly. It was thus primarily upon Lorraine's attitude that further developments would depend. It was he whose presence had been considered essential for the opening ceremony, who had made all arrangements as to seating and procedure, who had overcome the difficulties raised by the nuns in regard to their enclosure, who had presided over the committee which had drawn up the twelve heads of reform.³ In the debates his influence had been clearly decisive; he had shown an almost puritan zeal for reform whilst carefully avoiding any suspicion of unorthodoxy. All this was doubtless most satisfactory. Yet it remained true that while Tournon's singleness of purpose was transparent, Lorraine, after his known association with Baudouin and the eirenic party,

¹ Layard, p. 38.

² Šusta, I, 236.

³ *Journal du Colloque*, pp. 13, 15, 16.

could hardly fail to be looked upon as somewhat of a dark horse. Had he been deliberately playing the Queen's game in spinning out the debates? Was he privately encouraging and preparing for the Colloquy? Even with his limited knowledge Viterbo might well have felt that there was reason for anxiety when he turned these questions over in his mind.

II

With Beza's arrival at St Germain on August 22nd the general interest of the situation is transferred thither across the woods from Poissy. Already well acquainted with the King of Navarre, Condé and Coligny, Beza found new friends in de l'Hôpital, Cardinal Châtillon and even Cardinal Bourbon, who had apparently now overcome the scruples that in the previous summer had deterred him from conversation with the great heresiarch at the Bourbon court at Nérac.¹ Goodwill all round was plainly the order of the day. On the 23rd the Duke of Guise appeared at St Germain from Calais, and on the following day a personal reconciliation between him and Condé was effected in the King's presence.² That same evening a still more remarkable meeting took place.

Summoned to Anthony's apartments, Beza discovered himself in the presence of Catherine de Médicis with two of her ladies, of M. d'Étampes, Condé, the Cardinal of Bourbon and, somewhat to his disconcertment, the Cardinal of Lorraine as well. The Queen received him graciously, and as he stood wondering how he should comport himself towards Lorraine the latter approached him and breaking in upon his hesitation said ingratiatingly, "Hitherto you have been known to me only through your books, which in your absence abroad³ have occasioned the greatest disturbances in France. Now that you are here in person, I trust that you will show a spirit of peace and goodwill and lend us your aid in suppressing these disturbances."

¹ *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xviii, 625-6; Baum, *Anhang*, pp. 44-5.

² An *arrêt* of the Parlement had pronounced Condé's innocence in June.

³ Beza had been out of France since 1548.

It was a double-edged greeting. Beza replied modestly that indeed he was too unimportant a person to possess the wide influence with which the Cardinal credited him; moreover he had always deprecated violence, as he was prepared to prove in the forthcoming Colloquy. The Queen here intervened, and having first cleverly drawn from Beza a denial that he had been the author of the *Épistre au Tigre de la France*, began to speak of Calvin, simulating a great interest in details regarding his health, his personal appearance and habits. After some little time had been thus spent in working up an atmosphere of enforced and artificial ease, Lorraine began to turn the conversation into theological channels. In pursuance of his intention to concentrate the Colloquy upon the question of the Real Presence he began to sound Beza's eucharistic views. First, he expressed his surprise at an opinion, commonly ascribed to Beza, to the effect that Christ was no more present in the Eucharist than in the mud of the street—"quod Christus sit in Coena sicut in Coeno". Then, he continued, he had among his books at Poissy one in which Beza affirmed that Christ was to be sought in the Eucharist only as He existed before the Incarnation, a doctrine implying the absurdity that Christians enjoyed no closer union with God than had the Jews under the old dispensation. The first quotation Beza instantly repudiated; neither he nor any of his followers had been guilty of such blasphemy. The second he could not disavow. But he maintained that it was only absurd if stated apart from its context. If account were taken of the undeniable truth that Christ had existed both as God and as Mediator before the Incarnation, the absurdity disappeared. The Cardinal admitted this, and quoted in support the text "Agnus, qui occisus est a creatione Mundi".¹ Beza then enlarged upon the contrasts between the Old and the New Testament, but presently the Cardinal brought the conversation back to the Eucharist and asked for Beza's interpretation of the words of institution.

The reformer then gave a short dissertation on the orthodox Calvinist interpretation of the eucharistic presence. Repudiating

¹ Apoc. xiii, 8.

the absolute Sacramentarianism of the Zwinglians, who regarded the Lord's Supper as no more than a simple commemorative rite, he expounded the theology usually associated with Bucer and the Strasburg school. This theology held a middle, though by no means a mediatory, position between that of the Zwinglians on the one hand and that of the Lutherans, with their theories of Impanation and Consubstantiation, on the other. It taught the doctrine of *Signa Efficacia* as opposed to *Signa Representativa*. The signs—that is the bread and wine—do not merely represent; they actually are the channel through which flows the efficacy of that for which they stand. Beza explained that in the Eucharist the bread and wine remained distinct from what they represented, yet by a spiritual elevation were raised to a state of higher significance, and this by the direct action of God's power rather than by the words of consecration. Moreover what they signified was not simply the merits of Christ's passion. It was our Lord's true and actual Body and Blood which, by a process as real as the physical act of eating and drinking, were received by faith and contemplated as They existed in Heaven by the faithful communicant. Yet the Body and Blood were not contained in the bread, nor yet with the bread, which remained unchanged in substance. The doctrine of Transubstantiation, he urged, destroyed the nature of a Sacrament by annihilating the substance of the symbol and leaving the accidents alone to fulfil the symbolic function.¹

Lorraine would not be led into a detailed argument. He believed fully, he replied, in the defensibility of Transubstantiation, but held nevertheless that theology might have got on quite well without the term, and was not himself of the opinion that schism should exist or be perpetuated on its account. He spoke against the idea of a localized presence and referred in a very general way to Lutheran doctrines, alleging however that

¹ For a recent study of Calvinist eucharistic doctrine see Alexander Barclay, *The Protestant Doctrine of the Lord's Supper* (1927), pp. 113 *et seq.* In his recent work, *Cranmer and the Reformation in England* (1925), Mr C. H. Smyth has claimed that this was the doctrine held consistently by Cranmer after his first abandonment of Transubstantiation, and that it is the doctrine intended to be taught by the official formularies of the Church of England.

he had not had sufficient time to examine them properly. At the first mention of Lutheranism Beza was on the alert. At all costs this dangerous wedge must not be inserted into the cracks of the reformed edifice; the Cardinal must not be allowed to make capital out of Luthero-Calvinist eucharistic dissensions. Lutherans and Calvinists alike, he assured Lorraine, though united in the rejection of Transubstantiation on the one hand and the Sacramentarianism of the Zwinglians and Anabaptists on the other, both held firmly that a real communication of Christ's Body and Blood took place in the Eucharist.

This exposition may well have taken the Cardinal by surprise. He had probably expected sheer Sacramentarianism from Beza, since it was the general belief even in well-informed Catholic circles that the Calvinists denied the Real Presence *in toto*. Instead he had got this doctrine of the spiritual reception, of the *Signa Efficacia*. Beza pressed his advantage. It was by a sacramental as contrasted with a real or hypostatic union that the bread and wine became Christ's Body and Blood, which, though present corporally in Heaven and nowhere else, were received spiritually and by faith as truly as the signs themselves were consumed. Lorraine seems not to have instantly perceived—or perhaps at the moment he may not have cared to stress—the profound divergence between this belief and the Catholic doctrine. It was enough, for the moment, that Beza had admitted a real communication of our Lord's Body and Blood. There was even better reason than he had previously believed to look forward with optimism to the complete conversion of the Calvinists in a more thorough discussion. He turned towards the Queen, who with the rest of the company had been listening with great intensity, if perhaps with little intelligence, to the exchanges of the protagonists. "I am satisfied", he said. "Thus also do I believe."

His words produced a sensation. The Queen in premature triumph excitedly bade Lorraine mark well his error in reputing as Sacramentarians those with whom he was really in complete agreement. He himself declared that after so promising a start he would welcome nothing so much as a series of conversations

with Beza. "You will find me", he added engagingly, "not so black as I am painted."¹

One of the Queen's ladies present at this interview was Madame de Crussol, a wit of local repute and Protestant sympathies. "Bon homme pour ce soir, mais demain, quoi?" was her comment at the end of the evening as she gaily clasped the Cardinal's hand in her own.² Beza had good occasion to recall her *mot* next day when he heard a report that the Cardinal was claiming to have scored decisively off him. If it be true that Lorraine did in fact make such a claim, he certainly cannot be absolved from the charge of having lapsed from the strict truth; and when Montmorency made merry with Catherine over the alleged triumph he was severely—and rightly—given to understand that he was very poorly informed indeed.³ To the nuncio Lorraine himself explained that his hand had been forced by the Queen; he said that he had prolonged the interview no longer than was strictly necessary, had said nothing to which objection could possibly be taken and believed, moreover, that he had made some impression upon the Calvinist leader.⁴ It is not impossible that the nuncio in later conversation may have magnified this modest—though still unfounded—claim into the proportions of a dialectic triumph. But a contrary version that it was rather the Cardinal who had yielded ground also

¹ All the accounts of this evening come from the Huguenot side. The most immediate source is Beza's letter to Morel of Aug. 25th, of which there are two texts. First a Latin text, giving a very detailed account of the theological conversation and published in *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XVIII, 635-41; secondly a shorter French text published in the same volume, pp. 630-5 and also by Baum, *Anhang*, pp. 45-54, where it is supplemented from the Latin text by footnotes. See also *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XVIII, 644; La Place, pp. 235-8; and the *H.E.* I, 545-52. A second-hand version tells us that Lorraine stood morosely silent while the Queen excitedly pointed out that the Calvinists were after all no Sacramentarians but believers in the Real Presence—*B.S.H.P.F.* xxxii, 151, from a MS. diary in Gotha. But Beza in his letters states distinctly that Lorraine himself was equally committal.

² A more clumsy and perhaps therefore truer version of this well-known remark, reporting it as addressed to Catherine, is given in Kluckhohn, I, 206: "Frau, schafft aynen schreyber oder ziehn herzu, so diese ding auffzeichnen dan obwohl der Cardinal heut angefangen ayn Christ zu werden so wurt ess doch morgen alles wider leugnen, wan es nit auffgeschrieben ist".

³ *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XVIII, 640, 653. Cf. La Place, p. 238; *H.E.* I, 552.

⁴ *Susta*, I, 241-2.

became current. It was indeed more accurate, for whether he had genuinely been taken by surprise and was momentarily found lacking in perspicuity, or whether he was simply making a tactical move, Lorraine had certainly given his *nihil obstat*, as it were, to Calvinist doctrine—that is if Beza's account is to be trusted. This second rumour was welcomed in quarters where the Guise correspondence with the German princes was known: it encouraged the extravagant speculation that Duke and Cardinal would join forces to flout the bishops, enforce the grant of churches to the Calvinists, and even end by worshipping in them themselves.¹ It was, at any rate, by now common knowledge that His Eminence favoured a Colloquy.²

Assembled to consider the Calvinist petition for a hearing, the *Conseil Privé* was informed that the Queen had already decided that it must be granted; all that remained was to settle conditions and procedure.³ These were questions which apparently proved too much for the *Conseil*, for on August 25th⁴ the bishops received through Cardinal Armagnac a notification of the royal decision that they were to give audience to the ministers under such conditions and at such time as they themselves might decide. Armagnac himself, armed with a scriptural quotation, advised that a public debate should be avoided. There is no record of any remonstrance from Tournon—perhaps he was not present. But Lorraine, while appearing to take it ill that the main decision had been made above the Assembly's head contrary to all reasonable expectation, did not suggest disobedience or even protest. He moved that after the twelve heads of reform had been discussed a delegate should be admitted to say whatsoever the so-called reformers desired to say; after which a suitable reply could be made either by word of mouth or in writing. Most of the bishops disliked the notion of making any reply at all. They considered that it would be

¹ Languet, II, 134; For. Cal., No. 461 (2). Cf. *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XVIII, 648–9, and Layard, p. 40.

² Susta, I, 241–2.

³ *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XVIII, 643.

⁴ This date, given by the *Diario*, p. 108, makes it the morning after Lorraine's conversation with Beza. The *Journal du Colloque*, p. 24, gives the 26th.

more proper after hearing the Huguenot case—if hear they must—to send it off to be dealt with at Trent. The Bishop of Quimper, Étienne Boucher, even upheld that a promise of filial submission to the judgment of the bishops should be demanded as a necessary preliminary to any audition at all. But a reply formed an integral part of Lorraine's plans and his persistence carried the motion. Only five bishops found courage enough to vote in opposition, denouncing the whole proceeding as contrary to Divine Law. But the nuncio, though disappointed with the Assembly's lack of spirit at a critical moment, and especially displeased with Cardinal Armagnac whom he criticized as weak and servile, was content to speak of the voting as contrary to the Canons.¹ It was little use blaming Armagnac. The more important question was whether the bishops would have resisted with greater effect had it not been for Lorraine.

It was not without a sense of humiliation that the Assembly turned to resume its suspended deliberations. Monastic reform and commendams figured next upon the list. Salignac and Bouteiller showed themselves hostile to monasticism in general and to the mendicant friars in particular, holding the latter responsible for many abuses and superstitions which they condemned. They urged simplification on a large scale and opposed the exemption of regulars from episcopal control, Salignac maintaining that the Pope had no authority to dispense from the regulations to this effect laid down by General Councils. Cardinal Châtillon and the Bishops of Valence and Uzès also showed hostility towards the monastic and mendicant Orders. They vigorously assailed the doctrine of works of supererogation, which found a defender in the Bishop of St Brieuc. The other bishops and theologians attacked the views of Salignac and Bouteiller but were profuse in milder suggestions for monastic

¹ *Diario*, pp. 109–10; *Journal du Colloque*, p. 24; Šusta, I, 241, 242, 249. Boucher had lately been under restraint for certain letters to Rome revealing matters which the Government wished to keep secret—see Šusta, I, 208–9. This seems strange in view of his pronounced Gallican and anti-papal views, at least as old as the Gallican crisis of 1551. But, as a former secretary of the Roman embassy, he must have had plenty of correspondents in Rome not all necessarily in close touch with the Curia.

reform, and there was a general opposition to commendams. At the close of the voting Lorraine's ascendancy was once more demonstrated. He was empowered to draft canons to be laid eventually before the Pope and the General Council.¹ Towards the end of the month he was able to content the nuncio with the assurance that the Assembly would soon disperse.²

In forcing the bishops to hear the reformers, the Queen, materially aided by Lorraine, had scored heavily. The Calvinists were jubilant; and their jubilation was swelled by the violent anti-clericalism of the speech delivered at Pontoise on August 27th by the orator of the Tiers-État,³ and by the successful vindication on the part of the Princes of the Blood—that is the Protestant Bourbons—to a higher seat in the Estates than the Cardinals. Yet there were still obstacles in the path of the Colloquy. Divisions of opinion began to reveal themselves in the Calvinist ranks as to the wisdom and safety of a conference. Catherine was not thoroughly trusted. She was, after all, an Italian, and so might be up to almost any kind of tricks. Some of the ministers began to conceive fears for their personal safety; to wonder whether it would not be wiser to confine controversy to paper. A wide liberty of preaching in Huguenot households in St Germain had been allowed them, and it is clear from their correspondence that it was on to this activity that most of their energy and interest was now focussed. It was more facile, more advantageous, and on the whole better advertisement, to conduct an enthusiastic apostolate than to embark upon a reasoned theological battle. And Beza, mindful of Lorraine's side-reference to Lutheranism, was apprehensive at the persistence with which the conversation at Court gravitated around the Confession of Augsburg. Calvin had warned him repeatedly of the dangers that lurked herein, and had counselled him to avoid being led into too great an intimacy

¹ *Diario*, pp. 110-18. Much that is of interest in the reports of these debates must necessarily be passed over here. No detailed study of the decrees or discussions of Poissy in comparison with those of Trent upon the same subjects has ever been undertaken. It would be quite worth doing.

² Šusta, I, 240.

³ *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 437-54; La Place, pp. 213-27.

with the Cardinal of Lorraine. Consequently the conversation of the 24th was not repeated, and Lorraine was given no opportunity of compromising himself further.

Gradually the nervous qualms of the Calvinists were overcome. When it was the liberal Bouteiller who enquired whether they could consider accepting the Augsburg Confession, Beza was less inclined to scent a snare and replied with an air of great concession that given some important modifications the thing might possibly be considered. There was also a rumour afloat, perhaps not wholly incorrect, that several of the bishops felt unwilling to condemn as a heretic anyone who accepted the Apostles' Creed. But it was of course questionable whether it would be with these more conciliatory spirits that the Colloquy would be held. Beza wavered a good deal and began to long as heartily for the arrival of Peter Martyr as the other pastors had previously longed for his.¹ It was mainly due to the persuasions of the Admiral's chaplain, Merlin, that the pastors were ultimately convinced that the Catholics would stand to gain nothing by committing any outrage upon them, and that they might with perfect safety embark upon the adventure of a Colloquy.²

Even so the Queen's difficulties were by no means over. The ministers insisted on their own conditions, or they would retire, casting—presumably—the dust of St Germain from off their feet. Catherine dared not grant their conditions. There was a limit to the lengths she might go in defiance of Catholic feeling. Protests poured in thick upon her from all sides. St André's passion provoked him to deliver a violent attack upon a Government which stooped to conversations with apostate religious and to means so base and illegitimate as a National Council; an open quarrel with Navarre was only prevented from assuming serious dimensions by the Marshal's sudden illness and retirement.³ A delegation from the Sorbonne expressed the widespread indignation of the faithful: the mere presence of the Huguenots at St Germain with their active propaganda was by

¹ *C.R., Op. Cal.* XVIII, 653-74; Languet, II, 140.

² *C.R., Op. Cal.* XVIII, 645.

³ Sources cited by de Ruble, *Antoine de Bourbon*, III, 155-6.

itself an abominable scandal, but that they should be allowed to insist on detailing their heretical sophistries in front of the young King, whose mind was still immature, could only be described as outrageous; the preachers should be sent away, or at least not allowed to speak in front of the King. Catherine saw that she could not force the ministers' conditions upon the bishops. She replied to the Sorbonnists that the ministers were subjects whose requests must be listened to, but promised to take no important step without due consultation. Nevertheless it was decided on the Feast of Our Lady's Nativity that on the following day, September 9th, the Calvinists should appear at Poissy before the bishops and that Beza should be their spokesman. Orally Catherine assured them that the bishops should not be their judges, but she dared not commit this pledge to writing.¹ On the other hand she had listened sympathetically to more than one protest against Huguenot outrages in the provinces—protests from Lavaur, from Pamiers, Bourges, Montpellier, and elsewhere—and had issued an edict against disorder.² For the moment, therefore, she hoped to have placated all parties.

She had not placated the nuncio. In a last attempt to throw dust into his eyes before they were finally destined to be rudely opened, she produced the ingenious statement that Beza would only be permitted to speak on those matters of reform which the bishops were discussing, and that there would consequently be no question of dogma.³ But she had at last gone too far. Viterbo could no longer be hoodwinked. He knew that the Queen was lying; that she had deliberately deceived him over the purpose of the Assembly. Obviously there was not the smallest intention, nor ever had been, of choosing delegates for Trent. There was to be a Colloquy with the Huguenots, followed by some form of doctrinal compromise. Viterbo could scarcely find words strong enough with which to castigate the Regent's

¹ *Journal du Colloque*, p. 26; La Place, p. 238; *H.E.* I, 553-5; *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xviii, 686; *For. Cal.*, Nos. 485, 492; Baum, *Anhang*, p. 61.

² *Diario*, pp. 103-4; *Journal du Colloque*, p. 25; *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 46-7 (edict of Aug. 27th) and pp. 49-50, both pieces from the *Journal* of Bruslart.

³ Layard, p. 41.

double-dealing. In return she accused him of spying out her secrets and revealing them to Spain; and had his every action studiously watched and noted. It was an inglorious end to his nunciature—derisively capped by the brigandage of Turin, of which he had at last become aware. Impatiently awaiting the release which the arrival of his successor would bring, yet not daring to make matters worse by a sudden retirement, he despatched a secretary to Rome on September 8th with the news that despite the good intentions of the bishops the situation had become highly critical. The Queen's word could not be trusted; she was completely under the thumb of the Huguenots; and the favours shown to Beza, the liberty of preaching allowed to the Calvinists, and the confidence reposed in suspected Catholics such as Montluc, du Mortier and de l'Hôpital but withheld from the more orthodox, all plainly foreshadowed an interim. The ruin of Catholicism in France would have its reverberations in Flanders, in Spain and even in Italy; it would undermine the position of the Church all over Europe. The General Council was being ignored, the Chancellor, who seemed to guide opinion on this issue, openly deriding the former Council at Trent and Bologna and maintaining with increasing vehemence that without Protestant co-operation any attempt at a General Council would be futility itself. The translation of the Council from Trent nearer to France, to Besançon perhaps, had been suggested, but it was obvious that the Government would have little use for it wherever it might be. Finally, though the Queen promised otherwise, there was every likelihood that the abolition of preventions and annates would be confirmed by an edict and its ratification forced upon the Parlement, owing to the anti-clericalism displayed by the Estates.

In these perilous circumstances there were, Viterbo thought, several steps that the Pope might be advised to take. He might send a formal letter of protest declaring that the General Council would go forward whether the French sent representatives or whether they stood aloof. He might refuse, for the future, to institute to any French benefice before the nominee had made a confession of faith or before a satisfactory report of his life

and reputation had been procured from the nuncio and two trustworthy Cardinals. These, however, were but minor expedients. In Viterbo's opinion the time for paper measures was past. Something more substantial, more concrete, was required. A league of Catholic powers headed by Spain, Savoy and Lorraine, and publicly supported by the Pope, could alone safeguard the maintenance of Catholicism in France. The mere massing of Spanish troops on the frontier, without actual recourse to arms, would probably suffice to frighten the heretics, to put new heart into the Catholic resistance, even, it might well be, to push Navarre definitely over to the Catholic side: possibly it would be welcomed at heart by the Queen herself, whose real trouble—thought Viterbo—was timidity, a feeling of weakness and insecurity, a repugnance to trust herself to any one party with a definite programme, and, above all, a violent dread of being the cause of bloodshed. The necessity of a league Viterbo maintained vigorously at some length, arguing that it was the only remedy for a desperate state of affairs.¹ At the same time he sent to Spain a memoir on the French situation, which without descending to explicit proposals pointed out clearly—and of course Philip knew them only too well—the dangers which would result to Spanish interests from the advance of heresy to a position of domination in France.²

III

On the morning of September 9th twenty-two Huguenot ministers and lay deputies, some on foot, others in carriages, made the short journey from St Germain to Poissy under the escort of a body of royal archers. Preparations for their reception having already been made, they were ushered by the Duke of Guise into the great monastic refectory and placed behind a barrier erected across one end. In this kind of extempore jury box they comported themselves with dignity, a task much

¹ Viterbo's instructions to his secretary, Cipriano Saracinello, Sept. 8th—Šusta, I, 250-4. Cf. his letter of the same date to the legates at Trent—*ibid.* pp. 248-9.

² Šusta, I, 254-7.

facilitated by the circumstance that they were not permitted to seat themselves.¹ Charles IX was already in his place at the other end of the hall. Gathered around him were his mother, the King of Navarre, the Chancellor, the Princes of the Blood, the ladies and gentlemen of the Court. Sermons delivered on the two previous days by the Cardinal of Lorraine and by a doctor of the Sorbonne had bade the child hold fast to the truths of the Catholic religion. They had been enthusiastically received by large congregations.²

The Chancellor at the King's request then addressed a few words to the bishops emphasizing the unique importance of the occasion. In the general interests of peace and harmony, for the sake of those aspirations towards the restoration of religious and moral unity which were so widely felt, it behoved them to attend with charity and patience to the Huguenots and to judge them with lenience. Yet so patent and unblushing was the contrast between what was about to take place and the Government's earlier promises, that de l'Hôpital again refused Cardinal Tournon's request for a written copy of his speech.³

One of the Huguenot gentlemen, called de Monneville, then rose to thank the King for his gracious kindness and to request permission for Beza to speak. This was granted, whereupon Beza fell upon his knees and offered up a short extempore prayer, the enforced *communicatio in sacris* doubtless causing a certain *malaise* to the bishops. The prayer over, he rose and said how much he valued the privilege and honour of being able to repudiate before the King's Majesty those false

¹ *Journal du Colloque*, p. 27; the Calvinist *Discours des Actes de Poissy (Mémoires de Condé, II, 490-1)* which begins here and is followed by La Place, pp. 238-9; *C.R., Op. Cal. XVIII, 685 et seq.*; Baum, *Anhang*, pp. 60 *et seq.*; *For. Cal.*, No. 492. Cf. Delaborde, pp. 8-10.

² *Journal du Colloque*, p. 26; *For. Cal.*, No. 488 (3).

³ I have explained above (p. 285 note 1) why I think that the text given by Dufey (I, 485-9) as the Chancellor's speech of Sept. 9th is probably that of July 31st. For the same reasons the speech put into his mouth on Sept. 9th by the Calvinist *Discours des Actes de Poissy (Mémoires de Condé, II, 491-3)* seems likewise to be that of July 31st. La Place, pp. 239-40, and the *H.E.* I, 557, do not follow the Calvinist *Discours* here, but give a short account of a speech very like one to which Dufey has assigned the curious date Sept. 1st (I, 467-79) and which I assume here to be really that delivered on Sept. 9th.

aspersions of sedition which had been so widely cast upon himself and his co-religionists. These accusations were completely unfounded; he had no greater desire than to witness the re-establishment of unity and concord. There can be no doubt as to Beza's talents as a public speaker. They compelled the attention and won the respect of his hearers. The fine qualities of his oratory enabled him to hold his predominantly hostile audience as no other of the ministers could for one moment have hoped to do. Aristocratic, handsome, refined, he might well have suggested the angel to whose false doctrine apostolic precept bids us turn a deaf ear. His synopsis of the reformed teaching opened with an explanation of the Apostles' Creed, each article of which he dealt with in turn. He defined the Church as the company of believers outside which there was no salvation, and affirmed that the issue between Catholics and Calvinists lay first in the interpretation of several articles of the Creed, and secondly in the repudiation by the Calvinists of various beliefs erroneously and unjustifiably added by the Catholics. He attacked the doctrine of purgatory, defended the sole mediatorship of Christ, and upheld justification by faith, qualifying it however by a careful exposition of the place to be assigned to good works. All that was necessary for salvation could be found in the Bible, where obscurity in one text was always balanced—so he required his audience to believe—by clarity in another. Scripture was the final criterion for councils and fathers alike, though this did not derogate from the reverence justly due to their teaching. Passing on to the Eucharist he expounded the Presence in terms similar to those which he had used in his conversation with Lorraine. Was there any real difference, he asked, between this doctrine and that which the Catholics themselves held? Rhetorical questions need usually fear no answer—and in any case Beza had certainly been encouraged to expect the wrong one. Even so he might have avoided disaster had he not, warming to his subject, let fall the assertion that since Heaven was the sole abode of our Lord's risen and glorified Body, whereas the Eucharist was but celebrated on the earth, the Body of our Lord might rightly be said

to be as far removed from the bread and wine as Heaven was from earth.

An outburst of horror broke the polite silence which had up to that moment prevailed. The Admiral covered his face with his hands. There were cries of "Blasphemavit!" and amid a general commotion Tournon was seen to rise in angry protest and make as if to retire. But the Queen, though herself shocked by a plain sentiment the heretical nature of which required no great intellectual effort to perceive, suffered the speaker to continue, and the clamour subsided. Hurriedly Beza changed his subject and embarked upon a brief treatment of the remaining Sacraments. In his peroration he urged the necessity of restoring the Church's primitive simplicity, and in conclusion again offered his Majesty a copy of the Huguenot Confession of Faith. This was handed to the Duke of Guise who carried it across the hall and presented it to the King.¹

In an instant Tournon was on his feet, quivering with indignation. From the very first, he exclaimed with emotion, he had opposed the Colloquy. He had only submitted to it at the Queen-Mother's express wish. He had foreseen and prophesied scandal; before the eyes of all present his prophecies had been fulfilled. He implored the King to dismiss Beza's speech from his mind: the bishops would know well how to refute such errors. Catherine, in distinct embarrassment, replied that she did no more than seek a means of pacification; she had no desire to innovate and would not abandon Catholicism. After some discussion it was ruled that a reply should be made to Beza

¹ *Harengue de Théodor de Bèze, prononcée... en l'assemblée des cardinaux tenans le concil national à Poissy le IX de Septembre 1561*, 8vo, 1561 (German transl. 1561, Heidelberg; Engl. transl. 1562, London). Text also in *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xviii, 687-702, and in *H.E.* i, 560-76. A summary in La Place, pp. 241-54. See also *Journal du Colloque*, pp. 28-9; *Diario*, pp. 118-20; Languet, II, 139; Layard, p. 42; La Ferrière, *Lettres*, I, 608; Desjardins, *Négociations*, III, 461-2; *Journal of Bruslart in Mémoires de Condé*, II, 51. The sources give very different accounts of the effect upon Beza of the interruptions. The Catholics all say that he was so embarrassed that he could only continue with the greatest difficulty and was afterwards almost inaudible. The Calvinists maintain that he concluded with the same assurance as that with which he had begun. It seems impossible to judge between these two versions. Perhaps they are not really mutually exclusive.

eight days later. The Assembly then dispersed, all parties feeling somewhat chastened.¹

The next morning there was heated discussion amongst the bishops as to the form which this reply should take, whether it should deal with all Beza's points or only with a selected number. There was still the same unanimous desire to avoid the appearance of recognizing the King as arbiter in a debate, and the Bishop of St Brieuc, voicing this general feeling, repeated the previous suggestion that the safest course would be to make no reply at all, but to record a simple protest that the situation could only be legitimately dealt with by a General Council. The Bishop of Valence disclaimed for the royal family any design to arrogate to itself the judgment of religious doctrine, though one of the authorities relates, curiously enough, that he supported St Brieuc's proposal.² It was the Cardinal of Lorraine who ensured the continuance of the Colloquy. Beza's horrible blasphemies against the Real Presence—"utinam mutus fuisset vel nos surdi fuisset"—could not, he expostulated, be permitted to pass unchallenged. Some kind of rejoinder was definitely called for and he proposed that the Bishop of Séz, a prelate not devoid of liberal inclinations, should deliver it. The Assembly countered in the expected manner by choosing Lorraine himself. But the bishops' main position was safeguarded. They insisted that there should be no argumentation against Beza. The reply was to be in the nature of an authoritative statement, and four fundamental points were selected for exposition: the authority of the Church, the authority of General Councils, the authority and interpretation of the Scriptures, and the truth of the Real Presence. The theologians were asked to present written suggestions as to treatment. Cardinal Bourbon took his opportunity of dispelling an unlucky impression of doctrinal unsoundness which some words of his had created a few days previously.³ On his motion the Assembly

¹ *Journal du Colloque*, p. 29; *Diario*, p. 120; La Place, p. 254.

² *Diario*, pp. 120-1. This must surely be an inaccuracy.

³ Layard, pp. 35-6. He had said that if our Lord had left on earth but one drop of His precious blood the whole world would crowd to adore It. This gave rise to a suspicion that he had unsound views on Transubstantiation.

decided that before delivery Lorraine's speech should be solemnly accepted by all the bishops as containing truths for which they would be ready to lay down their lives.¹

Beza quickly perceived that his denial of the Real Presence, however fine as a display of courage, had been also an error of tactics. It was an error, moreover, which was to dog his footsteps unceasingly, for it presented the Catholics with an excellent excuse for pinning down the discussions on to the Eucharist when the Calvinists, through terror of the Lutheran wedge, were later struggling vainly to transfer it to less uncomfortable terrain. By offending the Queen, too, Beza feared that he had jeopardized the very continuance of the Colloquy. He attempted to recover his ground by an explanatory letter in which he endeavoured to give to his words an interpretation less offensive to Catholic ears.² His alarm, however, was unnecessary. Catherine had no intention of allowing a moment's displeasure, however sharp, to turn her from her course. Condé assured the Huguenot ministers that the Colloquy was in no danger of forcible termination; the bishops would not be permitted to bring it to an abrupt end by calling upon them to accept the Cardinal of Lorraine's doctrine or be driven away. And their courage received at this juncture a welcome fillip by the arrival of Peter Martyr whom they regarded as an impregnable tower of strength.

Catherine shared their satisfaction. She too had set great hopes on Peter Martyr. A Tuscan and her fellow-countryman, he came to Poissy at her special bidding, by a special permission. Behind him lay a long experience of eucharistic controversy garnered both in Germany and in England, while age and white hairs combined with undoubted learning and equally undoubted

¹ *Journal du Colloque*, pp. 29-30; *Diario*, pp. 120-1. La Place, p. 257, is insufficient and the *H.E.* 1, 584, definitely inaccurate in their respective accounts of these discussions.

² *Sommaire declaration sur certains points...* (8vo, 1561); also published as an addition to the editions of Beza's speech mentioned above. Text also in La Place, pp. 254-7; *H.E.* 1, 328; and *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xviii, 703-5. See also La Ferrière, *Lettres*, 1, 608. Claude Haton here inserts a curious kind of *questionnaire* supposed to have been put to and answered by the Calvinists on Sept. 10th (pp. 166-8), but there is no trace of this in any other account.

sincerity to give to the ex-Augustinian revivalist a fair claim to veneration. His first utterances, however, disappointed Catherine. He did not endorse her view of the situation, and declared promptly that the restoration of religious unity by means of a doctrinal compromise—the whole *raison d'être* of the Colloquy—would be impossible owing to the lack of goodwill on the part of the bishops. Realizing at once the futility of the search after comprehension he directed his efforts towards securing the Queen's influence for the direct benefit of Calvinism. He told her that she was plainly chosen by Providence to restore the original beauteous simplicity of the Gospel. He assured her that Truth might be neither pared nor pruned. He admonished her that the only course of action consistent with righteousness would be to allow freedom of preaching; if disorder resulted she should remember that Christ came to bring not peace but a sword. It was facile advice, more easily given than followed; yet the Queen would willingly have followed it had she felt strong enough to defy the bishops on so serious an issue. She reminded Martyr with a touch of bitterness that though Truth might be one object of the Colloquy, Peace was certainly another; and with characteristic *naïveté* implored him to do his best to work upon the bishops' feelings and invited him to visit her freely with his advice.¹ She seems to have been of the curious opinion that an apostate friar would make an admirable intermediary between a Catholic monarch and an Assembly of Catholic bishops.

A closer acquaintance with Catherine taught Martyr, as it had taught the other ministers, that her objects were not spiritual. Like Viterbo they realized that her interest in or knowledge of religion as such was extremely meagre, that

¹ For a detailed account of Peter Martyr's summons, arrival and first interviews with the Queen see Benjamin Paist Jnr., in the *Princeton Theological Review*, XX (1922), pp. 418–31. This article, in three parts, *ibid.* pp. 212–32, 418–48 and 616–47, entitled "Peter Martyr at the Colloquy of Poissy", is a narrative written from the traditional Protestant standpoint and is based upon the traditional sources such as La Place, the *H.E.*, Baum's *Beza*, Klipffel's *Colloque de Poissy*, Schmidt's *Life of Martyr* (1858), Baird's *Rise of the Huguenots* and the works of de Ruble and Delaborde. It adds nothing to our knowledge or understanding of the Colloquy.

theological niceties only concerned her in so far as they affected the political and administrative situation. They had deluded themselves sadly in regarding her as a possible convert. Their Gospel made no appeal to her because she was not open to that kind of appeal. She was not worried about Truth in the abstract, either at this or perhaps at any other period. At the same time her constant references to the Confession of Augsburg helped to stimulate the growing impatience of the Huguenots. When de l'Hôpital and the King of Navarre asked Martyr's opinion of the Confession he replied with greater decision than Beza that he would not hear of it; the Bible was the only test of doctrine, the only source of Truth; besides, he added, the rejection of the Confession by the Catholics rendered it useless as a basis of reconciliation. It is not difficult to understand how the Calvinists' attitude towards Catherine underwent very radical modification when they at last realized that convenience rather than conversion was her main object.¹

IV

On September 15th Lorraine laid before the bishops a summary of his projected speech. He referred with pleasure to the unity of faith shown by the theologians who had assisted him, thanking them with the graceful phrase "Inopem me copia fecit", and asked for the prayers of the Assembly.² The next day a vast audience gathered to hear him. To ensure his safety against assassins a thorough search of the room was made in the morning; the Duke of Guise had kept the keys personally overnight, and entrance was only by specially granted permission. Nevertheless the refectory was packed to overflowing. The nuns with their prioress listened from behind specially constructed lattices or through the windows opening into the refectory from the church.³ Foreigners were rigidly

¹ Letters of Peter Martyr and his secretary Stuckius to Calvin, Bullinger and others in *C.R., Op. Cal.* xviii, 705-10; Baum, *Anhang*, pp. 62-3, 65-6, and Hottinger, *Historia Ecclesiastica*, vii, 714 *et seq.* See also the letters of the two Secretaries of State, Bourdin and l'Aubespine, in *Le Laboureur, Mémoires de M. de Castelnau*, i, 731-2.

² *Journal du Colloque*, p. 31.

³ *Ibid.*; *For. Cal.*, No. 516 (7).

excluded and it was only by express command of the Queen that Peter Martyr was admitted.¹

As an orator the Cardinal was undoubtedly Beza's superior. But his style was more that of the professional rhetorician with all its emotional tricks, and unsympathetic hearers may not have been entirely unjustified when they contrasted his heavy latinisms with the lighter and more characteristically French style of Beza and other reformers.² Yet there can be little doubt that he was considerably more impressive to listen to, and on this occasion he did not fall short of his accustomed standard. Loyalty to the throne was his opening theme, and the divine sanctions upon which royal authority rested. But in spiritual matters the monarch was as any other ordinary lay-member of the Church. He had no claim to spiritual headship. From primitive times it had been the bishops, not the emperor, who had been recognized as the arbiters of doctrine; and it was as spokesman of the bishops of France legitimately ordained by the laying-on of hands and with the approval of their superior the Pope—in full possession therefore of the Apostolic Succession—that he now addressed the Assembly. Eight days ago, he said, a Confession of Faith had been presented by a representative of some wanderers from the fold who came to seek instruction in the Catholic Faith. That instruction he was now about to give.

This may not have been an acceptable description of the situation from the Calvinist point of view; it was at least a clear definition of the speaker's position. There was to be no argumentation, no pleading before the King as judge. The Cardinal spoke as one having authority. Time, he continued, precluded the exploration of the complete field of Christian belief, or even a satisfactory treatment of all the points upon which Beza had touched. He thanked God that the Reformers accepted the Apostles' Creed, and he wished in all sincerity that they could agree with him in the interpretation of all its clauses.³ He pro-

¹ Cf. Paist, p. 432.

² See the notes of Baum and Cunitz in their edition of the *Histoire Ecclésiastique*, I, 613.

³ Cf. above, p. 267.

posed however to confine himself to a few general truths about the Church and to an exposition of the Real Presence of our Lord in the Holy Eucharist.

The Church was more than the exclusive company of the elect. It consisted of the whole body of believers, whatsoever their ultimate eschatological destiny. It had existed before the Christian revelation. It interpreted the Word of God as found in the Scriptures and in tradition, and on questions of faith and morals its solemn decisions were infallible; though from time to time it might—and did—alter non-essentials according to the demands of circumstance. After the Scriptures the weightiest authorities were General Councils and the teaching of the early fathers. These were the touchstones in cases of disputed doctrine, but they were always to be used in conjunction with the authority of the principal churches, of which the Roman had always been held to be the most important. In preferring the ideas of one man to the doctrines of the teaching Church the Arians were the prototype of all later heretics: preoccupied with the search for moles in other people's eyes, they had remained curiously unconscious of the beam in their own.

The Cardinal then came to what he described as "the last point of my oration, which in truth is nevertheless the principal". In devoting the major part of his speech to an eloquent and conciliatory exposition of the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence—conciliatory in the sense that there was a deliberate effort to present it as simply, as reasonably, as scripturally, and as desirably as possible—he was but following the recommendations which he had himself laid down in his July memorandum. He was at last attacking his key-problem. But since Beza's speech he must have come to realize that the gulf between the Catholic and the Calvinist doctrines was far deeper than he had over-hastily supposed at his personal interview with the Reformer. His task was now to summon all his powers of eloquence, of reasoning, of persuasion, in order to draw the minds of the Calvinist divines across that gulf.

Deploring the confusion of eucharistic doctrine which pre-

vailed on all sides, he pointed out that such conditions were but the inevitable outcome of misplaced curiosity. Too much discussion tended not only to obscure the truth but also to imperil the fruits of the Eucharist—which fruits consisted of unity among Christians, the union of each individual Christian with our Lord, the remission of sins, and a pledge of eternal life. It was encouraging to note that similar sentiments were to be found among the Huguenot articles; discouraging, however, to see the incapacity of the Huguenots to extricate themselves from the deplorable welter of conflicting doctrines by a literal acceptance, in the traditional way, of our Lord's words at the Last Supper. Those words as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels and by St Paul possessed a quality of directness by no means common in the Scriptures; and in their four principal aspects—historical, sacramental, as a commandment, and as a testament later confirmed by the testator's death—the literal interpretation was plainly intended. The words were neither symbolic merely, nor parabolic. St Justin Martyr accepted this literal exegesis about a hundred years after the Ascension, and it was recognized clearly by the Councils of Nicaea and Ephesus. Not only could no later conciliar decision be produced which in any way contradicted or questioned the literal interpretation, but there actually existed a catena of positive testimony to its universal acceptance during the first five Christian centuries—the period on which the Calvinists had conferred an arbitrary monopoly of reliability. For the first hundred years after Christ there were the Apostles and their successors, St Clement, St Ignatius and St Denis¹; for the second, Alexander I,² St Justin, St Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen and St Cyprian; for the third, Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, St Athanasius, St Hilary,

¹ *I.e.* the pseudo-Dionysius. But none of the references in him to the Eucharist are very explicit—see Darwell Stone, *A History of the Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist*, I, 139—and the writer was under monophysite influence.

² *I.e.* passages in the ninth chapter of the second letter of Alexander I, one of the pseudo-Isidorian decretals—see Hinschius' edition, p. 99. This chapter is modelled on the words of the *Liber Pontificalis* which it amplifies—*Lib. Pont.* ed. Duchesne, p. 127—but which seems to be of little value according to the best authorities (Duchesne, Père Lejay, Monseigneur Batiffol).

Hesychius, St Gregory Nazianzen, St Ambrose, St Jerome, St Augustine and St John Chrysostom; for the fourth, St Leo the Great, Prosper, Theodoret and St Cyril; and for the fifth, St Gregory. Later witnesses might be found in St John Damascene and—still further on—St Bernard, figures universally revered.¹ So strong was the testimony of the early Church that the first prominent opponent of the Real Presence, Berengarius, died ultimately convinced of its truth.²

Admittedly the Real Presence, as implied by a literal acceptance of our Lord's words, constituted an unfathomable mystery. No rational explanation was possible of the exact manner in which Christ was received really, invisibly and insensibly. Intellectual curiosity, the restless questioning of the Jews—"How can this man give us his flesh to eat?"³—was unprofitable, to be controlled and restrained. Belief required not intellect but faith in the word of God which could not deceive. "Foy y est nécessaire, raison superflue." "Il faut donc croire simplement ce qui ne se peut scruter utilement"; and again—"Croyons au Seigneur, et luy obéissons en tout et par tout; ne luy contredisons, ores que ce qu'il nous dit sembleroit absurde, mal convenable, et contraire à nos sens et pensées".

Many could not bring themselves to make this act of faith owing to a deep repugnance to the idea of bodily contact with Christ. Yet *corporaliter* was a word sanctioned by patristic usage. SS. Cyril, Hilary and John Chrysostom, for example, all deny that it is only in a purely spiritual manner that contact can be established with our Lord. They insist on a real communication of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist and do not shrink from the words *substantialiter*, *naturaliter*, *corporaliter*—St Hilary in one passage even using *carnaliter*. On the other hand this union, though fleshly and carnal in essence, was neither fleshly nor carnal in manner. Its manner was "supernatural, super-

¹ In the published text of the speech and in d'Espence's MS. Latin translation detailed references are given in side-notes; they were not included in the text itself. Any one who feels so inclined may look up the passages in the collection of Darwell Stone or some such work. I confess that I have not done so myself.

² For this the Cardinal referred to William of Malmesbury, *De Gestis Anglorum*, lib. 3.

³ St John, vi, 53.

substantial, spiritual, invisible, ineffable, special and peculiar to the Sacrament", and similarly the Real Presence, though real and substantial, was nevertheless "neither local, circumscribed, definitive, subjective nor in any other physical or natural manner"; nor was it to be thought that any one special philosophy of matter—Aristotelian or otherwise—was essentially bound up with it.¹ The Church believed quite simply that in the Sacrament God makes a gift of His true and very Self, divinity and humanity. For this belief she relied on our Lord's plain words literally interpreted as the fathers had interpreted them, words which formed a sure and infallible guide and were the bulwark of the true believer against all species of rationalistic attack.

It had been objected that any substantial presence was precluded by the fact of the Resurrection. The Creed taught that our Lord ascended into Heaven and sat henceforth at the right hand of God the Father, and the Church was supposed to teach in opposition that our Lord's Body left Its place in a localized Heaven and descended through space on to the altar every time the elements were consecrated at Mass. It was a foolish, simple accusation. The scholastics had dogmatized strongly against the crude notion of a physical removal, and the Huguenots were the first people within the memory of man to suppose that the Real Presence was incompatible with the Resurrection and the clause "*sedet ad dexteram Patris*". The fathers had not thought thus: with a faith firm enough to accept the seeming incom-

¹ This statement will be discussed later on—see pp. 323-5. The important passage—omitted, incidentally, in La Place's summary—runs thus: "Bref en ce propos nous ne recevons aucune manière de *Esse in*, qu'ait mis Aristote ou autre philosophe. Car comme nous avons jà dit, nous ne déprehendons pas par sens, ou entendement, par raison, ou nature, ce vray corps précieux, et sang glorieux icy estre present, ou nous estre exhibé; mais par la seule foy appuyée sur l'autorité de la parole de Dieu". And in the Latin version of the speech given by d'Espence: "*Praesentiam certe vel localem, vel circumscriptivam, vel definitivam, vel subjectivam, vel ut breviter dicam ullum Aristotelem essendi in modum nulli hic ponimus. Nec enim hic verum Christi corpus et sanguinem esse ullo sensu, ullave naturae ratione deprehendimus, sed sola fide, quae cum sit invisibilium sive non apparentium, nos auctoritati divinae innixi, credimus Dominum suum nobis corpus et sanguinem hic vere quidem, sed invisibiliter, sive modo invisibili exhiberi*". This Latin version of d'Espence is not an absolutely literal translation of the original French.

patibility, they had been happy to meditate peacefully on the profound mystery of the simultaneous presence of Christ's Body in Heaven and in the Eucharist wheresoever it was celebrated on earth.¹

It would thus seem, the Cardinal urged, that despite even the teaching of St Augustine, whom they professed to follow, the Calvinists retained no belief in a supersensible Body of our Lord. For them He was no more present in the Sacrament than at a sermon, no more—or rather in no more intimate manner—in the Eucharist than at Baptism, no more in fact “in coena quam in scena, imo quam in coeno”,² words which for fear of scandal he would repeat only in Latin. Catholic theologians, whose faith in the Real Presence reposed on their complete trust in the word of God, were neither so ingenious nor so subtle as to understand how a Body could be actually and substantially exhibited and received, if at the same time It were also actually and substantially absent and as far removed as Heaven from earth. Indeed it was Catholic faith and Calvinistic notion which might more accurately be said to be thus far separated. The criteria properly applicable to the eucharistic mystery were those of religion rather than of philosophy. Which view gave greater glory to God—to regard our Lord's Body as fixed eternally aloof in Heaven, or, while holding It to be indeed eternally glorified and present in Heaven, to believe It also present on earth wheresoever the Eucharist was celebrated, by means of God's divine, mysterious, incomprehensible power? Let the Huguenots call to mind our Lord's desertion by many of His followers because of His “hard sayings”.³ Let them not by their eucharistic disputes render impossible the restoration of peace and harmony, nor wreck the reformation which the bishops were undertaking. One of their own most highly respected leaders—if they resented rebukes from Catholic lips—had warned them to beware lest

¹ According to Catholic theology our Lord's Body is present in Heaven *per modum existendi naturalem* and in the Eucharist *per modum substantiae*. Many modern writers consider this distinction a quibble, and continue to assert that Transubstantiation implies a localized presence. See, for example, A. C. Bouquet, *The Real Presence* (1928).

² Cf. above, p. 296.

³ St John, vi, 61, 67.

their interminable dissensions on the Lord's Supper should end by upsetting the entire Church.¹

"Il me semble", continued the Cardinal, "vous avoir plus ennuyé par ma longueur que je ne voudroie, mais non tant persuadé que je désiroie." Evidently the ministers were showing signs of irritation and restlessness. He would make one more appeal. If they would not regard the long tradition of the Latin Church, let them look to the Greek—to one particular church since they spurned the universal. There too they would find the doctrine of the Real Presence. "Que diray-je Grecque? Croyés en la confession Augustane et les églises qui l'ont reçue. De toutes incontinent vous vous trouverés convaincus." While the Calvinists remained unable to agree on the Eucharist even with other seceders from the Catholic Church, how was it possible to hope for reunion? How much longer would they be content to stand isolated before the face of Christendom? What right had they to spread new beliefs, to stir up unrest amongst flocks which belonged to them by no conceivable commission? Let them pause and reflect whether their doctrine could claim the maturity, the proud antiquity of Catholic doctrine. It was only their submission that could restore tranquillity to troubled consciences and peace to a distracted fatherland. Falling upon his knees, the Cardinal appealed to the King in moving and eloquent words not to depart from the faith held by his predecessors since the days of Clovis. He appealed to the Queen-Regent, to the King of Navarre, to the Princes of the Blood, to the royal councillors, peers and officers of all kinds, to all persons present, exhorting them to fail not in loyalty towards their God and their King. The Church of France, in whose name he spoke, held fast to true Christian doctrine and would gladly sacrifice life itself, should need arise, for the preservation of the Catholic religion and the royal crown of France.²

¹ The Cardinal meant Melancthon. But the letter to which he seems to have referred does not contain any such sentiment: see the note of Baum and Cunitz in their edition of the *Histoire Ecclésiastique*, 1, 610.

² *L'Oraison de Monseigneur le illustrissime et reverendissime Cardinal de Lorraine, faicte en l'Assemblé de Poissi, le Roy estant présent, le XVI jour de Septembre*, Paris, 1561, in 4to, in 8vo and in 16mo. Other editions: Reims,

The audience was deeply moved. Tears had gathered in the eyes of many of the more emotional. For Lorraine had made a supreme effort and had used the weapon of his eloquence with superlative effect. Beza realized his own danger: the bishops would probably seize the happy moment, when the Catholic ardour of the Assembly had been so brilliantly fired, to demand his instant adhesion to the Cardinal's doctrine on pain of being refused a further hearing. To prevent—if possible—such an eventuality, he stepped forward as the Cardinal resumed his seat, forestalling Cardinal Tournon who was rising as if to speak, and requested the Queen's permission to reply on the spot. For the very same reason that Beza made this request the Queen saw that she could not grant it. Feelings were running high; and their current, whipped into new vigour by the Cardinal's eloquence, would surely sweep aside any attempt to satisfy his adversary. Catherine announced that a day would later be assigned to Beza for his reply, but, as the latter had foreseen, the bishops had their own ideas on this subject. Solemnly reiterating Lorraine's declaration that the whole French hierarchy was prepared to face death for the truths just expounded, Tournon added that unless the Huguenots also accepted those truths they would not be suffered to be heard again. Thus openly did the bishops contradict the Regent. Nor did they

1561, in 4to; Lyon, 1561, in 8vo; Rouen, 1561, in 8vo. An English translation, London, 1561, in 4to; a German translation, Heidelberg, 1561, in 8vo. MS. copies in Douay, MS. 813, ff. 125 *et seq.* and Nimes, *Nouveau Fonds*, pp. 257-72 (3030), t. 1. The complete text is also to be found in the *H.E.* I, 588-613. The Latin version in d'Espence's *Discours* is not an absolutely literal translation, and the text given in La Place, pp. 257-68, is incomplete. There exists also a short French summary, *Recueil de la harangue de Monseigneur le Cardinal de Lorraine faite à Poissy le XVI de Septembre* (1561), in 8vo. Cf. also short accounts in the *Diario*, pp. 122-4, and in Peter Martyr's letters, *C.R., Op. Cal.* xviii, 763-4. I cannot forbear remarking that it is very disconcerting to read in the *Catholic Encyclopædia* (article by Monsignor Loughlin on "Discussions, Religious"): "We are told that the Cardinal of Lorraine confuted the heretic at the next session in a masterly address; but since he did not set it down in writing its value cannot be ascertained". It is a pity that the Monsignor seems to have consulted so few authorities before writing his article. The most restricted reading on the Colloquy would have saved him from so gross an error. Writers on Poissy in other good encyclopædias—e.g. Schaff-Herzog, *Encyclopædie für Theologie und Kirche*—are of course properly informed on their subject.

fear to persevere in this courageous attitude. The following day's proceedings revealed the general desire for a speedy dissolution. Although the last three heads of reform—including the important *Num remedium tantis litibus inveniri posset*—had not been discussed in the Congregations, a committee of theologians assisted by the Bishops of Paris, Pamiers and Séez was appointed to construct decrees under all twelve heads and to present them to the Assembly within three days. The financial negotiations, too, were now near completion. Thus it appeared that the bishops' restiveness to be off would soon be satisfied. As for the Colloquy, it was evident that they considered the whole unpleasant business, so autocratically thrust upon them by the Government, to be at an end, concluded—providentially—with gratifying satisfaction and brilliance, and with an oratorical triumph that made ample amends for the scandal which had attended its inception.¹

For Lorraine's speech had won golden opinions from his Catholic hearers. The acclamations of the bishops, the emotion of the faithful, had been fully justified; and the delighted nuncio had entertained misgivings about the orthodoxy of not more than one or two expressions. The remarkable qualities of the speech, its dignity and sincerity, its courtesy, its freedom alike from vulgar abuse and facile refutation, above all its extreme tactical skill, have never been adequately appreciated. To be sure, its magisterial tone, the assumptions which it made and its whole approach to the doctrinal problem are not those of the Memorandum, but under the circumstances it is difficult to see how they could well have been. On top of the simple appeal to the Scriptures and to the early fathers the Cardinal had now superimposed the notion of a teaching church, that is, of these appeals being made under the authority and guidance of the episcopate and especially of the Church of Rome. Yet they had been presented as sufficiently convincing even of themselves, and it had been at bottom to a consensus of opinion, scriptural and patristic, Latin, Greek and Lutheran, that the Cardinal had directed his antagonists' attention. Thus in manner as well as in

¹ *Diario*, p. 124; *Journal du Colloque*, p. 32.

matter the speech reveals a real continuity of policy with the Memorandum. The difference was that the Cardinal had himself performed the "collation of opinions" and now presented his results, without argumentation, as a teacher solves a sum for the benefit of stupid pupils. This didactic manner, however, was accompanied by striking indications of a real desire to be conciliatory. The appeal to Faith as opposed to intellectual satisfaction, the disavowal of crude misconceptions, the absence of the word "Transubstantiation" and the specific separation of the Real Presence from Aristotelian metaphysics, all point to a desire to put the case for the Catholic doctrine in a way most likely to meet the particular difficulties and least likely to offend the peculiar susceptibilities of the Reformers. And this without prejudice to accuracy. For the whole exposition of the Real Presence is perfectly consistent with, and indeed would seem to demand, "...that wonderful and unique conversion of the whole substance of Bread into Body and of Wine into Blood, the appearances of Bread and Wine nevertheless remaining, which conversion the Catholic Church most suitably calls Transubstantiation". These are the words of the Council of Trent ten years previously. And whether or no Lorraine had them in mind, whether or no he considered himself irrevocably bound by them, he was yet expressing doctrine in perfect consistency with them. For they are words which do not absolutely postulate the scholastic philosophy of matter, and the bishops at Trent were consciously anxious that they should not do so. A fierce *odium philosophicum*, much of it petulant and misdirected, was felt against scholasticism by the sixteenth-century Reformers. By presenting the doctrine of the Real Presence free from scholastic terminology, in maintaining that this terminology—though doubtless useful and even consecrated by the Church's usage—was not fundamentally necessary to the essence of the doctrine, the Cardinal of Lorraine gave proof of a genuinely conciliatory purpose and was yet within the bounds of orthodoxy. His aim had been to present the Catholic doctrine to those outside the Church as representing an overwhelming consensus of Christian opinion, as taught

by Scripture and the fathers, as free from philosophic commitment, as desirable to piety, as essential to a full and faithful trust in the words of our Lord. That it was an attempt which failed to convince is no reflection upon its intrinsic merit or ability.¹

¹ It seems to me that the main thesis of the Cardinal's exposition may be found in modern and up-to-date setting in the late Monseigneur Batiffol's fine book, *L'Eucharistie, La Présence Réelle et la Transsubstantiation* (7th edition, 1920). The word "Transsubstantiation" first appeared in the course of the twelfth century to denote the more orthodox doctrine of the change of being in the elements—hitherto indicated by such terms as *mutatio* or *conversio*—as against the rival theories of Impanation and Consubstantiation. It was officially adopted by the Church at the Lateran Council in 1216 when the absolute change of being was promulgated as an article of faith. Between the Lateran and the Tridentine Councils there flowered and declined the scholastic philosophy in which theologians became accustomed to argue, teach and speculate. But at Trent it was recognized that the Catholic doctrine of the Real Presence, which it was then necessary to reaffirm, was older than scholasticism and independent of it, so that the fathers were unwilling to commit it to technically scholastic terms. Hence the simplicity of the final definition: "...mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem totius substantiae panis in corpus, et totius substantiae vini in sanguinem, manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini, quam quidem conversionem catholica Ecclesia aptissime transsubstantiationem appellat" (Session XIII, canon 11, Oct. 11th, 1551). Mgr. Batiffol comments pertinently (pp. 496-8): "Le Concile n'a proposé aucune théorie métaphysique de la conversion: il pose les termes avec une clarté parfaite de ce qu'il appelle '*mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem*': il accepte et il justifie le vocable de transsubstantiation qu'il estime très apte (*aptissime*) à désigner cette conversion singulière et miraculeuse. La conversion est donc de foi, la conversion entendue de toute la substance du pain et de toute la substance du vin au corps et au sang du Christ, si bien qu'il ne demeure du pain et du vin que les apparences, conversion qui, ainsi entendu, porte très convenablement le nom de transsubstantiation. Le Concile dit: '*Catholica Ecclesia appellat*'. Il ne dit pas: '*Universa Catholica Ecclesia nuncupavit*' comme portait l'avant-projet de ce canon, parce que le Concile sait que le mot transsubstantiation est un mot récent: on a montré depuis que le mot était exclusivement latin. Mais le Concile n'a pas voulu céder aux injurieuses sommations de Luther, dénonçant ce mot comme aventurier et aristotélicien: non, c'est un mot très apte, et l'Eglise catholique l'a adopté au concile du Latran. La cause du mot est donc gagnée". It was of set purpose that the Council used the word *species* instead of the technically scholastic word *accidentia*; though some theologians, whilst recognizing that the Council neither did, nor desired to, nor in the nature of the case could, define the scholastic philosophy of matter to be *de fide*, hold none the less that by mentioning the continuation after consecration of the *species*—which admittedly has a meaning identical with that of *accidentia*—without their substance, the Council showed that it fully accepted that philosophy. Yet though the proposition that it is possible for accidents to exist without substance is considered to be "theologically certain", it has not been defined as of Faith, even as of Ecclesiastical Faith only. The word *accidentia* occurs only once, I believe, in a dogmatic decree—

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But the ministers had come to sneer, and sneer they did accordingly. Foiled in his attempt to answer the Cardinal on the spot, and annoyed at his inability to procure a written copy of the speech,¹ Beza strained at the leash for an opportunity to attack it while it was still fresh in his memory. He poured the utmost scorn upon it. "Never in all my life", he wrote to Calvin, "have I heard a greater display of ineptitude and imbecility; the old nauseating arguments from tradition, the worn-out sophistries on the interpretation of Scripture by the Church—all a thousand times refuted." The able presentation of the Real Presence he dismissed with contempt; and the derisive snort—"Westphali quisquilie!"—revealed his hatred of Lutheranism and his irritation that Lorraine should seem to approximate to the views of so violent an enemy of Calvin as the Lutheran Westphalus.² For though the Cardinal had specifically repudiated Consubstantiation, the Calvinists did not

that of the Council of Constance in condemnation of Wyclif in 1415—see Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (1920 edition), No. 582.

It cannot however be denied that the Church's doctrine of the Real Presence which she so suitably calls Transubstantiation *does* in fact postulate certain fundamental philosophic ideas. It presupposes the existence behind phenomena of a reality, an identity, a thing-in-itself, which actually makes a thing what it is, something quite other than the sense-data by which it is known to us, and consequently independent of scientific analysis. Transubstantiation—the change of reality—would be intrinsically impossible in a philosophy which was purely subjective and denied, or was sceptical of, the existence of realities behind sense-phenomena—such as the philosophy of Hume. The philosophic idea essential to Transubstantiation, and which scholasticism calls Substance, is thus older than scholasticism and is not confined to it. In so far as the Tridentine definition of Transubstantiation makes use of the scholastic term *substance* to express the basic idea of a thing's identity, to that extent it is undeniably a scholastic definition. There seems to be, however, no intrinsic reason why this should be so. See on this point Father Rickaby, S.J., in *The Month*, Sept. 1928: "Substance and Transubstantiation"—and the more technical expositions of A. Gardeil, *Le donné révélé et la théologie* (1910), pp. 111-12, Hugon, *La Sainte Eucharistie*, pp. 96-163, and Père Lebreton in the *Revue pratique d'apologétique*, t. iv (1907), p. 533—cited by Batiffol, pp. 495-6. See also the whole of Batiffol's *Epilogue, La doctrine du Concile de Trente et l'histoire du dogme eucharistique*, pp. 483-508.

¹ It was not published until the middle of October. See *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 52; La Ferrière, *Le XVI^e siècle et les Valois*, p. 60; For. Cal., Nos. 616, 624.

² C.R., *Op. Cal.* XVIII, 720-1, 763-5; Baum, *Anhang*, pp. 63-5, 66.

cease to look for points of contact between his doctrine and those of various hated Lutheran divines. The minister des Gallars, pastor of the Huguenot Church in London, wrote to the Bishop of London that Lorraine had seemed to follow Saxon opinions. Criticizing his speech as confused and well-nigh unintelligible, he declared that it would have excited the laughter of a child.¹ Hubert Languet, on the other hand, reported that the Cardinal's doctrine was definitely less advanced than that of the Saxons, of whom Westphalus was the most prominent; and considered that on many points he had seemed not far off agreement with Beza.²

The gratuitous assumption that it was Baudouin who had been responsible for the general tenor of the Cardinal's exposition of the Real Presence succeeded in raising the hostility of the Calvinists to an extreme pitch. But this idea, which found some acceptance in certain Belgian circles,³ must without question be pronounced incorrect. Baudouin's eucharistic doctrine was still Calvinist, and he had supported Calvin in a controversy with Westphalus quite recently. Moreover he had already returned into Germany to pursue the task entrusted to him by the King of Navarre of collecting liturgical materials.⁴ Spurred on, however, by their master at Geneva, the Huguenots did all that lay within their power to ruin Baudouin's credit all round. They laid to his account not merely the alleged Lutheran tinges in Lorraine's oration, but also the dangerous popularity enjoyed at Court by the Confession of Augsburg despite Calvin's repeated admonitions to Anthony of Navarre. Returning to Heidelberg in August, Baudouin had found the Elector-Palatine angrily nursing secret information that in France his ticket-of-leave professor had represented himself as an official envoy. The pious Elector's gorge had been turned by the horrid thought that he himself might be supposed to have some con-

¹ For. Cal., Nos. 507, 510, 511; La Ferrière, *Le XVI^e siècle et les Valois*, p. 58.

² Languet, II, 139-40. It seems to me uncertain, however, whether Languet was present.

³ *Burmanni Sylloges*, II, 241, 259. Cf. de Thou, *Historia sui Temporis* (ed. 1733), II, 126.

⁴ Cf. above, p. 253.

nection with Baudouin's proposals for a reform of the French Church, which were said to contain such enormities as the retention of the Mass and other popish errors. He taxed Baudouin roundly to his face with underhand dishonesty, and spoke of him as an "occasional Christian"—*ein Christ nach Gelegenheit*.¹ Baudouin became aware that his pitch had been queered; and though Frederick would not reveal the source of his information, insisting nevertheless that it was unimpeachable, the truth was not difficult to guess. Baudouin pleaded that he had been misrepresented and struggled to regain the Elector's goodwill. He explained that the popularity of Catholicism among the French masses rendered impossible its complete or sudden overthrow. Only moderate measures were possible until such time as the evangelical preachers whom the Queen was encouraging should have made a wider impression upon the people at large. Meanwhile it was proposed to make a start by redrafting the eucharistic liturgy and employing the vernacular in public worship, and the King of Navarre had authorized him to consult German theological authorities with a view to compiling a more scriptural and primitive liturgy for the Mass. But explanation was useless. It fell upon ears too well attuned to deafness; and in despair Baudouin turned his attention to the Duke of Württemberg.

Here an intermediary was necessary, and one was at hand in the person of Vergerius, the apostate ex-papal nuncio, who was at the time a pensioner of the Court of Stuttgart. Baudouin wrote to Vergerius an account of the state of religion in France similar to that which he had given to the Elector, and strongly urged the need of German intervention. The French people, he repeated, were on the whole staunchly papist, and able to digest only the very mildest doses of reform; the Government, however, was toying with the Confession of Augsburg, and though many of the nobility were followers of Calvin, quite a number were only retained in their new faith by the expectation of ecclesiastical plunder; it would be an excellent idea for the German princes to be represented at Poissy; indeed Christopher

¹ Kluckhohn, I, 191; Kaussler und Schott, *Briefe Vergerios*, p. 277.

might very well send Vergerius himself. Now Vergerius had long desired such a commission. He lost no time in forwarding Baudouin's communication to the Duke, representing that so eminent a man, if received at Stuttgart, would be likely to prove a mine of information and advice; nor did he forget to emphasize Baudouin's suggestion that he himself, Vergerius, should go as envoy into France. At the same time the ex-nuncio wrote to Anthony of Navarre welcoming the news that despite the prevalence of Calvinism the French Government was contemplating the adoption of the Augsburg Confession.¹

But Christopher had been too deeply impressed by the Elector-Palatine's revulsion of feeling against Baudouin to lend a particularly favourable ear to Vergerius' representations on his behalf. No such queer, unsatisfactory foreigners, he decided, should ever wind themselves too far into *his* confidence! He had no desire to see himself tricked by them as the Elector imagined that he had been tricked.² Moreover Baudouin had made a false move in suggesting Vergerius as a possible envoy to Poissy. Vergerius had already been unsuccessfully angling for this mission. It had seemed to him more desirable than the attendance at the Council of Trent which his former friend the Cardinal of Mantua and the nuncio Delphinus had been trying to bring about. Having given vent in his most florid style to joyous expectations of martyrdom at the hands of his former colleagues—a second Huss as it might be—he had taken it remarkably ill when, owing to the impossible conditions that he had demanded, Rome had not permitted an invitation to be issued to him.³ The old man had then indulged his spleen by fulminating against the Pope as anti-Christ, and against the universally respected Cardinal of Mantua, who would willingly have instituted a preliminary Colloquy to deal with his difficulties, as Judas. His hopes turned in the direction of Poissy, and when Beza and Peter Martyr were invited thither his

¹ Vergerius to Anthony, Tübingen, Aug. 16th (Stuttgart, Staatsarchiv, Frankreich, büschel 17, no. 101).

² Kluckhohn, I, 192.

³ For these negotiations see Šusta, I, 28–30, 32, 39, 43, 49, 59, 60, 96, 97, 120.

jealousy boiled over. Desperately anxious to figure once more in high affairs, but conscious of his theological incapacity, he begged to be sent as a diplomatic envoy with a kind of watching theological brief for Württemberg. Christopher was, in point of fact, anxious to be represented at Poissy, but not without proper invitation, and certainly not by Vergerius who could almost certainly be relied upon to compromise him in some way or other. Thus when Vergerius was encouraged by Baudouin to renew his already tiresomely reiterated request, Christopher replied by slamming the door in his face—the bathroom door, to be quite accurate, for he kept him grumbling in the hot baths at Göppingen where the ex-nuncio computed that he must have spent at least 140 hours, though admittedly to the great benefit of his health in general, and of his stomach in particular. Having thus only succeeded in getting Vergerius literally into hot water, Baudouin did not pursue his attempts to obtain a personal interview with Christopher. He wrote to the Duke briefly, making a very formal offer of his services and alleging that his preoccupation with the affairs of the King of Navarre prevented a visit to Stuttgart.¹

Huguenot intrigue had at bottom been the cause of Baudouin's repulse both at Heidelberg and Stuttgart. By the end of September he was in Cologne whither Cassander had just returned for the winter after a visit to the Low Countries. He delivered to the master a letter from the King of Navarre begging him to intervene in French affairs. But Cassander with his usual caution, or timidity, persisted in his refusal to outstep the academic limits of his eirenic endeavours: he wrote back praising Anthony's Christian efforts to restore unity and his breadth of mind in seeking help outside France, but declined to go in person to his assistance.² Baudouin left Cologne almost immediately and turned his steps in the direction of Paris. The only fruits of his German peregrinations were a few notes and papers entrusted to him by Cassander, including the manuscript

¹ For Baudouin's dealings with Vergerius and Christopher see Kaussler und Schott, pp. 277–80, 281, 285.

² Cassander to Anthony, Sept. 27th—*Cassandri Omnia Opera*, pp. 1129–30.

of a new eirenic tract which was shortly afterwards published anonymously at Bâle.¹

At the time of the Cardinal's speech Baudouin was still hovering around Heidelberg and Stuttgart, unable to carry out the King of Navarre's commission. Anthony however had been pleased by the speech. The omission of the words "Mass" and "Transubstantiation", as he sought to impress upon Beza, argued a conciliatory disposition and a genuine desire to come to terms. This view was shared by Coligny and even by Condé, both of whom endeavoured to restrain Beza by representing that unmeasured abuse could only jeopardize future progress. The eirenic party, in fact, realized, as the ministers did not realize, what was Lorraine's real purpose. And to Anthony of Navarre, it seemed reasonable, despite all Calvin's opposition, to suppose that a little Lutheran leaven might work wonders in fermenting the Cardinal's conciliatory gestures. He therefore took the important step of sending a personal request to the Duke of Württemberg and the Elector-Palatine for a mission of Lutheran theologians.

A messenger of Anthony of the name of d'Esthurneau is known to have reached Metz by September 19th, on which date the governor Vieilleville entrusted him with a letter to Christopher of Württemberg encouraging the Duke to accede to Anthony's request and promising hospitality to the persons whom he should send should they come by way of Metz.² D'Esthurneau found the Duke at Göppingen on September 27th and his mission was welcome.³ Christopher, despite his snubs to Vergerius and Baudouin, had been disappointed and hurt that the French had not followed up their earlier encouraging gestures by inviting German divines to the National Council;

¹ "De officio pii ac publicae tranquillitatis vere amantis viri in hoc religionis dissidio"—in *Omnia Opera*.

² Vieilleville to Christopher, Sept. 19th—Stuttgart, Staatsarchiv, Frankreich, büschel 17, no. 139 a.

³ Kugler, pp. 305-6 note 41, based on the *Fama Andreana*. But according to Vergerius (Kaussler und Schott, p. 290), d'Esthurneau would seem to have reached Göppingen on the 25th. Eight days from Metz to Göppingen seems unnecessarily long. But perhaps d'Esthurneau lost time by going first to Stuttgart.

and his resentment was shared by the Dukes of Saxony and Zweibrücken who considered that at least such well-known figures as Brenz, Matthias Flaccus or Gallus of Ratisbon might have received invitations.¹ From amid the steam of his hot baths Vergerius was spreading alarmist reports—which however nobody took very seriously—that Anglican theologians were about to appear at Poissy where they would be sure to exercise a decisive influence; and, as Bullinger gleefully pointed out from Switzerland, this would spell ruin to all hopes of a Lutheran success.² The Duke of Württemberg, therefore, though he had not presumed to interfere unasked, was only too pleased to accede to any direct request for intervention. He replied to Anthony that he would send not one but three theologians, and his choice fell upon Jacob Beurlin, Chancellor of Stuttgart University, who had been one of his delegates at Trent in 1551-2, Jacob Andreas who had been at the Colloquy of Worms in 1557, and Balthasar Bidembach his court preacher. Their instructions were simple: to recommend the adoption in France of the complete Augsburg Confession—to act, in fact, simply and solely as Lutheran missionaries.³ D'Esthurneau meanwhile proceeded to Heidelberg, where the Elector-Palatine decided to follow Christopher's example and chose two delegates, Michael Diller, his court preacher and an apostate Augustinian, and Pierre Boquin, an apostate French Carmelite. The instructions which he gave them left them a certain liberty of action.⁴

Any attempt to understand Anthony's motives in sending for these German divines will not be helped by the explanations which he afterwards offered to them when they arrived. It would be a delusion to suppose that he was prompted—as he later alleged—by a chivalrous desire to save the Lutherans from the misuse of their Confession by the Cardinal of Lorraine. Had he genuinely believed that it was the Cardinal's design

¹ Languet, II, 143; Kugler, p. 304. This mention of the Duke of Saxony strengthens my suspicion that Rascalon had visited the Saxon Court on behalf of the Guises in June or July—see above, p. 279, and below, p. 354 note.

² Kaussler und Schott, pp. 296-7, 302.

³ Kugler, pp. 305-6 note 41; Blanchet, *Recueil de lettres-missives adressées à Antoine de Bourbon*, pp. 133-4.

⁴ Kluckhohn, I, 208, 214.

merely to throw a damaging beam of light upon the eucharistic differences between Calvinists and Lutherans for the sake of better confounding them both, he could actually have found no better way of playing directly into Lorraine's hands than that of bringing Lutheran theologians on to the stage. His own acquaintance with both sects can hardly have failed to teach him that if it was a question of preventing the exploitation of Luther-Calvinist dissensions, then the rival champions should not be put together in a public ring but studiously kept apart. The truth was that Anthony's discovery of the malicious nature of Lorraine's references to the Confession of Augsburg was simply one of later convenience. It does not square with his earlier recommendation of the speech to Beza. It was cunningly elaborated about three weeks later in order to give a revised interpretation to an action which had been rendered inopportune by the development of circumstances, so that a move made originally in support of the Cardinal was retrospectively transformed into one intended for his checkmating. Moreover the new interpretation suggested that Anthony's motives had been purely religious, whereas they were primarily political. Frankly prepared to associate himself with any party which would undertake to satisfy his personal ambitions, he was still uncertain as to which party that would be, still unable to decide in his own mind which religion would eventually come out on top. Yet he was not altogether blind to the fact that it lay largely within his own power to determine the direction of events. His consciousness of this power was implied in the polite threat which he now conveyed to Rome through a new envoy, the *Sieur d'Escars*, to the effect that if the Pope would not actively support his cause at Toledo he would openly put himself at the head of the Huguenots and lead them on to complete domination in France.¹ All things considered, it was probably the middle party, responsible for the Colloquy, whose triumph he most desired to see. Such a triumph would relieve him of the unpleasant task of deciding on which side eventually to throw his forces, and would leave him free to prosecute his territorial

¹ Šusta, I, 88. On the mission of d'Escars, *ibid.* pp. 88-9, 92, 259, 265-73.

ambitions without the added complications created by religious differences. Though it entailed defiance of Calvin, Anthony thought it worth his while to further the eirenic policy. The Cardinal's speech had seemed to point a way. In sending for German divines Anthony had originally intended to follow up and help to develop the Cardinal's purpose, which was also the one best calculated to serve his own personal interests.¹

Much was thus going on behind the scenes that was not apparent on the stage at Poissy. Catherine and Anthony were seeking to make use of Lutheranism as a kind of theological sticking-plaster; but the powers of Lutheranism, anxious indeed to intervene, and called at last on to the stage by the King of Navarre, desired rather to excise than to heal. All, however, depended on whether the Colloquy were to continue; for if it were not, if the bishops were to have their way, then all intrigue and counter-intrigue in Germany became purposeless and might just as well be abandoned.

Here was the critical point. Could the Colloquy possibly go on seeing that the bishops had refused to submit to the indignity of hearing Beza reply to the Cardinal? And if it could go on, then in what way? Cardinal Tournon and the more intransigent prelates brought heavy pressure to bear on the Queen, insisting forcibly that unless the Calvinists submitted to Lorraine's doctrine she ought not to permit them to speak again under any conditions or circumstances whatsoever.² On the other hand the ministers clamoured for a second hearing, naturally desiring the opportunity of giving a public reply to the Cardinal of Lorraine. Their cause was aided by the liberal Catholics such as the Bishops of Valence and Séz who urged that in fairness the ministers should at least be given the chance of examining the patristic references to which Lorraine had appealed.³ Crushed between the upper millstone of the

¹ Kugler, pp. 305-6; Heidenhain, pp. 367-70. Contrast de Ruble, *Antoine de Bourbon et Jeanne d'Albret*, III, 191-4, 196-7, who upheld the exploded view that Lorraine sent for the Germans.

² De Sainctes, *Responsio...ad Apologiam Theodori Bezae quam edidit contra Examen doctrinae Calvinianae et Bezanae de Coena Domini* (1567).

³ *Ibid.*; de Thou, lib. xxviii; La Place, pp. 269-70. Lorraine in his speech had given no detailed references to the fathers to whose testimony he had appealed.

Assembly and the nether mill-stone of the ministers, Catherine had recourse to the counsel of her private oracle, Peter Martyr. But Martyr, though more willing than Beza to credit the Cardinal of Lorraine with conciliatory intentions, was none the less convinced that nothing at all in the way of doctrinal *rapprochement* could possibly result from a prolongation of the Colloquy. Yet because the Colloquy was of excellent publicity value he hoped for its prolongation, and for this reason employed in conversation with Catherine language more optimistic than he really considered justified. With much of the Cardinal's doctrine he declared himself prepared to agree: the duty of obedience to the civil power, for instance, and the inclusion in the visible Church of both good and reprobate—the latter, however, being a doctrine which he had earlier concurred with des Gallars in describing as crassly absurd. And though he could not concede that the Church was above the Scriptures, or agree with Lorraine's exposition of the Real Presence, he suggested—again contrary to his real opinion—that in private His Eminence's views might be found to be rather more elastic. Encouraging the Queen to find some means of continuing the Colloquy, even if it were only in private, he again impressed upon her—this being in truth his main object—that she ought to grant to each local church liberty to believe as it deemed to be most in conformity with the Scriptures.¹ It was a piece of advice the futility of which did not decrease with repetition.

Prolonged discussion, accompanied by renewed pressure from both opponents and advocates of the Colloquy, made it at length clear that the Synod could not be forced, against its resolutely declared will, to listen to a second speech from Beza. On September 22nd, therefore, the day originally intended for Beza's counter-reply, a compromise was devised by which further proceedings were to be freed from the doubtful advantage of being conducted under the unwilling and enforced patronage of the Episcopal Assembly. Twelve Catholics were to be selected to meet the twelve ministers in private conference, and there is evidence showing fairly clearly that this was the

¹ *C.R., Op. Cal.* XVIII, 720-1, 725, 765; Paist, *op. cit.*

suggestion of the Cardinal of Lorraine.¹ It was announced that the object would be to afford the ministers the chance of hearing a more detailed exposition from Lorraine of the various patristic references which he had made in his oration. The decision was certainly taken above the heads of the bishops,² and the Cardinal himself informed the Assembly that he intended to meet Beza under these new conditions. He assured them, however, that he would confine himself strictly to exposition and would not on any account enter into actual debate.³

The end, then, was not yet arrived. Death had not come for the Colloquy. Indeed there was at last in sight the informal private conference which Lorraine probably desired. For it was not reasonable to suppose that twenty-four divines representing two conflicting creeds, and brought together for an examination of controversial texts, would be able to refrain conscientiously from discussion and argumentation. Indeed it was highly questionable whether the bishops had acted to their own advantage in thrusting the Colloquy as it were underground. The new arrangement which had been necessitated by their refusal to tolerate a continuation of the previous one, though certainly less of an outward scandal, was probably more dangerous in reality to the true interests of orthodoxy. Conditions of privacy could hardly fail to generate an atmosphere of informality and freedom in which liberal and expansive spirits might be easily led into the utterance of hasty words or the expression of compromising opinions, the subsequent retraction or explanation of which might afterwards prove to be

¹ Charles IX to the Bishop of Limoges, Oct. 28th, 1562, Bib. Nat., *Nouvelles acquisitions françaises*, 20597—Petrograd transcripts—f. 120. Cf. the diary of Bruslart in *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 52-3. I have found no evidence to support the statement frequently met with that the Cardinal of Ferrara suggested the smaller meetings. Throckmorton's suspicions—For. Cal., Nos. 535 (1) and 595—prove nothing, and Languet had heard of the possible new arrangement before Ferrara's arrival—II, 140. Indeed something of the sort seems to have been contemplated immediately after Lorraine's speech, on the 17th: see the *Journal du Colloque*, p. 32.

² Desjardins, *Négociations avec la Toscane*, III, 463-4; For. Cal., Nos. 511, 535 (1).

³ *Diario*, p. 125.

matters of much greater difficulty. And the more the management of the Colloquy was allowed to fall out of the hands of the bishops into those of the Queen—even with Lorraine at her elbow—the more likely it became that the liberal spirits would not go under-represented in the ranks of the Catholic champions. Had the bishops been more far-sighted, they might have been more willing to bear those ills they had, than fly to others that they knew not of.

CHAPTER X

The End of the Assembly of Poissy

*Dogma datur Christianis
Quod in carnem transit panis
Et vinum in sanguinem.*

—Sequence for Corpus Christi—St Thomas Aquinas.

I

THE watershed of the Colloquy of Poissy has now been reached, and it separates two very different tracts of country. We have left behind the dignified exchange of oration and counter-oration by grave protagonists before a solemn synod and a royal court—impressive theological expositions in the grand manner, attended by every circumstance of solemnity and majesty. Their place is taken by a series of small, half-shamefaced disputations, around which many diverse and conflicting interests are at play, and which have been so heavily shrouded in mists of bitterness, suspicion and misinterpretation, that their true outline has yet to be clearly revealed. And at this point of division there appears upon the scene a new personage who though of considerable importance is not likely to exercise a soothing influence upon the actors.

The advent of the Cardinal of Ferrara was nowhere regarded with any particular degree of satisfaction. Unasked and unwanted, the legate of the supreme fisherman at Rome came to cast his line into troubled waters which Catherine de Médicis had reserved for herself. He came not only to ruin her tackle and to rob her of her prize, but also to serve her with a notice of trespass, intimating that the owner of the fishing rights, angry at her unwarrantable poaching, bade her haul in her line and turn her energy into more desirable channels. Catherine, knowing this, could barely maintain before Catholic diplomats the necessary appearance of being very well pleased with the honour of the legate's approach: a mask so uncomfortable

was only tolerable for short periods.¹ Nor did Ferrara excite more enthusiasm in clerical circles. To Lorraine and Tournon, themselves legates with special powers, his mission came as an open snub, as a public expression of "No Confidence" on the part of the Holy See. They made no attempt to hide their resentment, and openly expressed a determination not to yield precedence to the intruder.²

The legate's person might not inconceivably be regarded as adding insult to the injury of his mission. It did not matter so much that he was the grandson of Alexander VI—this was a disability not incompatible with sainthood—but he dated so ostentatiously from a past discredited era, and there hung about him the stale aroma of the later and more corrupt Italian Renaissance. As a man of action he had not enjoyed conspicuous success; his private reputation was little better than his grandfather's; and he was even credited with vices from which Alexander had been comparatively free. It was certainly convenient, if not natural, to emphasize the indecency of such a man arriving as legate from Rome, hot with talk of Reform and the General Council, yet dragging behind him a showy and expensive train of several hundred persons including a group of Italian bishops who ought themselves to have been hurrying off to Trent. Moreover Ferrara had been so ill-advised as to have accepted from Pius IV those customary legatine faculties of patronage which Lorraine and others had vainly denounced as ruinous to the influence of any legate, and which Tournon had wisely refused.

Yet the Pope had not chosen his man without good enough reason. The most inoffensive legate could hardly have avoided unpopularity at this particular moment. Ferrara was related by marriage to the Guises; he could look back on a long connection with France and French policy; he had been the chief French candidate at the last three conclaves. Though he had been a prominent anti-continuationist in the conciliar question—at least before the issue of the Bull—he was no supporter of the National Council. Yet he came with the set intention of not

¹ Šusta, I, 208, 209.

² *Ibid.* I, 209, 234.

irritating Catherine but of winning her confidence. Events, he saw, must be allowed to run their own course, and were neither to be stayed nor forced into contrary channels by dint of violent talk or a profusion of explosive superlatives. It was perhaps an advantage that his faith lacked all traces of fanaticism. He was by nature a society man and not easily ruffled. But this did not lessen his determination to carry out his orders and to place his spoke in Catherine's wheel.

For two days he was entertained at Meudon by the Cardinal of Lorraine. But heated words seem to have passed between them on the question of precedence, and on entering St Germain on September 19th his legatine cross was insulted in the streets and his person greeted with jeers of "au renard! au renard!" A not too effusive reception at Court was followed by the Chancellor's refusal to endorse his legatine powers owing to the hated faculties. From the Assembly at Poissy, however, a delegation of six bishops came to welcome him. In his reply he reproached them for their failure to resist anti-papal measures with sufficient firmness, and hinted that they found it to their financial advantage not to do so.

The situation which confronted him could hardly be termed encouraging. As Viterbo had reported, interest in the Council of Trent was either completely dead or dangerously directed—as when it was said that Valence would conduct to it a mixed company of bishops and ministers.¹ The Queen seemed to be entirely under Huguenot or at least dangerously liberal Catholic influences. At St Germain the reformed ministers preached, taught and performed their sacramental rites unhindered, nor without great effect, using their freedom to denounce the Catholic system and hierarchy in unmeasured terms. It was true indeed, and something to be grateful for, that the bishops had put their foot down against a continuation of the Colloquy in their presence failing a retraction on the part of the Huguenots. Nevertheless the Colloquy was to continue, and in a way that was more fraught with dangerous possibilities precisely because it was more private. Roman and clerical interests were

¹ Šusta, I, 88.

also being jeopardized in other directions. It had been vital for Catherine to make quite certain of the consent of the Estates to her regency, and this, with the assistance of Coligny, she had managed to do, but at the price of having to enforce the registration by the Parlement de Paris of the Ordinance of Orleans¹ which, amongst other provisions abolished annates and preventions and set up a new method of choosing bishops. The protests of the President, Gilles le Maistre, a severe anti-Huguenot, were answered by confining him to his house; and after various threats had been directed against it, the Parlement performed the registration, grudgingly and with reservations, on September 12th.² Viterbo had foreseen that this would happen, despite all the Queen's promises to the contrary. None the less, he protested vigorously and received a glib explanation from de l'Hôpital that the measure was only intended to be temporary.³ The deception became apparent when Ferrara set about procuring the Ordinance's revocation, which was to prove one of his hardest yet one of his most important tasks. The *dénouement* in regard to annates had come as an unwelcome surprise to Rome where it was believed that du Ferrier had successfully converted the Government to the papal point of view. Rome, however, had not been in a position to foresee that Catherine would be forced to buy the security of her own position with the confirmation of measures detrimental to papal finance. Successful over the Ordinance, the elated Estates began to discuss extensive schemes for the confiscation of Church property, wishing to thrust upon the clergy the burden of providing the financial assistance required so urgently by the Government. Their violent anti-clericalism frightened the bishops, who had early taken alarm at a rumour that the Government intended to treat financially with the clerical estate at Pontoise independently of the Synod. In a session specially convened on August 2nd they had protested against this dangerous proposal, whereupon the clerical estate was withdrawn

¹ Text in Isambert, xiv, 63-98.

² Maugis, I, 665-70.

³ Layard, p. 44.

from Pontoise leaving the bishops as sole representatives of the Church.¹ Financial negotiations then began, and on September 21st, two days after the legate's arrival at St Germain, there was signed the important agreement known as the Contract of Poissy, the main provision of which engaged the clergy to pay the Crown 1,600,000 livres per annum for six years, altogether about two-thirds of the original amount demanded by the Queen.²

Against these darker patches one bright spot of light could be set. The Parlement de Paris earlier in the year had again refused to defer to the royal wishes in regard to the Jesuits, withstanding both the eloquence of Père Cogordan, who pleaded in person at its bar, the direct orders of the King, and the new directions of the Bishop of Paris. It attempted to evade responsibility for the capitulation which it foresaw to be inevitable, by referring the question to the National Council should this ever meet.³ The Society's eventual success, however, seemed at last certain, since the Queen and most of the cardinals and bishops were its friends. But the opposition of Cardinal Châtillon, of a small minority of bishops and several doctors of the Sorbonne, called for delicate handling, and it was the Bishop of Paris, the Jesuits' old opponent and even now only a lukewarm convert to their cause, who was chosen to prepare the case and report to the Assembly. He again perused all the relevant documents—the Society's Bulls, its letters to the Kings, the letters patent of Henri II, François II and Charles IX, the various pronouncements of the Parlement and of the theological faculty, the testimonials of Jesuit colleges already in

¹ *Diario*, pp. 96, 98; *Journal du Colloque*, p. 17. On the Estates of Pontoise, whose importance appears to have been curiously neglected by historians, see van Dyke in the *E.H.R.* xxviii, 472 *et seq.* Cf. Picot, II, 57 *et seq.*, and Desjardins, *États-Généraux*, pp. 383 *et seq.*

² *Journal du Colloque*, pp. 17-18, 24-5, 30-1; *Diario*, pp. 97, 98, 99, 115, 122, 150-1. Cf. Serbat, pp. 34-7. Laferrière, *Le Contrat de Poissy* (1905), explains the importance of the Contract in the financial relations between the French Crown and the French Church, and in the position at law of the Church's temporalities. For a detailed account of the protracted negotiations, which were conducted mainly by the Cardinals of Lorraine and Tournon, the Dukes of Guise and Montmorency, the Sieur du Mortier and the Sieur du Gonnor, see Klipffel, *Colloque de Poissy*, pp. 56-65.

³ Fouqueray, I, 243-8. Royal *lettres de jussion* of Feb. 20th in Isambert, XIV, 98-9.

existence which Lorraine had advised the Jesuits to collect.¹ After much consideration du Bellay composed a carefully-worded decree legalizing the Society as a Society—thus enabling it to hold and inherit property—but not as a new religious order; requiring it, furthermore, to discard the title of Society of Jesus and submitting its members to the ordinary jurisdiction of the bishop and to all properly constituted legal authority. No criticism, however, was levelled at its Constitutions or at the Papal Bulls. On September 15th the Assembly approved the decree, which was registered by the Parlement in the following February, when the Society at last obtained possession of the legacies of Bishop du Prat of Clermont.²

The legalization of the Jesuits, effected at last after so protracted a struggle, was perhaps the Assembly of Poissy's most enduring work, though it attracted but small contemporary notice.³ It was especially gratifying for Laynez, whose arrival a few days later with Ferrara seemed particularly opportune. Indeed the Jesuit General received a warmer welcome than the papal legate, and though the quarters in which he was lodged with his companions proved uncomfortably straitened, he found ample compensation for the personal inconvenience in the excellent opportunities which the situation afforded for good works. Laynez paid many visits to Poissy, made himself *persona grata* with the bishops, and began a successful campaign of preaching in opposition to the rival oratory of the Huguenots. The Cardinal of Lorraine showed him every kindness, and gave a dinner party in his honour.⁴

¹ Cf. above, p. 60.

² Fouquieray, I, 253-7. The Jesuits were at first known in France as the *Société du Collège de Clermont* or simply as *prêtres de Clermont*, until in 1565 they received permission to call themselves religious of the Company of Jesus. Later on still their various privileges were gradually admitted by Charles IX and Henri III. Du Prat had died in 1560 and had left the Jesuits certain properties upon which they had been unable to enter.

³ There is no mention of it in the *Journal du Colloque* nor in the *Diario*. Nevertheless the decree of Sept. 15th is found in the more or less official collection of pieces relating to the Assembly (Archives Nationales, Registers G 8* 588 and 589 A; Bib. Nat., fonds français, 15812 and 17813). Hubert Languet remarked it briefly—II, 140.

⁴ Fouquieray, I, 257-8; *M.H.S.Œ., Lainii Monumenta*, VI, 52, 843 (Polanco's itinerary).

Profiting by the wave of kindly feeling set in motion by the decree of September 15th, and assisted also by the great edification given by their lives, the Jesuits had no difficulty in maintaining their prestige and popularity. But Ferrara's position was totally different. Not only—far from being just legalized—were some of his faculties considered definitely illegal, but he had a personal reputation to live down. Quietly he began to break down the ring of hostility which fenced him in. He laid aside his claims to precedence over the other legates and agreed not to display his cross in public. He took pains to make himself agreeable to Valence—though he had it in his power to cite him to Rome; and he cultivated the acquaintance of the suspect though influential *Sieur du Mortier*, father of the ambassador at the papal court.¹ The desired effect was not long in coming; Catherine soon unfroze, and the door to her confidence was finally unlocked when the legate gave his "benign approval"² to the proposal to continue the Colloquy in private. His abstention from any kind of public protest against the conferences surprised and pained many Catholics, but he considered it more prudent to let the proceedings run on to their inevitable failure, than by an indiscreet and premature condemnation to give them an artificial impulse and ruin his own chances of acquiring influence over the Queen. He embarked at the same time upon an enterprise which held out promise infinitely more fruitful—the definite capture of the King of Navarre for the Catholic cause. Despite Anthony's embassies to Rome and Toledo nothing serious had hitherto been attempted from the papal side to win him over. Already, however, Anthony had been persuaded to write to Rome expressing his pleasure at the Cardinal's legation³; and if it were true that it was a perilous thing to hold out offers of help to one who was deeply committed with heretics both at home and abroad, was married to a kind of Calvinist Papess, and continued to display the greatest vacillations in his own religious

¹ Layard, p. 44.

² The phrase is Klipffel's.

³ Šusta, I, 209.

observances, yet conversely it was no less true that a serious offer of assistance was the only way of resolving such hesitations and of attracting Anthony definitely to cast in his lot with the Catholics. Ferrara thus chose to provide for the deeper necessities of the situation rather than to meet the more obvious requirements of the moment. To have attempted the latter might have destroyed all hope of ever achieving the former.¹

II

The Prioress's study, a room evidently of considerable dimensions, was thrown open on September 24th to receive a curiously assorted company. The Catholics were represented by five cardinals—Tournon and Ferrara both declining to attend—by a trio of liberally-minded bishops, Valence, Orleans and Troyes, and by three theologians, Claude d'Espence, Claude de Sainctes, and Angelo Giustiniani, the Franciscan Recollect brought by Ferrara from Rome. For the Huguenots there appeared Beza and the eleven other ministers. A few other bishops and theologians came as spectators and were joined by Catherine herself, the King and Queen of Navarre, Condé, Coligny, and several members of the Court. Charles IX, whose interest in the proceedings would doubtless have been as exiguous as his understanding of them, was spared the tedium of attendance. The Huguenots, therefore, could no longer keep up any pretence of appeal to his arbitration.

The Catholics came armed with folios of the fathers, which were opened at the annotated parts and laid on the table. So far all was in accordance with the official programme of an examination of Lorraine's references. But in his opening address the Cardinal deliberately introduced a new note. They had met, he

¹ On Ferrara's arrival and early policy see Šusta, I, 225, 233, 295-7; *Journal du Colloque*, pp. 33-4, 35; C.R., *Op. Cal.* xviii, 765; *Lainii Monumenta*, vi, 48, 53; Desjardins, *Négociations avec la Toscane*, iii, 463. Cf. the account of M. Romier in *Catholiques et Huguenots*, pp. 222-8, who is very severe upon the Cardinal's person and abilities. There is a MS. account at Naples of the Cardinal's journey to and life at St Germain, which I have not seen. It is referred to by Calenzio, *Documenti inediti sul concilio di Trento*, pp. 330 *et seq.*, and by Roserot de Melin, *Rome et Poissy* (Introduction to the *Diario, Mélanges d'Archéologie et d'Histoire*), p. 75.

announced, to enquire whether the ministers were prepared to submit to the truths which he had expounded on the 16th. But if they had any difficulties he was willing first to hear and deal with them. It was a plain invitation to debate.

It was also the chance of reply so eagerly awaited by Beza. Calvin, however, had warned him so persistently of the dangers lurking on the eucharistic field, where Lorraine was supposed to be laying subtle traps with the Confession of Augsburg, that his appetite for debate on this topic had been quite taken away. He had decided to avoid the Eucharist altogether, feeling certain that otherwise he would find himself challenged in respect of Consubstantiation, a doctrine which it would be impossible to accept, yet disadvantageous to be forced to reject in public. He spoke, then, exclusively upon the Church. Of the visible Church as opposed to the invisible company of the elect, the administration of the Sacraments and the preaching of the pure Word were the sole essential marks. He tilted at the doctrine of the apostolic succession which he appeared to think conclusively shattered by the frequency of papal schisms, the heresy of Pope John XXII, and the sex of Pope Joan. An unbroken personal succession of ministers he pronounced to be desirable rather than essential. Normal entrance to the ministry consisted in the laying-on of hands after popular election and a successful examination in faith and morals; but cases of extraordinary vocation might occur, as in several Old Testament instances, where some or even all of these normal elements were absent. Infallibility was a prerogative that could not be allowed even to the Church assembled in General Council—much less to any one member, however distinguished, or any one portion of the Church. No privilege of inerrancy had existed under the Old Law: there were always grave defects in the composition of General Councils, and examples existed of positive contradiction between them—and this not merely on points of secondary importance. Catholic arguments for conciliar infallibility were often no more than abstract presumptions against whose validity the characteristics of human nature militated strongly. Scripture alone was the infallible guide, to which

fathers and councils alike must bend the knee. Not that the correct interpretation of the Bible was a matter of ease, nor that it lay within everyone's competence. But the divine command to search the Scriptures was eternally compelling, and in the search fathers and councils could play no more than an advisory part. It was natural for a body of unwritten tradition to arise; to a certain degree it was even necessary; but it should remain submissive to scriptural teaching and tend not to abuse but edification; nor could it possibly contain anything essential to faith or salvation. The Gospels had been written largely in order to check the illegitimate development of tradition, and thus, though it was perfectly true that the Church had existed before the New Testament, it did not follow that it had a superior authority, nor did the canon of Scripture rest on the authority of the Church. Having been deliberately expansive on these questions of the Church, the ministry, authority and tradition, Beza added that he had no time left to deal with the Eucharistic Presence. Little or no good, he believed, could result from his doing so.¹

The Cardinal of Lorraine then signed to d'Espence to reply, making it clear that he was going to allow discussion. D'Espence's preface made it equally clear that discussion had been foreseen and prepared for. He expressed his pleasure at having been afforded the opportunity for a quiet exchange of views, and said that he had always been opposed to the employment of force in matters of conscience. He added, however, that he was not well primed for answering all the varied objections to Catholic doctrine that had just been raised. It had been chiefly on the question of the Real Presence that he had prepared himself to talk; what he could say on any other subject could be only by way of extemporization. In spite of this disadvantage he made several telling if obvious points. Examples of extraordinary vocation culled from the Old Testament were surely irrelevant in regard to the New Testament ministry, but even assuming, hypothetically, the existence of a New Testament extraordinary vocation it was difficult to see how the Calvinists could lay

¹ Reasons of space have made it necessary to give only the outlines of these speeches and to omit many interesting and smaller points in them.

claim to it, seeing that they were unsupported by any kind of directly compelling or miraculous proof of divine sanction: yet it was equally difficult to see how, lacking the imposition of hands, they could even on their own reckoning lay claim to a normal ministry. Which kind of ministry, d'Espence asked, did they in fact claim? Turning then to the interpretation of doctrine, d'Espence admitted that it was misleading to affirm baldly that the Church was above the Scriptures. The Holy Spirit inspired both with equal authority. It also inspired with equal authority the assembled fathers of the Church when, as at Nicaea, contending parties who based opposing doctrines on the same texts brought their disagreement before a General Council which then pronounced on the true meaning of Scripture. The variations in the teaching of General Councils which Beza had asserted were recognized by St Augustine, could only, said d'Espence, have been in matters of custom. Then, carrying the war into the enemy's territory, he enquired on what grounds Beza himself held doctrines which had no direct warrant in Scripture—such as infant baptism, the perpetual virginity of Our Lady, the consubstantiality of Father and Son, the unbegottenness of the Father.

Beza refused to recognize the sincerity of d'Espence's amiability. His mind was so warped that he regarded with dark suspicion every single sentiment expressed by Lorraine or any of his dependents. With exquisite politeness to both he bestowed on d'Espence in his letters the sobriquet of "Balaam's familiar"—*conductitius Balaam*¹—but the sneer was as unjust as it was childish. D'Espence's professions, we know, were absolutely genuine. Moreover he had come to the conference not only animated by a feeling that goodwill was at last coming into its own, but armed with a well thought-out plan of campaign against the Calvinist ideas on the Eucharistic Presence. He saw that the mere piling up of texts and citations was not enough. The Calvinist doctrine was so constituted that its champions were quite equal to the task of turning every such text—from

¹ His corresponding description of de Saintes was "infacetissimus cucullus".

the Gospels onwards—to their own sense, whatever the strain on context or probability. The real point of division had to be faced, and it was this. The Calvinists would allow a real exhibition and a real reception of our Lord's Body in the Eucharist; they would use even the Tridentine adverbs "vere", "realiter", and "substantialiter", in conjunction with "exhiberi" or "sumi"; but they shrank from a realist interpretation of the presence itself, as distinct from the exhibition and reception, by taking cover under such phrases as "sacramental presence" or "sacramental union". D'Espence saw that his task would be to induce them to couple "vere", "realiter", or "substantialiter" not merely with "exhiberi" or "sumi" but with "esse"—or better still, with the stronger "adesse". There could then be no logical escape from the Catholic doctrine of a substantial presence actually in the elements.¹ He therefore directed his efforts towards obtaining their adhesion to some formula containing these vital terms, which done, the Colloquy would be able to pass on to other points. He must have ransacked Calvin's works to find instances of the happy conjunction of "substantialiter" with "esse", for he now exhorted the ministers, if they would not accept the exposition given by Lorraine, at least to listen to an extract from a recent work by one whom they revered as their teacher. He then read out three passages teaching quite specifically a substantial presence of our Lord's Body and Blood as distinct from their exhibition or reception. In one of these passages the word "adesse" figured: another rejected the implication of localization. "Why", said d'Espence, "can we not agree on the basis of these passages, in which your master admits a substantial presence in addition to a substantial exhibition and reception? We do not require your assent to the idea of localization which he rightly rejects." He handed them the book with the passages marked. It was Calvin's recent work *In Heshusium*.²

¹ See d'Espence, *Apologie contenant Ample Discours...* (1568), pp. 462 *et seq.*, 591 *et seq.*

² D'Espence, *Apologie*, p. 478; *Discours de d'Espence, Revue Historique*, May-June 1930, tome CLXIV, pp. 61-2. The three texts from *In Heshusium* (Heshusius was a well-known Lutheran divine) are given in Appendix IX, No. 2.

Before Beza could reply d'Espence was followed by Claude de Saintes¹, who repeated in a more emphatic manner all that his predecessor had said on the questions of Orders, the Church and the Scriptures, employing language of violence and abuse such as d'Espence had studiously avoided. It is difficult not to think that de Saintes was a little uneasy over d'Espence's attitude, though there was certainly no personal hostility between the two men. Fourteen years d'Espence's junior, de Saintes was a very different type of person. He had all the Dominican passion for precision and *a priori* reasoning, with which he combined a fierce enthusiasm that was sometimes carried to excess. While the equable d'Espence was to die quietly in his bed, removed from the public gaze and somewhat under a cloud, de Saintes, as Bishop of Évreux and one of the best-known and most uncompromising of *ligueurs*, was destined to perish in a dungeon for the cause of His Majesty King Charles X—better known as the Cardinal of Bourbon. But he was a scholar, and as an opponent in controversy by no means despicable. Still it seems fairly clear that Lorraine disliked the sharpness of his controversial methods; and he certainly took less and less part in the Colloquy.²

His intervention enabled Beza momentarily to elude d'Espence's questions on the passages from *In Heshusium* by appealing to the Queen for proper regulation of the Colloquy. It was sheer waste of time, he protested, to continue in so haphazard a way, without a fixed order of debate, at the mercy of the insults of

¹ The Calvinist sources say that he got up quickly and rudely, but de Saintes himself gives another impression. He says (*Responsio... ad Apologiam Theodori Bezae... contra Examen... de Coena Domini*, pp. 62 *et seq.*) that he first asked permission to speak; that Lorraine then asked him on what he wished to speak, to which he replied, on the matters then being discussed; that only then did the Queen give him licence.

² Beza himself states that Lorraine was angry at de Saintes' outburst and resolved to hold him in check—*C.R., Op. Cal.* xviii, 741. De Saintes, however, denies that Lorraine was either ashamed or annoyed with him (de Saintes, *op. cit.* p. 65). He admits that later on he took less part in the Colloquy, but ascribes this not to his violence but to the fact that the Calvinists saw that he was not a likely victim for their snares—a thrust at d'Espence. Nevertheless this is an admission that he was not sufficiently conciliatory. Lorraine, he declares, was as kind a patron to him after as he had been before the Colloquy. On de Saintes see Féret, II, 123 *et seq.*

any speaker who liked to rise, with neither books of reference nor secretaries to record the proceedings. But no answers being forthcoming to these complaints he was constrained to return to d'Espence's criticisms of his ministerial claims. Miracles, he declared, were not necessary to prove an extraordinary ministry, nor, he was now forced to admit, was the imposition of hands an essential part of normal ordination. As for their own orders, he and his fellow-ministers appealed confidently to their own life and teaching, to their popular election, to their recognition by the Swiss secular authorities, to their success in the face of fierce persecution. How indeed could they have been expected to ask for the imposition of hands from the Roman hierarchy when those hands were red with their own blood? But despite all this declamation, d'Espence had good cause to reiterate his enquiry whether the Calvinists claimed a normal or an extraordinary ministry, and to demand some other example of an extraordinary ministry under the New Dispensation. Beza could not but admit that there was none, and the Catholic sources are unanimous in recording his embarrassment in face of d'Espence's searching examination. He turned from the subject of orders to deal with de Saintes. If Scripture were so insecure a guide, wherein, he asked, with some confusion of thought, lay the basis of faith in Jesus Christ at all? The substance of all the doctrines that had been instanced as reposing on the sole authority of the Church could be found in Scripture. He believed personally in the Virgin Birth but it was not of vital importance to include it among the Articles of Faith. Asked by de Saintes why then the doctrine was found not only in the Apostles' Creed but in his own Calvinist Confessions as well, he could find no answer.¹ He would not deny that the apostles must have taught more than was recorded in the New Testament, though only, he believed, in matters pertaining to rites and ceremonies. It was, of course, the merest tilting at windmills to add that this admission did not diminish the absurdity of supposing that all contemporary ceremonial dated from apostolic times.

¹ This is recorded by de Saintes, *op. cit.*

But the task of meeting the passages from *In Heshusium* could not be indefinitely shirked. Beza assured the Catholics that these were far from being exceptional; they could easily be paralleled many times in the Master's works. But Calvin employed the word "substantialiter" only to disavow the notion of a purely imaginary presence, not to indicate that Christ was present corporeally in the bread. The Realities were in Heaven, on earth there were only symbols; yet by Faith communicants received the Realities truly and substantially. Thus by a rather subtle *distinguo* upon the word "substantialiter", Beza broke through d'Espence's logical net.¹

The discussion then became general, and, with the renewed intervention of de Saintes, increasingly acrimonious, many persons talking simultaneously.² At last the Cardinal of Lorraine put an end to the confusion and began to speak himself. He endorsed all d'Espence's points, explaining that the teaching function of the Church was more in the nature of judgment between men's opinions than judgment of the scriptural text itself, and dismissing the Huguenot appeal to the Swiss magistrates in support of their ministry on the principle "*nemo dat quod non habet*". Then he returned to the Eucharist. On this question, he pronounced, there had been sufficient discussion. Immediate steps towards agreement must be taken if the Colloquy were to proceed, for without the restoration of general belief in the Real Presence, the key-subject of the whole dispute, it would be futile to go on to others. He had already pointed out the overwhelming testimony to the Catholic belief in the records of the early Church; the passages he had cited were there for the Calvinists to see and he could add to them.³ What was needed was a formula upon which all could agree. He thereupon produced an article from the Confession of Augsburg and required the ministers to accept it.

The dreaded blow had at last fallen. Beza must either parade

¹ Cf. d'Espence, *Apologie*, pp. 479-81.

² De Saintes (*op. cit.*) relates that the fiercer Beza became, the milder d'Espence showed himself.

³ De Saintes (*op. cit.*) also relates that he reproached the ministers with having ignored the texts which had been put before them.

Calvinist dissensions with Lutheranism, or appear to have been overborne by the Cardinal's arguments. Desperately he played for time. Did the Cardinal require him to sign the whole Confession? By no means: all that was required was his assent—simply as the first step towards reunion—to the article which affirmed a substantial presence in the Eucharist; he would not even be asked specifically to accept the doctrine of Consubstantiation. Lorraine then produced another formula which he said had lately been sent from Germany, signed by more than forty eminent divines and accepted by the Elector-Palatine, the Duke of Württemberg, the Duke of Saxony and the Landgrave of Hesse.¹ This formula he coupled with the article from the Confession of Augsburg.

In a vain endeavour to escape the dilemma Beza turned once more in appeal to the Queen. It was obviously impossible, he pleaded, to come to an immediate agreement on the Real Presence; surely it were more practical first to explore matters where disagreement was less profound? But in face of Lorraine's insistence the Queen remained silent, and on all sides the Catholics urged the ministers, for the sake of peace, to accept the formulæ proposed to them. Beza was not insensible to the tragic properties of the situation. Though profoundly suspicious of the Cardinal's motives, he saw among those who urged his own signature many Catholics whom he was certain were sincere desirers of concord. Lorraine's move obviously had the support of the Liberals and appeared to them as a reasonable step in the direction of peace. True there had been no dispassionate collation of opinions, but a formula of mediation safeguarding Catholic doctrine had been advanced, and Lorraine was able to remind the ministers that it was Beza himself who by the scandal of his original speech was responsible for the concentration of the Colloquy upon the Real Presence. If he refused to make reparation by signing the Lutheran formulæ the Colloquy would end forthwith. The ministers shrank from incurring the odium of being held responsible for a disruption, yet were utterly unable to sign. The impasse seemed complete.

¹ These were the four princes visited by Rascalon, see above, pp. 279 and 331, and below, p. 354 note.

A temporary way out was at last found. Beza was given two days to decide which course he would adopt, and the meeting then came to an end. The Huguenots however broke up into small groups to carry on the discussion informally, and d'Espence and de Saintes were sent to talk to some of them in another room.¹ While they were absent the Queen implored Lorraine to find some other formula more acceptable to the Calvinists. The Cardinal yielded. Taking counsel with a few of the Catholic doctors present²—d'Espence and de Saintes being still out of the room—he produced the following formula which was handed to Beza: “Firma fide confitemur in augustissimo eucharistiae sacramento verum Christi Corpus et verum Christi Sanguinem vere, realiter et substantialiter esse et existere, exhiberi et sumi a communicantibus”.³ Beza was at once struck by the significant conjunction of “vere, realiter et substantialiter” with “esse” and “existere”. He subsequently asked de Saintes whether the Catholics would agree to the formula if “esse” and “existere” were removed, but de Saintes would not, for once, be dogmatic. He replied that he thought it unlikely, though he had no authority to make any definite statement.⁴ The ministers, armed with the passages from *In Heshusium*, the two German articles and the Cardinal of Lorraine’s formula, then left the monastery of Poissy to return to St Germain.⁵ It was by now dark. On making their departure

¹ De Saintes, *op. cit.* Actually, he says they were sent to St Germain the following day. But this is an impossible chronology and he himself makes statements later which contradict it. Taken as in the text, however, the statement fits in perfectly with, and is confirmed by, d'Espence’s account in his *Discours*.

² *Lainii Monumenta*, vi, 54 *et seq.*

³ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 62. Cf. Appendix IX, No. 4.

⁴ De Saintes, *op. cit.*

⁵ The Protestant sources of this meeting are the Calvinist *Ample discours des Actes du Colloque de Poissy* (*Mémoires de Condé*, II, 490 *et seq.*); La Place, pp. 270–90; the *H.E.* I, 619–53; de Serres, La Popelinière, de Thou, etc.; Beza’s letters in *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xviii, 740–3, and Baum, pp. 74–7; Peter Martyr’s letters in *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xviii, 766–8, ix, 6; and des Gallars’ letters in Baum, pp. 80–1. These give a very one-sided and insufficient account of the Catholic speeches, especially those of d'Espence. They need to be supplemented and balanced by the Catholic sources which are: the *Discours de d'Espence*, pp. 61–2; the *Diario*, pp. 125–33; d'Espence’s *Apologie* as referred to in the preceding notes; and de Saintes’ *Responsio... ad Apologiam Theo-*

several of them were overheard to be holding up the Mass and the Words of Institution to contemptuous derision. The Queen-

dori Bezae similarly referred to. See also Polanco's letters in *Lainii Monumenta*, VI, 54 *et seq.*, and the *Journal du Colloque*, p. 37. The narrative given in the text is the only one which is compatible with the data provided by all the sources. It is certain that the Cardinal of Lorraine handed over two German formulæ to Beza during the meeting and demanded his signature to them. One of these was the 10th article of the Confession of Augsburg; the other was almost certainly the article on the Eucharist from the Confession of Württemberg and was recognised as such by Beza who at once perceived the hand of Brenz (Baum, p. 89; La Place, p. 290, followed by the *H.E.* I, 652-3). Many contemporaries, however, confused these two articles or rolled them into one. Polanco speaks of the Augsburg Confession only (*Lainii Monumenta*, VI, 54 *et seq.*); Languet of a mutilated version of the 10th article (*Arcana*, II, 144); the *Journal du Colloque* (de Ruble, p. 37—of which more later) of the 10th article as signed in 1561. The *Diario*, pp. 132-3, has an impossible tale that what the Cardinal produced was a formula drawn up as a protest against Calvinizing tendencies in Lutheran circles at a meeting held at Lüneberg on Aug. 15th and sent to the King of France for use at Poissy by the Dukes of Württemberg and Saxony, the Count (Elector?) Palatine and the Landgrave of Hesse. It is true that a meeting of High Church Saxons did take place at Lüneberg in July, in order to protest against alleged Calvinizing tendencies in the Naumburg Preface, and we have seen it likely that Rascalon, who actually brought the Württemberg Confession from Stuttgart, was there on behalf of the Guises (see above, pp. 279 and 331). The Italian writer of the *Diario* may have confused this with Lorraine's allegation, for which however there is no basis, that the Württemberg article had been accepted by the other three princes.

On the other hand, a simple and easily performed collation will reveal the fact that the formula *Firma fide confitemur* which is given by the *Journal du Colloque* (de Ruble, p. 37) as being the 10th article of the Augsburg Confession as signed at Naumburg in 1561, and which is also to be found as such in La Place, p. 290 (with the significant alteration that *Sacramentellement* replaces *Substantiellement*), comes not only from no edition of the Augsburg Confession, but from *no German Confession at all*. This fact—the note in the *H.E.* I, 652, appearing to identify the article is totally misleading—was first pointed out in 1892 by Heidenhain (*Unionspolitik Landgraf Philipps von Hessen*, p. 393 and notes), who was forced to the conclusion, which it is now possible to substantiate from other evidence, that the formula was the composition of the Cardinal. Plainly, therefore, it was given to Beza *in addition* to the German formulæ upon which the attention of historians has hitherto been concentrated and with which it has been confused. Why, then, was it given and when? The *Discours de d'Espence* and the *Responsio ad Apologiam* of de Saintes give us the answers to both these questions. D'Espence tells us that it was drawn up by the Cardinal and some theologians while he himself (d'Espence) was out of the room conferring with a group of ministers after the break-up of the meeting—"la compagnie levée". De Saintes adds the information that it was done at the request of the Queen-Mother, and says that, like d'Espence, he himself was also out of the room at the moment with some of the ministers. It is true that he moves the incident forward a day, but it is apparent that this is an error, for he goes on to say that Beza made his criticisms of the formula *before leaving the monastery*, and speaks

Mother however told d'Espence and the Bishop of Valence that she desired them to come over to St Germain the following day to discuss the Cardinal's new formula with the Huguenots.¹

Now this formula expressed Catholic doctrine far better than did the two Lutheran articles; and though it did not directly teach the change of identity in the elements which is the essence of Transubstantiation,² it definitely employed the three adverbs "vere", "realiter", "substantialiter", which had been consecrated ten years before in vital passages of the Tridentine decrees,³ to express the mode of the Presence, coupling them not only with "exhiberi" and "sumi" but with the more critical words "esse" and "existere". Thus, though of Lorraine's composition, the formula fulfilled all d'Espence's requirements, a fact which indicates the understanding that existed between the Cardinal and his theologian. D'Espence, indeed, when apprised of the formula, noted its terms with great satisfaction,⁴ possibly all the more so in that he had opposed the Cardinal's policy of using the Confession of Augsburg and had unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade him from it. Not that he did not believe, with the Cardinal, that its 10th article, of which alone there was question here, was capable of an orthodox interpretation. He knew that this had been the view of such authorities as Cochläus, Eck and Hoffmeister, and he himself was of the opinion that the article could be so interpreted throughout the whole gamut of its many variations

of other events, that certainly took place on the 25th, as happening *the next day*. Clearly, then, his memory is at fault here—he was writing six years after the event. Further evidence of Lorraine's authorship comes from the little Diary in Sattler, *Geschichte des Herzogthums Württemberg*, iv, Beilage, p. 42, which definitely speaks of the formula as put together on the 24th by the Cardinal of Lorraine as a Confession of Catholic belief; and from the *Responsio pro Francisco Balduino* of Michael Fabricius (1564), in which we find: "brevissima formula ut extempore tunc conscripta fuit abs illo Cardinali" (p. 114). All the Calvinist accounts slur over the fact that the formula *Firma fide confitemur* was a separate thing from the German formulæ: none, however, definitely preclude the possibility. It would obviously have been as impossible as it would have been pointless for the Cardinal to have passed off a formula of his own composition as an article of the Confession of Augsburg.

¹ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 62.

² The Württembergische article, however, specifically affirmed the possibility of Transubstantiation—see Appendix IX, No. 3 (b).

³ See Appendix IX, No. 1.

⁴ D'Espence, *Apologie*, p. 468.

and reconstructions. Nevertheless in all other particulars the Confession of Augsburg was without question unorthodox; it had innumerable different versions and yet at best it was no more than a local creed presented at one diet. What was to be gained, he asked, by an arbitrary and peremptory attempt to force a creed of such poor credentials upon men who would not even accept the decrees of General Councils unreservedly?¹ The production of the Cardinal's new formula must certainly have seemed to him a strategic move in the right direction and a retirement from a bad tactical position.

To St Germain, then, went d'Espence and Montluc on September 25th and found themselves confronted in "neutral territory"² with Beza and des Gallars in order to discuss the new formula, all four agreeing, however, that they could not in any sense regard themselves as delegates speaking on behalf of their respective churches. The Huguenots stood out firmly against the formula, and after some discussion it was decided to modify it so that a substantial presence should be declared to exist along with the signs but in a manner not specifically defined. A draft of an avowedly tentative nature was produced in which the phrase "in usu coenae dominicae" replaced "in augustissimo sacramento eucharistiae"; the important word "existere" was dropped; in place of the Tridentine adverbs "vere, realiter et substantialiter" there appeared the phrase "vere, re ipsa, substantialiter seu in ipsa substantia" to which was added "spirituali et ineffabili modo"; while "fidelibus" was inserted before "communicantibus".³ These changes were all advances in the Bucerian direction by reason of the emphasis laid on the *use* of the Sacrament and on the *faith* of the recipient. None the less, it was still possible to maintain that the resultant version was capable of an orthodox interpretation, and both sides agreed that it should be not only shown but also recommended to their co-religionists.⁴

¹ D'Espence, *Apologie*, pp. 595-610, 725-51.

² "En lieu neutre", says d'Espence in his *Discours*, p. 62.

³ See Appendix IX, No. 5.

⁴ For this conference see the *Discours de d'Espence*, pp. 62-3; d'Espence, *Apologie*, pp. 466-8, and d'Espence, *Épître à l'évêque de Paris* in *Conciones Aliquot* (1562), pp. 47-8. See the *H.E.* I, 671, for a Huguenot account.

Meanwhile the Cardinal of Lorraine was facing the reproaches of a surprised and resentful Synod. The bishops censured him for having entered into actual debate with the heretics, when both propriety and honesty should have held him confined to the citation of proof. They represented that any renewal of this procedure would be taken as a deliberate slight upon their wishes. The Cardinal sought to justify his behaviour. He said that he had hoped by means of Lutheran formulæ to lead the Calvinists on to the truth of Transubstantiation, but confessed that their obstinacy had astonished him; he promised however that on the following day they should either sign or be driven away.¹

It was not only the bishops who felt uneasy. Lorraine's conduct was arousing suspicion in many quarters. The Constable considered that his speech of the 16th had erred on the side of politeness to the heretics, and now rumours were circulating to the effect that he was not really sound on the doctrine of Transubstantiation. It was certainly true that his efforts had been confined to extracting from the ministers the admission of a substantial Real Presence as distinct from a real exhibition and reception, and had not touched upon that change of reality in the elements which is the essence of Transubstantiation. But he might well have pleaded that this would follow logically in due course. Several critics, however, were of the opinion that there should have been a definite mention of Transubstantiation in the formula which he had composed²; and it seems highly probable that a further formula which the *Histoire Ecclésiastique* preserves as having been drawn up by some Catholic prelates on this day, the 25th, is really an ultra-Catholic, if that expression may be used, reconstruction of Lorraine's original³—in the same way that the St Germain production was a Bucerian reconstruction of it. But there is no reason to suppose that the

¹ *Diario*, p. 133; *Journal du Colloque*, p. 38.

² De Sainctes, *op. cit.* pp. 64-5.

³ The *H.E.* ascribes this reconstruction to some prelates *moins criminels* who imagined that the heretics were on the point of yielding and thought to supply the last inducement. But its wording (see Appendix IX, No. 6), supplying safeguards to the Catholic position rather than inducements to unsettled Calvinists, could only have come from prelates who from the Calvinist point of view were *plus criminels*.

Cardinal's personal faith was in any way deficient. Still less that there was any real foundation for the stories which the Venetian envoy professed to have heard from a secret and confidential source, that Lorraine had not only inspired the abolition of annates but would not have opposed a complete rejection of papal authority, so that by turning the Colloquy to his own schismatic uses he might finally emerge as the restorer of law, order and national unity.¹ Such stories, indeed, may serve to indicate that heads were being puzzled over the real meaning and trend of his tactics; they are insufficient as a serious explanation of them. In a private letter written during the Colloquy the Cardinal expressed his hope of preserving religion "en son entier", praying his correspondent, the Bishop of Verdun, to maintain intact the authority of "la sainte Église Catholique Romaine".²

III

On the morning of September 26th, while the ministers were arriving at Poissy for the second meeting in the Prioress's apartment, Beza broke the news to d'Espence that he had failed to procure his colleagues' assent to the amended version of Lorraine's formula drafted the previous day at St Germain.³ D'Espence ascribed this failure to the influence of Peter Martyr, whose close association with Bullinger had inclined him to opinions of a Zwinglian cast and had rendered him a little suspicious of the Bucerian views of Beza. D'Espence believed that without Martyr's pressure Beza and des Gallars would have been able to secure the acceptance by the other Calvinists of this formula,⁴ which now, however, had to be abandoned. The Queen-Mother's intervention, then, had not materially altered the situation. Though she had persuaded Lorraine to devise a new formula of reconciliation, though she had instituted an even smaller and more private conference at which this had been modified with the consent of both parties, success had in

¹ Layard, p. 45.

² *Petite Bibliothèque Verdunoise*, II, 129-30.

³ *I.e.* Appendix IX, No. 5.

⁴ D'Espence, *Apologie*, p. 468.

the end been snatched from her, and she now had the mortification of witnessing her plans collapse chiefly owing to the influence of the one man, and he an Italian, whom she herself had personally invited to the Colloquy.¹ The blow was disastrous for the success of the Colloquy. It was disastrous also for the ministers, for it put them back in the *status quo*, faced with the dilemma of the Confession of Augsburg from which they might, by accepting the modified version of the Cardinal's formula, have happily extricated themselves.

A curious commentary upon the opposition of the bishops to the conference of the 24th was provided when no less than twenty-five of their number—more than half, that is—with a similar number of theologians, were discovered among the spectators when it was continued on the 26th.² Perhaps they came to make sure that the Cardinal would redeem his pledges, and to enjoy the satisfying spectacle of Beza's impalement upon one or other horn of his dilemma. Once more the marked tomes of the fathers were brought in and placed upon the table; but this time the Cardinal did not invite debate in his opening remarks. Without further ado he demanded whether the Reformers were prepared to sign the German formulæ that had been given to them two days previously.

The pressure put upon Beza to sign had but hardened his determination to refuse. He had no intention of allowing himself to be browbeaten into an action as contrary to the dictates of his conscience as it would have been detrimental to his interests as a churchman. He had already decided to make an appeal from the snares of the Cardinal to the justice of the Queen, hoping to make it morally impossible for her to allow him and his colleagues to be abruptly dismissed if they refused

¹ The authors of the *H.E.* (I, 671) repudiate the idea of any serious disagreement between Martyr and Beza. They admit however that the Italian, owing to his special position, allowed himself a certain liberty of action and did not attach himself too closely to the Frenchmen. There is no doubt that he held "lower" sacramental views than the French Calvinists; and though we may accept the assertion of the *H.E.* that there was no open quarrel, it still remains extremely probable that he was responsible for the rejection of Formula V, which could be interpreted in a Bucerian way, though hardly in a Zwinglian.

² *Diario*, p. 133.

to sign a Lutheran article. He read out to Catherine a long and dignified protest which he had carefully prepared. He said that he and his companions had come to Poissy in order to explain and defend their creed, a task which they were fully prepared to undertake systematically, point by point. But hardly had they begun to explain their conception of the Church when the Cardinal of Lorraine, most suddenly and most unfairly, had drawn two red herrings across their path. The first was his surprise demand for their credentials, for an explanation by what authority they preached and administered the Sacraments—an issue totally irrelevant since they were not there to perform those functions. To proceed with the subject of Orders could only lead to statements highly disagreeable to the bishops, for if he himself might lack the imposition of hands, yet how many of the Catholic prelates present had been elected by the elders of their churches after a careful scrutiny of life and doctrine? How many could truthfully say that no money had passed hands when they obtained their see? But he had no desire to give offence, and so hoped that the Catholics would realize the wisdom of probing no deeper into the question of Orders. The second red herring was the question of the Real Presence, which had been given quite unnecessary prominence by the Cardinal. It seemed useless to continue the discussion because the Catholics appeared consistently scandalized by any doctrine with which they were unfamiliar. The Cardinal's promised catena of witnesses to a primitive belief in a substantial Real Presence had not—he alleged—been produced,¹ and in place of the civilly conducted conference which they had expected, a pistol had suddenly been thrust at their heads and they were told that they must either sign a formula chosen at the Cardinal's caprice or incur the undeserved odium of breaking up the whole Colloquy! Had they been criminals pleading at the bar they could have received no worse treatment! They could not possibly bind their principals at Geneva and Zurich, and they were totally

¹ De Sainctes, however, in the *Responsio ad Apologiam*, says more than once that the Calvinists deliberately ignored the books with the marked passages which had been brought into the room both on the 24th and on the 26th.

unable to see what the Catholics stood to gain by soliciting their signature to the Confession of Augsburg. The eyes of all the Protestant world—Switzerland, Germany, England, Scotland, Poland—were turned in expectancy towards Poissy. A rupture would have wide repercussions. He begged Catherine to institute an equitably conducted conference, to pit himself and his companions against opponents prepared for reasonable argument. Under such circumstances they would be only too willing to submit their creed to detailed scrutiny, to examine even the Confession of Augsburg should the Cardinal press the point; but while they naturally accepted everything that came from the pen of Calvin, in the case of the Augsburg Confession there were several preliminary points that would require elucidation. For instance it would be important to know whether the Cardinal was acting on his own initiative or as the accredited representative of the Catholic bishops; whether, too, he was prepared to sign the Confession himself. If he proposed to sign it officially in the name of the Catholics then it would be a matter of congratulation that the Gallican Church rejected Transubstantiation, and every effort would then be made to reach agreement on those points in the Confession wherein the followers of Calvin dissented from those of Luther. In order to clear the ground he once more gave an explanation of the Eucharistic Presence on Bucerian lines.¹ Finally he declared his confidence that in a reasonably conducted disputation, with a proper equipment of secretaries and books of reference, he and his followers would experience little difficulty in demonstrating that they had done no more than restore primitive usage and doctrine. He implored the Queen to listen to the voice of justice and to grant them this opportunity.

This unexpected move, by means of which Beza sought to throw the whole blame of failure on to the Cardinal, took everybody by surprise. And so skilfully was it made that many of the audience remained persuaded that after all the Huguenots had been rather roughly handled and deserved sympathy. But it is hardly possible to deny that Beza bought his sympathy at

¹ Appendix IX, No. 7.

some expense of truth. The position which he took up did not entirely correspond with the real facts of the situation. The concentration of the Colloquy on Orders and the Real Presence could not be interpreted as the forcible intrusion of irrelevant matter. If it were true that the Cardinal had picked out these two subjects for special treatment, he had done no more than select two cards out of a proffered full hand: it was simply untrue to assert that he had suddenly and arbitrarily introduced new matter. It would hardly have been possible to avoid the subject of Orders in any discussion on the Church, and when Beza asserted that he had not come to St Germain to exercise his orders—the absurd implication being that it would therefore be irrelevant to talk about them!—he seemed conveniently to forget the amount of preaching and proselytizing that had gone on there, not to mention a Huguenot wedding between persons of high rank which three days later he himself was to celebrate with deliberate pomp.¹ If he now attempted to evade further discussion on Orders and the Real Presence, having denied the latter in so striking a manner, small wonder if the Catholics construed his attempted evasion as an admission that d'Espence had effectively worsted him on the question of Orders and that on the Real Presence he was being led into an extremely uncomfortable position. And though the Huguenots might imagine that they had come to Poissy simply to explain and defend their creed, the Queen and Lorraine knew quite well that they had in fact been summoned in order to search for some agreement with the Catholics.

It was on these lines that the Cardinal of Lorraine now defended his handling of the Colloquy, and so competently did he do it that even Beza was forced to admire his skill in dealing impromptu with a difficult and unforeseen situation. The particular lines which the Colloquy had taken had been less a matter of his own choosing, he said, than an inevitable result of

¹ The marriage of Jean de Rohan, a near relative of both the King and Queen of Navarre, with Diane de Barbançon, who was connected closely with the Duke and Duchess of Étampes, was celebrated by Beza on Sept. 29th—the very day of the Assembly of the Order of St Michel at St Germain. See details in Delaborde, *Les Protestants à St Germain*.

the first speech in which Beza had laid claim to some kind of special vocation and had chosen a deliberately sensational simile in which to deny the Real Presence. If an unfortunate element of bitterness had crept in, this could only be imputed to Beza himself, whose uncalled-for attacks on the bishops not only cast aspersions upon the King, who under the Concordat nominated them, but also revealed a surprising ignorance of the manner in which these nominations were made. The King nominated by virtue of a popular right of election, which had been transferred to him, and before the final decision always sought the approval of clergy and people by royal letters. Beza's insinuations of simony were totally unfounded; if he referred to annates it behoved him to realize that these were paid not as the price of a bishopric but in acknowledgment of the Holy Father's supremacy.¹

The accusation of having insulted the King hit Beza on one of his most sensitive points. He denied the imputation indignantly and, shifting his ground, declared that the venality and intrigues of the clergy had led to such abuses of their right of election that the King had been forced to intervene in order to terminate a horrible state of affairs. This contention, besides being a change of ground, revealed a complete misconception both of the causes and the results of the Concordat. Without stopping however to resolve these inconsistencies, Beza went on to pour scorn on the royal letters to which the Cardinal had referred. It was common knowledge, he exclaimed, that these were no more than empty formalities. But the whole subject of Orders was unfruitful; he had certainly referred to it in his original speech, but it had only been a passing and incidental reference.

The Cardinal of Lorraine, nevertheless, continued to insist that Beza had been responsible for engendering an atmosphere of hostility and observed that insulting words about the French hierarchy formed but a poor prelude to reconciliation. "Le

¹ It is curious that the Cardinal completely ignored the Ordinance of Orleans which had just been forcibly registered and which provided for the abolition of annates and the election of candidates for bishoprics by a mixed tribunal of clergy and laity.

commencement d'injurier", he said, "est venu de vous." He went on to justify his use of the Augsburg Confession: he had brought it forward as a finishing touch to his demonstration of the universality of belief in the Real Presence. Once more, he demanded, would the Calvinists submit to the truth of this demonstration by signing the required article?

In face of this fresh assault Beza renewed his counter-attack. Would Lorraine first set them the example? Would he say, also, whether he had the authority of the bishops behind him or whether he was merely making a free-lance proposal? "I am under no obligation to defer to the formulæ of any individual teacher," rejoined the Cardinal, "whether he be one of yours or a German. But I will sign anything that expresses the truth. My colleagues here will assure you that I have done nothing without their advice and consent." "Then you will not sign the Confession of Augsburg," retorted Beza, "why then should I?"

It is traditional to regard the Cardinal's insistence at this juncture as evident proof of his insidious desire to discredit the ministers and break up the Colloquy. It is no longer possible to uphold the traditional view. Even the intransigent de Saintes, in defence of his patron, said emphatically that so strong were the forces at work to have the ministers sent away—Catholic forces, Lutheran forces from Wittenberg and elsewhere—that if Lorraine had not continued to support the Colloquy, Beza and his companions would not have remained long at St Germain. Had the ministers been willing to sign this one Lutheran article—it was never a question of the whole Confession—these hostile forces would have been seriously checked, and the Colloquy could then have proceeded to other points. Lorraine, in fact, was trying to save the Huguenots from themselves, had they been able to realize it.¹ He was prepared and would have been pleased to pass on to other aspects of the subject had they signed the Lutheran article on the Real Presence. He had definitely instructed d'Espence to this effect and had bade him be ready with arguments—amongst

¹ De Saintes, *op. cit.* pp. 18-19.

others—for the adoration of the elements.¹ What had happened was that the ministers had not unnaturally refused to be converted according to plan. They alleged that the Cardinal had failed to produce his promised catena of texts, though on the other hand the Catholics accused them of ignoring these when produced. Naturally, also, they fought shy of appearing to defer to a Confession which they attacked as bitterly as any Catholic dogma. The projected master-stroke was thus inevitably defeated, though it had the best intentions in the world and was the culmination of a series of eirenic moves in which the Cardinal's speech of September 16th, his championship of the smaller conferences, and his composition of a new formula at the end of the meeting of September 24th were the previous steps. He had set his heart upon forcing the ministers' adhesion to a formula containing the essence of the Catholic doctrine, and if he chose a Lutheran formula it may have been partly to save them the shame of a complete submission to definitely Roman terms, partly also—no doubt—to emphasize their isolation and play upon their fears. Perhaps when he threatened their instant dismissal if they would not sign, he may have bluffed; for unless he had the Queen behind him such a threat would have been idle. But the ministers had shown themselves in every way less pliable than he had anticipated; they had called his bluff—if bluff it were. In the name of abstract justice they had challenged his right to put his alternatives before them, and they had made their case seem considerably stronger than it really was. The Cardinal saw that he had been put in such a position that he could neither force their signature nor fulfil his threat of ending the Colloquy on the spot. He had made his throw and lost; it was a complete tactical defeat; and smarting under its sting he dropped his demand and signed to d'Espence to reopen the discussions.

Once more d'Espence began to make his excuses, asking that he might not be continually forced to speak extempore before so distinguished an audience, and suggesting that he might at least be allowed to have a preliminary meeting with Beza to

¹ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 73.

define the scope of the debate before it actually took place. He then apologized to Beza for having been obliged, at the last meeting, to make an attack upon his ministry in public; the situation had been none of his own choosing, he would far have preferred a private conversation. Nevertheless he went on to apply further criticism to the Huguenot claim to a valid ministry and concluded that without episcopal ordination their pastors could only be regarded as laymen.¹ Then returning to his extracts from *In Heshusium* he endeavoured to convince the ministers that the word "substantialiter" must of necessity be interpreted in the Catholic sense and as implying a real corporal presence. The whole idea of a real reception of our Lord's Body as food—an idea accepted in theory by the Calvinists—logically demanded the real corporal presence of that Body. This Beza would not grant, maintaining as before that Calvin's use of "substantialiter" had only a negative force and while disavowing the idea of a purely imaginary presence did not imply one of substance.

The argument proceeded thus for a little while until at last Peter Martyr felt called upon to intervene. Having first received the Queen-Mother's permission, he addressed the meeting in his native Tuscan dialect. He spoke for about half an hour, reviewing all the topics that had been previously discussed but without adding very much to them. On the subject of Orders he was lacking in precision; imposition of hands he did not seem to regard as absolutely necessary, since the ministers of Calvin possessed an equivalent in their pure teaching, to support which position he adduced several Old Testament incidents and the equally inapplicable analogy of Baptism at the hands of unbelievers. St Paul, he asserted with greater relevancy if less accuracy, had preached without ordination. He attacked Lorraine's use of the maxim "nemo dat quod non habet" respecting the non-competence of the Swiss civil authorities to confer spiritual jurisdiction, and emphatically disavowed all connection with lawless disorganized bodies such as the Anabaptists. On the question of the Real Presence he sought to prove that the

¹ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 64.

Words of Institution had never been interpreted by the early Church with absolute realism.¹ It is very difficult, judging by this speech, to account for Martyr's great reputation.

Called upon to reply by the Queen, d'Espence exclaimed that since Peter Martyr understood little French and he himself little Italian, an argument between them would resemble one between blind or deaf men. He protested against the unfairness of pitting him suddenly against one of the most learned men of the day, one who had perhaps written more than any one else living on the Sacrament. He made, however, a few observations on those parts of Martyr's speech which he had understood, picking out the Latin quotations and giving them the customary Catholic interpretations, after which Lorraine added to the texts and arguments, as indeed, says the disgruntled d'Espence, was his "*propre fait*".²

Furious at the irretrievable collapse of his schemes, the Cardinal of Lorraine had given signs of impatience at having to listen to a speech in a foreign tongue, though he had a perfect knowledge of Italian. But an additional trial of the same nature lay before him. Among the spectators sat the horrified General of the Jesuits, who now considered that his turn, too, had come for intervention; and the time was now indeed ripe, after the failure of Lorraine's scheme, to attack the whole idea of the Colloquy *in toto*. Obtaining permission both from the Cardinal and from the Queen-Mother, Laynez began to speak in Italian. A foreigner, he justified his interference on the plea that the Christian faith was international, and at once struck the keynote of his speech by proposing to examine not only the arguments of Peter Martyr, to whom he referred ironically as "*Fra Pietro*", but the whole basis and motives of the Colloquy as well. He most strongly deprecated conferences of any kind with heretics who had left the Church, pointing out that such persons were described in Scripture as serpents, foxes and wolves, to be shunned on account of their deadly cunning and vast powers of

¹ De Sainctes, *op. cit.* p. 67, states that Beza would not suffer Peter Martyr to complete his exposition of the Eucharist. This seems improbable.

² *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 64; d'Espence, *Apologie*, pp. 583 *et seq.*

prevarication.¹ It did not belong to the secular authority to assume the direction of spiritual affairs, the highest of which, namely matters concerning Faith, could only be decided by the Pope and a General Council. A General Council had already been proclaimed and thus it had become illegal, as the Council of Bâle had laid down, to assemble Provincial Councils. To Trent then let Beza, Martyr and their companions be sent; there they would find learned men of every nationality; there would be present the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit—a gift for which they could not hope in a Provincial Council. The Pope was willing to grant the fullest guarantees of personal safety that they could possibly desire. If, however, local conferences were really essential, at least let them be held in strict privacy, and in the presence only of men whose piety and intelligence would be such as to enable them to overcome rather than be overcome by the subtleties of their opponents.

Layneze then paid a warm tribute to the excellence of the replies made to the heretics by the Cardinal of Lorraine and the other Catholic champions. On the question of Orders he observed very properly that simony did not in any way invalidate either consecration or the bestowal of jurisdiction.² The Huguenots had championed the popular election of ministers: he pointed out that all forms of such election, even as originally applied to the Papacy, had invariably led to serious abuses of a simoniacal kind; so that to place the choice of bishops in the hands of the King, with the consent of the people, was in fact the best way to avoid simony. He then easily demonstrated the irrelevance of the various analogies by which Peter Martyr had sought to buttress the Huguenot claim to an abnormal ministry without ordination, enlarging and presenting afresh the points previously made in this connection by d'Espence.

Finally he spoke on the Real Presence, to which he devoted a third part of his whole speech. He explained fully the

¹ He did not directly attack the Huguenots as serpents, wolves, beasts, etc. but only applied to all heretics—and *a fortiori* to them—these expressions from Scripture.

² On this doctrine, only finally evolved during the later Middle Ages, see Saltet, *Les Réordinations* (1906).

Catholic doctrine that our Lord is present Body, Soul and Divinity, in the Host, in all Hosts, and in every particle of each Host, without being present in a local or circumscribed fashion or filling any definite quantity of space. He then volunteered a long, far-fetched and rather unnecessary simile of the Eucharist in the story of a prince who appeared periodically in commemorative festivities to re-enact in person some great victory. In conclusion he conjured the Queen to uphold and defend the true religion, and prophesied destruction to the French Crown were heresy allowed to triumph.¹

To dismiss this well-known speech of Laynez, as is very often done, with a few airy and derogatory epithets such as "violent", "menacing", "vituperative", "explosive", is simply to betray a lack of acquaintance with its text.² It is easy to understand that it was naturally very unwelcome to the Calvinists, but the predominant Calvinist tradition of the Colloquy has distorted it out of all recognition. It was obviously sincere, surprisingly moderate, very convincing, and astonishingly free from personalities. But the attack on the Colloquy as a whole, which was supposed to have been inspired by the Cardinal of Ferrara, could not but distress the Queen and all her supporters, not excluding Lorraine; and actually Catherine was reduced to tears. Laynez was certainly the ablest, probably the most learned, and perhaps the most holy man in the room, but in the circumstances it was too much to expect that the ultimate cogency of his thesis should win instant recognition. Yet the Jesuit Polanco wrote that the speech put new fervour and courage into the hearts of many of the Catholics, while the writer of the Italian diary described it as "excellent, learned and devout". On the other hand d'Espence shared the annoyance of those who resented the attack on the Colloquy, and spoke disparagingly of the Jesuit's thesis, disliking his florid emotional gestures.

¹ Text published by the Jesuits Grisar, *Lainii Disputationes*, II, 94 *et seq.*, and Fouqueray, *Société de Jésus en France*, I, 651-7, from the Jesuit Archives. Cf. Sacchini, *Hist. Soc. Jésus*, II, 278.

² It has been suggested that this text is a later redaction and does not represent what Laynez actually said. The only argument in favour of this theory is that it would fit many people's preconceived notions so well.

As for the Huguenots, their anger rose to boiling-point. Beza protested in tones of the highest moral indignation against the abuse which he alleged had been heaped upon them, being particularly enraged by Laynez's assumption that they were all manifest and convicted heretics. He still awaited the proofs of his conviction, and if Laynez had them concealed up his sleeve he challenged him to produce them—for no one else had yet done so! The Queen and her advisers, he informed the company, were fully aware of what they were doing; the best possible motives actuated them, those of peace and concord; it was absurd to talk of settling French affairs by packing everyone off to the other side of Europe; Laynez's simile of the Eucharist, comparing our Lord to a stage-clown, was both ludicrous and irreverent.

Once more it fell to d'Espence to pour oil upon the troubled waters. He returned to his thankless task, and, opening up a new avenue to exploration, enquired how the Calvinists distinguished the Sacraments of the New Law from the figures of the Old. The ministers explained their point of view on this question, and after some exchange of opinion d'Espence withdrew from the debate, probably in exhaustion, his place being taken by Jacques du Pré. Texts were in turn discussed, dissected and discarded, while other theologians and ministers joined in until the discussion again became general, every man buttonholing his nearest adversary. Courtesy seems on the whole to have prevailed, and though we are told that there was so much noise that even the Cardinal of Lorraine had to shout in order to make himself heard, there is really no reason to suppose that the proceedings were in any way disorderly or marked by any undue heat or excitement. The scholastics were maintaining that the "Hoc" in "*Hoc est corpus meum*" could not by the elementary rules of grammar refer to "*panis*"—as the Calvinists appeared to think. It could only refer to "*Corpus*"—the Body of our Lord, and was known as an "*individuum vagum*".¹ Beza remarked that he could no-

¹ St Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus held different opinions on this "*Hoc*". It is interesting to note that du Pré quoted from Bishop Gardiner in the course of the debate.

where recall the use of that expression by the fathers, whereat du Pré, with an admonitory shake of his forefinger, replied a little irrelevantly that were he in the theological schools he would soon be made to learn his technical terms! Some of the ministers, too, were provoked to an exhibition of childish mirth by the phrase "individuum vagum", and the Sorbonnists found that Peter Martyr—as an ex-friar—was better equipped than most of the other ministers to argue with them on their own ground; while de Saintes again relates that there was some difference of opinion discernible between Beza and his Italian colleague.

Night now began to fall over the disputants, but the Queen implored Lorraine and Beza not to abandon their efforts at a *rapprochement*. For some time longer, therefore, the discussion continued its useless course until finally it became absolutely necessary to make an end. The day had been heavy in the extreme and full of incident,¹ though it was difficult to see, for the moment, exactly how matters stood. Lorraine, repulsed all along the line, defeated in tactics, unable to prevail in argument, intimated his opinion that there would be less danger to the faith of lay spectators if the discussions were continued on paper. He promised to produce even more texts and references on the subject of the Real Presence,² and de Saintes tells us that he drew up a written catena of authorities which was sent to the ministers, but which the latter found it convenient to lose.³

¹ The sources are much the same as for the 24th. Calvinist are the *Ample Discours des Actes de Poissy* (*Mém. de Condé*, II, 490 *et seq.*); La Place, pp. 292-300; the *H.E.* I, 655-70; de Serres, La Popelinière, de Thou, etc.; Beza's letters in *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XVIII, 743-6 and Baum, pp. 77-80; Peter Martyr's letters in *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XVIII, 768-74; XIX, 6-8; and des Gallars' letters in Baum, pp. 81-2. The Catholic sources are the *Discours de d'Espence*, pp. 63-5; d'Espence's *Apologie* as cited in the foregoing notes; an important account in the *Diario*, pp. 133-42; Polanco's letters in *Lainii Monumenta*, VI, 54, 66 (also published in the *Précis Historiques* for January 1889 under the title of *Le Père Lainez au Colloque de Poissy*); the *Journal du Colloque*, de Ruble, pp. 37-8 (in his tendentious text de Ruble ran together the meetings of the 24th and 26th); and de Saintes' *Responsio in Apologiam*, pp. 65 *et seq.*, which should be used with care. For an estimation of Lainez's rôle see also Fouqueray, pp. 250 *et seq.*

² *Diario*, p. 142.

³ De Saintes, *op. cit.* p. 78.

But the most important result of the day was the fact that Laynez's speech, understood to have been inspired by the legate, had heavily prejudiced the continuation of the conferences—even if their own failure had not already done this. His root-and-branch condemnation of the Colloquy, though quite unforeseen, and occupying no more than about a quarter of his whole speech, had had important and permanent effect. Some of his hearers, no doubt, were intensely annoyed, but there were others who were refreshed and solaced to hear expressed so nakedly, and without apology, sentiments with which they heartily concurred but to which they had not dared give public utterance. The moment had been skilfully chosen. Beza's escape from the dilemma of the Lutheran articles had finally shattered the whole plan of action to which the Cardinal of Lorraine had pinned his assurance, and the Assembly had just been constrained to sit through a long speech in an Italian dialect from Peter Martyr, which, if infinitely boring to those to whom it was incomprehensible, must by reason of its unoriginal and lengthy repetition of arguments and illustrations already expounded by Beza, have been no less tedious to those able to follow. An atmosphere of restive dissatisfaction prevailed, and the moment was an admirably propitious one in which to drive home the point of view that the whole affair was not only a failure, but a mistake, and a reprehensible mistake at that. The clever Jesuit had timed his blow to a nicety.

IV

The ruin of his ambitious schemes seems to have caused a revulsion in the Cardinal of Lorraine's mind against the whole Colloquy. If Viterbo's information can be relied upon, he advised the Queen-Mother to enforce universal subscription to the Real Presence under heavy penalties, resorting once more to compulsion, since arguments so overwhelming had failed to carry conviction with obstinate unbelievers.¹ But Catherine was no longer in a mood to bow gently to his dictation.² She

¹ Viterbo to St Charles, Sept. 29th (Modena, *Estratti*).

² *Ibid.*

felt that the conferences of the 24th and 26th had been wrecked unnecessarily by his brusque and arbitrary handling; and meanwhile the ministers clamoured for the conversations to be renewed, but on some topic other than the Eucharist. Lorraine saw that the Queen was bent on satisfying them. Supported by the Chancellor, he suggested a return to the policy of the 25th, and advised the Regent to summon to St Germain a few carefully selected theologians who might attempt in private and with an equal number of Calvinists the task of hammering out a formula on the Real Presence acceptable to both parties.¹ He counselled, in other words, a resumption of the Colloquy on a still smaller and more informal scale, but insisted on its continuing to be concentrated on the Eucharist.

Catherine was only too ready to accept his advice. Late on the night of Sunday the 28th she sent notes to d'Espence, Bouteiller and Salignac ordering them to appear at St Germain early next morning.² On arrival the three theologians were duly informed of the purpose for which they had been summoned, and learnt that the Bishops of Valence and Séez were to act with them. Lorraine himself did not propose to take part in the renewed conferences. His personal interest in them had evaporated, and already he had departed for Meudon where he spent the next two days,³ leaving behind, however, a list of patristic texts on the Real Presence which de Saintes handed over to d'Espence.⁴ The five Catholics were then confronted with Beza, Peter Martyr, des Gallars and Malorat, whom Catherine earnestly implored to accept a reasonable statement of the Real Presence. The Calvinists, in reply, pleaded for a new subject of discussion. This however was not allowed, and after lunch the nine divines came together in the King of Navarre's house, with the Queen's animated conjurations for an accord on the Eucharist at almost any price still resounding in their ears.⁵

¹ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 66.

² *Discours de d'Espence*, pp. 65-6; *Journal du Colloque*, p. 40; *H.E.* I, 674.

³ *Diario*, p. 143.

⁴ De Saintes, p. 78, who gives a list of twenty-two fathers cited.

⁵ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 66.

Thus was the Colloquy of Poissy reduced at last to the level of a Court intrigue and stripped of the last vestige of properly constituted ecclesiastical sanction. The five Catholics were not only acting without proper warrant from their superiors, but could not even claim to be representative of the mind of the French Church. A citation to Rome on a charge of heresy hung over Valence; three of the quintet had taken part in the ultra-quist demonstration on August 3rd; and of the other two d'Espence had by his mildness of behaviour won for himself much unpopularity. He assures us, none the less, in a document written about three months later,¹ that all five showed great unwillingness, and hints that their reluctance was only overcome by an express command from the Queen. But it is significant that before the Assembly closed he was to defend their action most spiritedly, and on grounds quite other than that of unwilling and enforced obedience to royal command.² After the Colloquy was over, when the excitements of the moment were passed, and at a time when he himself was concerned to repel the charge of Calvinist tendencies, it would have been only natural for him unconsciously to exaggerate the general reluctance.

But whatever their private views on the situation, the amiability and reasonableness of the Catholics soon dispelled the suspicions and mollified the tempers of their opponents, who were at first much disgruntled at having been forced to reopen the question of the Real Presence. It soon became apparent however that this time there would be no attempt to manœuvre them into uncomfortable positions or to embarrass them with Lutheran articles. The Cardinal of Lorraine's formula "*Firma fide confitemur*" and its Bucerian modification "*Credimus in usu coenae*" were taken as the bases of negotiation, perhaps at the Cardinal's own instigation.³ Once more d'Espence received the impression that Beza, if left alone, could in the end have been persuaded to accept the second of these formulæ, and that des Gallars and Malorat would have followed him.

¹ D'Espence, *Épître à l'évêque de Paris*.

² See below, pp. 383-5.

³ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 66. See Appendix IX, Nos. 4 and 5.

But Peter Martyr was adamant in refusing to admit that a mere repudiation of the idea of localization was by itself sufficient recommendation for a reformed formula on the eucharistic presence. He stood out not only for a purely spiritual presence but for an exclusively spiritual mode of exhibition and reception, defined without fear of ambiguity. Uneasy lest his colleagues should be overpersuaded in these respects by d'Espence, he was assiduous in stiffening their resistance to the formula "Credimus in usu coenae", explaining away Calvin's not infrequent use of the word "substantialiter" and stoutly repudiating all the implications which d'Espence sought to show must follow logically from this use, a question in regard to which Beza, on the other hand, showed some disposition to go a certain way along the Catholic path. Finally the attempt at agreement on the Bucerian modification of Lorraine's formula collapsed. But of all the formulæ proposed at Poissy as bases of reunion it was the one which had come nearest to the achievement of its purpose.

The authors of the *Histoire Ecclésiastique* are here again at pains to scout the notion of any serious disagreement among the Reformers. They point to the fact that when at the end of the day Peter Martyr produced his own personal confession of eucharistic belief all the other ministers felt able to sign it without the slightest misgiving. Yet it is significant that Martyr should have considered a personal statement necessary at all; while in his letters he speaks of the dangerously yielding attitude of his colleagues and of the efforts to which he was driven in order to prevent them from making large concessions.¹ The Queen, too, now realized how unfortunate she had been in ever inviting Peter Martyr. But the failure of the first session notwithstanding, the conference was resumed on the subsequent day, September 30th, this time in the Bishop of Séz's house; and the number of the ministers was brought up to full strength by the addition of Jean de l'Espine.

¹ Cf. the assertions of the *H.E.* I, 674, with Peter Martyr himself in *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XIX, 8, and Baum, pp. 93-4. See also d'Espence's Epistle to the Bishop of Paris (*Conciones Aliquot*, p. 47); and *Apologie*, p. 468. Peter Martyr's confession is given in Appendix IX, No. 8.

It was now the Huguenots' turn to propose some plan of action. They brought forward a formula made up of the Confession of Faith read out by Beza on September 26th, prefaced by a short explanation that the Real Presence of the Body and Blood—in contradistinction to their real exhibition and reception—existed only in so far as Faith, which caused promised things to be present, was concentrated upon them by the recipient.¹ D'Espence saw at once that such a theory could not be reconciled with Catholic doctrine. He said so quietly to the Bishop of Séz, and pointed out to the meeting that the formula would certainly be in the highest degree disagreeable to the bishops at Poissy. The ministers, however, would hear of no modification. D'Espence therefore took it upon himself to make what changes seemed essential. He redrafted the formula by removing the Calvinist preface and placing after the original Bezeine Confession a statement, directly contrary to the subjective Calvinist position, that it was the Word of God—the Word on which reposed the recipient's Faith in the true reception of our Lord's Body and Blood—that caused the Presence of the promised things.² This redraft was submitted to the other four Catholics and by their advice laid before the ministers when the meeting came together for the third time on October 1st.³

Thus reconstructed in a contrary sense, the definition did not commend itself to its original authors, who desired it to be made perfectly plain that whatever change took place in the eucharistic elements was brought about by the Faith of the recipient and not by the Word of God. They proposed counter-emendations designed to restore the first sense of the formula. For "the Word of God, on which Faith reposes, causes to be present..." they substituted their original phrase "Faith, reposing on the Word of God, causes to be present", and in place of "we take truly and really" they put "we take truly and by Faith".⁴ In no other way would they accept the formula. The

¹ Appendix IX, No. 9. Cf. No. 7.

² Appendix IX, No. 10. Cf. Nos. 7 and 9.

³ *Discours de d'Espence*, pp. 66-7; d'Espence, *Continuation de la Tierce Conférence*, p. 3; *Journal du Colloque*, pp. 90-1.

⁴ Appendix IX, No. 11.

Catholics demurred but could not shake the resolution of their opponents, and the meeting ended in a renewed impasse. The next day there was no meeting, the Queen, for a reason which will presently appear, having countermanded it.¹

While fundamental differences of theology were being bandied about at St Germain with polite suavity, at Poissy, by way of contrast, personal jealousies had given rise to scenes of violent passion. During Lorraine's absence at Meudon a committee of bishops and theologians under the presidency of Tournon had applied itself to the task of forming the text of the canons which the Assembly proposed to issue. Returning on October 1st, Lorraine took offence that the committee had poached on territory previously allotted to himself in this matter, and was moved to a public outburst, perhaps suspecting that the committee's action indicated a retraction of confidence as a penalty for his part in the Colloquy. Neither demanding an explanation nor suffering one to be given, he embarked upon an angry and bitter tirade against Tournon who, tired and despondent, proved quite unable to deal with the onslaught and left the hall protesting that such treatment was intolerable. Dismayed at this unhappy consummation, the bishops remonstrated with Lorraine. They pointed out the necessity of preserving at least an outward show of harmony in face of the Calvinist menace. Ultimately Lorraine was prevailed upon to send an apology to Tournon. This was conveyed by the Bishops of Amiens and Orleans, both skilled diplomatists, and as a result the aggrieved President rejoined his Synod.²

This unfortunate scene was followed by an incident which, though it revealed the fundamental agreement among the bishops, was from another point of view even more disconcerting. A rumour was abroad at Poissy that the five Catholics at St Germain were claiming to be the Assembly's delegates, and though totally devoid of foundation it gained credence to such an extent that a discussion arose as to the advisability of expelling the offenders and denouncing them as heretics. This was on the morning of October 2nd, the day the Queen suspended the

¹ *Discours de d'Espence*, pp. 67-8.

² *Diario*, pp. 143-4.

meetings at St Germain. Her reason became apparent when the Bishop of Valence appeared with the formula proposed by the Calvinists on September 30th¹ and laid it before the bishops without the changes made by d'Espence. The Queen had decided to try her luck in this way before allowing the discussion on d'Espence's alterations to proceed, for she had been led to believe by the Calvinists, and perhaps by Valence himself, that the formula had the approval of all ten negotiators.² Her ill-advised move was a complete failure and only served to heighten the indignation of the Assembly against the proceedings at St Germain. The formula was at once pronounced to be pernicious by a very large majority, the few prelates who urged its acceptance on the plea that a creditor should gladly accept any payment from a bad debtor, however small in proportion to the total debt, being very properly rebuked for their misleading analogy.³ Defeated at Poissy, Catherine returned to the more promising atmosphere on the other side of the forest. Once more she summoned her ten champions. But she was drawing her last bow.

Frightened by their narrow escape from condemnation, the five Catholics made it plain to the Queen, the Chancellor, and the King of Navarre, that the course along which they were being driven was not without grave danger to themselves. They emphasized the fact that they had no commission from the Assembly and represented that a schismatic construction might be put upon their action. Agreement with the Calvinists seemed impossible, and they would have to give some account of themselves before the bishops.⁴ Despite these protests, a fourth and final meeting with the ministers was held on October 3rd, at which the discussions on d'Espence's emendations of the Calvinist formula and on the Calvinist counter-emendation were resumed. But the irreconcilability of the two opposing

¹ *I.e.* Appendix IX, No. 9.

² *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xix, 12; Baum, p. 93; *H.E.* I, 678, where, however, the mistake is made of ascribing to the evening of Oct. 4th events which took place on Sept. 30th.

³ *Diario*, p. 144.

⁴ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 68.

theological standpoints stood revealed at last in complete nakedness. For the Calvinists it was the Faith of the communicant, but for the Catholics the power of the Word of God, which caused our Lord to be present in the Eucharist. No ingenuity could bridge this gap between the subjective and the objective; no subtlety remove it. D'Espence, helped by de Salignac, laboured in vain to convince his opponents. He made extensive use of Lorraine's catena; there were discussions on St Augustine and St John Chrysostom; the eastern theory of consecration by the Epiclesis was adduced. But the Colloquy had struck rock bottom, and both sides seem to have recognized this. The Catholics, however, insisted that it was imperative for them to render an account of their actions to their ecclesiastical superiors. It was therefore decided to lay the formula in its final Calvinist edition before the bishops. The formula was handed to Bourdin, one of the Secretaries of State, who took it across to Poissy.¹

Whatever the appearances, the Catholics had not the smallest intention of implying that they accepted the formula, still less that they counselled the bishops to do so. They neither signed it nor in any way commended it. D'Espence's emphatic and repeated denials on this point must be unreservedly accepted,² while on the ministers' side there is des Gallars' definite testimony that both parties left the conference unfettered by any commitment, though he adds that the Catholics seemed not without some hope that the bishops might accept the formula.³ Is it then possible to believe in the complete honesty of the Calvinists when they made the mistake of interpreting a proposal to submit the formula to the Assembly as equivalent to its acceptance?⁴

¹ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 68. On these four conferences at St Germain (Sept. 29th and 30th, Oct. 1st and 3rd) see in addition to the references in the foregoing notes, the letters of Peter Martyr, Beza and des Gallars in *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xix, 8, 11-13, 14-15, 19, 57-8; Baum, pp. 83-4, and *For. Cal.*, Nos. 559, 569, 583, 595, 611. Also the *H.E.* I, 674-80, and the Diary published in Sattler, *Geschichte des Herzogthums Württemberg*, iv, Beilage 62.

² D'Espence's Epistle to the Bishop of Paris (*Conciones Aliquot*, p. 48) and his *Continuation de la Tierce Conférence*, pp. 147-50. Cf. *Journal du Colloque*, p. 42, and de Saintes, p. 81. See also, below, pp. 383-4.

³ Baum, p. 84. But elsewhere he gives the impression that the Catholics accepted—*For. Cal.*, Nos. 569, 583.

⁴ The Calvinist *Discours*, repeated in *La Place*, p. 301.

At Court, and in St Germain generally, it was widely believed that very same evening that the formula represented an accord between the two parties, and Catherine's hopes that had been dashed by the condemnation of October 2nd began again to revive. We should not be entirely without support in upholding the view that the Huguenots spread a deliberate *canard* out of sheer pride that the formula was one of their own manufacture;¹ but perhaps it is unnecessary to adopt this extreme and disagreeable view. The misunderstanding was certainly due to the fact that the suggestion of laying the formula before the bishops came from the Catholics, and the truth must be that the position at St Germain not merely on the afternoon of October 3rd but at all these conferences was neither so clearly defined nor so simple as it appeared in retrospect even to d'Espence. Within a week Valence was to defend the Calvinist position on Faith and the Word of God even before the bishops, and d'Espence himself to protest in extremely strong language against the condemnation—at once sweeping and detailed—which was the ultimate fate of the formula at the hands of the Assembly.² May not both have previously let slip utterances calculated to give the impression, where that impression would be welcome, that the formula was not wholly distasteful to them? Perhaps haphazard remarks and general expressions had too particular an interpretation or too precise a construction put upon them.³ A situation so undefined is only too liable to be afterwards viewed in the most divergent lights by those who take part, since, in the absence of written record,⁴ recourse can only be had to the ambiguities of private conversation as variously interpreted by different minds. The contradictory inferences which can be drawn from des Gallars' letters alone indicate well enough that the

¹ The little diary published by Sattler, *Geschichte des Herzogthums Württemberg*, IV, Beilage 62, p. 186, says this.

² See below, pp. 384-5.

³ Beza, for example, actually wrote of the first two St Germain Conferences "Statim inter nos convenit de spirituali communicatione per fidem" in *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XIX, 12.

⁴ Although it seems that there were secretaries present, no appeal was ever made to any official minutes.

position cannot have been too clear even to the actors themselves.¹

To a misapprehension probably produced by a combination of causes both deliberate and accidental, the Cardinal of Lorraine momentarily fell a victim. He was at the Court, des Gallars informs us, when the formula was brought in as having been accepted at St Germain by both parties. Naturally he would welcome the news of an agreement: naturally, too, he would consider d'Espence's alleged acceptance of it sufficient authority on which to base his own. Des Gallars relates that on looking over it he at once expressed his entire approval of it.² Though no other independent testimony to this incident exists,³ there seems to be no adequate ground on which to question des Gallars' statement.⁴ The Cardinal's action, if characteristically hasty, would in the circumstances be at least intelligible. But we know from d'Espence that before the day ended Lorraine was back at Poissy from St Germain.⁵ There he must have learnt from d'Espence how matters really stood, and when he afterwards gave Beza to understand that he had been overpersuaded by his theologians, there was possibly much truth in the statement, though Beza sneered and wondered whether he had ever really known his own mind.⁶

The following morning the formula was brought before the bishops. On its actual merits there was no reason why it should have been expected to meet with any more favourable reception than the almost identical version flung out so peremptorily two days previously. It was, however, understood

¹ Cf. Baum, p. 83, with For. Cal., Nos. 569, 583, and La Ferrière, *Le XVI^e siècle et les Valois*, p. 58.

² Baum, p. 84.

³ Unless we admit the *H.E.* (I, 678) as such, which expands des Gallars' "mire approbavit, ac laetatus est quasi ad eius castra transissemus" into "il est certain qu'il prononça ces mots: que jamais il n'avoit creu autrement, et qu'il espérait que l'assemblée de Poissy s'en contenteroit". Languet's account (II, 144) is also clearly derived from des Gallars.

⁴ De Sainctes categorically denied it (*op. cit.* p. 81), but then he was probably not at St Germain that evening, whereas des Gallars certainly was. Féret, I, 236, following the *H.E.*, blames both Lorraine and the five Catholics for accepting—as he supposes—the formula.

⁵ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 68.

⁶ Thus the *H.E.* I, 679–80.

that the Queen desired every possible effort to be made in its favour, though it is difficult to see how she could have expected the Assembly virtually to reverse a decision hardly forty-eight hours old. But though a weak card, it was the last in her hand, and in deference to her wishes a committee of theologians under the Bishops of Lisieux, Châlons and Lavaur, was appointed to examine the formula, to refute and correct it, if and where necessary, and to issue an authoritative statement of Catholic belief. The unhappy Bishop of Séez, descrying stormy weather ahead, confessed a profound repentance for his part in the St Germain conferences. Nothing, he declared, would induce him ever to repeat a proceeding so unpleasant: he had heard no single remark of piety or worth fall from the lips of the heretics.¹ Valence, on the contrary, appeared to be quite undisturbed either by repentance for the past or by qualms as to the future.

The deputed theologians were de Saintes and du Pré, who had taken part in the conferences of September 24th and 26th, Pelletier, Dean of the Collège de Navarre, Vigor, Brouchet and de Mouchy. They entertained few second thoughts regarding the merits of the formula, and it soon became common knowledge that, as both d'Espence and Peter Martyr had foreseen from the beginning, a condemnation was toward. On October 9th the findings of the committee were read out by Le Breton, one of the secretaries. They were thorough and complete. The formula was condemned under five heads—"hérésie", "autre hérésie", "autre hérésie", "fallace" and "insuffisance"; it was remodelled out of all recognition to meet these defects,² and a short Catholic Confession of Belief in the Real Presence followed.³ This Confession was then read aloud by each prelate in turn. Cardinal Armagnac was so overcome by emotion that he broke down thrice before getting through, but Lorraine enunciated it loudly and unhesitatingly, adding of his own initiative an anathema against all supporters of the condemned article. Seven bishops, Valence, Chartres, Uzès and Vence

¹ *Diario*, p. 146.

² Appendix IX, No. 12 (b).

³ Appendix IX, No. 12 (a).

among them, disapproved of the action taken by the Assembly. Of these some protested that only the Pope and a General Council could define and bind in matters of Faith; another observed that no objection would have been raised to the formula had it been discovered in the pages of St Augustine; another wanted more time for consideration; yet another held that the ministers had been inconsiderately treated. Even Cardinal Tournon confessed that without the criticisms of the theologians he would not have believed it possible that there could be so many errors in the Calvinist formula, and drew the moral that it was impossible to observe too great a caution in such matters. Finally Valence argued at some length in support of the doctrine of Faith as expressed in the condemned formula, saying that Faith certainly did cause promised things to be present and that when the Catholic theologians argued in their refutation that Christ had said "This is my Body" and not "This *will be* my Body *when you shall eat it*", they appeared to forget that Christ first said "Take eat" and only then added "This is my Body". Seeing that the general sense of the meeting was against the speaker, the President allowed these observations to pass without comment and the censures were carried by a large majority. It was decided that if the Huguenots wished the Colloquy to continue they must accept the Catholic Confession.

All were then rising to depart when Lorraine stayed them with the announcement that, a rumour being abroad that the condemned article had been accepted by the Catholic negotiators at St Germain, one of whom was one of his own dependents, he would be obliged if the bishops would listen to a true account of what had really happened. D'Espence thereupon rose to his feet, though he seems to have been totally unprepared for this eventuality.¹ After giving a short narrative of the Colloquy since September 24th, he dealt at length with his own attitude to the condemned formula, to the censures passed upon it, and to the Catholic Confession. He declared most emphatically that he had never accepted the ministers' version

¹ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 77: "ne s'attendant le matin d'estre appelé, ni parler".

of the formula, and gave an account of his struggles on behalf of the Catholic doctrine that the Eucharistic Presence was brought about by the power of the Word of God rather than by the Faith of the recipient. The Calvinists had at first declared that this was sheer magic, a charge which he had repelled on traditional scholastic lines. They had then suggested that the terms "Faith" and "the Word of God" were interchangeable, or at any rate consistently associated with each other in the Bible; yet they had insisted on substituting "Faith" where d'Espence had inserted "the Word of God", showing that they did not intend the argument of interchangeability to be used against themselves. But d'Espence asserted that despite this radical disagreement he would have been quite willing to have passed on to discuss the adoration of the Elements—a task which Lorraine had put before him as one for which he must prepare himself. In this connection the Calvinists could no longer have equivocated in regard to what manner of Presence they really believed in. He was still ready to broach this point with them, though if the Assembly knew of better negotiators and better arguments it might employ them without any offence to himself. Yet though he had not accepted and could not accept the article, he confessed that he had not seen in all Calvinist literature a formula that approached nearer to Catholic Truth; and in regard to the censures of the Catholic theologians all he could do was to offer up a prayer that God might open his eyes, for saving the reverence and friendship he had for those theologians, he confessed his complete inability to perceive in the formula the numerous heresies which they had succeeded in discovering. The condemnations had been far too sweeping. Words had been picked out arbitrarily and condemned without due regard to the context. Huge errors had been thus discovered where they were never intended. Both privately and publicly Lorraine had promised the ministers that in all the discussions only the usage of the Eucharist should be considered, so that it was plainly unjust to apply to considerations of pure theology what was intended to refer to usage only. It was peculiarly unjust to censure the formula for teaching that

the unworthy did not receive the Body of our Lord. He believed that the Calvinists agreed on this point with the Catholics, and the formula could not reasonably be construed as implying the contrary: it would surely be wiser not to publish this particular censure, for the ministers would certainly attack it, and then Their Lordships would find that it was easier to define articles privately behind closed doors than to defend them publicly or in written controversy.¹ The Catholic Confession he of course accepted unhesitatingly, though he would not hide that he himself would have couched it in different terms. But he protested strongly against the anathema which the bishops had considered it necessary to hurl at all who believed otherwise. The Assembly had solemnly repudiated the status of a Canonical Synod, yet here it was condemning doctrine with anathema, and promulgating definitions for general subscription! The time was long since past when fathers and confessors could be justified in employing private anathemas of their own. The privileges enjoyed by the giants of former ages could no longer be claimed. Let Their Lordships be content with their own Confession and leave others to believe as they chose. He reminded the Assembly that the Greeks attributed Consecration not to the Words of Institution but to certain "mystic prayers". Yet this did not prevent the Eastern and Western views on Consecration from being reconciled in a broader synthesis.

D'Espence was certainly embittered by the fact that the conferences had come to so inglorious an end, but many of his remonstrances had point, and his criticism of the theologians' censures was in many ways a just animadversion upon the rather pettifogging Sorbonnist frame of mind. Pelletier was obliged to reply that the censures were not formal censures but merely advice given to the bishops; but he was happier when he turned to deal with Valence. This he did so effectively that the bishop was reduced to an uneasy laugh and an embarrassed mumble that here was a monk who wanted to fight him! The Archbishop

¹ "Qu'il est plus en ce monde de censeurs que d'écrivains, quodque multo aliud est in umbra, et inter privatos parietes articulos cudere, aliud in luce publica vel scribere vel contradicere"—*Discours de d'Espence*, p. 74.

of Embrun, however, one of the youngest members of the hierarchy, took it upon himself to attack d'Espence, who with the aid of Bouteiller defended himself with spirit and some acerbity. Incivilities were bandied, of which d'Espence's suggestion that Embrun should return to school was the least offensive. The quarrel was not appeased until d'Espence at Lorraine's personal request apologized to the Archbishop after the Assembly had dispersed, and was reminded that it was Lorraine himself who had added the anathema to which he so ardently objected. But d'Espence did not diminish the number of his enemies on this day.¹

Lorraine now openly joined forces with the bishops to end the Assembly with all possible speed.² Few things remained to be done. It was agreed to compose a catechism and a running censure of the Huguenot creed for use in the parishes, but it does not seem that anyone was appointed to take definite steps,³ and Peter Martyr relates that the bishops successfully resisted an attempt of Lorraine to saddle them with a catechism of his own composition.⁴ A movement was set afoot at the Queen's instigation, and with Lorraine's support, to petition Rome for lay communion under both kinds, but a heavy majority turned down this suggestion that a regulation of the Council of Constance should be rescinded by papal decree. Catherine had to content herself with assuring the bishops that such of them as desired the concession might apply personally to the Pope or to the General Council.⁵

About this time Baudouin arrived back from Cologne. But even the display of Cassander's new eirenic tract, the *De Officio*

¹ See, besides the *Discours de d'Espence*, pp. 72-8, the *Journal du Colloque*, pp. 43-5 and the *Diario*, pp. 146-9.

² Layard, p. 46.

³ *Diario*, p. 145.

⁴ *C.R., Op. Cal.* xix, 15. Throckmorton earlier mentions a catechism of the Cardinal "in which he has maimed, transposed and multiplied the commandments", adding that it was done "under another title"—*For. Cal.*, No. 218. A catechism of Montluc, intended for use in his diocese, had recently been condemned by the Dominican censors: Chantonay had been responsible for sending a copy to the headquarters of the Order—*Šusta*, I, 218, 219.

⁵ *Diario*, p. 150; cf. Viterbo to St Charles, Oct. 15th (Modena, *Estratti*).

Pii Viri, even the news that Lutheran theologians were on their way from Germany, even his own personal influence, formerly so strong, could not now arrest the rapidity with which the Assembly was being wound up. Lorraine morose and in defeat was very different from Lorraine enthusiastic and buoyed up with hopes of triumph. One interview sufficed to acquaint Baudouin with that mutability of temper for which the Cardinal was so well known. It was not that the Cardinal harboured any rancour towards Baudouin—later indeed he was to do him good service—but for the moment he had no further use for him, and his whole interest in the Assembly had finally evaporated.¹ The disappointed lawyer's fortunes seemed as uncertain as his movements. Yet he still had active friends in Montluc and in Navarre, and Navarre entrusted him with the tutorship of his bastard son, Charles, after the bishop's efforts to procure him a professorship in Valence University had been temporarily frustrated by Beza's candidature of François Hotman.²

When the textual redaction of the nine canons had been completed, a final Congregation was held on October 14th under the presidency of Lorraine. A general Confession of Faith was made by all present, Valence, Chartres, Uzès and Vence purposely absenting themselves on this account, and Châtillon grumbling that there was a plot to entrap him into providing some pretext for his suspension.³ In a brief speech Lorraine thanked the prelates and theologians for their labours, urged them to preach against the heretics steadfastly yet sanely so as to give no pretext for disorder, and pronounced the Assembly to be at an end.⁴ In the evening the six cardinals took the canons across to St Germain and requested the Queen's permission to present them to the legate for papal confirmation. They also made a formal protest against the registration of the Ordinance

¹ For. Cal., No. 611 (Oct. 12th); La Ferrière, *Le XVI^e siècle et les Valois*, p. 59; La Place, pp. 291-2.

² Duquesne, p. 58 (with references); La Place, p. 291; cf. *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* XIX, 133.

³ Viterbo says that Châtillon, too, was actually absent when this last declaration of Faith was exacted—Viterbo to St Charles, Oct. 16th (Modena, *Estratti*).

⁴ *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 78; *Diario*, pp. 150-1.

of Orleans.¹ The Assembly of Poissy was over. Four days later a royal ordinance formally dissolved it.

V

The nine canons produced by the Assembly of Poissy,² all admirable examples of good, honest, workaday reforms, but spiced with the traditional Gallican jealousy of Roman interference, fell for those very reasons between the cross fire of two hostile lines of criticism. Precisely because they tended to support the existing Church order in all its main features, because they shut the door upon sensational reforms in liturgy or discipline, because, in a word, they failed to be Cassandrian, they seemed to Catherine trivial and inadequate—the merest pebbles in response to her cries for bread. Decrees so well calculated to block her plans for a reform of a much wider nature she would suffer neither to be formally promulgated nor to be sent to Rome for papal confirmation, and a chorus of Protestant tongues echoed her shrill cry of disappointment—“ils y ont passé assez légèrement”.³ On the other hand the restrictions placed by the canons upon papal dispensations, preventions, reservations and patronage in general, alarmed the Cardinal of Ferrara, and outweighed even his recognition of the general merit of the canons, a recognition afterwards freely awarded by the Council of Trent.⁴ Thus the ill-wind of Catherine’s displeasure blew some advantage to the Curia, which was not at all displeased that reforms involving heavy restrictions of papal influence should remain a dead letter.⁵

Council and Colloquy had alike failed the Queen’s purpose. The radical and eirenic ideals of the small group of idealists who held the Queen’s ear, even the more reasonable and better

¹ *Diario*, pp. 150–1. At Trent the French bishops were to demand exactly what the edict now gave them, the abolition of annates and preventions and the restoration of a form of episcopal election.

² Text in Duranthon, *Collection des Procès-Verbaux des Assemblées-Générales du clergé de France*, I (1767), *Pièces Justificatives*, pp. 7–16; Klippfel, *Colloque de Poissy*, pp. 140 *et seq.*; *H.E.* I, 616 *et seq.*; Languet, II, 161–83.

³ La Ferrière, *Lettres*, I, 239, 243; Le Plat, IV, 725–9.

⁴ Šusta, III, 19–21.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 293–4.

thought-out schemes of the Cardinal of Lorraine and Claude d'Espence, had made no impression upon the main body of clerical opinion. Isolated advocates such as Bouteiller, de Salignac and Gibou, Cardinal Châtillon and the Bishops of Troyes, Valence, Uzès and Vence, even the much misjudged d'Espence, whose chief sin was his behaviour rather than his beliefs, had found themselves hemmed in and blocked by the solid barricades of traditional conservatism. These barricades had found their figure-head in Cardinal Tournon; but great as were Tournon's services to the Catholic cause at Poissy, they were rendered more by reason of what he was than by what he did. By enabling the conservative opposition to coalesce round him he gave it cohesion if it lacked organization. But he did not create it. It existed already. The Colloquy—which Tournon was powerless either to prevent or in any way to influence—has been called the watershed from which the two religions parted.¹ Nothing could be further from the truth. The parting had long since taken place. What the Colloquy did was to demonstrate, in one or two particular examples, how final this parting was, how the two streams, flowing in different directions, were no longer susceptible of being brought into contact with each other. Both as a weapon against the Pope and as an opportunity for the eirenic liberals at home, the National Council had proved more effective in promise than in fulfilment. It had held out no hand to the middle party; it had taken its stand by Rome, in a typically Gallican way, but with a strong underlying loyalty. Actuality had robbed the bogey of its terror and had stripped the panacea of its medical properties. The bogey could never again be so alarming nor the panacea so attractive.

Bent on discovering some excuse for a failure which had from the outset been inevitable, Catherine made the Cardinal of Lorraine her whipping-boy. It was a heavy indictment that she brought against him: he had promised startling conversions, sensational reconciliations—and had secretly taken precautions that there should be none; he had spoken of the wide reforms that would be obtained from a National Council—and had privately arranged

¹ Armstrong, *French Wars of Religion*.

that the traditional polity should suffer no harm. The indictment was scarcely justified. Lorraine had perhaps never entertained precisely the same expectations from the Council as Catherine had; but expectations of some sort—and great expectations—he certainly had entertained, and their collapse wounded him bitterly. In the search after dogmatic agreement on the Real Presence, in the attempt to induce the Calvinists to accept the essence of the Catholic position expressed in some short formula either of his own or of Lutheran composition, the Cardinal had sought to lay a foundation stone over which liturgical and ceremonial reform might afterwards be durably built. He had not moved from this position of dogmatic unity before liturgical construction; and the series of his endeavours which have been traced in these last two chapters, naïve, complacent and even arrogant though they may have been in design, brusque and unsympathetic as they undoubtedly were in execution, were at least considerably more honest in purpose, more wide in objective, and more intelligent in conception than the predominant Calvinist tradition of the Colloquy has hitherto allowed historians to perceive.

What historians have not perceived, the Queen easily allowed herself to forget. She did not care that Lorraine had supported the demand for the Chalice, had seen his catechism rejected by the bishops, had consistently sponsored the smaller meetings of the Colloquy, both at Poissy and at St Germain, and had encountered the reproaches of the Episcopal Assembly for so doing. She pursued him with a mixture of malevolence and fear, and their old alliance, its object unattained, now gave place to a condition of personal estrangement. To add to the disagreeableness of Lorraine's position his relations with the Cardinal of Ferrara became acutely strained. Indignant at Ferrara's announcement that the Pope was willing to consent to the sale of Church property for secular purposes, he picked a quarrel with the legate, who retorted by accusing him of having secretly plotted both the Colloquy and the Ordinance of Orleans ever since the Assembly of Notables at Fontainebleau in the previous year. Ferrara's unpopularity put public opinion on Lorraine's

side. It was felt that though Lorraine undeniably had his difficult moments it was Ferrara's place to smooth these over rather than to ruffle them; the legatine rebukes, thought the Catholics, might better be directed against the Government towards whose policy Ferrara was showing so strange a complaisance.¹

The Guises, however, in pursuance of earlier intentions, left St Germain in a body on October 19th,² the day after the royal ordinance dissolving the Assembly. Their supposed complicity in a design mooted by the Duke of Nemours to remove the heir to the throne by stealth into Lorraine provided material which it was only too easy to work up into highly coloured accounts of their bellicose and provocative attitude towards the Government. But though Guise had certainly been a party to Nemours' conversations with the young Duke of Orleans and had even allowed his own son to be used as an intermediary, Catherine gave proof of her commonsense when she finally admitted the force of the Guises' expostulations that the kidnapping would not have been worth their while—would have been, as the Cardinal of Lorraine said to her messenger, the work of fools. She wisely decided to let sleeping dogs lie. She accepted their protestations of innocence and finally became convinced that the whole affair had been unwarrantably magnified.³ Nevertheless she remained a little frightened of the Guises, whose retirement to their estates for five months after her break with the Cardinal could not but appear a little sinister.

¹ Šusta, I, 296-7.

² The date given by Peter Martyr, *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xix, 60, by Beza, *ibid.* p. 64, and by the diplomatists Alvarotti and Strozzi, letters cited by Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, p. 240.

³ In his *Projet d'enlèvement d'un enfant de France* (*Bib. de l'École des chartes* (1914), LXXV, 5-48) the late Noël Valois placed this incident in its true proportions, demonstrating the falsity of the melodramatic accounts and interpretations given by such writers as the Baron de Ruble and Professor Thomson (*Wars of Religion in France*). But he was certainly wrong in trying to prove that the Guises left St Germain on the 21st instead of the 19th.

VI

As a small dinghy is towed almost unnoticed behind some stately larger vessel, so the ephemeral episode of the Lutheran mission followed upon the Colloquy of Poissy. The delegation appointed by the Duke of Württemberg in response to the King of Navarre's invitation had left Stuttgart on October 3rd and reached Metz on the 10th, to find that the corresponding delegation from Heidelberg had passed the previous night there. The two parties, after enjoying in succession the hospitality of the governor Vieilleville,¹ met at Châlons on the 15th, but found it impossible to continue the journey in each other's company owing to theological differences. The Palatine divines therefore entered Paris on the 18th, those from Württemberg following close on their heels the next day.

It was too late. The final curtain had been rung down on the Colloquy, and the political leadership of the Huguenots had been transferred from the Bourbons into the more capable hands of Coligny. Anthony was nevertheless at great pains to magnify to his guests the personal importance which he had in fact long since lost. Observing the Queen discharge the vials of her wrath on to Lorraine, he followed the royal lead and explained to the Germans how the Cardinal, by then departed from Court, had wickedly feigned to favour the Confession of Augsburg with the intent of weakening the whole Protestant movement by dividing its forces. To meet this danger he, Anthony, had procured their services. But the bombastic pose of the Protestant champion was ludicrously false. We have already seen how a move originally designed to support the general purpose of the Cardinal's speech was later restated as a counterstroke against it when Anthony had found it politic to misinterpret the Cardinal's aims.² But the move failed miserably to fulfil even its newly invented object. The divines from Stuttgart immediately offered theological battle to Beza—

¹ Vieilleville to Christopher, Oct. 12th; Christopher to Vieilleville, Oct. 22nd (Stuttgart, Staatsarchiv, Frankreich, büschel 18, Nos. 11 a and 13). Cf. *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xix, 80.

² See above, pp. 331-3.

who refused disdainfully—while those from Heidelberg proclaimed their sympathy with Calvinist doctrine, thus at once uncovering the dread spectre of Protestant disunion. Beza concluded that Navarre had been the blind, unperceiving tool of Baudouin, who desired—he supposed—to stage a public contest of Lutherans and Calvinists. Scornfully turning away from Anthony, the Calvinist leaders concentrated their attention upon the evil genius who was believed to be pulling the puppet's wires. Beza violently attacked Cassander's tract, mistakenly believing it to be Baudouin's work, and in doing so inaugurated a controversy which was to run a long and virulent course¹ and to have the effect of impelling Baudouin, disgusted by the ferocious intransigence of his former co-religionists and deeply chagrined at the sterility of his labours in the cause of reunion, ever nearer to Catholicism. But Beza, profoundly thankful that the Germans had come too late for the Colloquy, successfully resisted all Baudouin's endeavours to have it renewed for their benefit. The five divines kicked their heels in Paris for several weeks, obtaining no more than fair words from Anthony and a lukewarm reception from the Queen. Soon disease reduced their numbers to four, and in the end nobody was much concerned when towards the end of November they retired quietly to their homes.² Thus there petered out in complete futility the only attempt ever made to realize in practice the much talked-of scheme of reinforcing the French National Council with foreign non-Catholic elements.

¹ For chronological details see Duquesne. Cf. *C.R., Op. Cal.* xix, 65, 67, 94, 98, 99, 100, 121.

² A detailed account of the mission will be found in the *Württembergische Vierteljahrshefte für Landesgeschichte*, Neue Folge, viii Jahrgang (1899): "Der Reise der Württembergischen Theologen nach Frankreich im Herbst 1561", by Dr G. Bossert.

CHAPTER XI

The Reopening of the Council of Trent

*Laudate Dominum, omnes gentes,
Laudate Eum, omnes populi.*

—Psalm 116.

I

BY the autumn of 1561 only the most stubbornly hopeful of men would have cared to foretell with any degree of confidence the eventual success of the Bull *Ad Ecclesiae Regimen*. It was as if a much talked-of débutante, thrust at last after a protracted and arduous toilet into the crowded and expectant ballroom, had encountered only the most unfavourable comment, arousing, by her ambiguously expressed intentions, an almost universal suspicion. Of those whose partnership had been the object of her arts, the Emperor had been able to resign himself only after the lapse of several months, and with ill-concealed sighs of discontent, to the prospect of her company; the King of Spain had felt obliged to extort from her chaperon a private assurance of honourable intention; and the King of France, after a first unfavourable criticism of her make-up, had bowed a formal recognition and turned aside to take his pleasure elsewhere. In face of so devastating a reception, her successes with such lesser beaux as the Kings of Poland and Portugal were but petty triumphs, serving only to set in relief the larger failure. From the Protestant Powers had come complete and universal rejection. Queen Elizabeth would not allow the papal envoy Martinengo so much as to set foot in England; the Swiss Protestant Cantons followed the example set by their German relations at Naumburg; the nuncio Commendone was unceremoniously turned away by the King of Denmark; the papal envoy to the Czar of Russia languished in a Polish prison; and a letter to the Negus of Abyssinia eventually miscarried. After the rebuff of Naumburg, Commendone and Delphinus had divided Germany into

two spheres of activity and had set out on separate tours with the Bull. They were unable to obtain the support of a single Protestant town or prince. Even the Elector Joachim of Brandenburg, in whom Pius IV had reposed so misplaced a confidence, would do no more than extend to the nuncios an embarrassed and over-strained politeness. The Catholic bishops were for the most part more ready to accept than to attend the Council, alleging old age, illness, or the necessity of protecting their dioceses against heresy as excuses for non-attendance; while the Archbishop of Magdeburg, a son of the Elector of Brandenburg, followed up his fervent expressions of loyalty to the Holy Father by joining his father according to the flesh in the Lutheran camp. The Catholic princes and towns, however, revealed genuine willingness to be represented at Trent. The Duke of Bavaria was especially keen, and promises of support were also given by the Dukes of Brunswick and Cleves, the Imperial towns of Aix and Cologne, and in the Netherlands by Cardinal Granvelle and the Regent, Margaret of Parma. The picture was thus not entirely lacking in brighter spots, though in the main decidedly gloomy.

But though the horizon was still dark, it never entered the Pope's head to alter his course, much less to turn back. The ineradicable, almost childish optimism that holds so prominent if paradoxical a place in the subtleties of the Italian mind, and is surely one of God's gifts to the Papacy, had taken hold of the clear-headed and sensible lawyer, who now had no other thought than to keep doggedly on and open the Council as soon as the number of bishops at Trent reached an adequate figure. The acceptance of the Bull by the King of Spain, followed as it was by the start of a few Spanish bishops for Trent, had been a real turning-point in the fortunes of the Council; and repeated papal orders to the Italian, Sicilian, Sardinian, Corsican, Dalmatian, Cretan and Cypriot hierarchies had had the result of impelling quite a considerable number of prelates towards the Trentino. By the end of the year about a hundred bishops, nearly all Italians, were waiting for the opening session, and the Pope at length fixed the inaugural Congregation for January 15th, a date

by which the Emperor had promised that his ambassadors would have arrived. The junior legate, Cardinal Simonetta, was in Trent by the middle of December. He and the Cardinal of Mantua alone possessed the Pope's complete confidence and shared a secret cipher. Their instructions were to treat the Council as a continuation, to safeguard the earlier decrees at all costs, and, if their hands were forced, to proclaim so openly.¹ It was fully realized that this eventuality would entail very serious consequences with the Germans and French.²

The election of delegates for the Council of Trent had figured on the agenda of the French bishops at Poissy. But for all their theoretical deference to the claims of the Council the bishops seem to have taken no practical steps towards ensuring their representation at it.³ The dissolution of the Assembly, however, necessarily forced Catherine to some declaration. After pressure from Ferrara and Chantonnay she announced that a choice had been made of twenty-six bishops to go to Trent as representatives of the Gallican Church, together with an ambassador, M. de Candale, one of the de Foix family. To please the legate she promised that six of the bishops would start before Martinmas (November 11th), and that the rest would be at Trent by March 3rd.⁴

Ferrara saw in this a triumph for his conciliatory policy, and looked round to receive any credit that might be going begging. But, as at least Chantonnay realized, the Queen was not in earnest.⁵ While keeping Rome in play—for the attitudes of the Emperor and the King of Spain no longer provided any excuse for open disobedience—she embarked upon a series of efforts to effect a real change in the Council's character and to

¹ Pastor, VII, 168–203 (Engl. transl. xv, 216–63);

² Ehses, VIII, 263–4: the Bishop of Modena to Cardinal Morone, Dec. 11th.

³ On Sept. 27th the Jesuit Father Coudret wrote that the bishops had all decided to go to Trent with Lorraine at their head—*M.H.S.J.*, *Lainii Monumenta*, VI, 62. But there is no confirmation of this in any other source.

⁴ Šusta, I, 290, 292; Layard, p. 47; Languet, II, 157–8. Cf. *Zeitungen aus Frankreich* of Oct. 26th (Stuttgart, Staatsarchiv, Frankreich, büschel 19, No. 30): "Mittuntur a nostris Tridentinum duo archiepiscopi et duo et viginti episcopi".

⁵ Šusta, I, 290; For. Cal., No. 414.

organize opinion in favour of a new and less-committed assembly. With astonishing, unquenchable optimism she reset herself in pursuit of those ends of which she had been baulked by the summer Parlement and by the National Council—that is, a provisional toleration for Huguenot worship, and the ultimate reunion of Catholic and Calvinist by means of wide concessions in ceremonial and discipline and the mutual acceptance of mediatory doctrinal formulæ. She did not ask herself whether she might not be pursuing a mirage. Her policy, she believed, was the only possible one for her under the circumstances, and she saw its pragmatic value without stopping to question its first principles. But having at last awaked to the fact that she would never get what she wanted from the French bishops, she swung abruptly round towards Rome in a desperate last-minute attempt to secure for her policy the assistance of the Pope himself before the Council should open at Trent to spoil all. She put out a first feeler in the account of the Assembly of Poissy which was sent to the French ambassador in Rome on October 24th.

The difficulty of giving any account of the Colloquy palatable to Rome was successfully overcome by ignoring it altogether. The withholding from Roman inspection of the Canons of Poissy was justified on the grounds that they confined themselves to simple questions of clerical morality; while the impossibility of annulling the Ordinance of Orleans was ascribed to the importunities of the Estates. Great play was made with the choice of bishops for the Council, and hints were thrown out that negotiations on the question of annates and preventions might not turn to the disadvantage of the Holy See. These misrepresentations—as they all were to a greater or a less degree—were but so much gilding of the pill. There was one decision of the bishops that would be brought to the Pope's notice—their petition, the unanimous petition of bishops and doctors, for the provisional grant of the Chalice to the laity.¹

This letter was doubtless intended for the Pope's eyes, and it was certainly well calculated to throw dust into them. Not only

¹ Charles IX to de l'Isle, Oct. 24th, in *Le Plat*, IV, 725-9.

had the bishops as a body not made a petition for the Chalice, but Catherine and Lorraine had specifically failed to induce them to do so.¹ Nor was the moment propitious for such attempts to cozen the Pope. After a period of modification Pius' hostility towards Catherine was just in process of being re-kindled. The early despair which had inspired his description of Ferrara's legation as an Extreme Unction had first been modified by the persistent cheerfulness of Viterbo's earlier despatches in regard to the Assembly of Poissy—such as had come through—and then almost completely dispelled by his own preoccupation with the King of Navarre's virtual offer to be converted at the price of papal intervention in his interests with the King of Spain.² Consequently Viterbo's subsequent pleas for a league with Spain against France³ were at first passed over in favour of a milder policy involving some opposition to Philip II; whereupon the hopes of Navarre's envoy, M. d'Escars, became for a time surprisingly rosy. But the news of the Colloquy with the heretics, disquieting rumours that the French bishops intended to bring the Calvinist leaders with them to Trent, and the reports of de l'Hôpital's speeches, all conspired to alter Pius' temper, and disposed him to set a higher valuation upon the merits of Viterbo's more bellicose point of view. He began to enter again into closer relations with Spain, hoping that the maintenance of a show of attention to d'Escars would suffice to keep Anthony from fulfilling his threat of once more publicly assuming the headship of the Huguenots.⁴ A Spanish invasion of France, however, was not contemplated. It was assumed with confidence—for had not Viterbo said so?—that the mere concentration of troops on the Spanish and Belgian frontiers, together with a manifesto from King Philip, would suffice to operate the desired reversal of Catherine's policy.⁵ Yet it is worthy of attention that it was at this very moment that Pius offered Philip II the title to the Crown not only of France

¹ Cf. above, p. 386.

² Cf. above, p. 332.

³ Cf. above, pp. 304-6.

⁴ On the varying fortunes of d'Escars' mission see Šusta, I, 187-90, 265-74.

⁵ Šusta, I, 287-9.

but also of England, should the depositions of both Charles IX and Elizabeth for repeated disobedience to the Pope and persistent contempt for the General Council, ultimately become necessary.¹

With such thoughts running through his mind Pius IV was not likely to welcome Catherine's petition for the Chalice. Though he did not at once repulse it, the fate of its Imperial predecessor of the previous year was not a happy augury; and the Pope's apparently sympathetic confession that he had always held the question of the Chalice, like that of clerical marriage, to be entirely *de jure humano*, was merely a commonplace that evaded the real issue as to whether or no he felt prepared actually to grant the relaxation. When the Pope declined to take any decision without consulting the Sacred College, de l'Isle knew that Catherine's move had failed. The cardinals were almost unanimous against the grant. The Cardinal of St Angelo, with a curious choice of simile, went so far as to designate the Chalice as a poison, and the influence of Vargas was also thrown heavily into the scales against the French. The upshot was that on November 10th the French were referred, as the Emperor had been referred the previous year and as the Duke of Bavaria was fated to be the next, to the General Council.² On discovering the falsity of the statement that the request had come unanimously from the French bishops, Pius IV threw off all semblance of sympathy and spoke of it as "an extravagant petition, or rather complaint".³

The repulse of her reconnoitring expedition did not deter Catherine from the preparation of her main attack. Two of her lieutenants, Valence and Châtillon, endeavoured to prepare the ground with the new nuncio, Prospero di Santa Croce, who had at last replaced Viterbo. Valence argued speciously that since the sharp divisions of opinion among the French bishops at Poissy

¹ Šusta, I, 279-80.

² Letters of de l'Isle of Nov. 6th and Dec. 9th in Le Plat, iv, 739 *et seq.*; Sickel, pp. 234, 235; Ehses, p. 255. See also G. Constant, *Concession à l'Allemagne de la Communion sous les deux espèces*, I, 208-11. On Vargas' anger at the French demand see Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, 367-70, and Weiss, *Papiers d'État*, vi, 429.

³ Šusta, I, 330.

had prevented the taking of many important and necessary decisions, it would be more advantageous to have recourse direct to the Pope than to the General Council. Put differently this meant that the middle party had conceived the ingenious notion of escaping from the conservative majority, which they foresaw would be as heavy at Trent as it had been at Poissy, by previous appeal to a reputedly liberal Pope. Without proper support from Germany and Spain, Valence said, Trent could never be a success; and the Pope, though head of the Church, should know when to yield to the demands of his subjects.¹ Châtillon adopted much the same line. He spoke to Santa Croce with quite unusual fluency, and it may have been that this was his last attempt to reconcile in his own mind the two ideas of allegiance to Rome and fidelity to the principles of radical reform such as he had come to consider essential. Hostile as ever to Lorraine, he endeavoured to discredit him by repeating a story that at Poissy he had publicly declared his belief that no Pope had ever wanted a Council. But he was careful, however, to stress his own devotion to the Holy See, and endeavoured to explain away his own previous tendentious opinions. At the same time he maintained that the progress of the Huguenots could only be stemmed by a proper reform of the clergy, by the institution of vernacular prayers, by the abolition of private Masses—at least of those celebrated outside church—and by a general restriction of the number of Masses said. He offered to draw up a memorandum embodying these suggestions, and condemned very outspokenly the obstinacy of rigorists who refused even to listen to the reasons adduced on their behalf. Had the bishops at Poissy possessed more patience, had they shown more readiness to listen to their opponents, he believed that it would have been possible to have come to some arrangement admitting and accepting what was true in the reformed teaching, condemning what was manifestly false, and referring dubious points to the Pope. But the unfortunate severity and imperiousness of certain persons had wrecked all, and had left the Reformers hardened in suspicion and error. Santa Croce replied

¹ Šusta, I, 290-1.

that the Council of Trent would most assuredly grant any legitimate concession necessary for the salvation of the French people, and put it to the Cardinal that General Councils had always been the traditional refuge of the Church in times of distress and uncertainty. Châtillon could not but concur; but he maintained that the delay in the Council made some provisional settlement necessary, though he was willing that the Pope should not confirm this as permanent without the Council's assent, lest the rest of Christendom should rise in opposition. As Santa Croce was continually calling for the banishment of the Calvinist ministers under the terms of the July edict, the Cardinal explained that only the grant of the concessions which he had urged, especially that of vernacular prayers, would so alter the people's attitude towards the ministers as to make their banishment possible. But he was sure that, at least until the final decisions of the Council, some of the Huguenot demands ought to be conceded. This highly displeased Santa Croce, who replied with perhaps conscious exaggeration that a state of things which had existed for fifteen hundred and sixty years might well be allowed, even by the Calvinists, to be carried on for one year more.¹

The arguments of Châtillon and Valence met with more success when applied to the legate. Convinced that Catholicism in France was only to be saved through the Queen-Mother, Ferrara had set himself to humour her, to flatter her, to fall in with her schemes as far as he dared, lest harsh treatment should drive her into the arms of the Protestants. He was prepared to go a long way further in this direction than Santa Croce, who nevertheless shared his main point of view and deprecated the policy of absolute opposition to the Queen upheld by Cardinal Tournon and now again predominant in Rome. It was in accordance with these conciliatory principles that Ferrara consented to attend a Huguenot sermon in the Queen of

¹ Aymon, *Tous les Synodes des Églises Réformées de France* (1710), I, 6-12, 31-2. This contains the earliest edition of Santa Croce's letters, afterwards republished by Cimber et d'Anjou, *Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France*, VI. The edition needs to be supplemented by new materials revealed by Šusta. See Šusta, I, lxxvi-lxxvii.

Navarre's house, an action which drew down upon him the full blast of papal displeasure, and which he was obliged to explain at very great length indeed, making it the occasion for a full exposition of the principles on which he was trying to conduct his extremely difficult legation. It was in accordance, too, with the same principles that he extended his patronage to Catherine's idea of obtaining direct from the Pope the reforms and concessions that had not been even so much as considered by the Assembly of Poissy. During December, after having already given some hint to Rome as to what was in the air, Ferrara, assisted by two of his Italian bishops and a Dominican friar, thrice entertained in his own house Châtillon, the Bishops of Valence and Uzès, and the theologian Bouteiller. As a result the requirements of the middle party were put down on paper and entrusted to the legate to be presented to the Pope, together with the announcement that unless His Holiness would bring himself to grant the reforms it contained, at least until the final decisions of a General Council, the preservation of the Catholic religion in France could not be answered for.¹

The contents of this document were, it would seem, very striking.² Its catalogue of concessions easily exceeded those of the German Interim of Charles V. A new iconoclasm of expediency called for the removal of religious pictures from altars and church walls; the requirements of an enforced puritanism demanded the simplification of Baptismal ceremonies, the exorcisms to be included only at the will of parents and godparents, and even then to be pronounced in the vulgar tongue. Holy Communion was to be restricted to the first Sunday of the month, to be administered to the parishioners in both kinds and to be preceded by an instruction on the value and importance of the Sacrament at which a public and common confession should be made and the psalms sung by the faithful. At the consecration the deacon should eject all who did not

¹ Šusta, I, 298, 335; II, 373.

² Analysed in Šusta, I, 324, 326; II, 373-4. Forneron, *Ducs de Guise*, I, 341, says that a copy exists in the Brera Library in Milan. The text would doubtless be of great interest. The long *Remonstrances faites par le roi Charles IX au pape Pie IV*, published in the *Mémoires de Condé*, II, 562-75, seem to be apocryphal.

intend to communicate. On week-days only one Mass was to be celebrated, the remaining clergy, both priests and deacons, communicating from the hand of the celebrating priest. Epistle, Gospel and Creed were to be in the vulgar tongue: private Masses were to go. Thus far the scheme of things was an attempt to create a simpler liturgy; and while meeting many of the practical Huguenot requirements did not specifically run contrary to any fundamental doctrine of the Eucharist or of Baptism. But this was not all. The definition of the Real Presence, whether by the term Transubstantiation or by any other, was objected to; the abolition of Corpus Christi processions was demanded on the ground that the invisible majesty of God spurned outward manifestations of honour; and it was considered desirable that the people should be taught to regard the Mass as a sacrifice of praise only. These were vital things, and it can scarcely be wondered at that Laynez, whose opinion was asked by the legate, pronounced most strongly against the whole scheme.¹ Nevertheless Ferrara sent the document to Rome as representing the provisional concessions desired in France. He pointed out, also, that although the petition for the Chalice had not in fact emanated from the hierarchy as a whole, it was nevertheless true that the Cardinal of Lorraine and several other bishops had expressed such a desire at Poissy.²

Throckmorton described the scheme proposed by the middle party as "not very discrepant from the Queen's formula in England". It is not unlikely that the Book of Common Prayer had temporarily superseded the Confession of Augsburg as a model for the simplification of ceremonies, though Ferrara still believed that the latter was Catherine's ultimate goal. Paul de Foix, returning from a diplomatic mission in England, had brought back a French translation of the Common Prayer which had commended itself very much to the middle-party

¹ Šusta, II, 374.

² *Négociations ou lettres d'affaires ecclésiastiques et politiques par Hippolyte d'Este* (ed. J. Baudouin, 1658), p. 37. Another edition, from different MSS., in Baluze-Mansi, *Miscellanea*, IV. As in the case of Santa Croce's letters both these editions of Ferrara's correspondence need to be supplemented by further pieces in Šusta.

Catholics. It was "less repugnant to the papists"—in Throckmorton's words—"than any form used in Germany". A few influential but unfortunately anonymous churchmen advised Throckmorton to have an apology for the book composed, securely basing upon early authorities so much ceremonial as it retained. It would seem that Baudouin essayed this task, but early in the new year the appearance in France of Bishop Jewel's famous *Apologia Ecclesiae Anglicanae* rendered superfluous any additional work on similar lines. Plainly the Anglican liturgy was enjoying a seven days' triumph, however much or little it may have influenced the proposals sent to Rome.¹

It is interesting to watch these Gallicans no longer appealing from the Pope to a future General Council, but with a hastily assumed ultramontaniam which involved a complete reversal of principle, striving to insure themselves against a future General Council by previous appeal to the Pope. Though they put forward their proposals as temporary measures, it was plain that they hoped to have them eventually confirmed by the Council as permanent, when the success which they so confidently expected would have justified the initial papal action. Pius IV might well have been tempted to seize the excellent opportunity of displaying the extent of his power, but he was at the moment in no mood to conciliate the French, and his Cardinals were even less so. He had set a precedent the year before by refusing in similar circumstances to concede the Chalice and the marriage of priests at the demand of the Emperor; he had quite decided that the responsibility for any serious changes in discipline must rest on the Council's shoulders and not on his own, and he could thus use the impatience of the secular powers to obtain these relaxations as a stick wherewith to beat them to Trent. He shrank instinctively from personal responsibility for risk. If the floodgates were to be opened, his would not be the hand to turn the key. And quite apart from such purely tactical considerations, he was deeply shocked at the French proposals.

¹ For. Cal., Nos. 751 (3), 789 (7), 833, 839. Cf. *The Month*, Sept. 1902, and the present author's "On Rome and the English Prayer Book" (*Downside Review*, Oct. 1929) and "England and the Council of Trent" (*Dublin Review*, April 1927).

The document was "tanto empia et scelerata", wrote St Charles feelingly, that His Holiness had barely been able to achieve the reading of it. The French were told in reply that they might put their requirements before the Council when it opened, and thus the whole case for a provisional settlement was simply brushed aside.¹

Baffled by the National Council, snubbed by the Pope, the middle party could go no further without schism unless it could carry through the chimerical task of imposing its views upon the Council of Trent. And unless it could get the Council recognized as a new convocation and could obtain a more substantial German attendance than at the moment appeared likely, the chances of success in such an enterprise seemed fanciful indeed. Yet already during November the forlorn attempt was being made. The Sieur de Rambouillet, who had temporarily filled the Roman embassy earlier in the year, had been sent the round of the German Protestant princes in company with Hotman, the notorious Calvinist, in order to discuss the possibility of common measures for the transference of the Council from Trent and for rendering it more obviously œcumenical, so that the German Protestant boycott might be overcome.² The mission was of course secret, and later it became necessary to deny that it had had any ecclesiastical significance whatsoever.³ But a more open attempt was made to draw the King of Spain into the movement. The Sieur d'Auzance, sent to Toledo on a mission connected with the King of Navarre, took with him a memorandum containing proposals for an Œcumenical Council in Germany to be graced by the presence of the Pope himself.⁴ Philip's comments are not extant; but the German princes not unnaturally interpreted Rambouillet's mission, with its polemic against Trent, as an indication that the French connection with the Papacy was very near to breaking-point, and this impression was certainly not diminished by the Bishop of Valence's correspondence with the Duke of Württemberg,⁵ which forms an interesting contrast to his

¹ Šusta, II, 387.

² Le Plat, IV, 720.

³ Šusta, II, 405.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 369-70.

⁵ *B.S.H.P.F.* XXIV, 117-19.

conversations with Santa Croce. Rambouillet visited the Courts of the Elector-Palatine, the Duke of Württemberg, the Margrave of Brandenburg-Anspach, the Elector of Saxony, the Duke of Saxe-Weimar, the Elector of Brandenburg, the Landgrave of Hesse, and others. But it transpired that Catherine had overdone her evangelical pose. All she received in reply were congratulations upon her conversion, restatements of the now familiar Protestant conditions for a General Council, and fervent expressions of hope that delegates from Germany, England, Scotland, Scandinavia, Poland, and all countries wherein men had broken with the Pope, might combine with the French in the attempt to create a counter-Council to that at Trent. The wild hope of such an opposition Council, with a French assembly as its nucleus, was still father to a pathetic belief in its practicability. The customary invectives against papal claims over a Council, against the oaths taken by bishops to the Pope, against the earlier decrees of the Council of Trent, were once more brought forth and paraded.¹

Such rigorism was not to Catherine's liking. She had hoped that the German Protestants might yet be induced to meet the Pope half-way. But modification of their ideas so as to accept even a reorganized Council of Trent was as far from their thoughts as was the reorganization of that Council for Protestant benefit from those of the Pope. It must be confessed that Lutheran attendance at the Council of Trent, fought for so tenaciously by the French and by the Emperor, had now receded into the category of quite definitely lost causes. But despite this there was still no stirring among the French bishops, who now declared that the expenses incurred at Poissy made it impossible for them to contemplate an immediate journey to Trent. Catherine, however, still maintained that they would be there by March, though the six chosen to start at Martinmas—

¹ Copies of specimen replies given to Rambouillet in Stuttgart, Staatsarchiv, Frankreich, büschel 19, especially Nos. 36 c, 47, 74, 77. See also Heidenhain, *Unionspolitik*, pp. 373-5; Kluckhohn, *Briefe*, I, 232 *et seq.*, and Sattler, *Geschichte des Herzogthums Württemberg*, IV, *Beilagen*, pp. 206 *et seq.* Rambouillet and Hotman did not return to France until March 1562.

Paris, Lisieux, Avranches, Châlons, Le Mans and Lavour¹—were still in France at the close of the year, and the zealous Bishop of Paris, when urged by the legate to set an example, made it quite clear that in his own case at any rate the lack of funds was real enough.² Shortage of money was not an excuse likely to make much impression upon the opulent Cardinal of Ferrara. He showed, however, every sympathy when the bishops pleaded in addition the inclemencies of a rude winter season. But he still professed to believe that the representatives of the Gallican Church would be at Trent by March, and did not hide the fact that he would claim for himself all the credit for this still quite hypothetical triumph of diplomacy.³

It was impossible, in the long run, to hide from the papal agents the real reasons of the Government's unwillingness to hurry the bishops. The attempt was not seriously kept up after the new year, and Santa Croce soon found himself called upon to defend the cause of the Council against sharp criticism. It was objected that the sessions would spin themselves out indefinitely; that the bishops already assembled at Trent—mostly Italians—were an unlettered lot, personal dependants of the Pope, hardly to be regarded as independent agents, and in any case not likely to listen sympathetically to the French point of view. Santa Croce demurred at these reflections upon the intelligence of his countrymen. With some undeniable exceptions, he retorted, the bishops at Trent were a body of men whose learning and intellectual capacity were probably unrivalled in Europe; they were prepared to approach such questions as a vernacular liturgy, the abolition of images and lay communion under both kinds with a perfectly open mind, desiring simply to make some permanent decision; nor would the Pope attempt to influence them in either direction; and certainly, once the sessions were started, no one would desire to remain at Trent a moment longer than was necessary.⁴ But for all her assurances

¹ Šusta, I, 99. Another list in the *Mémoires de Condé*, I, 60, gives Amiens, Avranches, both Châlons, Évreux, Lavour and Séz. All except Avranches had been at Poissy.

² *Ibid.* p. 302.

³ *Négociations par Hippolyte d'Este*, p. 29.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 320-1.

that the bishops would soon be starting, the Queen was clearly unconvinced. Three weeks later she and Anthony again taxed the nuncio with the Council's lack of freedom. Moved to resentment, Santa Croce declared rhetorically, but a little uselessly, that he was prepared himself, at peril of his life if need be, to stand bail for the liberty of the Council. If a translation were desired, the French bishops were free to ask for one on arrival at Trent. Why should such store be set by German opinion, he asked, when the King of Navarre spoke of the aggravation caused in Germany by the papal decision to continue the former Council? Let the French confine their attention to their own affairs, and if they must imitate the Emperor, then let it be by sending an ambassador to Trent as Ferdinand had done. Volubly Catherine explained that she could find no occupant for the honourable post: M. de Candale had excused himself on account of a protracted lawsuit; M. de Montmorency, the Constable's son, had also declined. To whom was she to turn? But the nuncio was not impressed; while Chantonay, who was standing by, informed the Queen abruptly that there were obviously plenty of suitable people available.¹

Not even the privileged sex may eat its cake twice. So long as Catherine criticized the Council at Trent with such asperity, she could hardly expect her assurances as to the departure of the bishops or her affected embarrassment over the choice of an ambassador to be taken seriously. And these assurances were laid open to still greater suspicion by her continued intimacy with Beza, who had been retained at Court after the retirement of the other ministers, by her connivance at the spread of Calvinist propaganda, and by her notorious desire to secure toleration for Huguenot worship. The ambiguous legal situation created by the July edict was obviously no permanent solution. A fresh edict would have to be produced; and as on the spiritual issues Catherine had turned from the discredited National Council to the Pope, so now on the legal and administrative side she turned from the equally discredited Parlement to the

¹ Šusta, I, 327; II, 17, 376; Aymon, pp. 38-9; *Négociations par Hippolyte d'Este*, p. 18.

Huguenots themselves. And reciprocally the Huguenots were turning to her. The co-operation of their more responsible leaders—Beza, Coligny, the Châtillons, de Crussol—had helped to render effective an ordinance of October 18th forbidding arms to be carried in towns and ordering the restoration of all churches seized in the provinces by their followers.¹ Alarmed at the transformation which the Reform was undergoing, fearful lest a tactically impolitic and morally indefensible militarism should jeopardize the purely spiritual triumph which seemed almost within their grasp, they saw that a common desire to avoid a resort to arms and to effect some legal canalization of Huguenot energy linked their interests to those of the Queen. An understanding arose between them. Beza, on his side, was only too eager to hold the hotheads of his party in check, to discountenance violence and bloodshed. Catherine, on hers, was prepared to wink for the time being at the public exercise of the Huguenot cult, except in places such as Paris where this had led to riots and disorder, and she undertook later on, by means of a small assembly of suitable councillors, such as she had been promising ever since the end of the Colloquy of Poissy, to obtain its legalization outside city walls. The compromise was accepted at Huguenot headquarters and its effects spread like ripples from a stone dropped into water. In the provinces practical understandings in regard to preaching sprang up in many places between the representatives of the central Government and the moderate Huguenot leaders.

Beza and Coligny believed that they could only prevent the Reform movement from crashing headlong over the revolutionary precipice to almost certain destruction, by forcing it to accept the very restricted liberty now offered by Catherine. They saw that there was open to French Calvinism, had it the sense to grasp it, a chance to establish itself on a firm legal footing which would leave it free to develop its spiritual propaganda unhindered. Of this propaganda, its sole legitimate weapon, they conceived the most extravagant hopes. In his more sanguine moments Beza could look forward to the

¹ Isambert, XIV, 122, No. 38; Isnard, I, Nos. 1655-6.

conversion even of the royal family itself. But it was above all things necessary to control the extremists who were hastening on the process of militarizing the congregations, and who maintained that nothing less than complete and unrestricted liberty and the handing over of churches on the part of the Government should be accepted.¹

Catherine too had her extremists to take into account. Her suspicious hob-nobbing with the leaders of heresy had fanned the flames of the first French manifestation of a popular Counter-Reform movement in its literal sense. The Advent Preachers in Paris had delivered impassioned attacks upon the Huguenots and upon a Government which entertained such cordial relations of intimacy with them, and the eloquence of Laynez and Giustiniani had supplemented the native fire of the Parisian friars. Montmorency and St André, returning to Court, encouraged the now quite public and increasingly popular talk of Spanish intervention, though Santa Croce and Ferrara continued to preach Catholic support for the Regent, and even Tournon deprecated the employment of Spanish arms. But the Catholics were beginning to realize that for all the Huguenot clamour, for all the de-Catholicized districts, all the daily report and rumour of mass perversions, of the lapsing of whole chapters and churches—they still, nevertheless, preserved an overwhelming numerical superiority. Attempts to provide statistics claimed to show that the Huguenots numbered no more than some 4 or 5 per cent. of the total population. The menace to Catherine's plans of this Catholic revival with its big talk of an appeal to foreign force, its occasional massacres of Protestants, and its dark hints regarding the deposition of heretical sovereigns, was so great that the Queen in a moment of panic enquired whether the Huguenots were prepared to support her in the event of civil war. The resultant enquiry, which revealed the alarming fact that over 2000 mobilized Calvinist congregations existed, only helped to hasten on the military preparations which it was now Beza's main object to suppress.²

¹ See this "concordat" traced and elucidated by M. Romier, *Catholiques et Huguenots*, pp. 250-74.

² Romier, pp. 282-4.

But this one aberration over, the Queen did not look back from her desperate attempt to stave off bloodshed. Several of the more violent Catholic preachers were apprehended, even the zealous Bishop of Paris admitting their indiscretion. Early in the new year Catherine at last assembled the small group of councillors and parliamentary delegates which she had been promising since late in October. Such necessary persons as St André and Montmorency apart, its forty-eight members had been well picked, and there was little doubt that the Queen would be able to obtain a good majority for the edict she had prepared embodying the concordat with the Calvinists. Cardinal Tournon could name only twelve good Catholics out of the whole number; and though all shades of opinion emerged during the debates, from diehard reactionary to a direct proposal to hand over all Catholic churches to the Huguenots, the liberals were obviously in a strong majority and the Queen saw at the end that she had gained her point. Assured from the trend of the discussions that she would be able to plead exterior pressure, she closed the proceedings with a conservative speech which put a last-minute gleam of hope into the legate's heart. But though the play had ended happily enough, the reality to follow was of quite a different order. On January 17th the King signed the famous first Edict of Toleration which, though it denied the Huguenot claim to churches, granted—always until the final decisions of a General Council—liberty of worship outside towns, and by implication bestowed State recognition upon the hierarchy of pastor, congregation, consistory and synod.¹

The outcry amongst the Catholics was less violent than might have been expected. In the first place the edict did not come as a complete surprise. So far back as November Cardinal Châtillon had spoken to Santa Croce of a plan to allow Huguenot preaching outside city walls, citing as a precedent the treatment of the Arians in the fourth century.² Nor had it been a secret that partial toleration was the goal towards which the Queen had long been working. But by the operation, as it seemed, of

¹ Cf. Romier, pp. 255-300. Text in Isambert, XIV, 124-9; cf. Isnard, I, Nos. 1667-70.

² Aymon, II, 11.

some general law of compensation, the force of the bombshell was weakened if not—on a deeper view of the situation—entirely negated by a much heavier blow sustained almost simultaneously by the Huguenots. The King of Navarre had been encouraged by the apparent success of the mission of d'Escars definitely to throw in his lot with the Catholics. Making an end of hesitation and ambiguity—except in his correspondence with the German Protestants—he chose this moment to avow his conversion, voting explicitly against toleration in the debates preceding the edict, and thus branding himself as a traitor to God's cause not only in the eyes of Calvin but also in those of his own wife. His loss deprived the Huguenots of the immense advantage of having on their side the next-of-kin to the royal family, the man who by rights should have been regent. Though personally despicable, Anthony was a trump-card in the political game. His transference from one hand to the other took the edge off the Huguenot triumph; and for the Catholics it sensibly dulled the blow of the Edict of Toleration, which all things considered could perhaps be regarded as having fewer elements of permanency to its make-up than even the latest twist of an ambitious and unprincipled time-server. Thus while Tournon denounced the edict as “*sceleratissimo*”, Ferrara and Santa Croce after some grumbling were disposed to acquiesce in the *fait accompli*, persisting in their view that it was to the ultimate advantage of the Catholics to continue supporting the Queen-Mother. Despite her vagaries Catherine still heard Mass each morning. Better to allow her almost any amount of rope than to drive her in exasperation and fear of Spain towards the militant branch of the Huguenots. They little knew how near she had once come to flinging herself into Huguenot arms.

II

M. Romier has summed up the position of the Huguenots after the January edict in a few admirably chiselled sentences.

A dire vrai, la Réforme a parcouru, depuis un an, dans le royaume, un prodigieux chemin. Elle a gagné les foules, organisé ses cadres, fait admettre ses députés à la Cour et ses chefs au Conseil; ses théo-

logiens ont "prêché" publiquement devant le Roi attentif; son docteur le plus séduisant est le familier de la régente; elle a reçu, par l'édit de janvier, avec une pleine liberté de fait, la consécration officielle. Pour tout dire, elle est "autorisée". Qui de ses fidèles pourrait douter de son triomphe prochain?¹

With a sudden rush the rising tide had swept to its high-water mark.

But where, at this moment of heresy's triumph, this moment when the new religion had fought its way through years of fierce, unslaked persecution to a position of momentary safety, as a mountaineer after a pitch of continual peril grasps some secure ledge—where were the Guises? Surely they should have stood before all others, sword in hand, defending each step of the retreat, the stoutest bulwarks against the advancing flood? But no: they were in retirement upon their estates, enjoying, they would have you believe, the simple delights of a sporting country life.² Preserving a characteristic independence they had concerned themselves as little with the warlike outbursts of Montmorency and St André as with the desperate contortions of Catherine's diplomacy. On more than one occasion they refused flatly to come back to Court. But there could be little doubt as to the direction of their sympathies. They had left the Court because they would not tolerate the open Calvinist preaching and psalm-singing at St Germain, and knowing full well what Catherine's ultimate intentions were, they had refused categorically to appear at her marionette assembly of councillors in January. For them the Regent was still the shopkeeper's daughter; and their acute consciousness of their own natural superiority would not allow them to suffer the indignity of being dragged at her chariot wheels and of seeing their advice turned down by an artificially created majority of puppets. So Catherine went forward to the Edict of Toleration without their help and without their molestation, but under the shadow of their disdainful frown. The ordeal disconcerted her. She feared the Guises more than they her,³ despite her quick re-

¹ *Catholiques et Huguenots*, p. 299.

² Letter cited by Romier, p. 318.

³ For. Cal., No. 789.

covery from the scare of the Nemours affair.¹ When the governors of Verdun and Metz sent warning that there were rumours of a plot to seize the latter town, where a fortress was under construction, Catherine sent instructions to Vieilleville that the gates were to be closed against the Guises. But the plot was purely imaginary. The Cardinal of Lorraine sent an energetic protest to Catherine and managed to have the governor of Verdun, the too tolerant Boucard, replaced by the more orthodox Sieur de Loff.² The Cardinal had left Poissy exhorting the Catholic preachers not to incite their flocks to sedition, and he and his brother were certainly neither intriguing with Spain nor preparing for civil war. Their heaviest political guilt was a tendency to despoil the temporalities of the sees of Metz and Verdun for the benefit of the Duchy of Lorraine. On February 25th, 1562, an agreement was signed at Nancy between the Duke of Lorraine and the Cardinal of Lorraine by which the latter made over to his cousin several estates belonging to the two bishoprics and also various rights appertaining to his Abbey of Gorze.³ Shortly afterwards the Duke of Guise was made protector of all the lands and goods of the bishopric of Verdun.⁴ The Guises were immersed in local politics; they were not preparing to rise in their wrath against the Queen—they would not even pay her that compliment. They kept in weekly communication with St Germain,⁵ and early in the new year Throckmorton admitted sadly—almost as if it were a grievance—that the Guises had failed to play the rôle

¹ Cf. above, p. 391.

² Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, March 22nd, 1562; Calmet, VII, 118; For. Cal., No. 712; *Petite Bibliothèque Verdunoise*, II, 123-36.

³ The document relating to the episcopal lands is published in Calmet, VII, *preuves*, cccix-cccxi, and more fully in *Petite Bibliothèque Verdunoise*, II, 105-10, that relating to the Abbey of Gorze in Calmet, *loc. cit.* cccxi. The inscribed date is Feb. 1561 (Feb. 1562 in modern reckoning. This correction was made neither by Calmet nor by Frizon nor yet by Zeller, *Réunion de Metz*, II, 210. The Cardinal could not have been at Nancy to sign the document on Feb. 25th, 1561, as on Feb. 26th of that year he promulgated his reforms at Reims, see above, pp. 227-8). Zeller, *loc. cit.* notes, says that the treaty was afterwards ratified by the Emperor Rudolph II.

⁴ Calmet, VII, 117.

⁵ Despite Languet's ominous "de Guisiis hic est altum silentium" of Dec. 11th—*Arcana*, II, 187.

laid down for them, saying that "the matters break not out yet so grievously as was thought".¹

But though poles asunder on the question of Toleration, the Cardinal of Lorraine and Catherine de Médicis were still in substantial if now unco-ordinated agreement over the Council of Trent, and over the necessity of working upon conciliatory lines for the reunion of Christendom. In these respects Queen and Cardinal were still pursuing independently the path they had trodden hand in hand before the Colloquy of Poissy. She was appealing to Rome for substantial concessions; he, with similar ideas at the back of his mind, was looking eastward, across the Rhine, towards Augsburg and Stuttgart. He had left Poissy baffled in the attempt to force an orthodox formula on the Real Presence upon the Calvinists, but more than ever determined to come to close quarters with Lutheranism. He still thought and planned on a European scale. *Rapprochement* with the Lutherans had always been for him the key to the religious situation, the one vital problem which the Council could not afford to leave unattacked. Now he felt himself moved to attempt a trial of his own personal strength on the issue. He was about to make a grand unaided attempt to attract the Lutherans to the General Council. His very failure with the Calvinists at Poissy had served to make more evident the advantages with which he could approach the Lutherans.

Rumours of his intention were about even before he left St Germain. "They say", wrote Hubert Languet on October 17th, "that the Dukes of Württemberg and Zweibrücken, the Duke of Guise, the Cardinal of Lorraine and others will shortly meet at Vic. The purpose of the meeting is said to be the approval of the Confession of Augsburg."² This report, however, was both premature and inaccurate. The Cardinal's principal desire was to meet Brenz, the author of the Württemberg Confession that he had used at Poissy; but he prepared the ground with long-drawn-out elaboration. On leaving St

¹ For. Cal., No. 750 (3).

² Languet, *Arcana*, II, 150. But he also heard rumours of marriage proposals between the sons of the Germans and the daughters of Guise.

Germain on October 19th the Duke of Guise had addressed letters to the Elector-Palatine and the Duke of Württemberg informing them of his formal reconciliation with Condé and assuring them of his resolve not to depart from the honourable traditions of his family. To Christopher he sent copies of the Cardinal of Lorraine's speech of September 16th and of the rejected formula of St Germain, with the comment that though the latter had had to be turned down on account of its Calvinistic tone, nevertheless the Confession of Augsburg—appealed to in the Cardinal's speech—was still regarded favourably by many Catholics.¹ There was no suggestion of a personal meeting between the dukes, let alone between the Cardinal and Brenz, but Rascalon, who again carried the letters, was told to prepare the way for one. Accordingly Rascalon sent a note to Stuttgart about the middle of November intimating that the Duke of Guise intended to be at Nancy towards the end of the year and that he would be delighted to welcome Christopher there for a little hunting and the renewal of old intimacies.² Christopher understood at once that something more than a mere society engagement was intended. He persuaded himself that his old friend's religious convictions were breaking up, and became fired with eagerness to land so weighty a fish in the Lutheran net. Though warned to be on his guard by the Elector-Palatine, who again rebuffed Rascalon and had not a good word for the Cardinal of Lorraine,³ he fell in with the idea but suggested a meeting not at Nancy but at Saverne, about half-way between Nancy and Stuttgart. He made Guise a present of two printed editions of the Württemberg Confession and besought him once more to extricate himself from the slough of vain traditions and to seek the Truth in the Scriptures.⁴ Guise replied that he would be at the rendezvous at the end of January.⁵

¹ Guise to the Elector-Palatine and to the Duke of Württemberg, Oct. 19th, in *B.S.H.P.F.* xxiv, 77-8.

² Rascalon to the Duke of Württemberg, Nov. 15th—*ibid.* pp. 81-3. Cf. the same to the Duke of Zweibrücken, Nov. 7th—*ibid.*

³ Kluckhohn, I, 251-3.

⁴ Duke of Württemberg to the Duke of Guise, Nov. 22nd—*B.S.H.P.F.* xxiv, 113-15.

⁵ Duke of Guise to the Duke of Württemberg, Dec. 30th—*ibid.* pp. 115-16.

Signs of the Cardinal's eirenic purpose now multiplied. From St Germain he had gone with his brothers to Nanteuil, where he still was on October 26th when M. de Crussol arrived to investigate the Nemours affair.¹ There he had left them and had gone back alone to Reims, where he had delivered a course of sermons described by Hubert Languet—presumably from the testimony of some listener—as almost Lutheran in tone.² We know definitely that they had been composed for the benefit of the local heretics, whom the Cardinal summoned to hear him, but without success. He piped and they would not dance; they would not even meet him for a private interview.³ By the middle of November he had rejoined his brothers at Joinville.⁴ In Scotland the Catholic party was infuriated by a report that he had advised his niece to embrace Anglicanism. "The little bruit", wrote Randolph, "makes them run almost wild"⁵; and here may well be a clue to the story told a decade later by Walsingham and known to Archbishop Parker, that the Cardinal had once expressed his liking for the Book of Common Prayer—"if they would go no further"—and had offered Throckmorton to commend it as Catholic to the Council and the Pope.⁶ Whatever the truth, the Cardinal was plainly not so much out of harmony with the liberal spirits at Court who were bestowing their compliments upon the Anglican liturgy about this time. When it became known that he contemplated a journey into the Duchy of Lorraine there were those who read into it—and not inaccurately—an eirenic purpose. "I hear", wrote Throckmorton, "that the Cardinal of Lorraine is going to Metz

¹ See de Crussol's report in de Ruble, *Antoine de Bourbon*, III, 376-8, where it is dated Oct. 19th. M. Noël Valois, *art. cit. supra*, has shown that the 26th is the more probable date; and at any rate the 19th is several days too early. Languet is clearly in error in stating that the Cardinal of Lorraine left Nanteuil on the eve of de Crussol's arrival—*Arcana*, II, 126.

² *Arcana*, II, 158, 159. Cf. For. Cal., No. 595.

³ See Appendix X (a).

⁴ *Petite Bibliothèque Verdunoise*, II, 133, 135.

⁵ For. Cal., No. 883 (2)—letter of Feb. 12th, 1562.

⁶ For. Cal., 1569-71, No. 1813; *Correspondence of Archbishop Parker* (Parker Society), p. 398 (letter of Sept. 16th, 1572). Cf. the late Father Pollen, S.J., in *The Month* for Sept. 1902; and the *Downside Review*, *art. cit.* Oct. 1929.

to travail to accord the learned men of Germany in such sort as not only France but all countries of Europe may be contented to receive the formula of religion which will be there agreed upon. I know not how the bishop of Rome's authority will be limited in this matter."¹

Passing through north-eastern France at the close of the year, on his way from Brussels to the court of the Duke of Lorraine at Nancy, was the papal nuncio Commendone. At St Dizier he heard that the whole Guise family, similarly bound for Nancy, was at Ansorville, a Guise estate about a mile or two away. He therefore went out to them and spent the whole day with the Cardinal of Lorraine. Later they met again at Nancy and had several further conversations. Lorraine inverted, for Commendone's benefit, the genesis of the proposed interview with the Duke of Württemberg. He made out that the initiative had come from Christopher, who intended to be at Saverne with Brenz, Vergerius and other Lutheran divines; he himself, he said, having obtained the licence of the King, would go with his brother the Duke. Actually it had been only on December 30th that Guise had written informing Christopher of the Cardinal's desire to be present at their meeting. The nuncio commented that here was an excellent opportunity of obtaining first-hand information on the attitude of the Lutherans towards the Council of Trent. He begged Lorraine to employ all his skill in persuading them to accept it. The Cardinal promised to comply, and even said that he would send an express messenger to Rome with the result.²

They spoke also of Catherine's assembly of councillors and parliamentarians which was then sitting. The Cardinal was pessimistic, and expressed his suspicion—which was in fact perfectly justified—that the parliamentarians had been specially picked in order to ensure the grant of toleration to the Huguenots. At Court, he complained, psalms were being sung and Huguenot sermons preached almost in the Queen's room; the Constable and Marshal de St André had both shown excellent spirit and had left the Court on this account, but afterwards they had gone back. Despite Commendone's exhortations in

¹ For. Cal., 1561-2, No. 849.

² Appendix X (a) and (b).

the Pope's name, and despite at least two summonses from St Germain which arrived during the nuncio's stay at Nancy, Lorraine himself refused to return while such scandals continued. He appealed also to his ecclesiastical obligations. The charge of the province of Reims was a heavy burden and the necessity for his presence had been made quite evident to him. The heretics were active everywhere. The Bishop of Châlons had been chased out of a village where he had gone to instal a new rector, and it had been impossible to punish the culprits. His own nephew, the Comte d'Hu, who was Governor of the province, would take no action; and though he himself might banish heretics from the lands under his own temporal jurisdiction¹ he could not prevent them from reappearing in localities close at hand under the rule of the Comte. Had he felt at liberty to leave his province he would certainly have accepted the Pope's invitation to visit Rome, and would willingly have gone for a month or so to Trent. But as things stood he was not too happy even at his decision to make a journey into Lorraine. He complained of the inefficiency of the Bishop of Toul, who had pleaded old age to Commendone as an excuse for not going to Trent² and was allowing all his parishes in Lorraine to be served not by their rectors but by paid substitutes. At Metz, which he intended to visit, the Huguenots had been allowed to build a church, and the French garrison was corrupting a naturally Catholic people. He refrained from adding that popular opposition had forced him to abandon the idea of a Jesuit establishment.³ The people of Lorraine and the ducal family, his cousins, were good Catholics; but the nobles were infected with heresy, especially those resident at Court; there

¹ Hubert Languet reports that all who would not conform to Catholicism had been banished by the Cardinal from his principality on pain of death, but had been allowed to take their goods with them—*Arcana*, II, 205. This regulation tallies exactly with the policy which the Cardinal advocated in France.

² The Pope on hearing of this wrote very severely to the bishop, and would not accept his excuse—Ehse, VIII, 277 note 1.

³ *M.H.S.J., Latin Monumenta*, v, 326, 349. The Society was so hard pressed to find subjects to fulfil all the undertakings it had made that Laynez was not really sorry to abandon the Metz plan. The Jesuits did not go permanently to Metz until 1582, after a settlement in 1571 had failed to take root—see Viansson, *Les Jésuites à Metz* (1874).

was also the unhappy affair of the apostate Bishop of Troyes, which was being dealt with by the legate. While his spiritual duties made so many calls upon his time and energies there could be no question of a return to Court.¹ Commendone was obviously invited to conclude that the statesman had been swallowed up in the priest.

The nuncio left Nancy on January 9th with an assurance, almost certainly dictated by the Cardinal, that the Duke of Lorraine would be guided by the Emperor's example in the matter of the General Council. He had also been well deceived as to the origin and purpose of the Cardinal's proposed German trip. But even this doctored account caused uneasiness in Rome, where dark hints regarding Rambouillet's mission were beginning to leak out, and where the idea of the German meeting was thought very odd, despite the "vertu et bonne religion assez cogneüe desdits seigneurs de Guise".² Meanwhile the Duke of Guise had told Christopher of Württemberg that his three ecclesiastical brothers—the Cardinals of Lorraine and Guise and the Grand Prior—desired to be present at the interview, asking that Christopher on his side should bring Brenz and the Margrave George-Frederick of Brandenburg-Anspach, who was to visit Stuttgart in February. Christopher assented to these arrangements: the Churchmen, did they really intend to be converted, would be all the better grist to his mill. But owing to a *Kreistag* which he had to attend at Ulm, the Lutheran duke found it necessary to put off the interview until February.³

Whether it was out of fear for his personal safety or as a result of his differences with Catherine de Médicis,⁴ Lorraine

¹ Commendone to St Charles, Dec. 29th, Jan. 1st and Jan. 11th (*Barb. Lat.* 57-98, ff. 165-74), extracts in Lagomarsini, *Epistolae Pogiani*, III, 8-10; Ehses, VIII, 276-7; and in Appendix X. Commendone and Lorraine also discussed the difficult situation of Mary Queen of Scots and the question of her marriage. The Cardinal proposed an Austrian match again, also mentioning that the Kings of Sweden and Denmark and the Prince of Spain were suitors for her hand.

² Le Plat, IV, 99.

³ Guise to Württemberg, Dec. 30th, Feb. 14th; Württemberg to Guise, Jan. 10th, in *B.S.H.P.F.* XXIV, 115 *et seq.*, 119 *et seq.* Other letters in the Marburg Volume not published by the *B.S.H.P.F.* but used from the originals by Heidenhain, *Unionspolitik*, p. 387.

⁴ Cf. above, p. 414.

did not take his opportunity of visiting Metz. But in the interval the Edict of Toleration came to fulfil his worst fears at home. And the blow did not fall alone. Hardly had the royal signature been affixed to the Huguenot charter before the resumption of the Council at Trent revolutionized the European situation. *Dies Magna* indeed. But for Lorraine who had struggled so hard to avert it—*et amara valde*.

III

On the morning of January 18th, 1562, the feast of St Peter's Chair at Rome, a cheerful winter's sun shone down upon the city of Trent sparkling frostily in its arena of snow-capped hills. Events of great moment were being enacted in the cathedral of St Vigilius where, after an impressive procession from the church of St Peter, High Mass was sung by Cardinal Gonzaga, and the Archbishop of Reggio preached to a goodly company of Churchmen who, having been formally resolved into a General Council of the Church, were now celebrating their first public session. Fortune had at last smiled upon the labours of Pius IV. The great work to which he had put his hand had emerged from its prolonged gestation into a condition of active life. A hundred and nine bishops—a figure which the Pope hoped to see trebled—four abbots, four generals of orders and thirty-three doctors and masters of theology had entered into a special, almost mystic relationship with the Holy Ghost, and in union with the Holy See had assumed, at a critical period of storm and stress, the teaching functions of the Church. "La giornata fu felice quanto sia possibile a dire et favorita dal cielo et dalla terra", wrote the legates to St Charles, "onde ce ne allegramo di cuore con S. Bne et con V. Ill^{ma} et Rev^{ma} Sria pregando la bontà di Dio che a questo concilio dia quel successo et fine che sia degno di così bel principio."¹

Cardinal Seripando, by far the most attractive of the legates, observed in one of his letters that in comparison with the large numbers present on this occasion the earlier Assemblies at Trent in which he had taken part deserved to be ranked rather as Diocesan than as General Councils.² But ill-disposed

¹ Šusta, I, 164.

² Ehses, VIII, 292 note 3.

critics would be inclined to judge the Council's numbers more absolutely; and when all was said and done a bare 100—though better than the forties and fifties of the earlier sessions—was a poor figure to set against the 300 of Nicaea, the 400 of the Lateran, the 600 of Constance. Soon the Cardinal of Lorraine would dismiss Trent, in conversation with the Duke of Württemberg, as a synod without valid claim to œcumenical status.¹ And from the point of view of national representation, criticism was even easier and more specious. The Teutonic races were represented by a Flemish abbot, one English bishop and Cardinal Madruzzo of Trent—himself more Italian than German; while the Italian Piccolomini represented the Cardinal of Augsburg. There were four or five Greek or Illyrian bishops. Poland could claim Cardinal Hosius and an abbot who was also a bishop-elect. For the rest there were about eighty-six Italian bishops, thirteen Spanish, three Portuguese. The generals of orders, Dominican, Augustinian, Servite and Carmelite—the last represented by proctor—were all Italians. Of the doctors of theology twenty-four were Italian, four Portuguese and three Spanish. The consulting room was full enough, with doctors and specialists in plenty, but the gravely infected were not there.²

But in its mercy "High Heaven rejects the lore of nicely-calculated less or more"; and any test of proportional representation would certainly disqualify the first four General Councils—to go no further—of any claim to œcumenicity. The immediate problems which the legates at Trent had to face were not caused by the pressure of such numerical considerations, but they were nevertheless problems which raised fundamental questions respecting the Council's very being. At the conclusion of the Archbishop of Reggio's oration the solemn chanting of the Litany of the Saints followed with divers further prayers and

¹ Cf. below, p. 434.

² Pius IV had thought to placate German feeling by creating a fifth legate in his young nephew Cardinal Mark Sittich von Hohenembs, Bishop of Constance. The Cardinal, however, who was known as Cardinal d'Altemps, was a worthless youth, and his choice as legate, far from being welcomed, was much resented. After a short stay in Trent during the winter he retired to Rome and did not come back until a fortnight after the Council's opening. He played absolutely no part in it and finally retired altogether.

ceremonies, after which the secretary read out the Bull of Convocation and a decree previously agreed upon outlining in a few sentences the purposes of the Council. In connection with the public reading of the Bull several of the Spanish prelates, led by Pedro Guerrero, Archbishop of Granada, had a short while previously demanded a clear and unambiguous statement declaring the Council to be a continuation, and had stubbornly persisted in this demand which they twice repeated. Though empowered to content them in the final event,¹ the legates were yet loth to proceed so soon to unpleasant extremities. But it needed nearly a whole week of argument and the employment of extreme tact before they could persuade the Archbishop and his followers not to make a public protest at the opening session, and to be content with the private assurances given earlier to Philip II and now repeated by the legates themselves. The renewed outbreak of this fundamental controversy warned the legates of the inflammable nature of the material with which they had to deal, and the composition of the decree concerning the scope of the Council's activities, which had been put into the hands of the Bishops of Modena, Lerida and Telese (Massarelli), proved a task full of pitfalls. A draft was produced and submitted to the inspection of several of the leading prelates individually, including Granada, who gave it their approval; it was then unanimously adopted at the preliminary Congregation held on January 15th. Subsequently Granada conceived qualms—which he alleged were shared by several Italians. He objected to the words "*proponentibus legatis ac praesidentibus*", by which the right of proposing decrees had been restricted to the papal legates, on the ground that this detracted from the liberty of the bishops and would certainly offend the heretics and deter them from coming to the Council. The legates were not deceived by this transparent piece of strategy. Granada had already complained that the Italian bishops were bound hand and foot by their oaths to the Pope; and it was odd that a man who had only just been persuaded with immense difficulty to abandon a proposal which would in-

¹ Cf. above, p. 396.

dubitably have killed what little chance remained of the heretics coming to Trent, should suddenly develop this unnatural tenderness for their feelings. Seripando had told him that the regulation had been made simply with the object of securing greater efficiency and despatch of business, and had assured him that it would not detract from the bishops' liberty but rather augment this by withdrawing the legates from the actual discussions; he had even offered to call an extra congregation to discuss the decree again, an offer which Granada had refused. The next day when the decree was confirmed in the session, the Spaniard publicly protested that he could not accept the words "*proponentibus legatis*", since he regarded them as an unnecessary and inexpedient innovation in conciliar practice. His example was followed by the Bishop of Orense, while two more Spaniards, the Bishops of Leon and Almeria, accepted the decree only with a proviso that the legates should propose for discussion only what was deemed worthy of proposition by the Council. This incident, the first flicker of a long and ardent controversy, was the sole blot upon the harmony of the opening session. But the opposition of the Bishops of Salamanca, Lerida and Tortosa to the policy of Granada revealed that the Spaniards were not united. A second decree fixing the next session for February 26th was passed without criticism. The *Te Deum* was then sung and the ceremonies came to an end, having lasted about six hours.¹

There was an almost complete absence of Frenchmen. The Gallican hierarchy was represented by the Italian Bishops of Vivier and St Papoul. But Massarelli's list of those present contains the names of but two obscure persons in whose veins there flowed the Frankish blood of Clovis and Charlemagne and St Louis. They deserve for a brief moment to be rescued from their obscurity. One was Bartholomew Elcout and he was a cantor: the other was called Jacques Carra, and he was a courier, and a native of Lyons.

¹ For the Congregation of Jan. 15th, the session of the 18th, and the legates' difficulties with the group of Spaniards who followed Granada—Leon, Vich, Almeria, Orense—see Ehses, VIII, 283-303; Šusta, I, 152-66. Cf. the account in Pastor, VII, 203-5 (Engl. transl. xv, 263-5).

CHAPTER XII

Last Struggles of the Opposition

I implore you...to praise His Majesty fervently in my name, and to beg him...to give light to the Lutherans.

—St Theresa, *The Interior Castle*, VII, cap. 4, conclusion.

I

THE Council of Trent had opened: what was it going to do? Upon this city in a valley, now become as one set on a hill, the eyes of the whole Christian world were turned, many in pious assurance, others with cold glares of hostility, some in wistful uncertainty.

It cannot be denied that as soon as the opening of the Council had come within definite view, the Pope's pronouncements as to its agenda had become much more precise than they had been before the issue of the Bull of Convocation. Pius now revealed his express desire for the discussions on the Sacraments to be resumed where they had been interrupted in 1552, and regarded the question of Reform as quite secondary. He himself had set up commissions to deal with the reorganization of the Curia, and in his opinion the general reforms already decreed needed but few additional touches.¹ This programme was calculated to please few but Italians. It was clean contrary to the wishes of the French and Germans, and though tantamount to a declaration of Continuation, was also objected to by the strongest supporters of Continuation, the Spaniards, who urged vehemently and publicly that Reform was the main object of the Council, and were strongly opposed to the reform of the Curia being left in the hands of the Pope.²

All four legates realized the gravity of the danger that compliance with papal orders might lead to a rejection of the Council by the French and Germans³; but it was only Seripando who felt any sympathy for the Spaniards and believed that Rome would

¹ Šusta, I, 117.

² *Ibid.* p. 134.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 124-5, 129.

commit a serious error in stifling the desire for free discussion on Reform in all its aspects.¹ It was at length decided to open proceedings with a revision of the Index, a course which would entail no commitment in regard to the Council's identity; and for this purpose the legates requested and obtained from the Pope a formal letter handing the matter over to the Council.² But misgivings followed. To condemn books was to condemn their authors unheard, to render the safe-conduct which they intended to offer to many of these authors little better than a mockery. In this dilemma the legates suggested taking a straight vote on the question of new material versus the old programme, assuring Rome that a majority in favour of proceeding with the programme of 1552 could safely be relied upon; responsibility would then lie with the Council itself, not with the Pope, while the "proponentibus legatis" clause ensured the legates' control whatever the issue.³ Nevertheless, a draft decree was drawn up by Seripando declaring that the Council intended to apply itself to the revision of the Index and to the composition of a general safe-conduct in which there should also be promised a full and honourable pardon to all who might repent of their errors and submit to the Council. This draft, together with a scheme of regulations for the theological discussions, was sent to Rome whence it returned with several emendations.⁴ In the meantime the opening session had already been safely held; the legates had again taken consultation together and had finally decided on a course of action.⁵ In a General Congregation held on January 27th they laid before the Council three briefly-worded considerations on the need for examining the lists of prohibited books and for issuing an invitation, together with a safe-conduct, to all heretics. The opinions of the bishops on these points was solicited, and the voting which followed was

¹ Šusta, I, 135-6.

² *Ibid.* p. 140; II, 4; Sickel, *Römische Berichte*, I, 50; Ehses, p. 279.

³ Šusta, I, 129-30.

⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 146-8. The Roman criticisms, *ibid.* II, 3-4; Seripando's defence, *ibid.* II, 7-9.

⁵ Seripando's literary remains, in Šusta, II, 6. Cf. Merkle, *Concilium Tridentinum*, II, 472, and Ehses, p. 304 note 1.

not completed until February 12th.¹ Thus the Council was not given the chance of a direct vote on Continuation. The legates had decided not to force the issue just yet.

Some of the Spaniards, however, complained that the business of the Index and of the general citation of non-Catholics would simply waste valuable time which might have been better devoted to considerations of reform. Several bishops, moreover, were frankly suspicious of the idea of a safe-conduct, "ne veniant quorum non poenitet", as the English Bishop of St Asaph said. But on the whole a large majority desired both to grant a general safe-conduct and to offer a charitable reception to all prepared to recant and submit to the Council. On February 12th four prelates were empowered to draft the necessary decree.²

Apart from the Duke of Mantua, who had attended in person, none of the secular powers had been represented at the opening session, notwithstanding that this had been continually postponed to allow of the arrival of the Imperial ambassadors. Ferdinand's first ambassador, Georg Draskovics, Bishop of Pecs (Fünfkirchen), who represented him as King of Hungary, had actually reached Trent on the evening of January 18th. But he was not formally received, together with Anton Brus von Muglitz, Archbishop of Prague, representing Ferdinand as Emperor, until February 6th.³ On February 10th the reception of Count Sigismund von Thun completed the Emperor's triple representation,⁴ while on the previous day Don Fernando Mascareynas had been received on behalf of the King of Portugal.⁵ On January 30th the callow and uninformed Cardinal von Hohenembs appeared in Trent to complete the legatine college.⁶

The Emperor Ferdinand's instructions to his ambassadors⁷

¹ Ehses, pp. 304-25. I shall not cite older editions of documents from the *Acta*, such as those of Theiner, Le Plat, Raynaldus, Martène, etc., unless any special purpose is to be served thereby.

² Ehses, p. 325. For St Asaph's vote—*ibid.* p. 319; and cf. *Downside Review* for Jan. 1925, pp. 27-8.

³ Ehses, pp. 311-2.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 320.

⁵ *Ibid.* pp. 315-8.

⁶ Šusta, II, 14-15. Cf. Ehses, p. 278 and notes, and above, p. 422.

⁷ Sickel, *Concil von Trient*, pp. 252-60.

showed how strongly his mind was still obsessed by fears of heretical violence. He particularly suspected the Duke of Württemberg of nursing aggressive designs upon the Council, and this suspicion was shared by the Cardinal of Mantua who asked Rome whither the fathers could be removed in such an eventuality.¹ But such apprehensions were really quite groundless. The Duke's conferences with the other evangelical princes and his proposals of military alliances were all of a defensive nature, largely actuated indeed by fear of a Catholic league to enforce the decisions of the Council.² Nevertheless Ferdinand's extreme anxiety for the Council to give no unnecessary provocation arose not so much from any hope of coaxing Lutheran attendance as from terror of a Lutheran attack and a consequent breach of the public peace in Germany. His ambassadors approached the legates on February 13th in order to explain in detail their master's point of view. They insisted that no vestige of a handle should be given to the Protestants for refusing to attend the Council. They asked therefore that in the coming session, as in the previous one, no mention should be made of Continuation. They also asked that the session itself might be delayed until the ambassadors of more secular potentates and perhaps even the Protestants themselves should have arrived; four months' postponement, they said, would not be too long to consider. The intervening time could easily be filled up by work in connection with the safe-conduct and the Index, but they begged that the Lutherans should not be infuriated into taking up arms by the placing of the Augsburg Confession at the head of the list of prohibited books. The Emperor, they said, preferred lenience to severity, and even desired that the Protestants should be given a safe-conduct couched in their own terms.³

The legates were prepared to satisfy these demands as far as was possible. But they delayed giving their answer for four days. While they are deliberating let us leave the Trentino and turn

¹ Sickel, p. 277 notes; Šusta, II, 25.

² Kugler, II, 252 *et seq.*; Heidenhain, pp. 375-85, 395 *et seq.*

³ Ehses, pp. 325-7. Cf. Eder, *Die Reformvorschläge Kaiser Ferdinands I.*, p. 107 *et seq.*

our gaze westwards into Alsace where at this very moment the Cardinal of Lorraine, accompanied by his three brothers, and with his head full of projects for the reconciliation of Catholics and Lutherans, is nearing Saverne, to attempt a more direct approach to this problem of eirenics than seems likely ever to be staged at Trent.

II

The Guises reached Saverne on February 15th. There they found the Duke of Württemberg accompanied by Brenz and three other theologians, Esslinger, Andreas and Bidembach, of whom the two latter had been on the fruitless mission to Paris. Christopher's attitude was transparent. He had no other object than to commend his own faith to the Guises and to plead for toleration for the French Calvinists. But the Cardinal was playing a difficult and dangerous game. He desired to break down Lutheran suspicion and to establish personal relationships of mutual confidence with Christopher and Brenz as a preparation for a more formal and technical approach to the question of theological *rapprochement*. In this endeavour he was prepared to go to almost reckless lengths of exaggeration in estimating, for Christopher's benefit, the scope and nature of the concessions by which it might be possible for Catholicism to be modified. It was essential to bid high. For Christopher, in addition to being already half-committed to a project of the King of Navarre for a new Luther-Calvinist conference, had received many warnings against the wicked and deceitful designs of the Guises from the Elector-Palatine, from Philip of Hesse, even from Vieilleville.¹ To gain his end the Cardinal was prepared to use a floridity of expression and a width of conciliatory gesture which after their immediate purpose was achieved would doubtless stand in need of more precise interpretation.²

¹ Heidenhain, pp. 388, 390; Kugler, II, 333.

² The only source of the Conference of Saverne, from which all subsequent accounts are derived, is that compiled by Christopher himself and published in Sattler, *Geschichte des Herzogthums Württemberg*, IV, 215 *et seq.* A French translation in the *B.S.H.P.F.* IV, 184-8. While recording all the sensational utterances of the Guises, this document often leaves us, in a very provoking

On the morning of February 16th the Cardinal preached before an audience of some 300 people and at once struck the note of doctrinal concession. His text was the temptation of our Lord in the desert and he insisted that Christ was man's only mediator with God. Having thus prepared the ground for the abandonment of the Invocation of the Saints, he advanced towards Justification by Faith by teaching that trust was not to be reposed in good works. Later in the morning he privately received the four Lutheran theologians—but there is unfortunately no record of the interview—while his brother, donning a mask of pious and ingenuous simplicity, was closeted with Christopher. It was plainly Guise's intention to sound Christopher on the points broached in the Cardinal's sermon. Representing himself as an unlettered soldier, ignorant of theology but with a natural attachment to the faith of his upbringing, Guise declared with disarming frankness that he sought only the truth, whithersoever the search might lead him. He spoke of the troubles created in France by the religious dissensions, and explained that the intransigence of the Calvinist ministers had foiled the attempt of the Queen-Mother and the King of Navarre to restore unity at the Assembly of Poissy. He then asked how far the Lutherans went with the Calvinists. Christopher replied that they went the whole way, except in regard to the Lord's Supper, where their disagreement, however, was probably due to misunderstanding; in his opinion the Colloquy of Poissy had failed because the bishops had not been serious and had concentrated the debates upon the one article in the Calvinist Confession most likely to lead to a breakdown. The French troubles were due simply to the persecutions. Was there any other question?

There was. What, asked Guise, did the Lutherans understand by idolatry? They understood, it appeared, the worship of false gods, the recourse to mediators other than Jesus Christ, the reposal of trust in saints, in the Virgin Mary, in good works.

manner, without any indication of what Christopher and Brenz actually said. There is also a short account in a letter of Mundt to Cecil of Feb. 24th—Brit. Mus., Cotton MSS. Galba XI, ff. 196 *et seq.* Cf. also Baguenault de Puchesse, "Le Duc de Württemberg, les Guise et Catherine de Médicis" in the *Bulletin Philologique et Historique* for 1915.

Guise replied that he did none of these things, but when pressed that he must then abandon the whole cultus of the Saints, the doctrine of the Sacrifice of the Mass, belief in pilgrimages and purgatory, he pleaded theological incapacity and referred Christopher to the Cardinal, enquiring only how the Mass could be held to be idolatrous. Christopher explained; how, he has not related; but the explanation evidently involved some assertion of the Real Substantial Presence, for Guise at once commented that Beza at Poissy had taught the very different doctrine of a purely spiritual presence, and had maintained that the true Body and Blood of our Lord were as far distant from the eucharistic elements as Heaven from earth. Christopher was not daunted by the discrepancy. Doubtless Beza had meant no more than to attack the practices of reservation and eucharistic processions!

Guise did not press the point. Christopher then took the initiative and with much emotion appealed to his friend to clear himself, if he could, from the charge popularly levelled at his family of having shed much innocent blood on the score of religion. It was now Guise's turn to prevaricate. Sighing profoundly, he answered that before leaving Saverne he and his brothers would prove how deeply they had been wronged in this respect. Then, turning the conversation, he contrasted the internal divisions of the Protestants with the marvellous unity that had always characterized the Roman Church. This gave Christopher his chance for an excursus on the spiritual unity enjoyed by evangelical Christians. The Papist unity was hierarchic only; there were differences of opinion between different religious orders, and no less than five different forms of the Canon of the Mass. In accordance with his rôle, Guise evinced the greatest astonishment at these hardly catastrophic revelations. "If this be true I shall become a Lutheran. For there must be unity in the Mass or all is false. But I beg you"—he was careful to add—"to speak on these points to my brother." Christopher then admitted that he could not substantiate his statements without further reference to Popish books.

Very early next morning the Duke of Guise confessed to

Christopher that he had had a sleepless night as a result of their conversation. But his insomnia was more probably due to the necessity of midnight consultation with the Cardinal than to any spiritual crisis. Before seven o'clock the Guises had decided that Brenz and Lorraine, having spent the previous day in each other's company, should next confer in Christopher's presence. This having been arranged, the Cardinal delivered another sermon at eight o'clock. If Christopher's account be accurate, he now taught openly that the saints ought not to be invoked since Christ alone was man's sole mediator and advocate, and foreshadowed further concessions by declaring that God was to be adored only as He exists in Heaven—a formula making it possible to combine the abandonment of the worship of the Host with the retention of Transubstantiation. His text was the ejection of the buyers and sellers from the Temple—"quem locum", comments the English agent Mundt, "Cardinaliter tractasse dicitur".¹

The separate interviews of the previous day, Lorraine's with the Lutheran theologians, Christopher's with Guise, had plainly been preparatory to the combined sitting for which Brenz and his master now repaired to the Cardinal's lodgings in the afternoon of the 17th—which was the Cardinal's thirty-seventh birthday. Christopher sat among the four Guise brothers; Brenz placed himself opposite; there was no one else in the room. The Cardinal said that he desired both to explain his own faith and to suggest a means of re-establishing religious affairs *en bonne voie*. The previous day he had discussed many topics with Brenz—Original Sin, Baptism, Prayers for the Dead, Justification, Invocation of the Saints, the Articles of the Apostles' Creed—and he hoped that they had found themselves in substantial agreement. He desired now to pass on to the Mass, and he invited Brenz to speak his mind on the Mass without reserve or hesitation.

Brenz complied. As Christopher's narrative merely says, "Brenz lui-même saura le mieux rappeler ce qu'il a dit",² we

¹ Letter cited in the previous note.

² I quote from the French version.

must evidently supply for ourselves the ordinary High Lutheran polemic. Lorraine then repeated that God was to be adored only as He existed in Heaven, and conceded that in the practice of eucharistic processions the worship of the Host had been carried too far. Simple reverence for the Sacrament and the kneeling position at Holy Communion would be sufficient. But not content with these concessions, for which a skilful theologian might not perhaps have found it entirely impossible to offer some defence, the Cardinal proceeded to abandon even the sacrificial nature of the Mass, which he agreed should be regarded not as an organic prolongation of the sacrifice of Calvary to be offered for the living and the dead, but merely as an act of commemoration of that sacrifice, to be performed only when there were communicants. Small wonder then that Brenz exclaimed in delight: "Reverend sire, if the abuses of the Mass were suppressed we should soon be in accord!" Zwingli himself might have echoed this sentiment.

Interrogated by the Cardinal on the subject of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, Brenz denied that Christ the Head of the Church stood in need of a vicar. He pointed also to the indisputable but not very damaging fact that no such beings as Cardinals were mentioned in Scripture; but he was prepared to tolerate bishops if regularly elected, since degrees in ecclesiastical administration were clearly desirable. On the strength of this the Cardinal of Lorraine declared roundly that agreement on the hierarchy could soon be reached, observing airily that personally he cared little whether he wore a red coat or a black one. He passed thence to his next point. Did Brenz regard the Calvinists and Zwinglians as heretics? And if so, were they to be punished? He was told that except on the one question of the Lord's Supper the followers of Zwingli and Calvin agreed entirely with the German reformers. Christian charity demanded that in respect of their one error they should be exhorted and prayed for, so that by God's grace they might yet be brought to a knowledge of the truth: Brenz begged the Cardinal to take no severe or hasty action against them.

An easy transition led the Cardinal to his last point. Did any

possibility exist of restoring Christian unity? Brenz was ready with five suggestions, of whose nature, however, we are unfortunately given no hint. But they drew from the Cardinal the declaration that the Council of Trent, being as it was then constituted rather a simple Synod than a proper Œcumenical Council, was powerless to rescue Christendom from the dragon of disunion. He waxed eloquent, on the other hand, on the eirenic possibilities of the Confession of Augsburg, and maintained that if the Calvinists at Poissy had been willing to look less intransigently upon it, it would have been possible, without much difficulty, to have induced the bishops to come to some arrangement with them. Christopher put the obvious question. Would the Catholics themselves take the medicine which they recommended to the Calvinists? The Cardinal would reply only for himself—but he did so in no uncertain terms.

“Vous l’avez entendu,” are his words as Christopher records them, “et vous Brentius mon père, vous l’avez de même entendu hier avec vos confrères. De plus je prends Dieu à témoin que je pense et que je crois comme je le dis, et qu’avec la grâce de Dieu je vivrai et mourrai dans ces sentiments. Je le répète donc: j’ai lu le Confession d’Augsbourg, j’ai lu aussi Luther, Melanchthon, Brentius et d’autres; j’approuve entièrement leurs doctrines et je m’accorderais bien vite avec eux dans tout ce qui concerne la hiérarchie ecclésiastique. Mais il faut que je dissimule encore quelque temps afin d’en gagner plusieurs qui sont encore faibles dans la foy.”

Negotiation with the Calvinists, he went on, would not be so hopeless if they would show the same reasonableness as the Germans. Christopher therefore suggested that the experiment of Poissy should be given a second trial. The Cardinal replied that in such an eventuality he would gladly show the sincerity of his desire for concession. He asserted that in his own dioceses the Gospel was as freely preached as he himself had preached it that day and the day before; Mass, he alleged, was celebrated only when there were communicants; he was himself engaged in the composition of a new Canon which would be ready by Easter. Encouraged by these pronouncements, in which tactics assuredly triumphed over truth, Brenz earnestly supplicated the Cardinal to advance the Word of God in France and to shield

the faithful from a new outbreak of persecution. "Je le ferai comme vous dites," was the reply, "et de plus je vous prie instamment de m'écrire souvent, mon père. Si dans l'accomplissement de mes fonctions ecclésiastiques vous remarquez quelque chose qui vous déplaît, veuillez me l'écrire et m'avertir. Moi aussi, je vous écrirai et je vous reconnâtrai pour mon père en Christ."

This remarkable conversation, the setting and nature of which must be almost unique in Church history, had ignored one important subject upon which the Duke of Württemberg especially desired illumination—the question of the French persecutions. But later in the day, when free conversation had succeeded the stilted dialogue of the morning, the Cardinal of Lorraine swore most solemnly, engaging the salvation of his soul, that he had been a party to the condemnation of no man solely for his religious faith, having always left the Council Chamber when "affaires criminelles en matières de religion" had arisen, for these pertained to the secular arm: he had even, he alleged, pleaded for du Bourg. Such a *distinguo*, however, was surely unacceptable from one who had been at once "Pope and King" at the time of du Bourg's execution, and it was of course quite useless for the Duke of Guise, who simply swore to his innocence without further ado. Christopher, however, was fully satisfied. He promised to make known the good news throughout Germany, whereupon all four Guises pledged themselves upon their princely faith to persecute the adherents of the new doctrines neither in secret nor in public. All was then confidence and frankness and the closest intimacy. The Duke drew the Cardinal's attention to Christopher's observations regarding the doctrinal differences among the Orders and the variant forms of the Canon of the Mass. "Que dirai-je?" was the reply—and one can almost see the aristocratic shoulders rise in faint, refined disgust—"Que dirai-je? Notre Église Romaine est pleine de superstitions."

The desired atmosphere of amiability and confidence had thus been created; and artificial though it was, the result of a

flattery almost too heavily underlined and a theological "reasonableness" almost too extravagant to carry conviction, it had yet been readily absorbed by the enthusiastic German prince and his chaplain. It only remained to turn the situation to serious account. The Lutherans were being encouraged to feel that they might cherish a reasonable expectation of very liberal concessions eventually being made by the Catholics, despite the Cardinal's frank admission that as yet he stood in a minority and that time would be needed to form a party large or influential enough to carry such a policy through. To what extent all this represented his real private opinion is a question impossible to answer precisely; probably his mind fluctuated a good deal; but in any case it is not reasonable to suppose that he meant all that he had said to be taken *au pied de la lettre*. These stilted and superficial conversations can neither be regarded nor yet criticized as technical discussions of theology. They were of an exploratory nature; gestures of encouragement and of reassurance; and their purpose was to prepare the ground for a proposal which was made by the Cardinal—almost as if it were an afterthought—at an extra conference held at his request early on the morning of the 18th.

This proposal embodied what was really his main objective. It was that of arranging a conference in Germany between authorized representatives of Catholicism and Lutheranism. The Cardinal developed the idea at length, with evident seriousness of purpose, and begged Christopher to solicit the support of the other princes of the Confession of Augsburg, asserting that for his own part he could guarantee the consent of the Pope and of the Emperor. Any agreement between Catholics and Lutherans could hardly fail to be accepted by other Protestants—the English, the Scotch, the Scandinavians, the dissenters in France and Poland. For, he maintained—once more revealing his exaggerated estimation of the influence of Lutheranism—"l'exemple de l'Allemagne leur impose". At the same time he prophesied that the victory of the Tridentine decrees would lead to bloodshed on a large scale.

Christopher was at first sceptical. He could point to so long

and melancholy a line of past failures. But he felt that if the Emperor desired it the Lutheran princes would not refuse to make the attempt. This was sufficient for the Guises, who, having as good as gained their point, were now anxious to be off. They arranged for Rascalon to go to Stuttgart to assist in the preparation of invitations to the new conference—"lest", said Christopher, "I say either too much or too little". They also persuaded Christopher to write to the King of Navarre, stating that the Cardinal of Lorraine was prepared at a new conference to vindicate the sincerity of his desire for theological compromise. The four Guises then left Saverne. On departure, each took a solemn pledge against persecution and vowed to dedicate his energies to the cause of Christian unity. It was a final curtain sure of immense applause.

Christopher fulfilled all his promises. Abandoning Navarre's idea of an exclusively Protestant conference, he wrote to him from Stuttgart ten days later saying that the Cardinal of Lorraine had shown so accommodating a disposition in his conversations with Brenz on the Augsburg Confession that his proposal of a conference in Germany between Catholics and Lutherans could hardly fail to be productive of good. Rascalon, he revealed, was already with him helping to compose the invitations.¹ A meeting of evangelical princes was shortly to take place at Bruchsal, and since the Elector-Palatine, the Duke of Zweibrücken and representatives of Philip of Hesse would be present, Christopher decided that he would take that opportunity of inviting their co-operation in the Cardinal of Lorraine's proposal.²

The establishment of a German colloquy under his own personal inspiration and guidance was the Cardinal of Lorraine's real object at Saverne. He was certainly in touch at the time with the Emperor, who sent him and his three brothers a present of four pedigree Turkish horses;³ but though the proposal of a colloquy would probably have been not entirely unwelcome to Ferdinand and many of his advisers,⁴ it is less

¹ *B.S.H.P.F.* XXIV, 121-2.

³ Letter of Mundt, *cit. supra*.

² Heidenhain, pp. 393, 395.

⁴ Cf. Steinherz, 2, I, 300.

certain whether he was actually informed of it. All that he told the Bishop of Rennes—or rather all that Rennes passed on to correspondents—was that the Guises had succeeded in justifying themselves against calumnious reports branding them as persecutors.¹ But however much or little Ferdinand was involved, certainly the Pope knew nothing, and judging from his attitude in other similar matters it is difficult to suppose that he would have approved if he had known. On the breakdown of the negotiations which Delphinus and the Cardinal of Mantua had undertaken in the previous summer with Vergerius, Sturm and Zanchi—a breakdown occasioned first by Rome's refusal to sanction Delphinus' idea of offering Vergerius special terms of access to Trent, and secondly by Vergerius' wild anti-papal outbreaks into print²—the Cardinal of Mantua, who had had these negotiations much at heart, had suggested just such a colloquy in Germany as the Cardinal of Lorraine now proposed, with the same idea of smoothing a way to dogmatic reunion and of attracting the Lutherans to the Council. But Rome was so offended by Vergerius' latest publications that she decided to abandon all private negotiations with the German heretics. Pius IV fell back on the stock defence that all similar colloquies in the past had failed, and pointed out that there was no guarantee that such Lutherans as would come to a conference would be either representative in their views or empowered to speak for anyone but themselves. Moreover, a colloquy would probably entail a long delay in the progress of the Council of Trent, which the Pope was very loath to sanction for the benefit of three such "infami et scelerate persone" as Vergerius, Zanchi, and Sturm. He had consequently informed Mantua that he could not consider his proposal unless it were officially endorsed by the Emperor.³

This had been in November, at the very time when the Cardinal of Lorraine had been opening his negotiations with the Duke of Württemberg. He had then hoped that these would

¹ The Bishop of Rennes to the Bishop of Limoges, March 23rd—Cabié, *Ambassades de St Sulpice*, p. 13.

² Cf. above, pp. 328–9.

³ Šusta, II, 97, 98, 120.

bring him into touch with Vergerius also,¹ though it is improbable that he could have been aware of Mantua's parallel scheme. Placed thus in the larger frame of contemporary ecclesiastical politics, set in alignment with what we know of the Cardinal of Lorraine's general views on the religious situation, the Conference of Saverne falls naturally into place as a move in the conciliar controversy. It ceases to stand apart, disconnected and isolated, a disjointed incident for which some sensational explanation must be found. It connects back organically with the whole of the Cardinal's opposition to the resumption of the Council of Trent, with all that that implied, and with all the various manifestations of it that have been traced in this volume. It does not look forward to the civil war. To suppose a connection of purpose between the Conference, carefully planned and long elaborated in the Cardinal's mind, and the massacre of Vassy, perpetrated by the Duke in a moment of exasperation, is the most misleading and arbitrary of misunderstandings. Civil war formed no part of the Guises' intentions. Throughout the winter they had persistently refused to return to St Germain and lend their assistance to those Catholics who actually were, on the other hand, envisaging a resort to force. Yet this demonstrably false hypothesis that the Guises were planning war is vital to the traditional view that at Saverne their only intention was to discredit the French Calvinists in the eyes of the German Lutherans with a view to stopping up a channel of aid for the former in the coming conflict. It does little credit to Guisard ingenuity, always so darkly stressed by their morally-indignant critics, to suppose that they thought by such professions as they made at Saverne to ensure the military isolation of the Huguenots. The violation of their solemn engagements against persecution and violence would obviously have destroyed, immediately and irreparably, all the advantages to be gained by a feigned acceptance of the Augsburg Confession. And yet the traditional view also involves a belief that from the first the violation of those solemn pledges was deliberately intended! The argument is completely self-destructive.

¹ See Appendix X (a).

tive. It is true that various persons did suspect at the time that the discrediting of the Calvinists was the Cardinal's only object,¹ yet this is no proof: the same persons were responsible for other misconceptions, more or less plausible, in regard to the conference.² The Cardinal's dealings with Lutheranism had an independent objective, and were not motivated simply by the reactions that they might be calculated to produce in regard to the Calvinists.

It was on February 17th, the day on which the Cardinal of Lorraine made his most extravagant assertions at Saverne, that the legates at Trent communicated their reply to the request of the Imperial ambassadors. They regretted their inability to postpone the next session, since it would be necessary to promulgate the decree then being prepared concerning the Index; but they gave an assurance that the issue of Continuation would not be raised, while the session after next might well be put off for some considerable time. It had never been their intention to head the Index with the Augsburg Confession, and in any case the Index would not be published before the end of the Council. The safe-conduct would be couched in the most liberal terms.³

The ambassadors believed that the legates' reply had been dictated by Rome. This was not so; and as Seld, the Imperial Chancellor, realized, it would not have been possible within the

¹ See e.g. *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xix, 322, 331, 334; Languet, II, 193; Kluckhohn, pp. 261-2; Heidenhain, p. 401.

² Bullinger, for instance, had heard that Lorraine intended to go immediately to Trent and persuade the Council to send legates to the German Protestant Princes—a curious perversion of the truth—*C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xix, 334; with which cf. Kluckhohn, p. 261. Hugenus had heard that Navarre had been at Saverne,—*ibid.* p. 331. Others spoke of negotiations for a marriage, to be directed against the Bourbons, between Mary Queen of Scots and an Austrian Archduke, Württemberg acting as an imperial agent: Mundt in his letter cited above speaks of this. Compare also the references in *For. Cal.*, Nos. 849 and 1074. Sixteen years later Zanchi said that he and Andreas had been offered pensions of 200 crowns a year by the Cardinal of Lorraine at Saverne—*For. Cal.*, No. 1577, 314. The probability of this being accurate is considerably weakened by the fact that Zanchi was not at the conference, which, also, he misdates 1556. For contemporary rumours of large presents made by the Cardinal to the Lutheran theologians see *C.R.*, *Op. Cal.* xix, 334.

³ Ehsses, pp. 327-8.

short space of four days. But the legates did consult Rome afterwards. They wondered how long they could go on hedging over the question of Continuation, in view of the attitude of the Spaniards; they wondered, also, how long the next session but one could be put off without exasperating the French into despairing of Trent and returning to their vomit of a National Council. They could not agree among themselves whether it would be best after the next session to proceed immediately with the Sacraments, as Simonetta urged, or to turn to the canons of reform and exercise the theologians by drawing up a catechism, as Seripando counselled. They asked for a decision from Rome before the session.¹ Thus they were unable for the moment to tell the ambassadors definitely what they did in fact intend to do after the session. They suggested two alternative courses; either to return to the Sacraments—tantamount to a public assertion of Continuation—and leave at least three months' interval until the session after; or else to hold this session half-way through May and devote the interval to some non-committal work. The ambassadors chose the second alternative,² which the Pope then sanctioned.³

The second session was celebrated, as arranged, on February 26th. The mandates of the ambassadors present were solemnly read and accepted, and a Papal Bull was promulgated fixing the order of precedence among the bishops. Decrees were then passed entrusting the reform of the Index to a committee, and formally inviting to the Council, with the promise of a liberal safe-conduct, all who were "out of communion" with it, this wording being adopted in order to avoid giving offence. The following session was fixed for May 14th. Several bishops, however, mostly Spaniards, gave their *placets* only on the understanding that the intervening weeks should not be frittered away but devoted to serious questions of Reform. The number of bishops had now risen to 130, that of the theologians to fifty.⁴

¹ Sickel, pp. 269-70; Šusta, II, 22-4.

² Sickel, p. 270 notes; Šusta, II, 36.

³ Šusta, II, 30-1.

⁴ On the session see Ehses, pp. 355-68.

III

The opening of the Council brought into the arena a series of new and far-reaching problems. Not only was the basic controversy over Continuation now revived on the spot at Trent, but the Spanish war-cry of "Reform in head and members", expressive of a vehement desire that the reform both of the Curia and of the papal household should be undertaken by the Council, added an extra item to Rome's many anxieties. The Spaniards writhed, too, under the restrictions imposed by the "*legatis proponentibus*" clause. They openly declared their intention of allying themselves with the French to vindicate the Council's right to deal with whatsoever matters it liked, and their demand for the words "*repraesentans universalem ecclesiam*" to be inserted in the Council's title after "*sacrosancta synodus*" was an overt challenge to the papal claim to guide and confirm the Council in all its doings.¹

These fresh problems will not directly concern us in this volume. But their emergence helps us to understand how it was that after the opening of the Council all considerations not immediately connected with it tended to assume only a subordinate place in the Pope's mind. Absorbed in new and intricate problems of the utmost delicacy, Pius allowed the idea of employing Spanish coercion against Catherine de Médicis to drop away from him. At first, indeed, his ire had been inflamed by the January edict, and he had awaited with intense anxiety the arrival of the Sieur de Lansac whom the Queen had despatched on an explanatory mission, half expecting to be told that her arrangements with the Huguenots would preclude French participation in the Council of Trent. Great was his relief when de Lansac not only explained that the edict was a provisional measure necessitated by political exigencies and not intended to prejudice the acceptance in France of the permanent decisions of the Council, but also assured him of the Queen's firm intention to preserve the Catholic and Roman Faith in her realm and to ensure the arrival in Trent by the

¹ Šusta, II, 18, 23, 26-30, 38, 40-1, 398-400.

end of March of twenty-four French bishops, of whom he presented a list. This enabled Pius to confirm all the more willingly the legates' decision to satisfy the Imperial ambassadors at Trent by the postponement of the next session until May. Deference to German desires could be exploited as a spontaneous compliment to the French. In the flood of his relief Pius does not seem to have taken it much amiss that de Lansac again made a request for the grant of the Chalice to the laity, that he begged the Pope not to impose his own decisions upon the Council as Paul III had done, that he spoke of the absolute necessity of conciliating the German Protestants and implied that the Council must certainly be regarded as new. Though he could not but denounce the Toleration Edict, Pius IV felt that in the long run his conciliar policy was now secure. It was an added gratification when late in February de Lansac himself was appointed royal ambassador to the Council. The Cardinal of Ferrara was at last vindicated, and his policy was now crowned with Rome's approbation. By skilful bargaining and much aided by circumstances, Catherine had performed the semi-miraculous: she had pleased the Pope and the Huguenots together.¹

But feeling in Rome on any specific problem does not always reflect local Catholic sentiment. In France popular opinion was ranged not with the mild compliance of legate and nuncio, but with the fury of Tournon, St André and Montmorency. It was the force of popular indignation against the "insolence" of the Huguenots—an indignation stimulated indeed by the preaching of the Jesuits and Franciscans who had come with Ferrara, but at bottom primarily the expression of popular feeling—that had crowned with success the deliberate and sustained efforts at a Catholic revival which after several earlier false starts were at last making headway in France. Where Catholic pulpits had long been silent, wrote Ferrara, now they rang constantly with the voices of impassioned orators; and the flying squad of friars,

¹ On de Lansac's mission see Le Plat, v, 5-15; Šusta, II, 31, 33, 34, 371, 376, 380, 385, 418-19, 460-1; Sickel, pp. 272-3, 280; *Négociations par Hippolyte d'Este*, pp. 22-3. On his appointment to Trent—*Négociations*, pp. 88-9, 92; Šusta, II, 402, 404, 428.

organized through the legate by the generals at Rome, had turned out to be a superfluity.¹ Several of the bishops, appalled by the prospect of personal activity held out by the revival, thought to exchange their sees for less exacting but equally lucrative abbeys.²

The pendulum of the Huguenot advance, in fact, had reached the limit of its swing and had begun to recede. It was not that the Calvinist position altered, but that it began to be viewed in a truer light. The Catholics had come to realize and to assert their numerical superiority, to throw off the timidity-complex which had dominated them for so long. The conversion of the King of Navarre encouraged and added impetus to the energetic resistance to the January edict which immediately sprang up. The Sorbonne protested loudly against the measure; and the Parlement de Paris disgusted the Chancellor by at last registering the faculties of the legate,³ demanding a return to the July edict of the previous year and putting difficulties in the way of registering the new obnoxious one. The struggle over the registration kept Paris in a ferment and the preachers thundered their denunciations from every pulpit. The militant Catholics prophesied joyfully that, with or without Spanish help, not a Huguenot would be left in the country in three months.

Catherine made a final attempt at dogmatic *rapprochement*, hoping against hope to be able even at the eleventh hour to calm passions by the production of some formula of reconciliation that could be presented at the Council. De l'Hôpital and Montluc drew up a heavy programme of stock topics—Images, Baptism, the Mass as a sacrament and as a sacrifice, prayers in the vulgar tongue, Communion under both kinds, the religious vocation—which on January 28th was put before twelve Catholic doctors, d'Espence, de Salignac, Bouteiller, Laynez and Giustiniani being among them, and four ministers, including Beza. Despite the presence of the King, the royal family, the *Conseil Privé* and the Cardinal of Ferrara, the affair

¹ *Négociations par Hippolyte d'Este*, pp. 40-1.

² Šusta, I, 321-2.

³ On Jan. 18th—Šusta, II, 396-7; Le Plat, v, 15.

was a fiasco. After six fruitless conferences devoted exclusively to images, a halt was called.¹ It was the last flutter of a moribund ideal. The eirenic party had run to seed and its moment had passed. Once again Montluc began to protest his devotion to the Holy See.²

Indeed *sauve qui peut* was fast becoming the order of the day. The King of Navarre's zeal became all-devouring. Reviving his old claims he again demanded equal authority with Catherine; and Anthony Papist, in league with the Triumvirate, was a very different proposition from Anthony Protestant and in league with no one at all. Before his threats and Chantonnay's blusters Catherine was driven from position after position. The King's education was taken out of the hands of the Huguenot de Roche-sur-Yon and restored to his former Catholic tutor Jacques Amyot; Huguenot preaching was stopped at St Germain, and more attention was paid to Catholic ceremonies. Finally, Coligny and his brothers, of whom the youngest and most furiously Huguenot had lately been admitted into the *Conseil*, were obliged to leave Court. Almost beside herself with rage, Catherine endeavoured in revenge to force the retirement not only of St André and Montmorency but even of Tournon. But the Cardinal was too ill to move—soon he would fade quietly out of the picture—and the others could afford to be openly defiant. It was only moderate consolation that on March 6th the Parlement de Paris at length registered the edict of January.³ On March 7th the Court left St Germain for Fontainebleau. And on March 8th, at Monceaux, news came at last from the Guises.

It was not in Guise blood to remain indefinitely out of the limelight of public events. After months of apparent indifference to the Government's very existence, of persistent and disdainful deafness to its appeals and signals of distress, the Duke of Guise, his German adventure terminated, and his brother

¹ In addition to the sources cited by Romier, pp. 297–8, d'Espence's own account is extant in MS.—Bib. Nat., Coll. Dupuy 309, ff. 25 *et seq.*; and fonds français 15812, ff. 69–79.

² Susta, II, 396.

³ On the Catholic reaction see Romier, pp. 301–18.

having returned to Reims, was coming back to Court. Undoubted that he came to encourage the Catholic revival which he had done nothing to bring about. Undoubted that he came with vows to reverse the hated Toleration Edict—for all his soft words at Saverne. Undoubted, too, that he came in fury at the treatment lately meted out to the unhappy Bishop of Châlons by the insolent Calvinist congregation of Vassy. But he did not come as a senseless ogre breathing fire and slaughter. He had in his domestic train his mother, his wife, and two young children; Vassy lay on his direct route from Joinville to Vitry-le-François via Éclaron and stood in feudal dependence upon him. But it was impossible to expect him to regard with equanimity the spectacle of the local Huguenots illegally holding a Sunday-morning service within the town walls, in a barn half-belonging to his niece, the Queen of Scotland, and situated within actual earshot of the parish church where he was hearing Mass. Who fired the first shots—the Huguenots themselves or the swaggering young German *lacquais* sent by the Duke to interrupt the sermon—it seems impossible to decide. It is not much to the Duke's credit, however, even taking into account that he was three times hit by stones, that about an hour-and-a-half should have elapsed before he was able or willing to call his men off from the ensuing massacre. He had taken the law into his own hands. Indeed, he had meted out justice infinitely more brutal than the law demanded; and some thirty corpses, men, women and children, and five times as many wounded, were to show for it.¹

The massacre of Vassy was the Sarajevo of the Civil Wars. A crime as well as a blunder, it caused an explosion of feeling in both camps—and the camps were armed. The Queen's first impulse, on hearing the account given by the Duke's messenger, was to applaud the punishment as "molto buono".² But when

¹ On Vassy see the late Noël Valois, "Vassy", in the *Annuaire Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire de France* (1913), pp. 189 *et seq.* M. l'abbé V. Carrière seems to me to have completely answered (in the *Revue de l'histoire de l'Église de France*, 1920, pp. 344-50) the more important objections to Valois' article raised by the late M. Weiss in the *B.S.H.P.F.* for 1914.

² Šusta, II, 405.

a shrill "grido di dolore" went up immediately from the Calvinist churches, and when Condé with the enraged intoxication of a false prophet dramatically called the faithful to arms, she realized the serious nature of the situation. A Huguenot delegation headed by Beza loudly demanded justice from her, whereupon a stormy scene ensued with Navarre and the Cardinal of Ferrara, for the Catholics, on their side, were infuriated in the belief that the Duke of Guise had been wantonly attacked. Beza, however, strained every nerve in commendable endeavour to keep the Calvinist cause morally and legally immaculate. But though he deplored Condé's foolish and precipitate action, he could neither prevent nor rescind it. An official enquiry on Vassy was set up, but Condé had no use for official enquiries. He called again, and the armed congregations sprang from the soil. On March 16th the Duke of Guise, ignoring the Queen's orders to come unarmed to Monceaux, entered Paris with St André and Montmorency at the head of 3000 troops, declaring that the capital must be saved from Condé's threats. This time it was not the law in one particular application but the whole defence of the public weal that he had taken into his own hands—and certainly with greater justification. The Triumvirs were soon joined by Navarre. They fortified Paris, but carefully abstained from any molestation of Condé. The infatuated Prince, however, threw away every opportunity of peace. Raising yet more troops he retired south, taking the unhappy Coligny with him, and refusing to visit Catherine who was now isolated with the King at Fontainebleau and would gladly have had him there too. It was a fatal mistake. By the end of the month, after a severe struggle with the Queen during which they went so far as to threaten the King's deposition, the Triumvirs had brought the King back to his capital. Catherine, with her ideals discredited and her hopes in ruins about her feet, was forced to acquiesce in their domination. On April 2nd Condé seized Orleans and issued a manifesto which turned the opposing camps into hostile armies. On each side the warriors had overthrown the moderates, destroying at one shake of the mailed fist their gossamer webs of liberal fantasies.

Condé was no longer the bungling and ineffectual schemer of Amboise; this time his blow had been well aimed and accurately timed. The militarized congregations had given him a weapon; the massacre of Vassy the apology of a cause.¹

Reduced to insignificance by the sudden and violent intrusion of political issues, the middle party found itself powerless to stem the racing tide. There is no room for middle parties in time of war; and though Catherine's never-failing ingenuity so far prevailed over Condé's perversity as to prevent actual hostilities for several months, war was already as good as declared, and the long-drawn-out negotiations were as between belligerent parties. Already before the end of March the nuncio had written to Rome—and the truth of it became daily more manifest—"questo regno sta tutto sotto-sopra".²

IV

It is ironical indeed that the first French Edict of Toleration should have been decisive in securing French co-operation in the Council of Trent. But with a long record of duplicity behind her, Catherine had been able to minimize papal displeasure at the January edict by one clear announcement of her final intention to support the Council. De Lansac's mission committed her to it irrevocably, as nothing before had done. But at the same time it drove her from her vantage ground. Morally pledged to support the Council as it stood, her words on the necessity of a new council "*commode et libre*" naturally lost much of their sting; and though she and Anthony might still indulge in impressive talk of a translation to Constance or Besançon, or of satisfying German demands concerning a new convocation, and though de Lansac might echo these sentiments to the Pope himself, the Queen's commitment had largely deprived her of her power of frightening the Curia. She had even less chance of being able to remodel the Council of Trent once it was reopened than

¹ On events from Vassy to the seizure of Orleans see Romier, pp. 322-51. The threat of the King's deposition is recorded in a letter of Santa Croce's published by Šusta, II, 434-5.

² Aymon, *Tous les Synodes*, I, 94.

she had had of preventing its reopening. Yet in various ways she made the attempt. The Catholic reaction in France had not entailed the victory of papal ideas on the Council.¹

Catherine was a woman—and an Italian woman; so her obstinacy was a highly ingenious obstinacy. Clutching at straws she could by some magic lend them the semblance of bricks. All unwittingly it was the Cardinal of Ferrara who presented her with her first opportunity. During the winter the legate had been engaged in judicious and tentative *pourparlers* with a view to establishing contact with the Queen of England and persuading her to send representatives to Trent. The Pope, though doubtful of ultimate success, had not discouraged him, and he had received a brief authorizing formal negotiations. Coligny told Throckmorton, however, that though Anthony of Navarre's conciliar views were now steadily gravitating towards those of Cardinal Tournon and the Roman Curia, Catherine herself would like nothing better than that her ambassadors at Trent should join with those of the Emperor and representatives of Elizabeth in formulating their case against the papal policy and in demanding a new, free and impartial Council. In reply to these advances Elizabeth, after consultation with her Privy Council, said that she was well disposed to assist in a real Œcumenical Council, in regard to which she proposed to take the opinion of the German Protestant princes; but she could never recognize or support an Assembly so tied to the Pope as was that of Trent. Throckmorton begged Catherine to hold de Lansac back until the outcome of these projected Anglo-Lutheran conferences should be known. This was advice very welcome to the Queen-Mother, who explained to the English ambassador how pressure from Anthony and the militant Catholics was forcing her hand in the matter of the Council. She endeavoured to persuade Ferrara that a short delay in the despatch of the French ambassadors to Trent might result in their being eventually accompanied by Lutherans and Anglicans. The legate, however, knew that Elizabeth had made no promise; and he managed to carry his point that there was no adequate

¹ Šusta, II, 376; Aymon, I, 38; Languet, II, 205.

reason to suppose that she would ever do so. Catherine was obliged to tell Throckmorton that she could not delay her ambassadors nor go back upon the assurances of their speedy departure that she had given to Rome.¹

Catherine and Elizabeth were really at cross-purposes. Elizabeth simply saw a chance of delaying, perhaps indefinitely, the arrival of the French ambassadors at the Council; but Catherine desired to strengthen inside the Council the party that desired its fundamental reconstruction. The Cardinal of Ferrara saw the English negotiations rebound like a boomerang upon his own head, imperilling for one terrible moment his own hard-won triumph regarding the French support of Trent. But, the danger once averted, he continued his own private negotiations, though he was only able to communicate with Throckmorton through intermediaries. With another of the Queen's projects, however, he was more in sympathy. Like her, he was very anxious for some Huguenot representatives to go to Trent, and here he had with him the nuncio Santa Croce, who in January had assured the Cardinal of Châtillon "arditamente" that the ministers would be given the chance of an audience.² But when news arrived of the opening session and of the proposals for the issue of a safe-conduct subsequently laid before the Council, consternation was caused by the appearance of the words "modo redeant ad cor", which seemed to imply that the guarantee of personal safety would be conditional upon acceptance of the Council's decisions. Santa Croce, however, denied this, and maintained that the free pardon offered to such as desired to be reconciled would not prejudice the safety of those who did not. This explanation, though perfectly warranted by the proposition's wording,³ failed to satisfy either the Queen or Beza, who demanded more detailed and explicit safeguards. The Cardinal of Ferrara, conciliatory as ever, was anxious for

¹ Bayne, *Anglo-Roman Relations*, pp. 133-51.

² Aymon, I, 32.

³ It ran: "Non ab re quoque putavimus esse, omnes qui in haereses quas-cumque lapsi sunt et adhuc irretiti sunt, ad poenitentiam invitare cum salvi conductus ampla concessione, ac promissione magnae et singularis clementiae et benignitatis, modo redeant ad cor et sanctae catholicae ecclesiae divinam potestatem agnoscant"—Ehser, pp. 304-5.

these to be given. He believed that in any case the ministers would probably end by refusing to go to Trent, and so hoped to embarrass them by granting all their conditions. He advised the insertion of the words "etiamsi non redeant ad cor", and, inasmuch as the conviction of the Calvinists that the Council would start by confirming its own previous decrees was the main cause of their repugnance to attend it, sought to dissuade Rome from permitting for the present any action indicative of Continuation.¹ But the ministers' perhaps not unnatural disinclination to entrust themselves to the Council's mercies without the precisest of personal safeguards was heightened by the emergence of a difference of opinion between the legate and nuncio which damped even Catherine's zest. Santa Croce began to assert, contrary to his previous explanation, that the ministers, after discussing at Trent whatsoever they wished to discuss, would be expected, under the terms of their safe-conduct, to "captive il loro intelletto" and accept the Council's ruling.² So marked a change of opinion was not calculated to reassure the Huguenots. But Ferrara continued to maintain that all the ministers' conditions ought to be met, so that they should be left with no shadow of reason for complaining that they were condemned unheard. He firmly believed that when the moment came they would refuse to accept that for which they had so loudly clamoured. "Heretics", he said, "always do."³

The air was cleared of useless surmise, and a firm basis was at last laid for negotiations, when on March 4th the Council issued its safe-conduct. It repeated word for word the form used in 1552 for the benefit and indeed at the dictation of the German Lutherans, extending it by a new and additional clause to the dissidents of all countries and regions where doctrine contrary to that of Rome was legally preached.⁴ Thus the French

¹ *Négociations par Hippolyte d'Este*, pp. 74-7.

² Šusta, II, 402.

³ *Négociations*, pp. 100-1; *C.R., Op. Cal.* XIX, 301, 315.

⁴ Text in Ehses, pp. 373-5. An attempt to extend it still further so as to cover fugitives from the Spanish, Portuguese and Roman Inquisitions broke down before the strong opposition of the Spanish and Portuguese bishops. The Pope, on the other hand, was at first willing to allow fugitives from the Holy Office at Rome to be judged at the Council, but when a concrete instance came up in the case of the Patriarch of Aquileia, he modified his attitude. See Šusta, II, 36, 39, 58-9, 62-3, 64-8, 75-6, 201-3.

Calvinists were included; and all their conditions were met, for the safe-conduct was specifically pronounced to be independent of submission; it offered complete liberty of coming and going, of proposing and discussing with members of the Council, of replying to objections; it swept aside all possible or potential restrictions, disavowing all intention of evasion in the most comprehensive terms; it called down all imaginable pains and penalties upon the Council's own head should its pledges be in any way violated; and it pronounced that controverted points would be discussed "*secundum sacram scripturam et apostolorum traditiones, probata concilia et catholicae ecclesiae consensum et sanctorum patrum auctoritates in praedicto concilio Tridentino*".

The bread thus scattered upon the waters was not returned to the Tridentine Fathers. No single Protestant availed himself of the proffered facilities. Ferrara saw the swift fulfilment of his prognostications. The Huguenot ministers flatly declined to appear at the Council, and in self-defence produced further conditions which were conditions rather for a General Council as they would have had it than conditions under which they would appear at the Council of Trent. Like the German Lutherans they now declared that under no circumstances whatsoever would they condescend to have any kind of dealings with a Council summoned by the Pope. They would grace with their presence only a Council summoned by secular authority to a city not in Catholic hands; they would debate only with selected disputants in the presence of the ambassadors of the secular powers; they would yield to the decisions, not of Catholic bishops, but only of the Word of God. And in addition they would also require from the Catholics an express denial of the maxim that faith need not be kept with heretics.¹ The arrogance of this sudden and cowardly change of ground exasperated even the Queen. In desperation she declared that the ministers must either go to Trent or get out of the country altogether.²

¹ *C.R., Op. Cal.* xix, 318, 320.

² Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, April 23rd.

V

It must have been with deep feelings of relief, not unmixed with a little justifiable self-congratulation, that Ferrara saw the French ambassadors depart for Trent on April 14th, twelve days after Condé's seizure of Orleans. There were three of them: de Lansac, now returned from his successful mission to Rome; du Ferrier, of the unsuccessful mission of the previous year; and the Sieur du Faur de Pibrac. The faith of none was questioned; and de Lansac and du Ferrier had both made themselves personally agreeable to the Pope. But all were men after the Queen-Mother's own heart, liberally inclined, Gallicans, and lacking neither tenacity nor courage. They were held in esteem by many Protestants. Catherine could rest assured that they would adhere resolutely to the comprehensive and unambiguous instructions which had been given them.

These instructions,¹ to which all the French bishops who might find their way to Trent were told to defer,² opened with a résumé of the negotiations for a General Council that had passed between Pius IV and the Catholic powers, stating in brief the reasons which had led the French King to demand a new Assembly rather than the continuation of the Council of Trent, and to distrust the purpose of the ambiguous Bull of Convocation. Not desiring, however, to give too precise or too important a significance to the phrase "*sublata quacumque suspensione*", the King had decided to send his prelates and ambassadors to the Council, relying on the Pope's repeated assurances that the substance of all his requirements would be met. Before bringing forward any definite proposals, the ambassadors were therefore to make three preliminary demands—first for the translation of the Council to Constance, Worms or Speier, secondly for the addition of material sureties to the safe-conduct, and finally for a public declaration that the Council was a new Council. If these demands were not complied with the ambassadors were to absent themselves from the sessions

¹ Le Plat, v, 148-55, dated April 12th.

² *Ibid.* v, 156.

and await new instructions. If satisfactory answers were received they were to go on to insist upon the observance of the following general principles—freedom of speech, reform in head and members to be undertaken by the Council, and the Pope to have no power of annulling, confirming or in any way interfering with the decrees. About twenty specific requirements were then detailed, safeguarding traditional Gallican liberties and limiting Roman interference in matters beneficiary, in appeals, in dispensations and in the question of legatine faculties. In regard to the general reform of morals and discipline the ambassadors were told to ally themselves with the representatives of the Emperor who desired a return to primitive simplicity—so far as might be possible—together with large changes in ecclesiastical law. Finally the ambassadors were to announce that the French would not tolerate a league to enforce the Council's decisions by arms.¹ Not only would such an attempt be doomed to futility, but the very idea was in itself abhorrent. In France it was hoped that unity would eventually be restored through a revival of the spirit and works of the apostolate.

These were the demands, indeed, of "*une femme exigeante*". Even the Emperor, whom the experience of age had taught that capitulation to the Pope was sometimes an unpleasant necessity, was now no longer asking for the Council to be declared new, but for the fact that it was a continuation to be concealed as long as possible. But with feminine intransigence, and in the teeth of a situation which was daily developing more unfavourably, from the opposition's standpoint, Catherine still clung to every letter of the original French programme, broadly hinting, too, that the Pope was in some way morally pledged to stand by it. That she was able to persist in this attitude even after the capture of the Government by the Triumvirate showed how little the latter contemplated the championship of Roman views on the General Council. For Tournon had passed, almost unnoticed, to his reward, and probably neither St André nor Montmorency cared very much one way or the other about the

¹ Yet the Cardinal of Lorraine had suggested one in 1560, see above, pp. 138-9.

question. Moreover Catherine knew that she could expect positive support from the Guises. Hardly had the Duke of Guise made his triumphal entry into Paris, about a month before de Lansac's departure for Trent, when he exhorted Santa Croce to urge the Pope to hold the Council back, at any rate in the treatment of matters that might affect the German Lutherans. He said that the Cardinal of Lorraine had lately been engaged in an attempt to induce the Lutherans to attend the Council and entertained strong hopes of success, having induced the Duke of Württemberg to listen to two of his sermons, which had led to direct personal negotiations. It had been impossible to persuade the Duke, he went on, to send representatives to Trent, but he had agreed to a proposal that twelve divines of his communion should meet twelve Catholic doctors chosen by the Council, on neutral ground not too far from Trent, and under the presidency of the Cardinal of Lorraine. The Lutheran prince had declared his willingness to abide by the judgment of this body either on the articles controverted between Catholics and Lutherans or on the desirability of attending the Council of Trent. There seemed at the moment to be a general feeling in Lutheran circles favourable to a return to Catholic unity, if this could possibly be managed with untarnished honour: thus every hope might be entertained of the Cardinal converting not only the Duke of Württemberg and his minister Brenz—whom he had already almost as good as won over—but several other German princes as well. The Cardinal intended to send the Abbé Manne to Rome to lay the whole proposal before the Pope and to take the Pope's advice as to a suitable site for this minor Council. Manne had already gone to Reims to receive his instructions from the Cardinal. He would explain to Pius why it would be necessary, for the success of the Cardinal's plans, first to conceal them from the Sacred College, and secondly to prevent the Council of Trent from coming to any dogmatic decisions for the time being.¹

Here was rather a tendentious presentation of the Conference of Saverne. But the tendentiousness was more in regard to what

¹ Aymon, I, 98-101.

had actually taken place than in regard to the ultimate purpose. If the goodwill of Christopher and Brenz could be properly exploited there seemed no compelling reason to reveal unnecessarily the exact method by which it had originally been gained. But new difficulties now arose with Christopher himself. The Guises' proposals had barely been laid before the German princes assembled at Bruchsal,¹ when their chances of acceptance were immediately ruined by the news of the massacre of Vassy. The princes shrank in horror from contact, however remote, with hands so bloodstained; only Christopher refused to abandon hope and wrote to the Duke of Guise imploring him to save the colloquy by some explanation of his conduct which would assuage the outraged feelings of the German princes.² This letter crossed with one from Guise spontaneously attempting the desired explanation. The Duke endeavoured to minimize the extent of the massacre, and maintained not only that he had been attacked at Vassy but that his march on Paris and capture of the King had been a defensive move forced upon him by the insolence of the Huguenot mobilization.³ The receipt of Württemberg's appeal drew from him a second epistle in which he offered to send Rascalon again to Stuttgart to justify himself and his brother.⁴ Christopher took counsel with the Landgrave of Hesse. But Philip regarded the two Guise apologies simply as a confirmation of his own personal convictions regarding that family's extreme wickedness. He condemned with his customary frankness all idea of negotiation with the Cardinal of Lorraine, utterly refusing to believe in his alleged conciliatory disposition, and in time his violence began to make some impression upon Christopher.⁵

Meanwhile Lorraine himself was in enigmatic retreat at Reims. His position was one of definite strength. He had not been at Vassy.⁶ He had not come in triumph to Paris with the Duke and

¹ Cf. above, p. 437.

² Christopher to Guise, March 19th—*B.S.H.P.F.* XXIV, 211.

³ Guise to Christopher, March 17th—*B.S.H.P.F.* XXIV, 212 *et seq.*

⁴ *B.S.H.P.F.* XXIV, 501 *et seq.*

⁵ Heidenhain, pp. 400-1, 436-7 and notes.

⁶ But it was one of his secretaries who brought the news to the nuncio at Paris—Susta, II, 405.

Cardinal of Guise.¹ He had played no part in the ensuing political upheavals. As at the hour of the Triumvirate's birth, so now at that of its triumph, he held himself strangely aloof. His return to Court was desired and solicited by all parties, but it was long delayed.² Not until April 24th did he enter Paris, at the head of 300 armed followers.³ What had been in his mind during this period? Was he playing a double game; preferring to sit behind the scenes and combine the rôles of prompter and stage-manager, suggesting and guiding his brother's actions, inspiring the extreme skill and moderation of Guise's conduct in the capital *vis-à-vis* with Condé, which threw upon the Prince the whole blame of precipitating a resort to arms? Or was he simply engrossed in his German schemes; elaborating his plan of action; meditating the concessions he would offer, the terms he would insist upon; observing with a critical eye of disapproval the activities of the Council of Trent? It is impossible that he could have been wholly detached from his brother, whose dislike of the January edict he must certainly have shared. But it was soon only too plain that the massacre of Vassy and its consequences had gravely imperilled the fortunes of his German projects. Though he was soon to ally himself quite openly with the Triumvirate, he could scarcely have desired an unnecessary civil war for its own sake, or unless Condé's conduct forced the issue. It was a Protestant observer persistently hostile to the Cardinal, Hubert Languet, who spoke of him now as a harbinger of peace rather than of war,⁴ and even Catherine, whose main object was the preservation of peace, was eager to welcome him and bury the hatchet. Circumstances called for the aid of his financial skill,⁵ and the Queen made a great fuss of him, volubly defending her personal orthodoxy, and entrusting him with the spiritual care of her children.⁶ So,

¹ Guillemin erred badly here—*Le Cardinal de Lorraine*, pp. 292-3.

² Desjardins, *Négociations avec la Toscane*, III, 472; Alvarotti to the Duke of Ferrara, Feb. 24th; For. Cal., No. 924 (12).

³ For. Cal., No. 1043 (1); Aymon, I, 147.

⁴ *Arcana*, II, 218.

⁵ *Négociations par Hippolyte d'Este*, p. 169.

⁶ Bouillé, *Ducs de Guise*, II, 186 (from Chantonnay's correspondence).

after an interval of sixteen months, the Cardinal of Lorraine returned not only to the Queen's favour but to office as well.

But busy ministers who have their hands and heads full of the affairs of state at a period of great political crisis cannot spare the time to travel across Europe to sit for an indefinite period in Œcumenical Councils. It was now evident that at least for the immediate future the Cardinal of Lorraine would not appear at Trent. Indeed he told the Cardinal of Ferrara that contrary to the general impression he had never intended to go at all¹—which was obviously untrue. But he could still contemplate the prospect of a short journey into Germany. Bringing together the nuncio and legate he took the first opportunity of expounding to them his developed ideas on his proposed German colloquy. He would have the Fathers at Trent select a small international body, forming a kind of micro-cosmic council, and consisting of two Spaniards, two Frenchmen, two Germans and two Italians, to meet the Lutheran delegates at Worms, where it was rumoured that the next Diet would be held. He harboured the highest hopes that by this means Germany, and perhaps England as well, might in the end be regained for the Church. Until this conference had been given a trial he begged that the Fathers at Trent might refrain from issuing an Index, which was only a different way of issuing dogmatic condemnations. In addition, there was one extreme concession—he confessed it with some diffidence—that would probably be found necessary. This was not the grant of the Chalice, nor yet the marriage of priests, nor even a vernacular liturgy; but the withdrawal of the papal election from the exclusive hands of the cardinals. The conclave system, though long established and generally approved, was too prone to render the Papacy an Italian preserve. Some practical recognition of this fact might have decisive effects in Germany; though of course no reflection upon the legality of past elections, least of all upon the last election, was intended. Affairs, however, were in so unsettled a condition that it would not be practical for him to send the Abbé Manne immediately to Rome. As soon as

¹ *Négociations par Hippolyte d'Este*, p. 169.

quiet was restored he would himself go in person and explain his views to the Holy Father. Meanwhile it seemed that the time was now ripe for canonical action to be taken against Cardinal Châtillon and certain other French prelates. The Pope might rest assured that any sentence of deposition would not fail to find execution.¹

It is remarkable that neither Ferrara nor Santa Croce seem to have indulged in any kind of comment, favourable or unfavourable, upon this declaration of Lorraine's. They forward it quite calmly to Rome, and Ferrara is only a little irritated at having to listen so repeatedly to arguments in favour of keeping the Fathers at Trent idle. He took it for granted that the Pope and the legates at Trent would know all about the Cardinal of Lorraine's plans, all the more so since the Cardinal had alleged that the Emperor had already written to Rome on the subject of a new German colloquy. The legate contented himself with asking Lorraine for a written memorandum which he could give to his secretary who was starting for Rome the next day. This Lorraine promised to compose, but failed to produce in the morning, alleging sudden illness overnight.²

The Cardinal's decision not to send the Abbé Manne to the Pope, and his transparent device in order to avoid forwarding to Rome even a summary of his plans in writing, indicated a manifest disinclination to share his secrets with the Curia. But by explaining his plans orally to the legate and the nuncio, and especially by urging the deposition of Châtillon, the Cardinal had contrived to give the impression that his feelings towards the Pope were those of entire confidence and trust. His proposal to abolish the conclave, however, which Santa Croce had been careful to put apart in cypher, filled Pius IV with horror. Obviously the Cardinal of Lorraine was plotting to have himself elected Pope by the Council should the papal throne fall vacant during its sessions! Vain were all the Cardinal's attempts to conceal his plans from the other cardinals. To tell the Pope anything was also to tell the whole Sacred College: this had been made clear from several previous incidents. It was a terrible

¹ Šusta, II, 437-8.

² *Négociations par Hippolyte d'Este*, pp. 181-2.

thing, the Pope told the outraged cardinals assembled in congregation, that proposals of such a nature should come from persons who claimed to be the devoted sons of the Holy See! Vargas, indeed, used stronger expressions of quite unnecessary violence. "A devilish artifice!" he exclaimed in fury, "an artifice of the demon!" True, he did not consciously identify the demon with the Cardinal of Lorraine, for the Pope had concealed the identity of the culprit, and Vargas thought that it was de Lansac;¹ but it may be doubted whether a knowledge of the truth would have led him to modify his language. St Charles communicated Santa Croce's letter to Mantua and Simonetta, the two most trusted legates at Trent, with the rather silly comment that it would enable them to see for themselves how necessary it was to be on guard against the evil machinations of certain Frenchmen against the Holy See.² And that was all the attention that the Cardinal of Lorraine's plans for the reconciliation of Lutheran Germany to the Catholic Church got in Rome.

But it was not only with Germany that the Cardinal was concerning himself. England came also within his purview. And he worked the Anglican question for all and more than all that it was worth as a pretext on which to delay the Council of Trent. He vehemently urged Catherine to ask the Pope to hold back the Council in order to smooth the way for the attendance of English as well as German delegates. He argued that a short postponement of the important sessions would not really inconvenience the bishops while enormous good might come of it; and added that to refuse Elizabeth's request—she had not of course made one—would smack of discourtesy: in addition a short breathing space would be welcomed by the French bishops destined for Trent; it would enable them to recover from the financial strain of the Assembly of Poissy and, more important still, to make better arrangements for the good estate of their dioceses during their absence. These arguments were hotly contested by Ferrara. Having only with extreme difficulty managed to get the French ambassadors off to Trent in the teeth of the Queen's

¹ Döllinger, *Beiträge*, I, 427-8.

² Šusta, II, 138-9.

desire to detain them for the supposed benefit of the Queen of England, he now saw with dismay the very progress of the Council itself endangered in the same doubtful interest. Enough pains, he remonstrated, had already been wasted over Elizabeth; there was no longer any reason to expect developments of a favourable nature. Many bishops had already been at Trent for more than a year, and it would not be fair, especially on such flimsy grounds, to keep them away from their churches a single unnecessary moment longer. Catherine by herself Ferrara might have over-persuaded—he had done so in the matter of not delaying the departure of de Lansac. But Catherine supplemented by the Cardinal of Lorraine was too strong a combination for him. Letters were sent to de Lansac instructing him to make representations towards securing as long a delay as possible in the doctrinal sessions of the Council, on the pretext that the French bishops were unable to leave their posts at a moment of such stress and upheaval. And indeed, quite apart from the English or the German question, the French did not want to see the Council take any vital doctrinal decision without the Gallican Church being represented. Catherine and the Cardinal of Lorraine really desired the postponement of the Council's next session until the winter.¹ But the Queen was willing to accept gratefully what little breathing-space she might get, and she knew that she would have the sympathy if she could not enlist the direct assistance of the Emperor.² Thus worsted by the Cardinal of Lorraine, the Cardinal of Ferrara resumed his habitual compliance and advised Rome to allow a short postponement of all important business at Trent. But he did this more in order that the secular powers might be deprived of all legitimate ground of complaint against the Pope than because he expected any real advantage to accrue.³

But during March there were laid before the Council twelve important heads of reform⁴ on which the bishops, strengthened

¹ Le Plat, v, 163.

² *Ibid.* pp. 147–8.

³ For all this paragraph see the *Négociations par Hippolyte d'Este*, pp. 165–8.

⁴ Ehses, pp. 378–9.

now by the addition of ambassadors from the King of Spain, the Duke of Florence and the Swiss Catholic Cantons, and by representatives of the clergy of Hungary,¹ began their debates early in April. They fell immediately into the dreaded controversy over the nature of the obligation of episcopal residence, and with this important discussion and its consequences the real internal history of the third period of the Council of Trent may properly be said to begin.² Thus the long prologue is ended. Everywhere the historian finds himself in the presence of a transformed situation. While the Council of Trent settles down at last to serious theological business, the outbreak of the civil war in France ends the period of open opposition to the Papacy. The Cardinal of Lorraine has not yet abandoned his ingenious efforts to regain the German Lutherans for the Church, but his in many ways questionable proposals have ceased to threaten the good estate of the Council. France is committed to the Council of Trent, however obstinately her ambassadors may insist on conditions now impossible of fulfilment. She has failed, moreover, to make good her alternative schemes. From conciliating the Calvinists she has come to fighting them. It is exactly the *dénouement* most agreeable to Rome.

¹ Ehses, pp. 379-401.

² *Ibid.* pp. 402 *et seq.* The direct vote which so angered Rome was taken on April 20th—*ibid.* pp. 463-4.

EPILOGUE

THIS book has attempted to trace the struggle waged by the French, and in particular by the Cardinal of Lorraine, against the continuation of the Council of Trent by Pius IV and on behalf of the convocation of a new General Council better adapted to restore the unity of Christendom by freedom from the commitments of Trent which formed an impassable stumbling-block to the Protestants. In that struggle the spring of 1562 is a turning point. By means of its traditional blend of firmness and pliancy the Papacy has procured general Catholic acceptance of an ambiguous Bull of Convocation; it has induced all the Catholic monarchs of Europe to recognize the Council successfully opened at Trent, and, if not actually to despatch them, at least to promise the early despatch of the prelates of their realms and the ambassadors of their royal power. But in regard to the proper interpretation of the Bull, and in regard, consequently, to the real nature of the Council, whether it be new or only the old one continued, there has as yet been no public binding injunction. Rome, however, is only biding her time. Her legates have the plainest instructions to treat the Council as a Continuation, and a private but solemn assurance has been given to the King of Spain that this is so and that the older decrees will all be eventually confirmed. Moreover, outward appearances are all on her side. In reality, then, the demand for a new Council has been definitely defeated, and, less generous than before over the question of site, Pius IV will now only contemplate a translation in the improbable event of a Lutheran attack. The insistence of the Pope, acting like dropping water, continual, periodic, never violent, has cut deep into the stone of Habsburg resistance. The Emperor's ambassadors no longer demand that the Council be declared new: all they ask is that it shall not yet be openly proclaimed to be only a continuation.

But though Ferdinand has come to recognize that the main battle is lost, the French, blind to all facts adverse to their *idées fixes*, not only still pursue the impossible but show little sign of weakening. The total failure, both reformatory and eirenic, of the much-advertised National Council has brought into their conciliar policy no element of restraint or diffidence. Facts and experience have made no impression upon abstract Gallic logic: Catherine de Médicis sends off the French ambassadors to Trent with instructions couched as if nothing had ever happened even to damage, much less mortally to wound, the prospects of the opposition. Yet it must be admitted that amid a host of unfavourable circumstances, there are two which are calculated to keep alive, even definitely to encourage, the hopes of those who desire a new Council. Despite fierce Spanish demands there has as yet been no public declaration of Continuation, and this is due to the wisdom of Rome, which has no desire to force the issue until absolutely constrained to do so: secondly, in their extreme dread of permanently alienating the French and Germans, the papal legates at Trent, contrary to Rome's original behests, but with her subsequent ratification, have felt compelled to abstain from dogmatic business such as would have revealed the true nature of the Council as unmistakably as any formal pronouncement. These are not unimportant positions for the opposition to have gained; they give time for old weapons to be re-sharpened and new ones to be prepared wherewith it is hoped to turn the temporary success to permanent advantage. It becomes the general endeavour of the opposition—of the Emperor and his ambassadors, of Catherine de Médicis and hers, of the Cardinal of Lorraine acting independently—to put off for as long as possible the evil day when the Council shall turn its attention to dogma. And meanwhile they hope on, waiting, like Mr Micawber, for something to turn up.

What they hope will turn up—at Trent—is the Protestants: Lutherans, Calvinists, Anglicans. But such hope has now burst the bounds of all reasonable human expectation. St Peter Canisius may report from Germany that the Elector of Saxony, the Elector of Brandenburg and the newly-apostatized Arch-

bishop of Magdeburg are about to accredit ambassadors to the Council;¹ the Cardinal of Ferrara may converse discreetly, and Catherine de Médicis less discreetly, with English agents; the Cardinal of Lorraine may elaborate his schemes for a German colloquy, and the Council of Trent promulgate its safe-conduct in ample, generous proportions. It is all to no purpose. Time will work no miracle of mellowing; the hard, cold phalanx of Protestant opposition to the Council remains as inflexible as ever. In their efforts to melt it the Catholic "moderates" but turn the other cheek to repeated Protestant blows—and present Rome with her justification.

It was a hopeless rearguard action, capable only of defending for a short while a few hard-won points of vantage that could not permanently be retained. The opposition could not keep back the tide for ever. Its weapons broke repeatedly in its own hands; for it could promise but could never fulfil. Its bids for Protestant attendance fell increasingly short of success. It was in danger of losing touch with the realities which it claimed alone to be facing. The two questions of a new Council and of Protestant attendance would indeed continue to be agitated throughout the remaining sessions of the Council of Trent, but as real issues they were already dead. New divisions were to form themselves within the Council itself, to complicate, supersede or distract attention from the older ones; already, indeed, one was appearing in the controversy on episcopal residence. It is such domestic doctrinal issues that are coming to the fore. On the big lines of policy the Counter-Reformation, for better or for worse, had made its choice.

The chief insufficiency of the unsatisfactory word "Counter-Reformation"—a term as misleading as "Reformation" itself—is that it invites a disastrous over-simplification. To regard what we usually call the "Counter-Reformation" as a mere reaction against what we have become accustomed to call the

¹ Cyprianus, *Tabularium Ecclesiae Romanae*, pp. 212, 221. Cf. Kluckhohn, p. 261, and For. Cal., No. 891 (6).

“Reformation”, would be to misconceive and to underrate what was in fact a most complex movement. The Counter-Reformation was essentially a hybrid; and it suffered all the penalties, if it also enjoyed all the advantages, that may be considered to accrue from the possession of a double personality. Positively, it was a phase in the long chain of Catholic expansion and development, a phase that in some form or other must necessarily have come about whatever the circumstances of the sixteenth century. Negatively, it was a defence, expanding into a vigorous but only very partially successful counter-attack, undertaken by historical Christianity as transmitted through the Middle Ages, against the innovations of the Protestant revolution. Neither of these two elements can properly be said to have sprung entirely from the other. But they reacted upon each other, modified each other, qualified and coloured each other at all points, sometimes for mutual strength, sometimes for mutual frustration; while many more ephemeral considerations of local import—political, economic, personal—entered in to dapple with a variety of shades the general uniform colour of the whole movement.

The unity of the Counter-Reformation, the fixing and settling of its various elements into one mould, can be both exaggerated and antedated. The struggle over the question of the General Council in the first two years of Pius IV’s pontificate was one of the crucial periods that decided the final orientation of the movement. It was a clean, decisive battle, fought out within the Catholic Church on a clear field after the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis had ended the period of international warfare inaugurated by Charles VIII sixty-five years previously: a battle between Rome and her adherents on the one hand, and on the other an unco-ordinated opposition of very mixed elements, some motivated by political considerations of empiric expediency, others by what remained of Erasmian and Contarinian idealism. In addition, the whole conflict was exacerbated by the urgent problem of dealing with dissenting minorities too large to be coerced and too determined to be converted. It would perhaps be something of an over-statement to speak of a definite “party

of moderation" within the Church.¹ For the term "party" would seem to imply a degree of cohesion and of agreement on first principles that did not in fact exist between the various elements opposing the Papacy. No party feeling, no theological sympathy, no sense of spiritual affinity linked the Emperor Ferdinand with Catherine de Médicis, Frederick Staphylus with the Cardinal of Lorraine, Claude d'Espence with Zasius, George Cassander with the Cardinal of Ferrara, Jean de Montluc with Dr Gienger. At the most there was perhaps some kind of psychological similarity which caused them to react in the same way under much the same kind of circumstances. Nor must it be imagined that the conflict was essentially national; for though the ranks of the opposition were recruited chiefly from Germans and French, whose political chiefs guided it, yet many Germans and French supported the Roman policy, and there were Italians who sympathized with the opposition.

This book has thus sought to describe a lost cause—not necessarily to commend it. It has been said, however, that a certain sympathy with error is necessary for a really profound theologian, and whether or no the dictum appeals to us as theologians, it is certainly true that for the historian a not unsympathetic study of the vanquished is essential for a proper appreciation of the victorious cause. But Clio is notoriously impatient of failure. Greedy for triumphs, she is apt to disdain her lost causes as ugly ducklings. It is a fatal tendency, an immoral tendency. "Ce souvenir", M. Constant has finely said, speaking of the *parti modéré* under Pius IV, "Ce souvenir l'historien le doit rappeler". "Le doit rappeler": for it is indeed a duty, owed to Truth, and, as such, a bouquet to be offered to Clio whether she spurn it or no.

¹ See however the attractive and stimulating chapter of l'abbé G. Constant, "Les deux partis réformateurs sous Pie IV" (in his *Concession à l'Allemagne de la communion sous les deux espèces*, 2 vols. 1923).

APPENDICES

- I. The Cardinal of Lorraine to Pope Pius IV, Amboise, March 22nd, 1560.
- II. Mémoire baillé au Sieur de la Bourdaisière, Rome, May 12th, 1560 (extract).
- III. The Cardinal of Lorraine to Cardinal Tournon and the Cardinal of Ferrara, Pontgouin, June 20th, 1560.
- IV. Pius IV to the Cardinal of Lorraine, Rome, August 21st, 1560.
- V. The Cardinal of Lorraine to the Cardinal of Ferrara, Orleans, October 31st, 1560.
- VI. Pius IV to the Cardinal of Lorraine, Rome, March 3rd, 1561.
- VII. Jones to Throckmorton, Belchiers, July 4th, 1561 (extract).
- VIII. Rathschlag in Religionssachen vom Kardinal von Lothringen gestellt, June-July 1561.
- IX. Eucharistic Formulæ employed at the Colloquy of Poissy, September-October 1561.
- X. Commendone to St Charles Borromeo, Nancy, January 1st, and Pont-à-Mousson, January 11th, 1562 (extracts).

*The Cardinal of Lorraine to Pope Pius IV,
Amboise, March 22nd, 1560*

[There are several discrepancies between the sixteenth-century copy in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Coll. Dupuy 309, f. 36, and the version published by Hubert Languet in his *Arcana Saeculi Decimi Sexti*, II, 61-2 (1699). Both appear to be defective in different ways, though there is nowhere any real difference of meaning. The following text is a conflation with my own punctuation.]

BEATISSIMO PATRI post humillima pedum oscula. Tantis nominibus devinctissimum me Sanctitati Vestrae fateor, ut nullum mihi argumentum maius in scribendo esse confitear, quam ut hoc toto animo et qua possum observantia testatum Sanctitati Vestrae relinquam, ac nunc¹ cum maxime ex litteris ad me perhumaniter et saepe scriptis Sanctitas Vestra declararit² et longa maximorum beneficiorum commemoratione demonstravit Reverendissimus Cardinalis Guisius. Sed longe molestior causa scribendi se offert, et proh dolor insperatum omnino argumentum de statu religionis in hoc Christianissimo a recepto Evangelio hactenus regno: nempe, quod satis antea suspicabamur, haereticos esse viros quam plurimos non contemnendi nominis, nimirum toto hoc mense integro praeter opinionem experti sumus, magno gentis nostrae dedecore, magna sceleratissimorum hominum audacia, maiore—quod peius est—argumento pene collabentis vitae et Catholicae religionis, nisi Dominus Deus nos adiuvet, et tu, pater sanctissime, non desis. Haec omnia latius³ exponet Dominus de la Bourdaiziere qui has Sanctitati Vestrae perferret, vir summe pius, integerrimae vitae et fidei. Quod vero praesentius afferri possit remedium, non video—dum de concilio generali deliberabit Sanctitas Vestra, quod cogendum nunquam censerem nisi subscribant prius Serenissimus Imperator et cum Rege Christianissimo Rex Catholicus, et reges omnes in exequendis concilii decretis se non defuturos polliceantur—quam si Reverendissimum Cardinalem Turnonium, Sacri Collegii Decanum, huc quam citissime mittas cum auctoritate Legati de latere ad Regem, nullis aliis adiutum⁴

¹ Languet has “me” instead of “nunc”.

² The sense seems to require some such word as “benevolentiam” or “amicitiā” understood in this clause.

³ So Languet. The Dupuy MS. has “latine”, but I think it hardly probable that the Cardinal intended any adverse reflection upon his own Latin style, though this is not without its difficulties.

⁴ So Languet. The Dupuy MS. has “adjunctis”.

facultatibus (ne quid Sedi Apostolicae et praecipue Romanae Curiae depereat) nisi ad visitandos et reformandos in Ecclesia Gallicana corruptissimos mores, cogendos si opus sit episcopos; qui cum deliberarint quid potissimum in doctrina et moribus statuendum sit, quod ad hoc regnum retinendum attinet, id omne Sanctitati Vestrae cognitum sit; quantum sua providentia iudicaret Ecclesiae Dei expedire, vel decernatur vel immutetur.¹ Id si non fiat, verendum est maxime ne potentissimum et florentissimum hoc regnum, non sine magno reliqui orbis Christiani periculo, facile tanta haeresis peste laboret quod postea ubi in maiorem audaciam proruperit non facile reprimatur. Obsecro igitur Sanctitatem Vestram per viscera misericordiae Dei nostri ne hanc Dei causam contemnat, ne Ecclesiam Dei quam acquisivit sanguine suo laborantem gravissime deserat. Et sibi persuadeat nullum alium ad hoc negotium componendum tutius deligi posse Reverendissimo Cardinali Turnonio; si enim alius mittatur qui ex Gallis non sit, nihil efficiet. Hic longe erit Regi gratissimus et nostris Parliamentis (quod aiunt) acceptissimus, quod maxime est videndum, proceribus denique omnibus et universae Ecclesiae Gallicanae. Iterum de Rege nostro Reginaque nihil dubitet Sanctitas Vestra; de Duce Guisio fratre meo omnia Christiano viro fortiter digna fieri sibi polliceatur; de me vero sibi persuadeat (cujus capiti haeretici omnes insidiantur, cuius mortem omnino procurandam publice et audacter statuunt, missisque undique sicariis expetant) pro fide Catholica retinenda, pro dignitate Sanctitatis Vestrae et Sedis Apostolicae conservanda, nunquam me quicquam quod possim, praesentissima etiam morte,² praetermissurum. Quam summa alacritate pro Dei gloria suscipiam si ita Deus optimus Maximus statuatur ut me gratia sua non indignum iudicet; apud quem flecto genua ut Sanctitatem Vestram quam diutissime Ecclesiae suae regendae servet incolumem, cuius pedes ter beatissimos deosculor. Ambasiae, xxii³ Martis 1560.

Ejusdem Vestrae Sanctitatis
humillimus servitor
Carolus, Cardinalis de Lotaringia

¹ Cf. below, pp. 478-9.

² So the Dupuy copy. The version of Languet has "praesentissimam potius mortem optarim", but the phrase as in the text occurs in another letter of the Cardinal (see below, p. 476 note 2).

³ So the Dupuy copy. Languet gives the date as xxi.

*Extract from the Mémoire baillé au Sieur de la
Bourdaisière, Rome, 12 Mai, 1560*

[Bibliothèque Nationale, fonds français 3102, f. 90 vo. Contemporary copy.]

ENCORES que monsieur de la Bourdesiere soit bien memoratif de tous les propoz qui sont passez entre le pape et luy, cependant qu'il a esté par deça, si n'a pencé pour cela l'evesque d'Angoulesme qu'il y eust mal d'en mettre par écrit succinctement les principaux et plus notables cheffs dont il luy souvient.

Le premier sera le fait du consile a la celebration duquel sa sainteté monstre estre totalement résolue et chercher tous les moiens de l'abréger et incontinent que l'ambassadeur de l'empereur qui doit bientost estre icy sera arrivé, de proposer en présence de tous ambassadeurs l'ouverture du concille de Trente et en lever la suspension qui n'estoit que a la volonté du pape et jusques a ce que les guerres d'Allemaigne fussent cessées ne pouvant notre dit Saint Pere, ce luy semble, mieux faire pour incontinent parvenir a un si grand et universel bien estant le consille de Trente accepté par tous les princes et nations qui pourroient discorder en l'ellection d'un autre dont ne procederoit que dispute et retardation, remettant au surplus sadicte sainteté au concile mesme quand il sera assemblé de se remuer et transporter au lieu qui luy semblera le plus commode par le consentement des princes mesmes, de l'empereur, du Roy et Roy Catholique lesquels estans bien d'accord, tout le reste de la Chrétienté ne fera difficulté de les suivre.

Et affin que chaincun congnoisse de quel pied marche sa Sainteté et qu'elle parle sincerement et de bon cœur, elle est preste de se soub-scrire et obliger à suivre et observer et faire observer par son estat les decretz et ordonnances dudit consille pourveu que les trois princes susdits facent le semblable et offre de convenir avecques eux d'un général pour la garde et seureté des prelatz qui se trouveront audit concille et contribuer pour sa part a l'entretienement et soulde des gens de guerre qui y seront nécessaires et que promptement il soit veu et arresté combien il touchera a un chaicun de paier pour son regard.

Il n'est possible de dire ne exprimer combien la mention d'un consille national deplaist à notre dit Saint Pere pour les raisons qui sont desduites en l'instruction baillée depuis peu de jours à l'archediacre Passy et plusieurs autres alléguées par sa Sainteté, disant que

cela est un vrai scisme et separation de l'Eglise dont il ne se peult ensuivre que tout mal et confusion tant pour le regard des âmes que du roy et de son estat.

Monsieur de la Bourdesiere se souvient assez des propoz tenuz par sa dicte Sainteté sur l'absolution des hérétiques portée par ses lettres patentes publiées en France dont les coppies ont esté envoiées par deça tant par le nunce que autres et des responce sur ce faictes à sa dicte Sainteté par luy et semblablement par Monsieur le Cardinal de Tournon et l'evesque d'Angoulesme.

*The Cardinal of Lorraine to Cardinal Tournon and the
Cardinal of Ferrara, Pontgouin, June 20th, 1560*

[Copy. Modena, Archivio di Stato, Cancelleria Ducale, Documenti di Città e di Stati Esteri, Roma, xxxi. Another copy Bibliothèque Nationale, Coll. Dupuy 309, ff. 37 *et seq.* In any discrepancy I have simply followed the more probable reading, and the punctuation has been revised.]

ILLUSTRISSIMI et Reverendissimi Domini mei observantissimi.¹

Quod litteris multorum iam antea perferebatur ad me, id praesens amplissimis verbis confirmavit Dominus de la Bourdaiziere, cum primum ad nos rediit; nempe, Sanctissimum Dominum Nostrum parum probasse nostram epistolam,² quae de concilio nationali cogendo videretur mentionem facere, cui non levem suspicionem adiecerit, quod paulo ante haeretici publica venia donati erant a Rege Christianissimo, quam et subsecuta esset proclamatio Regia auctoritate in lucem edita, quae dum res ut successerint in ultima coniuratione explicat, pollicetur intra paucos menses episcoporum conventum. Haec suis ad me litteris Beatissimus Pontifex aperte declarat, Concilium Generale potius convocandum censet; nationalis vero infelicem exitum pertimescit; sententiamque nostram ut dicamus imperat, et quo in statu res omnes nostrae sint in tanta haeticorum perturbatione scire vult; idque pro sua summa erga Regem Christianissimum regnumque hoc universum benevolentia, et vere paterno pioque amore. Idem vos Illustrissimi Domini mei scribitis; eadem pertimescitis; et renuntiatum vobis esse non sine magno animi dolore adiungitis publice in Senatu Parisiense a quodam primario³ et consulari viro confessionem haeticam perlectam fuisse. His omnibus ut respondeam facit ea qua Sanctitati Suae devincior observantia, facit et quod vobis satisfacere cupio, admonet vero inprimis existimationis meae retinendae perpetuum studium. Iam praeter opinionem et expectationem accidit,⁴ quod mense martio a coniuratis experti sumus, ut prius sicariorum enses et haeticorum arma viderimus, quam quicquam⁵ de re tam immani nobis persuaderi potuerit. Et quod antea nunquam factum legimus ex tot sceleratis

¹ The Bib. Nat. copy has written in the margin—"Il parle de l'entreprise d'Amboise, rend raison pourquoi il seroit nécessaire de convoquer un concile national".

² *I.e.* Appendix I.

³ Bib. Nat. in the margin has "M. Viole".

⁴ Bib. Nat. in the margin—"De l'entreprise d'Amboise".

⁵ Thus in the Modena copy. The Bib. Nat. version has "quisquam".

viris nemo unquam discessit, qui haec exponeret, adeo sacramento addicti fidem datam summa religione observabant. In hac rerum perturbatione omnium qui aderant sententia visum est, quod et mihi summopere placuit, veniam publicam proponi eis qui venerant religionis ergo, modo pollicerentur se posthac pro Ecclesiae Catholicae ritu et observatione vivere velle, atque eadem via prohibere, ne plures eiusdem farinae homines concurrerent, qui nos imparatos adorirentur. Quo pacto hoc factum improbari possit non video. An permittitur haereticis suo more vivere? Sitque aliqua, quod aiunt, interimatio? Nihil minus,¹ et ego hoc nullo unquam modo fieri debere censerem, nec praesentissima etiam morte.² At non plectuntur qui tam graviter peccarunt. Deus bone, utinam omnes ea via redirent ad nos, qui a nobis recesserunt. Quam feliciter nobiscum ageretur! At non resipiscent, et hac indulgentia deteriores fient. Erunt tum recte severius puniendi. Et eo facilius cum omnia ad id exequendum erunt paratiora, et illi minus poterunt. At qua auctoritate fit? Crimen est mere ecclesiasticum nullis regiis legibus subditum. Non condonat Rex suo edicto quicquam quod lege ecclesiastica decretum sit. Ad suos iudices scribit, suis imperat, de iis mentionem facit qui a suis et sua lege detinentur; nihilque episcopis aut inquisitoribus praescribit; nulli prohibentur sua uti auctoritate et jurisdictione. Scio hoc decretum maximam nobis utilitatem attulisse. Nam ex infirma³ plebe homines quam plurimi si hac via domi suae tuto se posse vivere non existimassent, fortasse res nostrae hodie salvae non essent. Coniunxissent enim cum religione, in qua iam satis obfirmati erant, vitae et fortunarum omnium causam, pro qua ad arma facile prorupissent, quod hactenus fugiendum esset consulto existimavimus. Interim factionum capita quaeruntur, praeter eos qui tantae temeritatis poenas dederunt, qui si in Regis potestatem venient, pacatiora omnia sperabimus. Et dum haec cogitamus edictum a nobis est conscriptum Regis auctoritate, et sanctioris⁴ Concilii sententia, cuius exemplar ad vos mittimus,⁵ quod visum est his temporibus maxime necessarium. Ex eo cognoscetis quomodo tandem omne religionis negotium iudicibus ecclesiasticis committitur, et via aperitur qua statim seditionis et perturbatae Reipublicae rei puniuntur, nulla religionis apud iudices laicos facta mentione, quod antea nos perdidit, ut tu magis, Beatissime mi Decane,⁶ scire potes, quod ex te audivisse semper testati sumus.

Nunc ad id venio, quod in epistola mea scriptum erat. Suadebam in primis Legatum ad nos de latere mittendum. At qua ratione? Ne

¹ Bib. Nat. has "nihilominus".

² Cf. above, Appendix I.

⁴ Bib. Nat. has "sanioris".

³ Bib. Nat. has "infima".

⁵ The Edict of Romorantin.

⁶ *I.e.* Cardinal Tournon, Dean of the Sacred College.

quid hic fieret sine Sedis Apostolicae auctoritate. At vero maxime, ut viri boni et religiosi intelligerent quantum Sanctissimo Domino Nostro curae sit, ut hoc regnum in fide Romanae Ecclesiae retineatur. Adiungebam nullas alias facultates Legato dandas, praeter eas quae viderentur necessariae ad morum et haeresum correctiones. Hoc certe a me factum fuit ne videremur in detrimentum Curiae Romanae quicquam exposcere, atque etiam quod iudicabam hoc perturbationem magnam viris ecclesiasticis afferre et magnum sedis Apostolicae contemptum. Suadebam te, illustrissime Turnoni, deligendum; sciebam enim praeter praeclaras animi tui dotes quantum auctoritate tua apud nos possis, et rerum ante actarum experientia quam tua sit cum aetate observanda dignitas. Sed et propterea magis ad hoc negotium aptus videbaris, quod sciebam te praesente nihil unquam non tantum decerni, sed ne proponi quidem potuisse, quod aut nos a capite divideret, aut membrorum unionem seiungeret, quod tantum¹ videbatur pertimescendum. De Concilio autem Nationali cogendo, nullum mihi tunc visum est ad rem praesentius remedium, aut securius, nec ut aliter credam persuaderi ullo modo possum, si Concilio Generali via secludatur. Dum enim hoc aperietur, quis sanae mentis aliud desideret? Conciliorum frequens usus, et summa auctoritas, quantum afflictis et pene desperatis rebus remedium attulerit non ignoratis; nec tantum generalium, quae pauca admodum fuerunt, sed et provincialium et nationalium extant tot et tam praeclara decreta, Sedis Apostolicae auctoritate confirmata, quae, usu et morum nostrorum corruptela pene oblitterata,² sunt magna devotione renovanda. Hoc si remedium tam perturbatis rebus differatur, non video quicquam nobis relictum esse, nisi ut sanctam illam antiquitatem admirantes, a qua tam longe discessimus, infelices nos arbitremur, qui illis coaetanei cum illis jamdiu non obierimus, aut nostra tempora deplorantes, natos nos esse paeniteat ante ea tempora quae illorum mores et instituta recipient. Sed periculum est ne tunica Ecclesiae inconsutilis dividatur. Qui³ quaeso fieri⁴ potest si omnia Sedi Apostolicae referantur, si decretorum ab ea auctoritas pendeat, si praesit Sedis Apostolicae legatus, si Rex favet et re et nomine Christianissimus? Quis tumultus? Quid pertimescimus? Si denique Deus in medio eorum est, qui nomine eius congregantur, quod qui fidelis est Deus repromisit, quo modo superabitur a mendacio veritas? At vero mores reformatur. In doctrina autem quid statuas? Multum quidem ut innovetur absit. Deleantur de libro viventium, Domine Deus, qui hoc cogitant, qua post Deum nihil certius credi

¹ Bib. Nat. has "tamen".

² This phrase ("quae...oblitterata") is not in the Modena copy.

³ Bib. Nat. has "quae".

⁴ Bib. Nat. has "subi".

potest, quod nemo sanæ mentis unquam dixerit, si aliud Evangelium, aliam Sanctam et Apostolicam Ecclesiam non sibi fingat, et Deum fidelem neget. Sed declarari oportet¹ quo pacto hæc doctrina prædicanda sit, an omnes omnia capiant, an arcana Dei, legis et sacramentorum misteria ita omnibus sint proponenda, ut nihil sibi persuadere velint quod non ratiocinentur; formula prædicatoribus præscribenda, disputationibus gymnasiorum, editionibus librorum, curionibus et parochis, plebeis et viris doctis, idque ex præscripto et ne tam incerti divagemur; demonstrandus est hæreticorum error, et quo tendat eorum insania, ut qui de his aliquid persuaserunt facile intelligant se toto caelo errasse et longe a veritate abesse. Præterea in doctrina notandi sunt qui irrepperunt in ecclesiis nostris in Sacramentorum administratione abusum, qui in caerimoniarum ritu; jam demum ad mores episcoporum et totius cleri veniendum est, et providendum ne semel compositis his dissensionum monstris tam facile in eadem aut certe maiora incidamus. Hæc mea est, Illustrissimi viri, sententia; hæc in doctrina et moribus statuenda videntur sub Sedis Apostolicæ et Sanctissimi Domini Nostri auctoritate; hoc est quod ego tantopere cum viris quampluribus et piis et doctis desidero. Atque utinam antequam ad Concilium Generale ventum esset, ita reformatio hæc instituta fuisset; existimo faciliorem fuisse viam ad convincendos et revocandos hæreticos. In hoc si quid a me peccatum est, exemplo eorum qui ante nos in Ecclesia Dei fuerunt viri boni et sancti factum est; hoc speratum tamen est quod ecclesiæ dissidenti antea semper Dei beneficio et conciliorum usu evenit; hoc inquam a Deo Optimo Maximo omnibus votis expetitur, ut nostris temporibus pacato orbe sub pacata etiam et unita vivere liceret ecclesiæ. Parcite, quaeso, Reverendissimi Domini, si vestras occupationes tam longa epistola interturbem, sed profecto mihi ipsi satisfacere non possum, si vobis quid senserim non exponam. Scripserim ego aut crediderim penes Nationale Concilium auctoritatem esse decernendi novum aliquid in doctrina aut moribus? Scripsisse me non video. Dixi—hæc sunt eadem verba—mittendum legatum, et eum Turnonium mea sententia deligendum. Ad quid vero? Ad visitandos et reformandos in Ecclesia Gallicana corruptissimos mores. Quid tum postea? Ad cogendos, si opus sit, episcopos, hoc item Sedi Apostolicæ reservatum. Qui cum deliberarint quid potissimum in doctrina et moribus statuendum sit, quod ad hoc regnum retinendum attinet, id omne per Sanctitatem Vestram cognitum quantum sua providentia iudicavit Ecclesiæ Dei expedire vel decernatur vel immutetur.² Dixi jam antea quæ deliberari debeant, at non dico de-

¹ Bib. Nat. has "potest".

² Cf. above, p. 472, in Appendix I, the identical phrases in the Cardinal's letter to the Pope.

cerni, non dico statui etiam accedente Sedis Apostolicae legato, sed dico recollectas sententias ad Sanctitatem Suam mitti, ut statuatur vel immutetur. Hocne est quicquam velle ab unione ecclesiastica revocare? Aut Concilii Generalis auctoritatem imminuere dum Nationali permitto quod unicuique archiepiscopo licet sua auctoritate, nempe, convocatis suis suffraganeis et eorum collectis sententiis omnia Sedis Apostolicae iudicio submittere? Nec existimetis, quaeso, hoc me dicere ut velim quasi auctoritatem epistolae meae defendere. Nihil enim viro Christiano indignius quam errorem velle suum, si quid est, tueri, quem semper in scribendo fuisse fatebor si vos ita iudicatis. Sed nolim ulla unquam in re de fide mea et observantia erga Sanctissimum Dominum Nostrum et Sedem Apostolicam dubitari, nec quicquam aliud me cogitare quam ut Deo debitus honor et Ecclesiae Catholicae et Apostolicae perpetuo retineatur, nosque finem aliquem tantis dissidiis in Ecclesia videamus. Quod autem ad regiam proclamationem attinet ubi de episcopis agitur, qui ut deliberent brevi cogentur, id mihi videtur Rex verbis honoratissimis dicere, nec quicquam sibi imperii attribuere in iis rebus quae a Sede Apostolica pendent, hoc tantum se profitetur curaturum, quod viri qui experientia et doctrina aliquid possunt quotidie testantur, his malis nullum finem sperari posse nisi Concilii Generalis auctoritate, aut, si id non licet, reformatione cleri ex Nationalis Concilii sententia Sedis Apostolicae auctoritate confirmata.

Hoc superest quod renunciatum est de Senatore Violano in quo nihil video quod succenseatis. Pro more est apud nos receptum ut qui in Senatum eunt neminem alloquantur aut quasi saluent dum per palatium incedunt, supplices enim libellos accipient ab omnibus. Inter eos accedit ut Violano supplex libellus cum sacculo porrigeretur eo die quo Dux Mormorantius Connestabilis in Senatu erat. Ille pro more ubi sedere incipit, libellum aperit mox et sacculum; in eo confessionem illam, quam scribitis, reperit. Refert ad Senatum. Ubi inscriptionem vident, subito imperant incendi; inquiri etiam volunt quis eam porrexerit; inveniri aut cognosci nullo modo potest. Haec rei est veritas in quo nihil omnino a quoquam in Senatu peccatum est, quod longe aliter video vobis fuisse renunciatum.

Video iam satis quod nunc scribo protraxisse, quod quaeso excusetis. Volui enim rationem reddere earum rerum omnium quae vestrum unusquisque ad me de iis scripserat, quod latine feci ut nostra haec epistola per vos legi possit in ea Illustrissimorum et Reverendissimorum Dominorum meorum congregatione, qui a Sanctitate Sua deputantur rebus secretioribus tractandis, quos audiui earum rerum participes fuisse quarum ego rationem reddo, quibus si per vos, Illustrissimi Domini, mihi liceat manus osculari, exosculor quam possum humillime. Illis haec eadem scripsissem si de vestra

erga me benevolentia certissimus non essem. Scribo ad Sanctissimum Dominum Nostrum, sed breviter. Nolo enim illi molestus esse, sed spero haec omnia per vos dici posse, quod quidem erit mihi longe gratissimum, et me vobis magnopere devincietis. Bene valeant Dominationes Vestrae Illustrissimae et Reverendissimae, quibus cum omnia mea semper devoverim, certo sibi persuadebunt qui magis eos amet, suspiciat et veneretur apud nos esse neminem. De reliquis vero huius Regni negotiis et Ecclesiae statu vos certiores faciet qui has vobis reddet,¹ si ex eo desideratis praeter ea quae a Regio Oratore² intelligetis. Deus Optimus Maximus Dominationes Vestras Illustrissimas quam diutissime servet incolumes.

Datum in Castro de Ponte Goenio in Carnutibus,³ die 20 mensis Junii 1560. Illustrissimarum et Reverendissimarum Dominationum Vestrarum humilis servitor

Carolus, Cardinalis de Lotaringia.

¹ The Abbé Manne.

² The Bishop of Angoulême.

³ Pontgouin, near Chartres.

*Pius IV to the Cardinal of Lorraine,
Rome, August 21st, 1560*

[Cambridge University Library, Add. MSS. 4823, without folio numberings.
Copies from Naples, Bib. Nazionale, XI, B, 3.]

DILECTE fili, salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem. Havemo ricevuta la lettera sua portataci dal Abbate de Manna,¹ et inteso a lungo da lui quanto haveva da dirci in nome suo. Havemo anche visto la lettera che per detto Abbate de Manna ha scritto a li Cardinali de Teornone et di Ferrara,² et in risposta di tutto lei diremo che noi non havemo diffidato del buono et sincero animo suo verso le cose de la Religione et di questa santa sede, anzi havemo tenuto per certo che lei haverebbe sempre havuto cura et protettione de la dignità di detta sede, come conviene a chi è membro sì principale et sì honorato de la Chiesa di Dio come è lei, così la eshortiamo a perseverar hora con tanto maggior core quanto che la vede il bisogno maggiore, et più necessario il rimedio, et sopra tutto non lascerà pasar innanti il Concilio Nationale di quel regno, aiutanto al' incontro la resolutione et prontezza nostra di celebrare il Generale, come vederà per la lettera che scrivemo a Sua Majestà Christianissima, et come più largamente intenderà dal detto Abbate di Manna, il quale torna ben informato del animo nostro. Resta ch' ella creda che di lei, et de le honorate et pie attentioni sue, noi siamo quanto più si può essere satisfatti. Onde per questo et per l' antica affezione che già tanti anni le portiamo desideramo che ci porga l' occasione di farle cosa grata. Così mandandole la nostra benedittione preghiamo Iddio che la conservi et consoli di quanto desidera.

Dat. Romae, die xxi Augusti 1560.

¹ See above, pp. 124, 139 and 480 (Appendix III).

² Appendix III.

*The Cardinal of Lorraine to the Cardinal of Ferrara,
Orleans, October 31st, 1560*

[Biblioteca Comunale di Trento, MS. 122 (4257), p. 43. Copy.]

MONSIGNORE tutto lo spaccio del presente Corier non è fondato in altro, che solamente sopra la sicurezza et la parola che m' havete dato per l' ultime vostre delli dieci del mese presente, che nostro Signore haveva risoluto d' aprirci ben presto il concilio generale nel luogo di Vercelli nel Piemonte overo a Casale del Monferrato. Cosa, ch' io non vi saprei dire quanto sia stata grata al Re et per la quale per maggior testimonio della sua contentezza Sua maestà ha voluto mandarvi questo spaccio et insieme a Monsignore d' Angulem suo Ambasciatore affinche vediate per esso come ella s'accomoda alla santa et laudabile volontà di Sua Beatitudine et che se a un tale et si grande bene com' è il detto Concilio generale vi succede et vi si aggiunga da qui avanti qualche ritardanza, non si causerà mai dal suo canto. Il che vi prego Monsignore poichè è piaciuto sin qui sua Santità farvi partecipe della sua intentione, et di volercela per il vostro mezzo dichiarare a voler procurare il più presto che sarà possibile vedendosi che tutto il frutto et tutto il felice successo che possa nascere dal detto Concilio non consiste che nella sola prestezza di aprirlo et che se vi si perde tempo differendosi et rimettendosi le cose alla lunga, voi non potreste credere quanti maligni spiriti giudicaranno diversamente et faranno maligna interpretatione di questa buona intentione di Sua Santità. Et perchè più volte vi ho scritto et fatto intendere per qual ragioni et sopra quali accidenti la nostra Congregatione de Prelati della Chiesa Gallicana fosse già conclusa, io non ve ne voglio toccar più altro, et bastarmi solamente di dirvi che non si può presentare il più bel mezzo di mandarla per terra, che il detto aprire del Concilio generale fatto et formato secondo l'ultima determinatione di Sua Santità et quella che ella largamente vi ha dichiarato et comunicato, et che voi mi havete fatto intendere. Nella quale io vi prego humilmente Monsignore mio di voler non pur confirmare Sua Santità ma consigliarla di passare oltre all'effetto di quella promettendovi in questo mezzo che Sua Maestà aspettarà nove di voi, et il ritorno di questo Corriere senza cominciar cosa alcuna circa la congregatione di detti nostri Prelati.

[The rest of the letter deals with private affairs.]

D' Orliens, 31 ottobre 1560.

*Pius IV to the Cardinal of Lorraine,
Rome, March 3rd, 1561*

[Cambridge University Library, Add. MSS. 4823, without folio numberings.
Copies from Naples, Bib. Nazionale, XI, B, 3.]

DILECTE FILII. Salutem et Apostolicam benedictionem. Literae quas manu tua ad nos dedisti fuerunt nobis imprimis gratae. Persuasi nos sumus quaecumque scribis ea tibi ex corde prodire, agnovimusque singularem prudentiam ac virtutem tuam, tam in ferenda patienter morte felicitis memoriae Francisci Regis, quam in occasione ex incidentibus saeculi capienda, ut Deo inservias et per custodiam gregis tibi commissi celestem gloriam consequaris, quas ob res satis tibi benedicere satisque commendare non possumus. Non mediocres et tibi gratias agimus benevolorum prudentiorumque monitorum quae nobis offers super statu praesentium Galliae rerum, superque bono Concilii universalis progressu. At ita Deus, et Dominus noster Jesu Christus, consilia nostra cogitationesque provehat, ut nihil vehementius cupimus quam id quod in hac re scribis effectum reddere. Itaque et fuerunt nobis grata et semper erunt monita tua bona, atque prudentia. Quod vero ad te proprie pertinet, tuasque rationes, omnia tibi de nobis libere sponte, quaecumque a patre amantissimo omniumque tuorum commodorum et honoris cupidissimo, expectare et consequi posse. Cumque spe tua aut opinione falleris, semperque prolixum erga te favorem, et gratiam nostram experieris, atque hoc fine tibi benedicimus, omniaque bona praecamur. Datum Romae, die 3 Martii, 1561.

Extract from Jones to Throckmorton, July 4th, 1561

[First few lines only. Brit. Mus. Add. MSS. 35830, f. 140.]

I DO humbly thank your L. for your letter of the 23 of June, wherby I perceiue youe haue receiued myne of the 25 of Maye. I sent your L. an other of the 4th of June, which er this I trust be come to your handis: I cannot to muche muse at the Cardinal of Lorreine his conuersion, but I meruail not at it, knowinge him as I do, But if he haue alterid his mynd ex zelo and bona fide, I think there cannot (sauing your L. correction) be any stay in the reformation of Religion there, if otherwise let them beware whome it toucheth, that the wolf enter not into the shepcote in vestimento ouium the better to deceyue them: and howsoeuer it be, the mater must nedis be of great consequence in such a personage; If I were there I think thambassador of Spaine wold not stick to call the Cardinal Atheiste, though he governe the quene his niepce....

...from Belchiers, the 4th of July 1561.
your good L. humbly to commande

H. Jones.

*Rathsschlag in Religionssachen vom Kardinal
von Lothringen gestellt, June-July 1561*

[Stuttgart, Staatsarchiv, Frankreich, büschel 17, No. 926. ¹A French version, *ibid.* No. 105 *b*; and a German version, No. 105 *c*. The spelling and punctuation of the MS. have been retained except for a few obvious corrections.]

NON hoc iam quaeritur, utrum deliberandum an causae religionis in ordinem redigendae et reformatio instituenda. Non enim rationes solummodo, sed et incumbens extrema necessitas hoc exigit, et nos eo compellit, et ea quidem gemina, tam enim gloria Dei, quam ante omnia promovere et conservare debemus, quam pax et tranquillitas huius Regni, et conservatio omnium statuum et ordinum eiusdem, hoc postulant.

Sed de medio et remedio quod ad hanc ordinationem et reformationem constituendam commodissimum sit, questio est.

Videtur autem mihi ad concordiam christianam, et reformationem ecclesiae necessariam, haec ratio commodissima, et quae ad executionem harum rerum plurimum faciat, vel causas saltem huius dissidii et schismatis, e medio tollat.

Quod ad unitatem et concordiam attinet, tantopere illam commendat sacra scriptura, ut nihil illa prius sit aut superius.

Et symbolum fidei, quam profitemur, hoc tenet quod unam tantum agnoscamus ecclesiam. Quod quidem contra schismaticos ita interpretati sunt, quod ecclesiae unitas simplicissima vocata sit. Et hoc ex libris Augustini liquido apparet, et si cui liberet legere, quae bonus et sanctus vir de unitate ecclesiae adversus Donatistas conscripsit, copiosius inveniet rationes expositas quae concordiam et unitatem nobis hodie etiam promovendam commendant, si quando de ecclesia et religione mentio fit. Vult etiam Apostolus ut nulla inter nos schismata sint aut ferantur, sed ut unam fidem et unum Baptismum habeamus. Testatur etiam quod Deus non sit Deus confusionis sed pacis.

Et si accuratius considerentur omnes consequentiae et eventus, nihil certius est quam concordiam, de qua mihi sermo est, in primis necessariam esse, non solum ecclesiae sed etiam reipublicae causa.

Possent haec latius per omnes circumstantias explicari et illustrari omnibus historiis, sententiis veterum et virorum prudentum, nec non commodis et fructibus, quos unitas secum fert, et contra ingentibus malis ac detrimentis quae schismata et dissensiones comitantur tamquam radicem omnium dissipationum. Sed haec cuiusvis iudicio, quod vera haec esse testabitur, relinquo, et simpliciter iudico

et in hanc sententiam eo (quod quidem conscientia nostra nos docet et talem confessionem extorquet) quod quemadmodum unica tantum est vera religio, ita nullam aliam ferendam aut tolerandam. Et quemadmodum omnes in nomine Jhesu Christi baptizati sumus, et Christo nomen dedimus, ita necessarium est, ut omnes in ipso unum simus, et in una ecclesia ejus.

Et quemadmodum olim Imperator Zeno *ἐνωτικὸν* publicavit, ita et nos multo magis flagitemus. Nescio enim quod falsum et perniciosum schisma interim.

Dixi me intelligere Sanctam et Christianam unitatem alias enim nihil aliud esset quam malignum conciliabulum et scelesti coniuratio.

Contenderunt olim Arriani et alii Haeretici quorum precipua fuit potentia, nullam aliam esse ecclesiam praeterque ipsorum, et voluerunt ut omnes ipsorum instituta approbarent et sectarentur, neque quicquid aliud celebrarent quam unitatem, quibus recte responsum fuit, necessarium esse, ut haec unitas in Christo sit, alias enim nihil aliud esse quam latronum aut praedonum societatem. Ad hunc modum respondit ipsis S. Hilarius in libro de Synodo a principe.

Caeterum ut Christiana et Sancta Unitas et concordia ineatur, necessitatem postulare dixi, ut de reformatione necessaria consulatur, vel causae saltem dissidiorum removeantur et tollantur.

Ut autem illud obtineatur, cognitio causae in primis necessaria est. Hoc est, utrum iure fiat vel iniuria, quod in negotio religionis hoc tempore discordes sumus atque distracti.

Verum ut ad causae cognitionem pervenire possimus, certum est, sententiarum opus esse collatione. Non dico disputationem necessariam esse. Video enim quem finem sortiantur acutiores, odiosae et rixosae disputationes, presertim si mysteria nostrae religionis attingantur.

Scio legem tales disputationes et quidem probabilibus rationibus vetare. Memini etiam D. Hilarium et alios prudenter dixisse et scripsisse cum de Arrianis (qui disputationes petebant et urgebant) verba facerent, quod Theologiam in artem transformaverint et in tecnologiam verterint. Theodoretus de fabr. heret.

Nec mihi excidit quid Augustinus sentiat, cum de hac re mentio incidit, nimirum quod Donatistae omnem collationem subterfugientes et rejicientes, disputatorem eum vocabant.

At bonus ille vir affirmat, ordinariam et optimam rationem esse disputationis, eam videlicet quam nos collationem vocamus.

Et quidem non negaverim, nisi causa tam esset distracta latepatens, atque aestuans, satis mihi esset unicum et simplex exemplum proponere et quidem vetustum, cuperemque ex animo hanc controversiam benigne et amice componi.

Exemplum inquam quod Eusebius lib. 7, cap. 24. commemorat,

repetens ea quae bonus ille et antiquus episcopus Dionysius Alexandrinus de se ipso litteris mandavit, cum incideret controversia componenda, quae in diocesi eius exorta fuerat.

Optandum sane esset et processus et conclusiones omnium collationum in causa religionis tales esse.

Quod autem attinet ad questiones hoc tempore agitatas, tam graves et eo progressae sunt, ut si unquam concilio opus fuit, certe hoc tempore opus sit, quod quidem in gravioribus negotiis religionis ordinarium et utilissimum remedium habitum fuit, sed plerumque accidit, ut cum bonam et aequam viam iuris expetamus tot exceptiones, revisiones et remissiones interveniant, ut ne principium quidem veniri nedum ad finem perveniri possit.

Quadraginta nunc anni sunt quod nobis concilium promissum et a nobis expectatum est, et fama fertur Papam Tridentinum concilium continuare velle. Credo autem constare plerisque quid agatur et quod alio remedio opus sit. Nolo iam commemorare longius quod plerique vident et intelligunt, sed hoc iam mihi in mentem fuerit, quod D. Augustinus de Donatistis scribit, Hoc agunt in Conciliis ut nihil agatur.

Dicitur de, nescio quo, generale concilio. Et quidem primum concilium Nicenum inquam talem finem sortitum est, ut merito nomen, memoriam et auctoritatem generalium conciliorum magnificare et revereri debeamus.

Non autem talis nobis est hoc tempore Monarcha, qualis fuit Constantinus, ut nobis tale concilium quale Nicenum fuit persuadere aut sperare possimus, neque in nostra Europa talis princeps est cuius sit nationes convocare. Quid igitur?

Alterum Concilium generale dictum Constantinopoli celebratum, et ab Imperatore Theodosio convocatum, qua ratione generale fuit!

Cum tamen occidentales non interfuerint, ita ut precipua pars Christiani orbis desiderata sit, fuit autem generale, quod attinet ad alteram partem Orientalem videlicet. Nec quidquam earum rerum praetermisit Theodosius propter absentes occidentales, qui ipsi subiecti non fuerunt, quas in Oriente constituere potuit ac debuit. Interea et occidentales secuti exemplum eius, suum peculiare concilium celebrarunt, et cum tandem omnia in commune conferrentur, medium hoc fuit et via constituendi ordinem in Ecclesia.

Et quod maius est, cum eo ipso tempore in Italia Episcopus Romanus res omnes ad Concilium adornaret non intermisit D. Ambrosius Episcopus Mediolanus cum vicinis suis parvum Concilium Aquileiam convocare, propter Arrianos superstites quorum caput Palladius quidam erat, ut cum ipso sententiae conferrentur. Cui cum omnium nomine respondendum esset, hac declinatoria usus est,

dicens, quod hoc non esset perfectum integrum et generale concilium. At D. Ambrosius talia nihil moratus concilium continuavit.

Consideratio hujus historiae et exempli satis nos docet quid hoc tempore facere et possimus et debeamus, quibus maiores causae incumbunt et urgent.

Neque iure dici potest, non licere conciliis nationalibus tractare de causis religionis. Quid enim iis, qui sic loquuntur, constet de vetustis conciliis ignoro; sed ut ex propinquo rem petam, non debisset huius modi homines cepisse oblivio Concilii Arausicani in nostra Gallia, quod non ita multo post mortem Augustini celebratum fuit. Quod quidem Concilium sive nationale sive provinciale appelles, sua contra Pelagianos decisione satis testatur, quod non minus iudicii habuerit quam pleraque Concilia generalia.

Quia igitur Rex episcopos Ecclesiarum Gallicarum convocavit, ut ad diem 20. Julii hic comparere debeant, nihil aliud requiritur quam ut congregatio et synodus illa authorisetur ut potestatem et pondus habeat, et ut adhibeantur qui idonei sint et apti ad procurandum hoc quod summa postulat necessitas.

In hoc igitur res consistit, ut si negotium instituendum et dirigendum est quemadmodum oportet, adeo brevis est terminus et fortassis adeo celeriter fiet resolutio, ut iam non admodum necesse sit aliter causam prospicere.

Ultro autem fateor summam postulare necessitatem providere ut resolutio eo modo quo par est et conveniens fiat, et totus processus ita reguletur, ut Deus agnoscatur praeses, et fines seu exitus ita se habeat, ne opus sit rem retractare et actum agere. In summa ut negotium ita agatur, et processus tam plani, et iudicium ita fundatum sit et evidens, utqui hinc appellare conarentur temeritatis et impudentiae convinci possent. Addo, ut haec omnia eo modo fiant et dirigantur qualem res ipsa exigit et requirit.

Fieri autem potest ut aliquando celerius concludatur ad providendum presenti necessitati et ad tollendas causas dissidiorum, quae regnum hoc perturbant, et una ad satisfaciendum conscientiae siquidem ei tempestive occurrere volumus (quod faciendum est) quod iam maxime est necessarium.

Verum ut recte iudicetur, adiungendum est quod Constantinus in Concilio Niceno et Theodosius in Constantinopolitano proposuit cum leges ferre et monstrare vellent, qua ratione in causa religionis controversa decidendum sit.

Ubi igitur, ut convenit horum amborum sententiis et aliorum usi fuerimus, sperandum est, reformationem cito inveniri posse, quae nos in causa religionis reconciliet.

Deo laus et gratia omnes confitentur et profitentur hodie summarium fidei, quod symbolum Apostolorum vocant, atque ita

conveniunt et consentiunt cum precipuis articulis Christianae Religionis, quod quidem non parvum initium est ad Christianam conciliationem.

Cum enim in hoc consentirent veteres christiani, videbantur sibi precipuum, et quod unitas ac concordia in primis requirebat consecutos esse.

Nihil aliud enim, si res per se consideretur, hactenus multis seculis controversum est.

Inter nos hoc tempore controversia est de iis, quae his adhaerent et precipue discordes sumus de administratione huius doctrinae.

Cum igitur utraque pars in hoc conveniat et veterem ecclesiae honorem exhibeat, et primitiva illa ecclesia memoriam et rationem talium ceremoniarum et rituum reliquerit, et nobis videre liceat qualis fuerit prima institutio multarum rerum, et qui abusus secuti sint, magnum et bonum medium habemus iudicandi de eo quod aut retinendum aut rejiciendum sit.

Verum quidem est quod non solum considerata sit ratio et forma veteris ecclesiae, quae a tempore Apostolorum plus minus annos ducentos, tamquam in servitute, sub dominio et potestate ethnicorum tyrannorum fuit, sed etiam ratio habenda est eius status qui interea in libertate principum Christianorum tempore etiam annos plus minus ducentos fuit, et qualia sint tempora presentia considerandum est, et quid de hac sancta vetustate reliquum habeamus recti et integri, et quid corrupti ac quos abusus. Et semper in priori gradu authoritatis ponendum est, quod nobis commendarunt Apostoli.

Praecipua causa de qua iam litigamus, Sacramentum est, et de iis quae Sacramento adhaerent. Et quemadmodum in Ecclesiis nihil magis in usu est, ita nihil est, ob quod magis scindimur et distrahimur, cum tamen illud Sacramentum ad hoc institutum sit ut concordēs vivamus.

Miserandum sane, ut id quod institutum est ut concordēs simus, iam maxima causa sit gravissimorum dissidiorum et discordiarum. Eo igitur diligentius inspiciendum est unde nam haec oriantur, vel saltem intelligamus quid controvertatur.

Controversia est partim de communicatione Corporis et Sanguinis Domini nostri Jesu Christi praecipue autem de transsubstantiatione, de adoratione, item ut Sacramentum reservetur et includatur, et ut circumferatur, de missis privatis, invocatione sanctorum, intercessionem pro mortuis, et qua lingua in Ecclesia utendum sit, et de aliis hujusmodi, quae ad ea pertinent, quae in ecclesiis, ubi convenitur aguntur et docentur.

Haec omnia diligenter ponderentur incipiendo ab antiquitate, a Christo et Apostolis, et quemadmodum deinceps servata sint. Consideretur debita reverentia, discretione et iudicio, quorsum interea

res redierit, s[t]atim abusus et error deprehendetur. Postquam autem malum agnitum et confessum est necessario tollendum est, quod quidem eo facilius est factu cum malum utriusque partis consensu est damnatum.

Mirum profecto est his temporibus quod multi agnoscant et confiteantur abusus, et nihilominus defendant, ac si optimi essent.

Hoc ipsum est quod honestis et synceris hominibus valde dolet, ita ut aliter iudicare non possint, quam quod huiusmodi homines qui talibus rebus ludunt et se oblectant, omnem religionem ludibrio habeant, atque ita coguntur de aliis rationibus dispicere.

Quia igitur in rebus politicis non ferimus ut nostra mandata irrita sint, et executione careant, velut sententiae nostrae et decreta iudicialia contemnantur, quid igitur de his dicemus qui in ecclesia earum rerum de quibus ipsi cognoverunt et sententiam tulerunt, executionem impediunt, quemadmodum a Deo et per leges sancitum est.

Antequam autem de executione dicamus, controversiam prius distinguemus.

Potest controversia esse, aut de rebus ipsis de quibus sermo est, vel de personis quae invicem litigant. De his personis, inquam, quae parere non volunt et tam longe suis passionibus et affectibus abducuntur, ut etiam contra suam ipsorum conscientiam pugnent, taceo, ut verum fateantur id cuius convincit eos conscientia.

Tales fere fuerunt primi auctores schismatum quae primitivam ecclesiam valde exercuerunt.

Sed huiusmodi homines ad hanc sententiarum collationem de qua loquimur admittendi non sunt, debent etiam excludi turbulenti et partibus addicti, qui auctores sunt rixarum et schismatum et favere illa cupiunt etiam inter se ipsos, qui tamen facile inter se convenire possent.

Incidit mihi hoc loco, quod nobis Ecclesiastica historia commemorat. Fuit aliquando acerrima contentio inter Cyrillum Episcopum Alexandriae et Johannem Episcopum Antiochenum qui tum temporis prestantissimi Episcopi in ecclesia erant. Unus quisque suas habebat rationes et sectatores, alter alterum excommunicabat et anathematizabat. Peperit hoc deplorandum scandalum, nec quicquam profitebatur ad reconciliationem vel conciliis vel aliis quae suscipiebantur rationibus. Simulatque autem ambo convenissent et invicem collocuti essent, neque fidem adhiberent amplius iis qui ipsos invicem concitaverant, reconciliati sunt, magno gaudio et applausu ecclesiae.

Ut autem huius fraudes et doli praecaveantur, necesse est, ut haec collatio sententiarum non similis sit actioni partium litigantium, sed tamquam deliberatio et consultatio inter iudices.

Accedamus igitur ad difficultatem quae in ipsa causa controversa est. Quod in hac causa difficillimum est pertinet ad articulos Sacramenti, cum iis quae adhaerent et antea commemorata sunt.

Videtur autem non usque adeo difficile esse iudicare ut putatur, modo nos ratione supradicta informemus. Verum ne in aerem loquamur sed ut experiamur utrum res ita sese habeat negotium consideremus et introspiciamus paululum, ut appareat, quid de foelici exitu sperandum sit.

Quod attinet ad commemoratos articulos, audimus et videmus ex scriptis apostolicis, actis ecclesiasticis, ex historiis, ex sententiis et decretis veterum patrum quibus semper et ab omnibus Christianis honor habitus fuit, quam inde resolutionem petere possimus, qua igitur difficultas restat in iudicio et executione.

His itaque compositis, maxima causa dissidiorum sublata est, et parata via, ut unanimes simul dominum Deum nostrum invocare, bona et quieta conscientia ei servire, amice et pacifice vitam agere possimus, et deinde plenam ac integram reformationem prae manibus sumamus, talem inquam qualis in hoc seculo inter homines sperari potest. Scio equidem, illam uno momento obtineri non posse, verum aliquid et multum sane est, si modo incipiamus et viam struamus.

Multi sunt qui, ne rem aggredi cogantur sed declinent, affirmant, controversiam esse leviolem et indignam cuius ratio habeatur. Alii autem tanti esse momenti ut impossibile sit eam componi. Et ut brevibus dicam, in hac sententia sunt huiusmodi homines, negotium religionis omittendum et unicuique permittendum liberum de ea sentiendi quidquid libeat. At mihi videtur has opiniones mirificas esse et alienas et meminisse veteris dicti:—Malum est sub principe esse apud quem nihil liceat, peius autem est sub tali principe esse apud quem omnia liceant. Nihil igitur iuvant tales extremitates, sed malas consequentias secum trahunt.

Nullam omnino rationem habet, si dicatur, controversiam eam quae nunc agitur nullam esse vel adeo levem, ut non necesse sit principes et gubernatores eam tractare. Versamur enim in discrimine maximi, quod unquam fuit, schismatis, hoc est, quod invicem scindimur, ac contrarias opiniones et ceremonias recipimus, ex quo sequetur id quod quisque ante oculos quasi videt.

Probator ratio esset, si diceretur causas religionis ita esse confusas et intricatas quod nulla supersit spes concordiae, sed quod de ea tanquam de morbo incurabili desperandum, et fortunae committendum sit.

Hoc autem talem prae se fert speciem ac si hi, qui talia spargunt sibi ipsis in hac desperatione placerent, et nimis parum ea curarent, qua nobis ante omnia commendata esse deberent.

Verum quidem est, quod eo tempore quo Theodosius Imperator in oriente cepit ecclesias valde turbatas reformare, confessi pii episcopi et scriptis testati fuerint, quod haec reformatio esset instar remedii quod morbo inveterato et qui profundas egisset radices

adhiberetur, propterea non solum experto medico, et magna industria et labore, sed et longo tempore ac spatio opus erat.

Nihilominus tamen facere noluerunt, quod olim fecerunt qui infirmos suos ad plateas deferebant, et praetereuntibus commendabant, quod proprie dicere possumus deponere, hoc est omnem curam et onus adjicere. Sed nihil tam grave fuit quod desperationem peperisset, vel impedivisset, quo minus rem aggredierentur, ita ut tandem re ipsa, quod petierunt, consecuti sint.

Fateor quidem quod excusationem mereamur, quando omnia facta sunt quaeabilia erant factu, quamvis non obtineatur quod quaerebatur, quemadmodum medicus qui morbo incurabili et lethali mederi non potuit, vel bonus nauta qui tempestate submersus est, quid aliud dicere possumus, si forte accidat quod olim praestantissimus poeta de bello scripsit:

Ut cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae
Addunt se in spatia, et frustra retinacula tendens,
Fertur equis auriga nec audit currus habenas.¹

Nescio utrum hac ratione Caesar Valentinianus excusandus sit, qui sane Christianus fuit princeps, sed quam vehemens et acer prius fuit antequam caesar crearetur, tam remissus et mollis in imperio fuit et religionem omnibus liberam reliquit. Fortassis eo tempore cum impossibile existimaret alia ratione causae mederi, atque ita promisit ethnicis, judaeis, gentibus suo agere arbitrio. Quamvis ipsum D. Ambrosius ex parte excuset, utpote quod Imperator non omnium eorum quae ille agebat conscius fuerit.

Verum quidem est cum Christiani olim praeter omnem aequitatem gravissimas persecutiones sustinerent, ita ut nullum aliud medium ad conservationem suorum novissent, aliquoties petierunt, talem sibi concedi libertatem qua usi essent veteres et ostenderunt religionem cuique liberam permittendam.

Talis est informatio et petitio Athenagorae, Tertulliani, Lactantii quam ad gentes prescripserunt.

Talia etiam sunt postulata Athanasii et Hilarii ad Arrianos, qui praecipui erant apud Caesarem Constantium et crudelius grassabantur quam antea tyranni ethnici.

Et tolerabilius sane est talem concedi libertatem, quam ut falsa religio defendatur et conscientiae hominum ad eam vi adigantur. Non autem iam quaeritur utrum inter haec duo extrema eligendum, multo minus in medium adducam exemplum Christianorum principum et episcoporum, qui Novatianis olim omnem libertatem et impunitatem in ipsorum secta concesserunt.

Haec omnia ad tempus facta sunt, cum Arriani, Manichei, Mace-

¹ Virgil, *Georgics*, I, 512-14.

doniani, qui multo crudeliores hostes erant, satis negotii facesserent. Ad haec utebantur Christiani opera Novatianorum contra supra dictos haereticos.

Nolo tamen suppressere in Codice Theodosiano legem inveniri, quae Imperatori Theodosio adscribitur, quae dat (ut eius verbis utar) potestatem communicandi et colligendi iis qui secundum ea sentiunt, quae in Ariminensi concilio decreta sunt.¹ Ita ut aperte loquendo, Arrianis talis libertas detur. Concilium enim Ariminense Arrianum fuit.

Sed invenio hanc arrianam legem Theodosio falso et sine ratione adscribi, ideoque merito ex codice Theodosiano, tanquam a falsario inserta deleri deberet.

Verum maledicta illa lex est, quam Arriana Imperatrix Justina eo tempore Mediolani publicare voluit.² Sed reiecta est, et Cancellarius subscribere vel obsignare noluit, et citius officium suum et statum amittere voluit, quam legem hanc approbare.

Verum quidem est, in controversiis religionis non satis laudari potest moderatio, facilitas et benignitas principum et gubernatorum, sed propterea non omnino laxandi sunt freni.

Novi quidem Donatistas olim in hac fuisse sententia, contra vero non ignoro quodnam responsum tulerint, legere hoc licet in libris Optati Milevitani de Schismate Donatistarum, et in libris D. Augustini qui post Optatum fusius et copiosius de hac re scripsit.

Caeterum intelligo diligenter providendum ne erretur, praesertim cum audiamus multos praestantes et conspicuos homines esse, qui interrogati qua ratione praesens controversia componi et tolli possit, respondere audent, vi obtinendum, ut in possessione maneat et illam retinent, igni et ferro delendos, quemadmodum antea quoque, eos qui cum ipsis non consentiant. Quia autem haec sententia admodum periculosa est, expendamus eam atque examinemus.

Dominus Cancellarius in propositione optime et prudenter demonstravit, mala et morbos nostrae reipublicae de quibus nunc agitur exquisita et efficaci cura opus habere, magna enim sunt. Et quod externa et corporalia media, quae antea magna severitate adhibita fuerunt nihil profecerint, necessarium igitur esse ut mitiora, imo spiritualia et interiora remedia prae manibus sumantur, quae etiam huic morbo maxime conveniunt.

Mirandum igitur est, quod multi apud quos vetus consuetudo, in qua educati sunt, sese exerit, in ea sententia perseverant, haereticos comburendos, hoc est eos qui hoc tempore recesserunt a forma religionis in hoc regno usitata.

¹ Cod. Theod., lib. xvi, tit. i, iv.

² This opinion had recently been upheld by François Baudouin in his *De Institutione Historiae Universae*, p. 123 (cf. above, p. 253). The Cardinal's indebtedness to him here seems plain.

Primo dicere liberet experientiam, quae etiam stultorum magistra est, satis nos docere posse, quod hoc remedium non sit idoneum, ad eradicandos eos, quos haereticos vocamus, quorum numerus interea crescit et auctus est. Verum ad hoc mihi respondebitur, meum argumentum non esse sufficiens ad rejiciendum remedium praedictum, idem enim et de furibus et praedonibus dici posse.

Cui dixero, impossibile esse hoc tempore tantam multitudinem populi extirpare, et coniectu facile esse quid secuturum sit. Si hoc tenetur, respondetur ac replicatur, me tantum inconveniens allegare, non autem sufficere hoc, ut propterea bene deliberata consultatio et sententia contemni debeat, quia executio aliquanto difficilior est, cum tamen in deliberationibus criminalibus huiusmodi consultationes nunquam spretae sint. Propterea his insistere et inniti nolo.

Sed duo capita sunt quae nobis ob oculos ponunt aequitas, iustitia et leges.

Primo disputatur et adhuc quaeritur, utrum ii de quibus loquimur haeretici sint vel non. Deinde si per omnes circumstantias ponderatum et definitum sit, esse haereticos, expendendum deinceps est utrum poena erroris alicujus et falsae opinionis, hoc est haereseos, corpori et vitae irrogari debeat.

Quod ad primum attinet, respondetur mihi, constare hoc et satis determinatum esse, quia res sit saepe iudicata.

Sit sane ita. Sed ab hac nostra definitione provocaverunt et obijciunt nobis hanc propositionem. Nos errasse. Quia igitur multa et varia sunt iudicia et quaedam diversa, remissionem petunt quam denegare ipsis non possumus, praesertim cum definitio haereseos, quae per leges et veterem ecclesiam nobis proponitur, non eam spetiem prae se ferat, quod illos comprehendat et ad ipsos spectet.

Et profecto ea quae prius attigi et quaedam capita controversiae quae supra deduxi, satis ostendunt, non sine causa aut praeter aequitatem multis rebus quae nunc in usu sunt contradici. Ubi alias ad examen ventum fuerit manifeste et liquido cognoscere licebit in quibus erratum et abusus irrepperit.

Quod ad alterum articulum attinet, dico, etiamsi haereses essent, tamen quatenus in erroribus et opinionibus religionis versantur, non licere nec per leges, nec per rationes in eas extremo supplicio animadvertere. Non loquor hic de Atheis et blasphemis qui contra suam ipsorum conscientiam pertinaciter Deo rebellant. Neque enim ignoro qua poena isti digni sint, fateorque sceleratos istos impostores, et omnes qui sub pretextu religionis seditiones et tumultus movent, qui latrocinia exercent et aliena rapiunt, aliaque crimina designant ab ipsis legibus damnata, parimodo supplicio afficiendos esse.

De simplici haeresi aliis sceleribus non gravata mihi sermo est, quae tantum in falsa opinione absque dolo malo et fraude consistit,

sed tantum cor hominis totum possedit. Atque hic citare possem conditionem illam, quae omnibus legibus addi solet crimina vindicantibus, si sciens dolo malo fecit.

Sed ad species descendamus et consideremus quid principum Christianorum leges et veteris ecclesiae iudicia hac de re statuant.

Metaphora qua Dominus Cancellarius usus est de aegroto et medico, saepius in ore Christianorum fuit haeresibus grassantibus, sed barbarum et crudele remedium est quod non sanat sed occidit.

Objici mihi posset, Corpus, non membrum aliquod curandum esse. At si ratio iniri posset, quod utrumque servaretur, non video quare ea utendum non sit.

Nimis longum esset omnes rationes commemorare quas veteres in medium adduxerunt, ad flectandos nos ad talem moderationem. Sed ad propositum medicamenti D. Augustinus saepius habet hanc propositionem, Haereticos esse velut furiosos qui sunt ligandi vel lethargicos qui sunt excitandi non autem occidendi. Haec causa est, quod nobis illud displiceat.

Et quia sanctus ille vir cum Donatistis et Manicheis pugnans hanc quaestionem plene et tanquam ex professo tractat, dignus est qui prae reliquis omnibus audiat, praesertim cum habeat caeteros omnes ipsi consentientes.

Fatetur quidem se aliquando in ea fuisse sententia non invadendos esse haereticos, et quod sufficeret uti verbis et institutione. Postquam autem expectatione cognovit, bonum et utile esse, post institutionem, etiam castigatione uti, ad damnandos inobedientes, primam sententiam mutavit. Verum ad eum modum restringit alteram sententiam ne castigatio sit capitalis imo etiam sine laesione corporis. Et alias se ipsum declarat, quod mallet in priorem sententiam concedere et quod impunitas hac in parte aequior et justior sit quam ultimum supplicium.

Protestatur etiam palam et aperte malle se ab haereticis (quales tum temporis fuerunt Donatistae) occidi quam eos occidere.

Quia igitur D. Augustinus hac in parte valde laboravit, ut criminalium actionum executiones, quando capitales sunt, impediret, non minus recte fecerunt eius aetatis episcopi alii, inter quos praecipui sunt D. Ambrosius et D. Martinus.

Et huius quidem historia valde notabilis est et cum ad Galliam pertineat eo commendatior nobis esse debet, nec video quamobrem illi pro sufficientibus agnosci non debeant. Legantur autem quae Sulpitius Severus Gallus de S. Martino scripta reliquit. Et quid D. Ambrosius senserit ac statuerit in epistola quadam ad Valentinianum, taceo iam caetera chronica et plus animadvertetur et intelligetur quam ego hoc loco pronuntiare audeam. In summa quamvis Priscillianus scelestissimus fuerit haereticus, tamen episcopi qui

occidere eum constituerant in Comitiiis Trevirensibus autoritate principis Maximij ab ecclesia excommunicati sunt.

Si quis autem contentus esse nolit D. Augustino, Ambrosio, Martino, precipuis tribus Doctoribus et episcopis Latinae Africanae, Italicae et Gallicae ecclesiae adducam alios orientales, qui sententiae eiusdem et autoritatis non minoris sunt. D. Chrysostomus parabolam de zizaniis explicans non satis declarat suam sententiam.

Non iam disputo utrum eius expositio praedictae parabola ad propositum faciat, hoc unum volo, quod aperte sentiat idem quod nos affirmamus. Quid de S. Cyrillo dicemus? Julianus apostata, ut Christianos maxima calumnia gravaret, falso dixit, quod eos qui religionem ipsorum aversantur interficiant. Cyrillus autem respondens, illud pernegat, et utitur retorsione affirmans adversarios talia facere, quorum christianos falso accusarent.

Possem recitare multas praeclaras sententias veterum qui contra haereticos scripserunt et excommunicaverunt eos, noluerunt autem hoc ad mortem eorum trahi, sed protestati sunt contrarium.

Non excidit mihi [quid] Epiphanius de episcopo quodam recitat, cum mentio fieret de quodam insano scelesto qui in manus magistratus inciderat. Memini etiam quid Christianus Magistratus decreverit, non habita ratione sententiae episcopi et quomodo demonstravit episcopo non pr[a]ecedendum furiose, ut tandem Episcopus ex parte agnosceret choleram suam maiorem quam par esset.

Hic cernere licet quales gesserint viri illi quos ecclesia veneratur et quid adhuc mereantur eo nomine, quod cum haereticis ferissimis et insanissimis negotium ipsis fuit.

Objici mihi posset, me tantum verba facere de bonis illis veteribus episcopis quibus conveniebat mansuetudo, lenitas, et commiseratio. Et quod consueverint etiam pro raptoribus et furibus intercedere, sed hoc magistratui qui gladium gerit adversari.

Ad hoc respondeo, commemoratos episcopos etiam allegare leges magistratus, quod non sint rigidiores.

Replicabitur autem in Codice Justiniano, Tit. de Haeret., duos inveniri qui mentionem faciant extremi supplicii.¹

Non autem insistam commemorando et demonstrando contra quos haereticos hae leges latae sint, sed hoc dicam quod attinet ad ea quae ibi de ultimo supplicio inseruntur, falsariam esse additionem. Et ut verum esse quod initio dixi demonstretur, origo legis quae in codice Theodosiano est inspiciatur.² Quod autem ad alterum attinet

¹ Codex 1. 5. 5. 1 and 1. 5. 8. 11.

² The words "et ultimo supplicio tradendis" which Codex 1. 5. 5. 1 applies to the Manicheans are not to be found in the original form of this law in the Theodosian Code—Theo. 16. 5. 6. 5. Here again the Cardinal is clearly indebted to Baudouin, *De Institutione Historiae Universae*, p. 123.

videantur acta Concilii Chalcedonensis; animadvertetur meam admonitionem non esse inanem.¹

Caeterum omissa ista questione, et ut redeam ad hoc quod ab initio dixi ut de bona concordia constituenda ineatur ratio, et ut Synodus vel congregatio quae ad 20 Julij expectatur sibi bene correspondeat et consentiat, nihil aliud deest, quam ut huic rei occurratur, per formulam aliquam, quae huic congregationi presentari possit, et quae ita se habeat ut quemvis puderet, huic se facile opponere.

¹ The phrase in Codex 1. 5. 8. 11. concerning the "ultimum supplicium" is not to be found in the *Authenticum*. For Chalcedon see Mansi, 7, 502.

*Eucharistic Formulæ employed at the Colloquy of Poissy,
September–October, 1561*

1. Definitions of the Council of Trent, Session XIII, October 11th, 1551.¹

Canon 1. Si quis negaverit in sanctissimæ eucharistiæ sacramento contineri vere, realiter et substantialiter corpus et sanguinem, una cum anima et divinitate Domini nostri Jesu Christi ac proinde totum Christum, sed dixerit tantummodo esse in eo ut in signo, vel figura, aut virtute, anathema sit.

Canon 2. Si quis... negaverit mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem totius substantiæ panis in corpus, et totius substantiæ vini in sanguinem, manentibus dumtaxat speciebus panis et vini, quam quidem conversionem Catholica Ecclesia aptissime transubstantiationem appellat, anathema sit.

2. Three extracts from Calvin's *In Heshusium* used by d'Espence on September 24th, 1561.

(a) Ubique admitto substantialiter nos pasci Christi carne et sanguine, modo facessat crassum de locali commixtione commentum.

(b) Substantialiter Christi carnem et sanguinem nobis offerri et exhiberi in coena... hinc conficitur neque de præsentia, neque de esu substantiali, sed tantum de utriusque modo esse certamen, quia localem præsentiam non admittimus.

(c) Omnino isthaec piis tenenda est regula, ut quoties symbola vident a Domino instituta, illic rei signatae veritatem adesse certo cogitent ac sibi persuadeant.

[Given by d'Espence in his *Apologie*, p. 478.]

3. Lutheran articles put forward for Beza's signature by the Cardinal of Lorraine on September 24th.

(a) The 10th article of the Confession of Augsburg.²

(i) *The original article of 1530.*

De coena Domini docetur, quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint et distribuantur vescentibus in coena Domini, et improbantur secus docentes.

¹ These canons were not quoted at Poissy. I give them here solely for the purpose of comparison.

² It is impossible to discover which version the Cardinal used. Probably the original. That of 1540 will be seen to be much more Bucerian.

(ii) *From the Apology of the Augsburg Confession.*

Decimus articulus approbatus est, in quo confitemur nos sentire quod in coena Domini vere et substantialiter adsint corpus et sanguis Christi, et vere exhibeantur cum illis rebus quae videntur pane et vino, his qui sacramentum accipiunt.

(iii) *The 10th article of the 1540 version.*

De coena Domini docetur, quod cum pane et vino vere exhibeantur corpus et sanguis Christi, vescentibus in coena Domini.

(b) Article on the Eucharist from the Württemberg Confession.

De substantia Eucharistiae sentimus et docemus quod verum corpus Christi et verus sanguis ejus in Eucharistia distribuuntur, et refutamus eos qui dicunt panem et vinum Eucharistiae esse tantum absentis corporis et sanguinis Christi signa. Credimus etiam omnipotentiam Dei tantam esse, ut possit in Eucharistia substantiam panis et vini vel annihilare vel in corpus et sanguinem Christi mutare.

[From Heppe, *Die Bekenntnisschriften der altprotestantischen Kirche Deutschlands*, pp. 24, 189, 346 and 514.]

4. Formula composed by the Cardinal of Lorraine on September 24th at the Queen-Mother's request, and given to Beza.

Firma fide confitemur in augustissimo sacramento Eucharistiae verum Christi corpus et verum Christi sanguinem vere, realiter et substantialiter esse et existere, exhiberi et sumi a communicantibus.

[*Discours de d'Espence*, p. 62; *Journal du Colloque*, de Ruble, p. 37, with wrong title; d'Espence, *Apologie*, p. 466. *La Place*, p. 192, gives a French version, substituting "sacramentellement" for "substantiellement", in which he is followed by the *H.E.*, by *La Popelinière*, and, *inter alios*, by Salig, *Historie der Augsbургischen Confession*. See d'Espence's strictures on this change, *Apologie*, p. 467.]

5. Modification of No. 4 made at St Germain on September 25th by Beza, des Gallars, d'Espence and the Bishop of Valence.

Credimus in usu coenae Dominicae vere, re ipsa, substantialiter, seu in ipsa substantia, verum corpus et verum sanguinem Christi spirituali et ineffabili modo esse, exhiberi, sumi a fidelibus communicantibus.

[*Discours de d'Espence*, p. 63; d'Espence, *Apologie*, p. 467; *H.E.* 1, 672.]

6. Modification of No. 4 made at Poissy on September 25th.

Credimus et confitemur in augustissimo Eucharistiae sacramento esse et existere verum Christi corpus natum ex Maria Virgine, et de

manibus sacerdotum, eorum ore consecratum, exhiberi et sumi a communicantibus.

[H.E. I, 671.]

7. Declaration of Faith read out by Beza on September 26th.

Nous disons que nostre seigneur Jésus-Christ est en l'usage de la Sainte Cène, en laquelle il nous présente, donne et exhibe véritablement son corps et son sang par l'opération du Saint Esprit, et que nous recevons, mangeons et bevons spirituellement et par foy ce propre corps qui est mort pour nous, et ce propre sang qui a esté respandu pour nous, pour estre os de ses os, et chair de sa chair, à fin d'en estre vivifiés, et percevoir tout ce qui est requis pour nostre salut.

[La Place, p. 195, from the *Relation des Calvinistes*.]

8. Personal declaration of Faith made by Peter Martyr on September 29th.

Respondeo pro mea parte Christi corpus non esse vere ac substantialiter alibi quam in coelo; non tamen inficior Christi corpus verum et sanguinem illius verum, quae pro salute humana tradita sunt in cruce, fide atque spiritualiter percipi a fidelibus in sacra coena.

[*Discours de d'Espence*, p. 66; *Journal du Colloque*, de Ruble, p. 40; the H.E. I, 675. In Baum, *op. cit.* Anhang, pp. 84-5, is a more developed form, some five times as long.]

9. Formula proposed by the Calvinists—Beza, Peter Martyr, Malorat, des Gallars and de L'Espine—on September 30th, and condemned at Poissy on October 2nd.

En tant que la foy rend présentes les choses promises, et que cette foy prend véritablement le corps et le sang de nostre seigneur Jésus Christ par la vertu du Saint Esprit, à cet égard nous confessons la présence du corps et du sang d'iceluy en la Sainte Cène en laquelle il nous présente, donne et exhibe véritablement la substance de son corps et son sang par l'opération de son Saint Esprit, et nous y recevons et mangeons spirituellement et par foy ce propre corps qui est mort pour nous, pour estre os de ses os, et chair de son chair, affin d'en estre vivifiés et percevoir tout ce qui est requis à nostre salut.

[*Discours de d'Espence*, p. 66; *Journal du Colloque*, de Ruble, pp. 40-1; the H.E. I, 676-7. Compare with No. 7 above.]

10. Formula No. 9 remodelled by d'Espence and submitted, with the approval of the other four Catholics—the Bishops of Valence and Séz, Salignac and Bouteiller—to the Calvinists on October 1st.

Nous confessons que Jésus Christ en sa Sainte Cène nous présente, donne et exhibe véritablement la substance de son corps et de son sang par l'opération du Saint Esprit et que nous recevons et nous mangeons sacramentellement, spirituellement et par foy ce propre corps qui est mort pour nous, pour estre os de ses os, et chair de sa chair, afin d'en estre vivifiés et percevoir tout ce qui est requis à nostre salut. Et par ce que la Parole de Dieu sur laquelle est appuyée nostre foy fait et rend présente les choses promises et que par cette foy nous prenons vrayement et réellement le vray et naturel corps et sang de nostre Seigneur par la vertu du Saint Esprit, à cet égard nous confessons la présence du corps et du sang de nostre Seigneur en la Sainte Cène.

[*Discours de d'Espence*, p. 67. Compare with Nos. 9 and 11.]

11. Formula No. 10 with Calvinist emendations (as) made on October 1st. Submitted to the bishops at Poissy on October 4th and condemned on October 9th.

Nous confessons...à nostre salut. Et parceque la Foy appuyée sur la parole de Dieu fait et rend présentes les choses promises, et que par cette foy nous prenons vrayement et de fait...en la Sainte Cène.

[See the *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 67. The version in the *Journal du Colloque*, de Ruble, pp. 41-2, and in the *H.E.* 1, 678, add "seu realiter et re ipsa" after "vrayement et de fait". There are also slight variations of little or no significance in this formula as it is given by Baum, Anhang, p. 84, and by La Place, p. 199, as also in the many MS. copies which are to be found in Paris, Stuttgart, London, Rome, etc.]

12. Catholic definitions of October 9th.

(a) The Reformation of Formula No. 11 in accordance with criticisms made by the theologians under the headings: "hérésie, autre hérésie, autre hérésie, fallace, insuffisance".

Nous croyons et confessons que le prestre ministre ordonné par Jésus-Christ au Saint Sacrement de l'autel consacre le vray corps et sang de nostre Seigneur qui sont sous les espèces de pain et de vin, et ce par la vertu et efficace des paroles desquelles Jésus-Christ a usé instituant ce sacrement. Et que nous recevons et mangeons le vray corps sacramentellement, spirituellement, véritablement toutefois, réellement et substantiellement à nostre salut, si par foy, avec preuve de nos consciences suffisante, nous nous présentons à la réception, autrement à nostre damnation. Et pour ce que la foy appuyée sur la parole de Dieu ne fait ni ne rend présentes les choses promises (car soit que nous recevions, croyions ou non, la parole ne

laisse d'avoir sa vertu) en cet égard nous confessons la présence du vray et naturel corps de Nostre Seigneur lequel recognoist non seulement les bons et vraies fideles, mais aussi les hypocrites mauvais et ceux qui n'ont la vraye et droite foy.

(b) Catholic confession of belief in the Real Presence.

Nous croyons et confessons que, au Saint Sacrement de l'autel, le vray corps et sang de Jésus-Christ sont réellement et substantiellement sous les espèces du pain et du vin, par la puissance de la divine parole prononcée par le prestre, seul ministre ordonné à cet effet, selon l'institution et commandement de Nostre Seigneur Jésus-Christ.

[These pronouncements of Oct. 9th are most conveniently seen in the *H.E.* 1, 680-5. See also de Saintes' edition: *Réformation de la Confession de la Foy que les ministres de Genève présentèrent au Roy en l'Assemblée de Poissy*, 1562. Also *Discours de d'Espence*, p. 70. MS. copies abound.]

(a) *Commendone to St Charles Borromeo, Nancy, January 1st, 1562.* (Barb. lat. 5798, copy.)

Partendo di Sandesir¹ intesi come il Cardinal di Lorena con gli f. 168 r.
fratelli dovevano quel giorno essere in Ansorville una lega lontano da Sandesir, dove io andai a ritrovarlo et fui seco un gran parte di quel giorno fin' al' hora di cena. Quello che io intesi da S.S. Ill^{ma} è che il Duca di Virtemberg l' ha pregato a volersi abboccar con lui, di che il Cardinal ha scritto in corte et n' ha havuto licentia dal Re. Andarà seco il S^{re} Duca di Guisa suo fratello, et da altra parte col Duca di Virtemberg verrà un figliuolo del Lantgravio, il Duca Volfango de Dipont,² et di più il Brentio, il Vergerio, et simili altri. Il luogo sarà Teberna,³ castello et residentia del Vescovo d' Argentina, a li confine di Lorena.

Di quello che io scrissi da Sandesir circa il Vescovo di Tr/oys⁴ f. 168 v.
S.S. R^{ma} m' ha detto il medesimo, et n' ha aggiunto come questo Vescovo ha renuntiato in favore d' uno che egli s' ha nominato, riservandosi 2000^m franchi di pensione, et una casa del Vescovado, et che la Regina et il Re di Navarra dovevano scrivere et raccomandare questa espeditione a S.S^{ta}, et che il Cardinale di Guisa come Arcevescovo di Sans et metropolitano di Troys haveva cominciato a formar processo contra detto Vescovo, ma poi haveva lasciato tutto il carico a Mons^{re} Ill^{mo} Legato,⁵ il quale procedesse et informasse S. Beatitudine.

De la Chiesa sua di Rens mi ha detto come ultimamente essendo in visitar per la diocese in un viaggio mando a invitar gl' Ugonotti di quel luogo che venissero a la sua predica, et glielo negorno con molte insolentia, et di nuovo chiamati che venissero a parlare al Cardinale non lo volsero fare; et se bene il Conte d' Hu Governatore de la provincia è nipote del Cardinale, et S.S. Ill^{ma} se ne è doluto seco, non se n'è pero fatto altro, anzi se il Cardinale caccia costoro de' luoghi dove egli ha la giurisdittione temporale essi si riparano subito ne' luoghi vicini che sono nel governo del detto Conte.

Del tumulto di Scialone⁶ S.S. Ill^{ma} mi disse di non haver' ancora inteso cosa alcuna, et che pur due hore primo gl' era venuto un servitore di questo Conte d' Hu, il quale era pas/sato da Scialone, f. 169 r.
et non gli n' haveva fatto parola. A me fu detto da persona la quale

¹ St Dizier.

² Wolfgang von Zweibrücken (Deuxponts).

³ Saverne.

⁴ Antonio Caracciolo (cf. above, pp. 291 note 1, and 420).

⁵ The Cardinal of Ferrara. ⁶ Châlons-sur-Marne.

referiva d'esser stato presente. Il Cardinale a questo proposito mi raccontò che il Vescovo di Scialone chiamato da S.S. Ill^{ma} a provvedere ad un villaggio de la diocese di Scialone qui vicino et tutto calviniano, detto Vosi era stato cacciato di chiesa a romor di populo concitato dal predicatore calviniano, et che non si vede via di punirgli, di che mostra grandissimo dispiacere, dicendo che non le pare che si possa ritrovare cosa più misera ch'esser costretto di vedere et tollerare continuamente così fatti disordini, et che questo l'aveva ultimamente forzato a partire de la Corte ancora che S.S^{tà} l'avesse essortato a non partire percio che egli conosceva di non potere operare altro ch'esser testimonio di quello che vi si fa, et di vantaggio gli conveniva ogni dì udir salmi et prediche degl'heretici sopra la stanza stessa dove egli habitava, con troppa indignità del grado che egli tiene, et che per questo similmente il Contestabile s'era già partito più volte, et così il Marescial di S^{to} Andrea, et che a gran ventura de' Cardinali se poteva reputare che vi ritornassero, come già aveva nuova che erano tornati, et qui laudò grandemente la bontà di questi due Signori, ond'io presi occasione di dirle che Nostro Signore per simili rispetto havea scritto et essortato S.S. Ill^{ma} / ch'è di tanta autorità et valore a fermarsi in Corte, et egli tornò ad allegare le ragioni sudetti, et di più che a lui come Arcivescovo di Rens con carico de molte chiese importava et premeva molto il periculo di quelle, sentendo quanto gl'heretici s'affaticavano per infettarle, et che poi venuto haveva chiaramente conosciuto la sua presentia esser più che necessaria, et che quando questo non fosse sarebbe molto volentieri venuto per un mese o due a Roma dove S.S^{tà} l'aveva invitato l'Agosto passato, et che sarebbe anche andato volentieri per un mese a Trento, ma che essendo hormai le cose negli termini ne' quali sono, questo solo breve viaggio a li confini di Lorena gli mette pensiero tanto che non lo palesa ma va intertenendo di settimana in settimana i populi con speranza del suo ritorno, ne perocessa di far tuttavia per la Lorena ancora quello che può di volere andare a Metz, dove gl'Ugonotti hanno già fabricato una chiesa o loggia loro, et che ivi et con prediche et con altre vie ancora cercherà di aiutare et confirmare quel populo, il quale dice essere assai buono, ma che tutto il male in quella città nasce da la guarnigione di Francesi, similmente degl'altri luoghi di Lorena mi disse che i populi erano molto catholici, et laudò grandemente il buono zelo et la religione del Duca et de la Madre, et de la moglie, ma non già / da' nobili, i quali per il più dice essere infettati et massimamente quelli che servono in corte. Si dolse poi apertamente che il Vescovo di Tull non aveva quella diligentia che doveva, et che ci fosse tanta penuria di curati per tutta Lorena, non vi essendo quasi un solo rettore a la residentia ma tutti mercenari.

f. 169 v.

f. 170 r.

(b) *Commendone to St Charles Borromeo, Pont-à-Mousson, January 11th, 1562 (ibid.).*

...che vogliano dimandare la nominatione del' abbatie di f. 174 r. Lorena.¹

Il medesimo giorno io partì di Nanci et partì ancora il Cardinal di Lorena il quale in più volte ch' io fui seco in Nanci mi ragionò lungamente de le cose di Germania et di Francia, specialmente circa l' assemblea de le due consiglieri per parlamento di Francia de la quale io scrissi al primo di questo. S.S. R^{ma} mi disse haver lettera di iiii di questo con avviso che fin' al' hora non s' era concluso alcuna cosa, ma che tuttavia s'andavano pigliando i voti, dimostrava pero di temere assai che non si concludesse a favore de gl' heretici. Vennero da quella corte mentre io fui in Nanci due gentilhuomini, il primo mandato, come dicevano, de la Regina a visitar il Duca et la Duchessa, pure esso Cardinal di Lorena mi disse come egli portava ancora lettere al Duca di Guisa suo fratello richiamandolo a la Corte, il secondo venne in più diligentia et come mi disse il medesimo Cardinale portava al Duca di Guisa nuove lettere del medesimo tenore de le prime. Nondimeno S.S. R^{ma} m' affermò che non vi ritornarebbe fin' a mezza quaresima, et che fra tanto andarebbe seco a Teberna ad abbocarsi col Duca di Virtemberg, al qual proposito io li disse come con questa occasione la potrebbe scoprire quanto si può sperare di questi Protestanti circo il Concilio, et che essendo lei di tanta autorità et prudentia gl' sarebbe anco potuto fare meglio capaci de la somma benignità et sincerità di Nostro Signore in questo negotio del Concilio. S.S. R^{ma} mi promesse di far quest' officio in ogni modo, et che di tutto quello che potesse ritrare darebbe subito avviso a S. Beat^{ne} per correrlo a posta. f. 174 v.

Io dimane spero essere a Metz, et seguìro il viaggio secondo che di Brusselle scrissi a V.S. Ill^{ma} a la quale...etc. Di Pontemosone a li xi di Genaro. MDlxii.

¹ Preceding paragraphs up to this point published in Ehse, VIII, 276-7.

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- C.U.L. Add. MSS. 4803, 4804. (Acton Transcripts.) Transcripts of the rather untrustworthy "Avvisi di Roma" of the Codex Urbinatensis, 1038, 1039.
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- II. Modena, Archivio di Stato, Cancelleria Ducale, Estero, Roma, Concilio di Trento, 110, xxii. This volume contains "Estratti" of the Bishop of Viterbo's dispatches to Rome for the period June 1560-April 1561. The originals are lost. A few of these Estratti were published by Ehses, as above; but there are plenty of points of interest in the unpublished portions. The same volume also contains letters of the Bishop of Fermo, nuncio in France in the first half of 1560. Also the *Relatione de Nichetto* (1561-2), largely published by Dr Šusta.
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III. Stuttgart, Staatsarchiv, Frankreich, büschel 15 *et seq.* From this source comes the important Rathschlag in Religionssachen of the Cardinal of Lorraine, published as Appendix VIII. (See the Cambridge Historical Review for 1927.)

IV. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale. The sixteenth-century copies of the letters of the Bishop of Angoulême, ambassador in Rome, contained in Fonds Français 3102 (other copies in Fonds Français 16038 and Cinq Cents Colbert 343), permit the important six months' gap to be bridged between those published in Ribier, *Lettres et Mémoires d'Estat*, vol. II, which stop in December 1559, and those published by Henry et Loriquet, *Séances et Travaux de l'Académie de Reims*, vol. XXVII, which start in July 1560. A number of other pieces, mainly in the Fonds Français and the Collection de Dupuy, have also been used.

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